Atlanta Casualty Company v. Margie Etta Fuson, Damon Lee Fuson and Shannon Nicole Fuson

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03A01-9507-CV-00232

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; April 3, 1996; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of Margie Etta Fuson and her two minor children in a declaratory judgment action initiated by Atlanta Casualty Company. The case revolves around whether an automobile insurance policy issued to the deceased Damon P. Fuson provides uninsured motorist coverage to his family after his death in a car accident involving an uninsured vehicle. The trial court found that the policy did indeed afford coverage to the Fusons, despite their not being named insureds, not being involved in the accident, and not owning the vehicle in question. The insurance policy had a limit of $25,000 per person for bodily injury and had already tendered this amount to the deceased's estate. The Appellant contended that it owed no further obligations to the Fusons under the policy, referencing Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201(b), which limits recovery to injured occupants of a vehicle. However, the trial court ruled in favor of the Fusons, stating that the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy provided coverage for the accident, thus granting their motion for summary judgment while denying any additional relief they sought.

Under the supreme court’s decision in Hataway v. McKinley, Ohio law governs the tortious elements of the case, allowing each survivor (spouse, children, parents) to have separate claims for damages presumed from wrongful death, as outlined in R.C. 2125.02(A)(1). For interpreting the insurance contract, Tennessee law applies, adhering to the principle that insurance contracts are constructed under standard contract rules. The court is obligated to enforce the policy as written, interpreting its language in a straightforward manner without forced constructions that could extend coverage beyond its intended limits. Any ambiguities in the contract are resolved against the insurer.

The policy includes an endorsement for Uninsured Motorists Coverage, which specifies that damages for bodily injury are payable to "insureds," defined as the named insured, family members, or others occupying the covered vehicle. The court finds the policy unambiguous and confirms that the appellees qualify as "insureds," entitled to recover damages for the bodily injuries sustained by the deceased, who is also considered an "insured" under the policy. Ohio law provides the appellees with distinct claims against the uninsured motorists, affirming their right to recover separate damages related to the accident.

Atlanta Casualty contends that T.C.A. 56-7-1201(b) eliminates coverage for the appellees under the current circumstances. The statute, as of 1992, establishes priorities for recovery under uninsured motorist coverage for bodily injuries to an insured occupying a vehicle not owned by them. It specifies that the primary coverage is from the vehicle in which the injured party was an occupant, and if this coverage is exhausted, the injured occupant may seek excess recovery from other policies, but only one excess policy can be utilized. Atlanta Casualty argues that since the appellees were neither "injured occupants" nor owners of an insured vehicle, they are statutorily denied coverage. However, the court finds the statute does not apply to the current case, which does not involve issues of recovery priorities. The court concludes that the appellees are entitled to coverage under the policy for the accident in question, affirming the trial court's summary judgment in their favor and dismissing the case. Costs are assigned to Atlanta Casualty Company, with provisions for execution if necessary.