John Wayne Slate was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. He appealed, raising two issues: the propriety of the twenty-five-year sentence and the judgment that indicated an effective sentence of thirty-three years. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling but modified the sentence to a total of twenty-four years, comprising a consecutive three-year sentence and a concurrent five-year sentence. Slate's criminal history includes a prior conviction for first degree murder, which was later reduced to second degree murder following a successful appeal that cited insufficient evidence of deliberation. The trial court's remand required a re-evaluation of Slate's sentence under both the 1982 and 1989 sentencing guidelines, ultimately leading to the imposition of the lesser sentence as mandated by Tennessee law, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-117 and the precedent set in State v. Pearson.
The defendant in a direct appeal of his sentence claims the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors, neglected several mitigating factors, and did not review the trial transcript prior to sentencing. The state agreed that the appellate review was de novo, without a presumption of correctness, but maintained that the thirty-three-year sentence was justified. The de novo review encompasses an analysis of the trial and sentencing evidence, the presentence report, sentencing principles, arguments from counsel, characteristics of the offense, mitigating and enhancing factors, statements from the defendant, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation.
In the case of John Wayne Slate v. State, evidence indicated that the defendant shot David Jackson at his home and attempted to escape while awaiting trial. William Bailey, initially charged as an accessory, pled guilty after testifying for the defense. Key witness Glenda Hampton described events leading up to the shooting, stating she accompanied the victim to the defendant's home on January 30, 1988. She recounted a meeting where the defendant and the victim interacted amicably before tensions escalated, involving alcohol consumption and an argument between the victim and Bailey, which culminated in a confrontation between the defendant and the victim. Hampton's testimony highlighted the dynamics of the evening, including the atmosphere of conflict that preceded the victim's departure around 9:45 p.m.
Hampton testified that she felt scared during an argument between the victim and the defendant. As they attempted to leave, she turned to find the victim shot in the head while the defendant stood nearby with a gun. Although she did not see the exact moment of the shooting, she indicated that Bailey was near her, not the defendant. After the incident, Mrs. Slate urged Hampton to hide in a closet, where she eventually fell asleep and later awoke to police outside. The victim died a week later from a gunshot wound to the forehead.
The investigation revealed that the defendant and Bailey had fled to LaCrosse, Wisconsin, using false identities. Upon his return to Sevier County, a search of the defendant's jail cell uncovered a loaded handgun and escape plans. The defense claimed the shooting was accidental and presented testimony regarding the victim's history of conflict with Bailey. The defendant described the victim as being intoxicated and argumentative, noting that the victim had a small gun and that an altercation escalated, leading to the accidental discharge of the gun that struck the victim.
Bailey corroborated the defendant's account, explaining his long-standing issues with the victim and stating that he believed the victim was reaching for a weapon when he pulled out his own gun. Both men maintained that the shooting was accidental and recounted their actions following the incident, including Bailey's retrieval of both guns.
Sgt. Preston Romines testified that during his search of the victim's car after the shooting, he found only one beer can, contrary to claims of multiple cans. He confirmed that no spent cartridges or firearms were located in either the defendant's residence or the victim's vehicle. Investigator John Schmidt from LaCrosse County reported that the defendant admitted to disposing of the firearm used in the incident and claimed that the victim had the gun before it discharged when the defendant tried to seize it. The defendant did not mention taking a gun from Bailey.
During the sentencing hearing, the fifty-three-year-old defendant described his stable family life, having been married for seventeen years and maintaining close ties with his children. Since incarceration, he has earned his G.E.D. and accumulated three years of college credits. He recounted that the victim, a friend, visited his home to borrow money while intoxicated and mentioned being in trouble. After lending money, the victim returned later with co-defendant Hampton, both of whom were intoxicated. The defendant objected to the victim smoking marijuana, leading to a confrontation. He claimed that Bailey drew a gun, which prompted him to intervene. In the ensuing struggle, the gun discharged, accidentally shooting the victim. After the incident, the defendant called for an ambulance and asserted that he left the state out of fear and intoxication.
