Joan E. Hall appeals her conviction for criminal responsibility for the conduct of another committing first-degree murder, which resulted in a life sentence. She raises several issues on appeal: 1) alleged withholding of evidence by the State in violation of *Brady v. Maryland*, which she claims violated her due process rights and warrants a new trial; 2) the trial court's failure to grant a new trial based on perjured testimony from Natalie Romine; and 3) whether sufficient evidence exists to support her conviction considering the Brady violations and perjured testimony.
The court affirms the trial court's judgment. Witness testimony outlines events from August 1, 1995, when Hall flagged down Stan Golden, claiming her husband had been shot and was dead in the river. Danetta Marshall and her neighbor Michael Key, along with Key's family members, corroborated Hall's frantic statements about her husband's shooting, with observations of her distress and claims that "they" shot her husband. Chad Robinson also reported hearing a gunshot around the time of the incident, further supporting the timeline of events.
Johnny Simmons, a deputy from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department, responded to a call at 4:18 p.m. on August 1, 1995, arriving at Eldad Bridge by 5:10 p.m. He found the victim's body by the riverbank. Andy Cline, head of Crime Stoppers, videotaped the crime scene, which was later presented to the jury. Paramedic Mac Kidd arrived to find the victim had already been pulled from the river and noted a gunshot wound to the back of the head, with additional wounds indicating a possible entrance to the upper left quadrant of the body.
Mamie Ruth Hall, the victim's mother, testified about the victim’s family, including his two adopted daughters, one biological daughter, and twin sons. The victim had been married to the Defendant for seven years prior to his death and had recently been laid off from his job at Amana Refrigeration. Following the death of the Defendant's mother, her biological son, Richard Romine, moved in with them but had previously lived with Michael Romine in Ohio.
Mamie Hall described a good relationship with both the victim and the Defendant, recalling an incident where the Defendant jokingly threatened to kill her son. She had fished at the shooting location just days before the incident. After the victim's death, Hall heard the Defendant suggest that Richard Romine was responsible for the shooting, prompting her to hire investigator Larry Shavers to look into the murder.
Investigator Joyce McConnell responded to a 911 call at 4:15 p.m. on the same day and found the Defendant in a distressed state on her porch, claiming she feared for her safety and believed multiple people were involved in the shooting. The Defendant had left the fishing area briefly and heard her husband shout for her to run. Although she initially did not mention Richard Romine’s presence, she later indicated he had been with them while fishing. The Defendant was later interviewed at the Sheriff’s Department, where she was read her Miranda rights, and her recorded statement was presented to the jury.
Defendant was unaware of who shot her husband during a fishing trip. She heard her husband yell "Run Joanie" before hearing shots. Earlier, Richard Romine had been with them but was dropped off at a nearby intersection. In a handwritten statement to police dated August 1, 1995, Defendant recounted that Richard had threatened her daughter, stating he would kill her husband and blame it on her. A search of their home revealed no weapons linked to the murder, and the Defendant tested negative for gunshot residue. Richard Romine was charged with the murder that evening, with the investigation extending into early 1996, eventually leading to charges against the Defendant and David Michael Romine.
Kevin Duff, a life insurance claims examiner, testified that the Defendant received $84,692.38 in death benefits from a policy on the victim. During an interview, the Defendant reiterated that she and Richard had gone fishing together with the victim, and upon hearing shots, she found her husband deceased in the water. Tensions existed between Richard and the victim, with Richard having previously threatened the victim. After living with the Defendant and the victim, Richard moved to Ohio but returned to Tennessee in March 1995.
Richard, who discovered at age twelve that the Defendant was his biological mother, had lived with her and the victim, along with the Defendant’s two daughters. He noted initial conflicts with the victim, including an incident of abuse against Jenia and a dispute that led to police intervention. Richard admitted that weeks before the murder, the Defendant expressed a desire for the victim to be killed, showing him a Derringer handgun and indicating the urgency due to an insurance deadline. Richard eventually agreed to commit the murder, discussing plans with the Defendant shortly before August 1, 1995, while Michael Romine was present.
