Paschal Hyde, Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences from a Davidson County jury for three counts of aggravated rape, three counts of assault, and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. He received life sentences for the aggravated rape charges, eleven months and twenty-nine days for each assault count, and twenty-five years for each attempted murder count, resulting in an effective sentence of life plus fifty years. Hyde raises several issues on appeal: 1) sufficiency of evidence for aggravated rape, 2) denial of his motion to sever offenses, 3) invalidity of certain indictment counts due to lack of specified mens rea, and 4) alleged misapplication of sentence enhancement factors leading to consecutive sentences.
The case involves a troubling history between Hyde and the primary victim, Nicole Bowman, who is also his stepdaughter. Testimony revealed a pattern of sexual abuse starting when Nicole was very young, including vaginal penetration and other abusive behaviors, often occurring when her mother was absent. The abuse was described as frequent, occurring approximately three to four times a week, and involved various forms of physical and sexual aggression. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the trial court's judgment after careful review of the evidence and claims presented.
The Defendant lived with Nicole until she was thirteen, after which he continued to visit her, especially on special occasions, pressuring her for sexual favors. Nicole never reported the abuse due to threats from the Defendant against her and her mother. On one occasion, when her mother left her alone with the Defendant, he sexually penetrated her as punishment for not cooperating. At eighteen, after disclosing her relationship with a boyfriend, the Defendant physically assaulted her, demeaning her and forcing her into further sexual encounters. These abuses persisted until she was twenty-one. Following her high school graduation in June 1992, Nicole worked but was compelled to surrender her earnings to the Defendant, who claimed she owed him for her upbringing. He managed her finances, taking half of her paycheck and using her funds to pay for his own vehicle. During this period, the Defendant lived rent-free with a woman named Fanny Lee, who managed the household expenses, while restricting Nicole’s access to her own car and monitoring her whereabouts closely. Nicole's social life was severely limited, and she had no close friends.
Nicole began a relationship with Claude Rucker shortly before the events leading to the attempted murder convictions. She would secretly meet him after work, as she had to wait for her sister’s shift to end. The Defendant, who was unaware of this relationship, exhibited unusual behavior during a church service on November 6, 1994, where he confronted Nicole about her attitude after seeing her talk to another man, Lawon. This confrontation escalated at home, where the Defendant violently attacked Nicole, throwing her onto a chair, and threatened her regarding her car. After this incident, Nicole sought police assistance but did not initially pursue a warrant and opted to stay with Rucker.
The following day, the Defendant drove Nicole to work against her wishes. At work, Rucker confronted the Defendant about his relationship with Nicole. The Defendant's initial calm demeanor shifted to anger as he accused Nicole of lying. Meanwhile, at Lockheed, the Defendant attempted to force Nicole into his vehicle. Despite the intervention of her friend Erica Frierson and their manager William Brady, who advised the Defendant to leave, he remained for a time before eventually departing.
Claude Rucker and his sister encountered the Defendant while driving, during which the Defendant insisted that Rucker retrieve a woman named Nicole for a serious conversation. Despite Rucker's prior offer to facilitate a meeting, the Defendant continued to follow them. After a brief separation, Rucker and Nicole sought police assistance to obtain assault warrants against the Defendant. Later, upon arriving home, they spotted the Defendant hiding in Nicole's parked car.
The next day, the Defendant appeared at their house, claiming he was unarmed and questioning Nicole's respect towards her mother. Rucker retrieved Nicole’s purse, which contained police cards, indicating their intention to go with the Defendant. However, they first entered the house to call the police, prompting Rucker to lock the door out of distrust for the Defendant.
Upon the Defendant’s arrival, he forcibly took Nicole into a bedroom, demanding money and threatening her life with violent language. He subsequently confronted Rucker with similar threats. In response to these threats to their safety, Rucker and Nicole filed for warrants against the Defendant for threatening their lives.
On November 10, 1994, Rucker and Nicole left for breakfast, with Rucker parking his car out of sight to avoid the Defendant. As they sat in the car, the Defendant approached with a shotgun, prompting Rucker to reverse the vehicle. The Defendant began shooting, causing Rucker’s car to crash into a telephone pole. Rucker, injured and disoriented from blood loss, witnessed the Defendant preparing to reload before fleeing to seek help from a nearby woman.
Fanny Lee, who lived nearby, heard someone enter her home before leaving shortly before the police arrived. She noted the Defendant’s blue Blazer was not present, and mentioned he owned guns kept at her house, with a shotgun missing that morning. Rucker sustained multiple injuries from the gunfire, while Nicole suffered severe facial injuries, losing vision in one eye and requiring extensive medical care, including reconstructive surgery.
