Douglas E. Samuelson, as the natural father and personal representative of Kevin L. Samuelson, appealed a wrongful death case following the dismissal of Dr. Mark S. Totty from the lawsuit. Kenneth L. Samuelson died of pneumonia at age 28 after consulting several medical practitioners and visiting Donelson Hospital. The trial, which commenced on April 17, 1995, involved claims against multiple defendants, including Donelson Hospital and Dr. Totty.
Prior to the trial, Dr. Totty's counsel sought to exclude the plaintiff's expert witness, arguing that the expert did not meet the statutory qualifications under Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(b). The trial judge ruled against the plaintiff, determining that the expert's testimony would not aid the jury and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Totty, dismissing him from the case. The trial proceeded against the remaining defendants, resulting in a jury verdict attributing 51% fault to one defendant and 49% to the decedent.
After the verdict, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside Dr. Totty's dismissal, supported by a new expert affidavit, but this motion was denied. The plaintiff later certified full satisfaction of the judgment against the other defendant and appealed the dismissal of Dr. Totty, asserting that the expert was indeed qualified and that procedural requirements were not followed. The appellee contended that the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the jury's fault allocation due to having accepted the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, deciding that the jury's finding of fault was binding on the plaintiff.
Res judicata, established in Shelley v. Gipson, asserts that a final judgment from a competent court conclusively determines the rights and facts at issue for the involved parties in subsequent cases. In contrast, collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of specific facts determined in a prior case, requiring identity between the parties or their privies, as noted in Blue Diamond Coal v. Holland-America Ins. Co. However, there are exceptions where a judgment can bind a different party if the same issues were litigated. The Cantrell v. Burnett case illustrates this, where a jury's finding on vehicle defectiveness was held conclusive against the manufacturer despite different defendants. The significance of allowing only one opportunity for litigation on the same cause of action is emphasized, as discussed in Loveman Co. v. Bayless. Additionally, Hammons v. Walker Hauling Co. clarified that a jury's specific finding binds the plaintiff in future suits against different defendants. The distinction between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel was recognized in Algood v. Nashville Machine Co., with a preference for the latter.
Privity in this context refers to the legal connection between parties involved in a judgment, specifically regarding shared interests as established in Cantrell v. Burnett and Phillips v. General Motors Corp. Dr. Totty was deemed to be in privity with the other defendants concerning the decedent’s fault. The plaintiff's acceptance of the jury's verdict against the other defendants rendered that judgment final, making the findings on the decedent’s life value and fault percentage binding. According to TSC Industries, Inc. v. Tomlin, only a single recovery is permitted, and the jury's valuation indicates that the plaintiff has been fully compensated. The dissenting opinion's cases are distinguished as the plaintiffs in those cases did not collect on a judgment before pursuing additional defendants. The court asserts that a plaintiff cannot validate one verdict while challenging another, as this would complicate the application of comparative negligence principles. The court concludes that since the jury has determined the recovery amount, the judgment stands affirmed, with costs on appeal taxed to the appellant. Further proceedings are to occur in the Circuit Court of Davidson County.