The Defendant proposed to Richard a murder-for-hire scheme, offering the victim's truck, $10,000, and health insurance payments in exchange for killing her husband. The initial plan involved Richard shooting the Defendant in the leg to stage a robbery, with no urgency to act before August 1, 1995, due to the victim's insurance policies being renewed. Changes to the plan occurred, eliminating Richard's presence during the shooting and the leg injury staging. Richard received instruction on loading a handgun and was given four hollow point bullets by the Defendant, with two loaded into the gun. He drafted a contract detailing the arrangement, including the provision of a gun, gloves, and an alibi by the Defendant, but she refused to sign it despite agreeing to its terms.
On August 1, 1995, Richard was picked up by the Defendant, equipped with the gun and gear for the shooting. Initially, Richard expressed concern that the victim was aware of their plan, which the Defendant denied. The plan called for Richard to shoot the victim near a river, but he ended up shooting him from behind after the Defendant distracted him. Following the shooting, Richard disposed of the gun and fled with an accomplice, Michael. They later paid a phone bill, where Richard confessed to Michael that he had killed the victim. After changing clothes and disposing of evidence, they returned to the Defendant's home and subsequently went to the hospital after learning about the victim's shooting.
During cross-examination, Richard acknowledged inconsistencies in his testimonies and previously misleading statements, including falsely claiming the Defendant had pulled the trigger. He later expressed regret for attempting to shift blame onto her in a letter dated April 26, 1996. Investigations led by TBI special agent Donna Pence began in October 1995, involving interviews with relevant parties and collection of evidence.
Michael Romine, the biological uncle and adopted brother of Richard Romine, testified about events leading to the murder of Richard's victim. In summer 1994, the Defendant (Richard’s mother) asked Michael if Richard could live with her due to issues between Richard and the victim. Michael returned Richard to Tennessee in February 1995, and later they moved into a trailer together. By summer 1995, tensions escalated as the Defendant expressed a desire for the victim to be removed, even formulating a plan for him to be shot during a fishing trip. Two days later, she showed Michael a .38 caliber gun and offered him $10,000 and a truck for the act. Although Michael went to the fishing site, he couldn't proceed with the plan. Subsequently, the Defendant claimed she was "playing around" but also mentioned poisoning the victim by adding poison to honey he consumed.
In late July 1995, the Defendant discussed a double indemnity insurance plan and urged Richard to shoot the victim, assuring him of a light sentence and promising to provide legal support. On August 1, 1995, she confirmed the shooting was to occur that day and provided Michael with $300 to create an alibi for Richard. After picking up Richard, Michael paid his phone bill at 3:43 p.m. and then returned to the Defendant's house, where Richard showered while Michael burned his shoes and washed his clothes. Michael later discovered bullets in the washing machine, which he initially disposed of but later turned over to public defenders.
Michael admitted to law enforcement that he had not told the complete truth to protect Richard. He identified a contract related to the murder found by Natalie Romine, Richard's wife, in Richard’s room post-funeral. After being indicted for accessory after the fact, Michael pled guilty to the charge, accepting a two-year sentence. Toxicologist Louis Kuykendall confirmed that the victim's coffee tested positive for cyanide, while no other drugs were found. Natalie Romine, who had minimal prior contact with the Defendant, learned of the victim’s death from her after the incident, where the Defendant claimed Richard was responsible.
