Shirley Ashford v. Joshua C. Benjamin Dorothy Wiseman Jackson v. Joshua C. Benjamin Stevan L. Black v. James E. Blount, III - Concurring

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02A01-9408-CV-00175

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; December 4, 1995; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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James E. Blount, III, the appellant, is appealing a judgment from the Shelby County Circuit Court that found him in criminal contempt for his conduct during personal injury litigation involving the Jacksons and the Benjamins. The trial judge directed a verdict on liability in favor of the Jacksons, leading to a jury trial for damages, where Mrs. Jackson was awarded $35,000. After the verdict, Blount displayed a "thumbs down" gesture towards the jury and exited the courtroom before being excused, expressing dissatisfaction with the decision. A juror reported Blount’s comment that the verdict was a "travesty of justice" as he left. Following the jury's discharge, Blount confronted jurors in the hallway, vocally criticizing their decision and wishing them similar injuries in the future. Blount also clashed with opposing counsel, Stuart Breakstone, accusing him of unethical behavior, and physically pushed him multiple times during the altercation. The appellate court ultimately reversed and dismissed the contempt judgment against Blount.

The trial judge appointed Stevan L. Black as amicus curiae to investigate and prosecute a contempt citation against Blount for violating T.C.A. 29-9-102(1, 2, 4), which addresses willful misbehavior that obstructs justice, including actions by court officers and interference with court processes. Blount's motion for the trial judge's recusal was denied. The court found Blount guilty of two counts of criminal contempt for separate incidents characterized as "outrageous and willful," resulting in a $50 fine and 10 days in jail for each count, plus $5,000 in attorney fees to Black.

Blount's behavior was partly triggered by overhearing opposing counsel inform jurors about medical bills being covered by insurance. He confronted the jurors, claiming otherwise. The contempt was prosecuted under Rule 42(b) T.R.Cr.P., as the trial judge did not directly witness the incidents but was informed in a subsequent meeting.

Blount raised several issues for review: the trial court's authority to hear the contempt charges, the appointment of Black to prosecute, the sufficiency of the evidence for the contempt findings, and the appropriateness of the sentencing. The court's review of the contempt convictions is governed by Rule 13(e) T.R.A.P., which allows for reversal only if evidence is insufficient to support a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The court must view the evidence in favor of the prosecution, with Blount carrying a presumption of guilt after the trial court's ruling.

Blount's actions stemmed from his perception of an inadequate damages award for his client. His conduct included making a "thumbs down" gesture towards the jury, muttering discontent regarding the verdict, and leaving the courtroom abruptly before being excused. After the trial, he expressed his dissatisfaction to some jurors. The trial court found Blount in contempt based on three statutory grounds, emphasizing that contempt can only be punished for acts explicitly defined by statute. For a conviction under one statutory provision, evidence must demonstrate that Blount's behavior was willful and obstructed justice. The court referenced precedent, including United States v. Oberhellmann, which established that an "actual obstruction" must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring tangible effects such as delays or errors in proceedings. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Campolongo ruled that conduct must significantly disrupt proceedings to qualify as contemptuous. In this case, there was no evidence that Blount's actions disrupted the trial; at least one juror reported not seeing his conduct. The conclusion drawn is that, despite being inappropriate, Blount's behavior did not fulfill the requirements for contempt as outlined in previous rulings.

The appellant approached a female juror after the jury was discharged, expressing anger or sarcasm regarding her satisfaction with the verdict. The court cited Castellio, which concluded that similar actions did not constitute contempt since they occurred after the trial ended and could not obstruct justice. However, Blount, being an attorney involved in the trial, is subject to different standards and potential sanctions by the Disciplinary Board for professional misconduct. The Tennessee Supreme Court, referencing Winfree v. State, noted that contempt typically involves actions that hinder the administration of justice during a trial. The record indicates that Blount's actions did not delay or influence the jury's decision, as they only occurred after the verdict was announced and did not interrupt further proceedings. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to support a contempt conviction for violations under subsections (1) and (4). 

Regarding subsection (2), the determination of whether Blount is an "officer of the court" under the contempt statute is critical. While some federal and state courts do not classify attorneys as such for contempt purposes, the Tennessee Supreme Court has affirmed this classification, as demonstrated in Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co. The court recognized that attorneys are indeed officers of the court who must act in good faith. Further examination is needed to assess whether Blount's actions were related to his official duties with the court, but case law on this is limited.

"Transaction" is defined as the act of conducting business, involving negotiations and management. In the case of Robinson, an attorney faced contempt charges for false statements made to the court during representation of a client, with misconduct occurring before and after the lawsuit commenced. However, Blount's actions did not qualify as "official transactions," since his misconduct happened outside of direct court interactions and was not linked to his role as an attorney. Blount's inappropriate behavior toward opposing counsel occurred after the jury's discharge, including physical contact and accusations of unethical conduct, but did not obstruct justice or interfere with court proceedings as required by the contempt statute. This parallels the ruling in State v. Creasy, where inappropriate remarks made during a recess did not constitute obstruction as the court was not in session. Consequently, contempt convictions against Blount are reversed due to insufficient evidence supporting violations of contempt statutes. Although his behavior was condemned and deemed unprofessional, it does not meet the threshold for criminal contempt, highlighting that not all misconduct is criminal. The court emphasizes the need for professional respect toward the judicial process, and while Blount's actions are criticized, they remain subject to disciplinary action rather than criminal penalties.

T.C.A. 29-9-103 outlines the limitations on punishment for contempt, specifying that circuit, chancery, and appellate courts can impose a fine of up to $50 and imprisonment for up to 10 days, while other courts can impose a fine of only $10. Attorney's fees are generally not recoverable unless specified by statute, contract, or recognized equity, as established in Pullman Standard, Inc. v. Abex Corp. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees, reversed the trial court's judgment, and dismissed the case, indicating that the parties were not responsible for Mr. Blount's actions. Mr. Black participated at the trial judge's request. The court decided to tax the costs of the appeal to Mr. Blount, allowing for execution if necessary.