During the trial, Nicole read letters indicating a troubled relationship with the Defendant, suggesting past abuse and thoughts of suicide. Her mother, Teresa Bowman, testified for the Defendant, acknowledging some financial control he exerted over her but denying knowledge of any sexual abuse. However, she later admitted understanding that Nicole's letters implied abuse. The Defendant provided a different narrative, claiming he carried the shotgun for protection and was merely trying to retrieve Nicole at the request of her mother, while asserting self-defense against an alleged attack by Erica Frierson.
On November 9th, the Defendant visited Rucker’s house to check on Nicole, feeling threatened by Rucker, who had warned him against confrontation. Rucker was dating Nicole and allegedly sold drugs. The Defendant kept Nicole’s car, which had been broken into, at his home, where he cleaned it and repaired the brakes, discovering marijuana inside. After confronting Nicole about the marijuana and a cellular bill she owed, the Defendant returned to Rucker's house on November 10th. Observing Rucker in a car without Nicole, he perceived a threat and shot at Rucker's vehicle, then left the scene in another vehicle. He surrendered to authorities three days later.
During cross-examination, the Defendant denied controlling Nicole, asserting she willingly entrusted him with her money. He admitted living without paying rent at Fanny Lee’s house and acknowledged using his own funds for gambling, while rejecting claims of coercing others for money. He denied derogatory remarks towards Nicole, any physical abuse beyond a couple of instances, and maintained that all allegations were fabricated, despite admitting to having assaulted her. The shooting was claimed to be accidental, with the Defendant stating he fired once, despite two holes found in the windshield.
In January 1995, a grand jury indicted the Defendant on multiple counts, including assault and attempted murder. An April 1995 superseding indictment added aggravated rape charges, though several were dismissed due to the statute of limitations. The remaining charges, including three counts of aggravated rape from 1979 to 1981 and counts related to the November 1994 incident, were tried. The Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, three counts of assault, and two counts of attempted first-degree murder, leading to an appeal of both his convictions and sentences.
The Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his guilty verdicts for aggravated rape, but the Court identifies a plain error that prevents a thorough review of the evidence. Specifically, the State failed to elect the specific offenses for which it sought conviction regarding multiple incidents of aggravated rape occurring in 1979, 1980, and 1981. Although the Defendant did not raise this issue on appeal, the Court can recognize plain errors affecting substantial rights at any time, as per Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The Defendant had requested a bill of particulars, which did not clarify the charges sufficiently. During the review, it became evident that some trial proceedings were not transcribed, prompting the Court to allow the parties to supplement the record and submit additional briefs concerning the State's failure to elect offenses.
The State acknowledged the error but claimed it was harmless; however, the Court disagreed, referencing the Burlison v. State case, which establishes that in sexual assault cases with multiple incidents, the State must elect specific offenses for conviction by the close of its case-in-chief. The Court noted that the election requirement serves three purposes: aiding the Defendant's preparation for defense, protecting against double jeopardy, and ensuring a unanimous jury verdict. While the latter concern is paramount, the Court observed that the election at the close of the State's proof does not significantly assist the Defendant's defense preparation, and double jeopardy protections are already in place for the charged offenses. Ultimately, the Court emphasized the constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict as a critical factor in its decision.
In State v. Shelton, the defendant was charged with aggravated rape, and testimony regarding the defendant's behavior during the indictment's timeframe was deemed relevant and admissible. However, the trial court improperly allowed this evidence without requiring the State to elect specific incidents, as mandated by Burlison, leading to a potential "patchwork verdict," which the Tennessee Supreme Court cautioned against in Tidwell. The court emphasized the necessity of ensuring a unanimous jury verdict, particularly when multiple incidents are presented without clear differentiation among counts. The victim's testimony indicated repeated acts of sexual assault over several years, but lacked specificity about individual incidents. This generality exemplified the "grab bag" theory, where the jury could improperly assume that if multiple offenses were proven, at least one for each year could be counted as aggravated rape. The court recognized the abhorrent nature of the defendant's actions but ultimately determined that the lack of electing specific incidents constituted reversible error, warranting a new trial, as the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The supreme court acknowledges the complexities in prosecuting sexual abuse cases involving young children, emphasizing that while evidentiary rules may be relaxed to assist young witnesses, constitutional protections for defendants must remain intact. The state must either limit witness testimony to a single incident or prepare the case to allow for a clear election of charges before jury deliberation. The court found that the state failed to elect specific offenses for conviction, which undermined the jury's ability to deliver a unanimous verdict and hampered effective appellate review of the evidence.
