State v. Quinton Cage

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01C01-9605-CC-00179

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; January 25, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Quinton Cage was convicted by a Montgomery County jury on December 2, 1994, of multiple charges including aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment. Following a sentencing hearing on January 13, 1995, he received a total sentence of 25 years for aggravated rape, 20 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 8 years for aggravated robbery, 3 years for attempted aggravated robbery, and 2 years for reckless endangerment, with the longer sentences running consecutively and the attempted aggravated robbery sentence running concurrently.

Cage raised several issues on appeal, including: the timeliness of written notice for the transfer hearing, the establishment of trial court jurisdiction, sufficiency of the indictment for attempted aggravated robbery, sufficiency of evidence for aggravated kidnapping and robbery, denial of pre-trial motion for expert assistance, quashing of a subpoena for state expert materials, admission of DNA evidence, and the excessiveness and propriety of consecutive sentences.

The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment after reviewing the record. The victim, Rajohnah Stephanie Stuard, testified about the events of April 1, 1994, detailing her abduction at gunpoint after leaving a retail store, instructions to drive to her bank to withdraw money under duress, and her strategic attempt to signal for help by writing "Help" on her check.

Stuard testified that after she drove behind a white building, Appellant forced her into the back seat and demanded she undress despite her pleas not to be raped. Following her compliance, Appellant sexually assaulted her and ejaculated. After the assault, Stuard took her clothes, moved to the front seat, and attempted to leave but was ordered by Appellant to hand over her money and purse, which she did, totaling approximately $350 along with her car keys. She then hid behind a barbeque pit until Appellant drove away in her vehicle. Afterward, she ran to a nearby house to call 911, and an ambulance transported her to the hospital. Throughout the incident, Appellant held a gun, which Stuard described as a black automatic with scrapes, and she believed it was real, stating she would have fought back if he had not been armed. Dwayne Turley testified that Appellant came to his residence in a white Ford Explorer on April 1, 1994, and that he owned the gun Appellant possessed, which he claimed was a pellet pistol he had discarded. Sergeant Robert Ott of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, responding to a dispatch regarding a white Ford Explorer, spotted Stuard’s vehicle on Interstate 24 at around 5:00 p.m. and initiated a pursuit, during which Appellant drove at speeds up to 110 miles per hour, weaving through traffic until crashing into a guardrail, flipping the vehicle and rendering it a total loss. Upon arrest, Appellant claimed he had been kidnapped by Turley.

Teresa Worley, a nurse at Clarksville Memorial Hospital, assisted Dr. Stephen Kent with a rape kit examination on Stuard on April 1, 1994. Dr. Kent noted the presence of a cloudy discharge in the vaginal vault that was consistent with semen. Subsequently, he performed a rape suspect examination on the Appellant at the Montgomery County jail. Joe Minor from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified that DNA testing revealed a match between the sperm found in Stuard and the Appellant's blood sample, with a statistical probability of one in 4,400,000 in the Caucasian population and one in 16,800,000 in the African-American population. The Appellant claimed that on his sixteenth birthday, he met Stuard, who invited him into her vehicle, and that they had consensual sex after visiting a secluded location. He acknowledged stealing Stuard’s vehicle out of revenge for a slap but denied taking her money, admitting to endangering the public during a high-speed chase.

The Appellant argued that the trial court should have dismissed the case or remanded it to juvenile court due to not receiving timely written notice for his transfer hearing, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134. The court had informed the Appellant's counsel of two available dates for the hearing, and after discussions, they settled on April 8, 1994. Written notice was provided on April 6, and the hearing took place as scheduled. The court concluded that any notice issue arose from the Appellant's choice of date, leading to a waiver of this argument. Consequently, the issue was deemed without merit under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a), which states that relief is not warranted for parties responsible for their own errors.

Appellant argues for reversal of his convictions based on the State's alleged failure to establish venue during the acceptance hearing. He acknowledges the absence of Tennessee authority mandating venue proof at such hearings but infers a requirement from Tennessee Code Annotated sections 37-1-134(a) and 37-1-159(d)(2). The court disagrees, affirming that section 37-1-134(a) requires the juvenile court to determine if the criminal court has "competent jurisdiction," but subsection 37-1-159(d)(2) does not necessitate venue re-establishment at the acceptance hearing. The trial court met the necessary determinations regarding venue. Even if a venue establishment was required, any failure was deemed harmless as Montgomery County was the proper venue, supported by constitutional rights for trial in the county of the crime. The State proved by a preponderance of evidence that the offenses occurred in Montgomery County, corroborated by testimony from Stuard during both the transfer and trial hearings. Appellant did not contest the propriety of the venue, leading the court to conclude this issue is without merit.