The Defendant invited Natalie to the funeral of her husband, claiming she had no family, and upon her arrival in Huntsville, Alabama, discussed potential insurance money of $250,000 related to the victim's death. The Defendant described the victim negatively, stating she was trying to protect her son Richard. During the visitation, the Defendant provided inconsistent accounts of the shooting, suggesting Richard had been smoking marijuana beforehand. Following the funeral, she appeared to joke about the situation but later gave Natalie and another individual money for food and drinks. Natalie discovered a contract at Michael and Richard’s home that outlined a plan involving payment and assistance for committing murder. Michael attempted to hide the contract but later returned it to Natalie. During a visit to Richard at a juvenile detention center, the Defendant warned him not to disclose details about the incident. After returning to North Carolina, Natalie overheard discussions about the Defendant attempting to poison her husband and her request for Michael to kill him. The Defendant later tore up the contract, which Natalie preserved and eventually gave to Michael. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Charles Harlan revealed the victim died from two fatal gunshot wounds, with no drugs detected in his system. Although cyanide testing was not performed, Harlan stated he could detect it if present. The State concluded its case with this evidence. Investigator Jeff Bradford testified about the shooting investigation, noting that drug paraphernalia was found at Michael and Richard's residence, but the contract was not located.
Jim Cranford, brother of Ruth Hall, observed that the Defendant and the victim had a strong marriage, noting no inappropriate behavior from the Defendant during the funeral and believing she genuinely mourned her husband. Palmeda Taylor, a licensed psychologist, evaluated Richard Romine, determining he was not mentally ill and competent for trial. Richard acknowledged a level of insanity in committing murder but later retracted his confession, accusing the Defendant instead. He was described as manipulative, with average intelligence, poor frustration tolerance, and a propensity for overt anger.
The excerpt further discusses the legal principles surrounding exculpatory evidence as established in *Brady v. Maryland*, which mandates that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence relevant to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. The prosecution is also required to disclose evidence useful for impeaching witnesses. To establish a due process violation for failing to disclose such evidence, the following conditions must be met: 1) the defendant must have requested the information or it must be obviously exculpatory; 2) the state must have suppressed the information; 3) the information must be favorable to the accused; and 4) it must be material. The defendant carries the burden of proving a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence, focusing on whether the omission denied a fair trial. The materiality standard is based on whether undisclosed evidence could reasonably undermine confidence in the verdict, as clarified in *Kyles v. Whitley*.
Evidence is deemed material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have altered the outcome of a trial. The Defendant claims the State violated Brady v. Maryland by withholding exculpatory evidence, which she categorizes into three groups: written witness statements from Danetta Marshall and others, a lengthy sworn statement from Natalie Romine, and a TBI report from Special Agent Donna Pence. The legal precedent suggests that delayed disclosure may not invoke Brady protections unless it causes prejudice. The Defendant’s argument, although extensive, lacks sufficient citations to support her claims. The State contends that the witness statements are merely Jencks material, which are governed by the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellate court notes that the written statements of several witnesses are not part of the appeal record and were not preserved for review, limiting the court's ability to consider the Defendant's arguments regarding inconsistencies in these statements, which she asserts could undermine the State's narrative of the events surrounding the shooting.
The cross-examination of witnesses in the trial was notably limited, with Danetta Marshall being briefly questioned about a statement she signed indicating that a neighbor child reported a shooting. Michael Key was not cross-examined at all, while Adrian Key was questioned but not regarding specific timing. Aron Key also faced no cross-examination. Chad Robinson was questioned using part of his written statement about communication with his father. The Defendant had requested access to all witness statements before the trial, but the State did not provide these until after direct examinations had taken place. The record lacks evidence that the statements of the witnesses, including Danetta Marshall and others, constituted Brady material, as there was no indication that the delay in providing these statements caused prejudice to the Defendant. Consequently, Brady does not apply.
The Defendant claims that exculpatory evidence exists within a 69-page sworn statement by Natalie Romine, which was given to defense counsel after the trial commenced. While the Defendant references contradictions between Romine's statement and the testimonies of other witnesses, these contradictions are not clearly detailed in the brief. Notably, Romine's statement included negative remarks about her deceased husband made by the Defendant, which the Defendant argues conflicts with the testimony of Ruth Hall, the victim’s mother, who described a positive relationship between the Defendant and the victim. However, the Defendant does not clarify how a statement could be recognized as exculpatory based on subsequent trial testimony. Even assuming the prosecutor could foresee such contradictions, the cited instance does not meet the materiality standard established in Kyles v. Whitley.