At the hearing, the defendant provided thirty-seven exhibits showcasing good behavior while incarcerated, including participation in educational and rehabilitation programs. Despite this, the state presented evidence of four infractions during his time in prison, including possession of contraband and failure to report to officials. The defendant argued that these charges were dismissed. The presentence report highlighted a criminal history of multiple offenses, including DUI and assault, some committed while on probation. The defendant challenged the report's accuracy and noted dismissals of certain charges. Notably, he had maintained consistent employment from 1974 to 1988 but had a history of alcohol abuse.
The Sentencing Acts of 1982 and 1989 emphasize that sentences must be proportionate to the offense's severity, with a focus on fair and consistent treatment. Confinement is justified when less restrictive options have failed, and rehabilitation potential is a key consideration. Sentences should be the least severe necessary to fulfill sentencing purposes (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103). The state sought to enhance the defendant's sentence based on his prior criminal history, noncompliance with community release conditions, and the high risk to human life posed by his crime (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111(1, 8, 10); § 40-35-114(1, 8, 10)). The state retracted its enhancement request related to firearm use during the offense (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111(9); § 40-35-114(9)), instead opting for firearm enhancement under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-6-1710. The defendant acknowledged his criminal history but disputed the claim of noncompliance with release conditions and argued that the high-risk factor was already reflected in the offense. He presented mitigating factors, asserting he did not foresee serious bodily injury, that substantial grounds existed to justify his actions, and that his conduct post-incarceration should be considered. The victim was shot in the forehead during an incident where the defendant was intoxicated, and evidence indicated he tampered with the crime scene and fled the state. After returning to Tennessee, he attempted an escape and acquired a weapon. Classified as a Range I offender under the 1982 Act, the defendant faced a sentencing range of ten to thirty-five years for second-degree murder (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-109(a, c, d)(1)). The trial court found multiple enhancement factors and no mitigating ones, imposing a thirty-five-year sentence. The identified enhancement factors included the defendant's criminal history, noncompliance with release conditions, and willingness to commit a crime with high risk to human life, supported by evidence of prior alcohol and violence-related convictions that contributed to the murder. Enhancement factor (10) applies when the defendant creates a high risk to others, as established in State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
Factors (1) and (10) are deemed significant by the trial evidence and presentence report. The defendant claims he did not foresee his actions would result in serious bodily injury, but this assertion is undermined by the evidence supporting his second degree murder conviction. He also argues he acted under strong provocation, yet these claims are given minimal weight as the state's position was that the shooting was intentional and unprovoked, a theory the jury accepted. The defendant's assertion that unusual circumstances negated his intent to break the law is contradicted by his actions post-offense, including fleeing the scene, disposing of weapons, and attempting to escape custody, which do not support his defense.
Under the 1982 Act, the defendant's sentencing range is ten to thirty-five years. While similar cases can guide the determination of an appropriate sentence, each case is assessed on its own merits. Previous cases, such as State v. Galloway and State v. West, involved similar circumstances where defendants received sentences of twenty-two and thirty years, respectively, influenced by factors like prior criminal histories and the manner of the offenses.
In this case, three enhancement factors are present, with two heavily weighed against the defendant, who receives little consideration for mitigating circumstances. Despite showing potential for rehabilitation while incarcerated, the court concludes a twenty-eight year sentence is warranted. Additionally, due to the use of a firearm in the commission of the crime, a five-year enhancement is applied, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty-three years.
The defendant is classified as a Range I offender under the 1989 Act, with a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-five years for a Class A felony. The starting point for the sentence is the minimum of fifteen years, adjusted based on enhancement and mitigating factors. In this case, the trial court found four applicable enhancement factors, leading to an increase in the sentence to twenty-four years, one year less than the maximum. Despite the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, the weight of the enhancement factors necessitated a near-maximum sentence. Under the 1982 Act, the calculated sentence would have been thirty-three years, but the lesser sentence of twenty-four years is imposed per legal guidelines.
The judgment form erroneously included special conditions that exceeded the remand order. Specifically, it incorrectly stated that the sentence was an effective thirty-three years due to consecutive sentences, including a three-year sentence for attempted escape and a five-year concurrent sentence for possession of a firearm while incarcerated. The firearm enhancement factor mentioned does not apply under the 1989 Act. The judgment should accurately reflect a Range I, twenty-four year sentence for second degree murder, with a consecutive three-year sentence for attempted escape and a concurrent five-year sentence for firearm possession.