The defendant claimed that the indictment's allegations of aggravated rape were flawed due to insufficient mens rea. However, the court noted that a prior ruling (State v. Roger Dale Hill) was based on a criminal code applicable only to offenses occurring after November 1, 1989, and that the supreme court had reversed the Hill decision. The court determined that the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the charges and conferred jurisdiction to the convicting court.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not granting a motion to sever offenses. He was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated rape from 1979 to 1985 and other unrelated offenses from 1994, which were consolidated for trial. The trial judge indicated he would allow evidence to connect the offenses but would grant a severance if such evidence was insufficient. The court referenced Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, stating that offenses may be joined if they are similar or part of a common scheme, but a defendant is entitled to a severance unless these conditions are met.
Determining if the offenses tried together represent a common scheme or plan involves examining their evidentiary connections. A common scheme or plan can be classified into three categories: distinctive designs or signature crimes, larger continuing plans or conspiracies, and the same transaction. A continuing conspiracy focuses on the shared goal of the crimes rather than their similarities. In this case, evidence indicated that the Defendant maintained significant control over the victim, Nicole Bowman, from early childhood, exploiting her for sexual purposes and restricting her social interactions. He exerted this control even after moving out when she was thirteen, demanding money from her and her family, and enforcing strict oversight of her activities. Nicole's attempts to establish independence and relationships were met with violence and threats from the Defendant, culminating in his shooting her and her boyfriend when he perceived a loss of control. Despite the temporal distance between the offenses, they were linked by the Defendant's overarching desire to dominate and sexually exploit Nicole, reflecting a consistent and malicious intent.
Evidence of aggravated rapes was deemed admissible in the trial for assaults and attempted murders, despite general inadmissibility of evidence regarding independent crimes due to relevance issues and potential for bias against the defendant (Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)). The trial court allowed this evidence not to show the defendant's character but to establish his motive for the charged offenses. The defense argued that the assaults occurred while he was mediating a dispute and that his actions were protective. However, these claims contradicted the State's evidence, particularly regarding the intent necessary for attempted first-degree murder. The nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim was relevant to establishing hostility and intent, supporting the trial court's decision to admit the evidence.
Regarding sentencing, the defendant contested the application of enhancement factors and consecutive sentences. The appellate court must conduct a de novo review of sentencing challenges, presuming the trial court's determinations correct if it is shown the court considered relevant sentencing principles and facts (Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-401(d)). The review includes examining trial evidence, presentence reports, sentencing principles, the nature of the criminal conduct, and any statutory mitigating or enhancement factors.
The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for each of two attempted first-degree murder convictions, applying various enhancement factors under Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-114. For the attempted murder of Nicole Bowman (count twelve), the court noted the Defendant's prior criminal history, the particularly severe injuries inflicted, and the use of a firearm. For the attempted murder of Claude Rucker (count thirteen), the court applied similar enhancement factors, including the Defendant's lack of hesitation to commit a high-risk crime. The court found no mitigating factors. The Defendant contested the application of factor (6) regarding count twelve, arguing that it was an essential element of attempted first-degree murder. However, precedent allows for its application as the offense can occur without injury. Additionally, the Defendant challenged the application of factor (10) for count thirteen, claiming no bystanders were present. The State argued that Nicole Bowman's proximity to Rucker during the second shooting increased the risk, thus justifying the enhancement factor. The court concluded that the inherent risk to human life was applicable in both counts given the circumstances of the charges.
Nicole Bowman's proximity to Claude Rucker during the second shot does not elevate the risk of harm beyond that typically associated with attempted first-degree murder. There is no evidence that any witnesses were sufficiently close to the shootings to be at risk. Consequently, the trial court's application of enhancement factor (10) to count thirteen, concerning Rucker's attempted murder, was erroneous. However, other enhancement factors sufficiently justify the twenty-five-year sentences for both attempted murders. The trial court deemed the Defendant a dangerous offender, indicating a lack of regard for human life and a willingness to commit high-risk crimes, as defined by Tennessee law. Despite the Defendant's argument regarding his single prior aggravated assault, the court found that his ongoing pattern of abusive behavior towards Nicole Bowman and her family warranted consecutive sentences. The trial court's assessment that the sentences were proportionate to the severity of the offenses and necessary for public protection was upheld. The court affirmed the consecutive twenty-five-year sentences for attempted murder while maintaining concurrent sentences for assault, culminating in an effective fifty-year sentence. The convictions for assault and attempted first-degree murder were affirmed, but the convictions for aggravated rape were reversed, remanding for a new trial.