The appellant argues that his conviction for attempted aggravated robbery should be overturned due to an insufficient indictment. Under Tennessee law, aggravated robbery involves the use of a deadly weapon or an object that leads the victim to reasonably believe it is a deadly weapon. The indictment stated that the appellant acted with intent to cause aggravated robbery using a weapon designed to make the victim believe it was deadly. The appellant claims the absence of the word "reasonably" means the indictment only charged attempted robbery, warranting a reversal. The court disagrees, citing that an indictment is valid if it provides adequate notice of the charges to the accused, allows the court to enter a proper judgment, and protects against double jeopardy. The court emphasizes that indictments need not adhere to strict pleading standards and should be assessed with common sense rather than technicalities. A reasonable interpretation of the indictment demonstrates it sufficiently informed the appellant of the attempted aggravated robbery charge and included essential elements of the offense. Therefore, the court finds no merit in the appellant's argument regarding the indictment's sufficiency.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, asserting that the display of an inoperable pellet gun could not lead the victim, Stuard, to reasonably believe it was a deadly weapon. Under Tennessee law, these offenses require either the use of a deadly weapon or a display that creates such a belief. The court outlines that when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, it must uphold the jury's verdict, which credits the State's witnesses and resolves conflicts in their favor. The burden of proof lies with the Appellant to demonstrate insufficiency. The court emphasizes that it cannot reweigh evidence or substitute its own inferences for those of the jury. 

Despite Appellant's claims regarding the gun's inoperability, testimony indicates that Stuard did not have a chance to examine the gun before the offenses, as Appellant threatened her while holding the gun. The court notes that a rational jury could infer that Stuard believed the gun was real, based on her immediate fear and the circumstances of the encounter. The evidence was deemed sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that Stuard reasonably perceived the gun as a deadly weapon, rendering Appellant's claim without merit.

Appellant's pre-trial motion for state funds to hire a DNA expert was denied by the trial court, which was consistent with Tennessee law at the time, allowing expert assistance only in capital cases. Although Appellant cited State v. Barnett, which established that a trial court may provide expert assistance in non-capital cases if the defendant shows a "particularized need" due to due process concerns, he failed to demonstrate such need. The Appellant's arguments largely revolved around the legal entitlement to expert services without substantiating how an expert was necessary for his fair trial, referencing only the anticipated damaging testimony from the State's expert. The court determined this was insufficient to meet the "particularized need" standard set forth in Barnett, affirming the trial court's discretion to deny the motion based on undeveloped assertions. Consequently, the denial of the request for expert assistance was upheld, and the issue was deemed without merit.

Appellant argued that the trial court improperly quashed his subpoena duces tecum for documents held by the State’s DNA expert, claiming entitlement to materials that informed the expert's conclusions. However, the trial court had previously denied Appellant's discovery motions under Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, determining that the requested documents were protected as "work product." Appellant did not contest this ruling. Following the denial, he issued a subpoena for the same materials, which the State moved to quash. The court granted the motion, stating that Appellant could not bypass the protections of Rule 16 by utilizing a subpoena under Rule 17. The court emphasized that both rules must be read together and that Rule 17(c) cannot be used to procure documents not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(2). The trial court's decision to quash was upheld, affirming that it did not abuse its discretion.

Additionally, Appellant contended that the admission of DNA test results was a reversible error, arguing that it violated Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence due to the potential for unfair prejudice. The trial court's decision to admit evidence is largely discretionary and is not overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. The court found the DNA evidence highly probative in establishing the accused's involvement in the crime, particularly in the context of a rape case where Appellant had not yet acknowledged sexual contact with the victim. The probative value of the DNA evidence was not significantly outweighed by any prejudicial risks, leading to the conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence. Thus, this issue was also deemed without merit.

Appellant argues that his sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and reckless endangerment are excessive, alleging that the trial court misapplied mitigating and enhancement factors in determining the sentence lengths. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of sentencing issues, presuming the trial court's determinations are correct only if it can be shown that the trial court considered all relevant sentencing principles and circumstances. In this case, the trial court is found to have failed in this regard, leading to a review without the presumption of correctness.