Defendant claims that various statements made by Natalie Romine are exculpatory. Specifically, she references a statement suggesting uncertainty about whether Michael Romine was framing her or vice versa, asserting it fails the "materiality test" as it was presented to the jury. Another claim involves a part of Romine's statement indicating that Michael Romine was promised custody of Richard for his cooperation, which was also shared with the jury, thus not meeting the materiality threshold.
Additionally, the Defendant argues that Romine's statement about Michael being offered custody of the Defendant's children in exchange for implicating her is exculpatory; however, this information was similarly disclosed during the trial.
Moreover, the Defendant points out that Romine testified that the Defendant admitted to attempting to poison the victim, which contradicts the forensic pathologist's testimony. However, since this admission was presented at trial, it does not qualify as exculpatory evidence under the materiality test.
The Defendant also references Romine's assertion that Richard had conflicts with the victim, arguing it contradicts other witnesses' testimonies. Yet, the Defendant fails to cite specific records of this testimony, leading to a conclusion that it does not meet the materiality test for exculpatory evidence.
Overall, the document concludes that none of the statements claimed as exculpatory by the Defendant satisfy the materiality test as they were all presented to the jury during the trial.
The defendant claims exculpatory evidence based on several points related to Natalie Romine's statements and the trial testimony. Firstly, the defendant asserts that timing of events related to insurance coverage is exculpatory, contradicting Richard Romine’s testimony about recent insurance renewal. However, the jury was informed about the insurance details, and the claim does not satisfy the materiality test for exculpatory information.
Secondly, the defendant references a statement where Natalie Romine claimed that the defendant expected $250,000 in insurance proceeds, while trial testimony indicated she received $84,692.38. However, Natalie’s statement suggests the defendant believed she could receive nearly $250,000 through various assets, indicating no contradiction with trial testimony.
Thirdly, the defendant argues that information regarding the victim's infidelity and relationship troubles is exculpatory, citing inconsistencies with trial testimony. However, she fails to specify which testimony is inconsistent or identify the witnesses involved, thus not demonstrating that this information is exculpatory.
Additionally, the defendant cites a statement from Natalie Romine about Richard Romine threatening to kill the victim and blame the defendant. Still, the defendant had previously provided similar details in her own police statement, indicating no undisclosed evidence.
Lastly, the defendant points to a conversation with Natalie Romine in which she allegedly stated that the victim deserved to die, suggesting this as exculpatory evidence. However, the context and implications of this statement are not explored in detail within the provided excerpt.
The argument presented emphasizes the inconsistency of claims regarding the relationship between the Defendant and the victim, asserting that trial testimony indicated a good relationship without citing specific contradictory evidence. The Defendant's claim of exculpatory evidence relating to a statement made at a funeral home, suggesting that Richard Romine's drug use motivated the shooting, is rebutted by the fact that this information was already presented to the jury through Natalie Romine's testimony, failing the materiality test for exculpatory evidence.
The Defendant also argues that discrepancies in the description of a purported "contract" between Richard Romine and the Defendant, such as the number of pages and the condition of the document, constitute exculpatory evidence. However, no record citations are provided to support these claims, and even if contradictions existed, they do not meet the materiality test.
Additionally, a claim that Natalie Romine's statement included previously unmentioned actions related to Richard Romine's actions is dismissed due to the lack of record citations. The presence of drug paraphernalia found at Richard Romine's home does not satisfy the materiality test for exculpatory evidence either. Furthermore, the assertion that Natalie Romine directed Michael Romine to report the Defendant's involvement in the crime contradicts her trial testimony regarding her knowledge of the criminal justice system, but again lacks specific record citations. Overall, the evidence presented does not meet the criteria for materiality as defined in legal precedent.
Defendant claims certain information omitted from Ms. Romine's statement qualifies as exculpatory evidence. Specifically, Defendant points to Ms. Romine's trial testimony indicating that one of Defendant’s attorneys advised her to destroy a contract, asserting that this omission is significant. However, the court disagrees, stating that this exclusion does not render the statement exculpatory. Additionally, Ms. Romine expressed in her statement that at one time, she believed Defendant had no involvement in her husband's death, which could have been pivotal for impeachment and establishing innocence if known prior to trial. The court reviewed this part of her statement and found that the jury had access to similar testimony during the trial. Furthermore, Ms. Romine recounted an incident involving a police investigator suggesting bias against Defendant, which Defendant argues is exculpatory. The court notes this information was also presented at trial and fails to satisfy the “materiality test” for exculpatory evidence. Lastly, Defendant argues that a contradiction in Ms. Romine's statement regarding the alleged instruction to destroy evidence is exculpatory. The court highlights that Ms. Romine testified under oath about overhearing Defendant's conversation with her attorney, indicating that this testimony was adequately presented to the jury. Overall, the court concludes that none of the claimed omissions or contradictions meet the criteria for exculpatory evidence.
Ms. Romine testified that the Defendant's lawyer indicated he would send an associate to retrieve a contract, stating the associate would be in Raleigh, North Carolina, the following day. Any discrepancies between her statement and trial testimony were presented to the jury. The prosecution could not be aware of contradictions until the witness testified, and thus could not determine if the information was exculpatory prior to trial. It was concluded that the claims of withheld exculpatory evidence did not meet the "materiality test" under Brady v. Maryland. The prosecution's delay in providing a 69-page statement from Ms. Romine did not result in prejudice, even if the material were exculpatory.
Regarding the TBI report from Special Agent Pence, which was sealed during the trial and only unsealed post-verdict, the Defendant pointed out examples of alleged exculpatory information and inconsistencies with trial testimony. However, the Defendant did not specify where these inconsistencies occurred in the record. Most exculpatory claims overlap with Ms. Romine's earlier statement, and those that do not are not considered Brady material due to lack of significance. Nevertheless, the State erred by not disclosing parts of Agent Pence’s report after Ms. Romine testified, as it constitutes Jencks material, defined under Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure as a witness's written statement. The TBI report includes portions of Ms. Romine's written statement as well as a verbatim transcript of her oral interview, confirming the need for disclosure.
Agent Pence's report includes a written statement from Natalie Romine that should have been shared with defense counsel after her direct examination, as required by Rule 26.2. The prosecution cannot incorporate a witness's statement into a law enforcement report to circumvent this requirement. During a jury-out hearing, confusion arose regarding the disclosure of this report, with the district attorney acknowledging it as "Jencks material," which would only be provided after Romine's testimony. Defense counsel questioned the timing of access to the report, arguing it would aid in cross-examination. The court acknowledged the need for rules regarding disclosure but ultimately indicated that no specific rule entitled the defense to the report before the testimony.
A review of Romine's statement revealed minor inconsistencies, which were addressed during her prior sworn statement or trial testimony. The failure to comply with Rule 26.2 was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant also claimed the trial court erred by not granting a new trial due to perjury by Romine, who misrepresented her arrest history. Evidence post-conviction indicated Romine had more arrests than she disclosed, including a conviction for theft and other offenses. The State argued that even if this evidence had been available for impeachment, it would not have changed the trial's outcome.
The trial court holds discretion in granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, requiring the defendant to show: 1) reasonable diligence in seeking the evidence, 2) the evidence's materiality, and 3) that it is likely to change the trial outcome. In this case, the trial court denied a new trial despite the defendant's reasonable diligence in uncovering impeaching evidence related to witness Natalie Romine’s prior convictions. While this evidence could have discredited Romine's testimony, the court concluded it was not material enough to alter the trial's result, as Romine was not the sole witness against the defendant, and other witnesses provided substantial testimony supporting guilt. The defendant's claims regarding the insufficiency of evidence due to alleged Brady violations and Romine's perjury were rejected, with the court affirming that sufficient evidence existed to uphold the conviction. The judgment was affirmed by the judges involved.