For the especially aggravated kidnapping sentence of twenty years, the trial court concluded that no mitigating factors applied and that the sentence should be enhanced due to the exceptional cruelty shown to the victim and the severity of the injuries inflicted. While the appellate court agrees that no mitigating factors from Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113 were applicable, it notes that the trial court overlooked a relevant mitigating factor from Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305, which considers voluntary release of the victim as a mitigating factor. Despite recognizing this factor, the court assigns it little weight due to the absence of a deadly weapon in the incident.

Additionally, the appellate court finds that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factor (5) regarding exceptional cruelty. The court emphasizes that the trial court's basis for this factor—a threat to shoot the victim—does not meet the threshold for "exceptional cruelty" as defined by Tennessee law, which requires a level of culpability beyond that inherent in the crime. The threat made by Appellant came after a statement assuring the victim he would not kill her, indicating that such a threat is consistent with the nature of especially aggravated kidnapping.

The application of enhancement factors (5) and (6) was found to be inappropriate by the court. Specifically, the trial court's reliance on enhancement factor (6), which pertains to the severity of injuries inflicted on the victim, was flawed. Although emotional and psychological injuries can justify this factor, the State failed to provide expert testimony demonstrating that the victim's emotional injuries were "particularly great" compared to those typically suffered by victims of especially aggravated kidnapping. 

Conversely, the court determined that enhancement factor (1), concerning the appellant's prior criminal history, was applicable. The appellant had juvenile adjudications for theft, burglary, and sexual battery, which can be considered in adult sentencing. The seriousness of these prior offenses warranted significant weight for this enhancement factor. 

Despite errors in applying certain enhancement factors, the court clarified that such errors do not automatically result in a reduced sentence. It upheld a twenty-year sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping, deeming it appropriate given the significant weight of enhancement factor (1).

For the aggravated rape sentence of twenty-five years, the trial court found no mitigating factors applicable and initially applied enhancement factor (6) regarding the severity of injuries, which the appellate court also deemed inappropriate, paralleling its reasoning from the kidnapping sentence. However, the court noted that two other enhancement factors should have been applied for the aggravated rape sentence, leading to a conclusion that the trial court's application of enhancement factors was inconsistent.

The trial court's decision to apply an enhancement factor to Stuard’s sentence was based on the disruption of her normal life activities due to the fear stemming from her rape. However, no expert evidence was presented regarding the extent of her psychological injuries, leading to a conclusion that the State did not meet its legal burden to apply that factor. The court found that the trial court erred by not applying enhancement factor (1) for the aggravated rape sentence, especially given Appellant’s prior adjudication for sexual battery. Additionally, enhancement factor (7) was improperly disregarded, as the Appellant's actions were driven by a desire for pleasure, evidenced by his testimony regarding his feelings during the assault. Consequently, the appropriate sentence for aggravated rape was determined to be twenty-five years due to the application of two enhancement factors with no mitigating factors.

Regarding the sentence for reckless endangerment, the trial court identified no mitigating factors but correctly applied enhancement factor (3) since Appellant’s conduct endangered multiple individuals. Although Appellant contested this application, the indictment specified that only one person needed to be endangered, making it valid for the enhancement. The court concluded that the trial court should have applied an additional enhancement factor, recognizing the severity of Appellant's actions.

Appellant drove at 110 miles per hour in heavy traffic on Interstate 24, endangering his passenger, other motorists, and police officers, justifying the application of enhancement factor (1) for reckless endangerment. The trial court erred by applying enhancement factor (10) since high risk to human life is inherent in the offense. Consequently, the court determined a two-year sentence for reckless endangerment was appropriate due to the application of two enhancement factors without any mitigating factors.

Regarding consecutive sentencing for several serious offenses, including especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape, the trial court has the discretion under Tennessee law if statutory criteria are met. The court found Appellant to be a dangerous offender, indicating a disregard for human life, as evidenced by his high-speed escape in a stolen vehicle. Though the trial court did not explicitly apply the Wilkerson test for consecutive sentencing, the circumstances satisfied it: the severity of the offenses warranted consecutive sentences, which are necessary for public protection given the increasing violence in Appellant’s criminal history. The court noted Appellant showed no remorse and denied responsibility for his actions, supporting the need for consecutive sentencing.

The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.