Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
State v. Paul William Ware
Citation: Not availableDocket: 03C01-9705-CR-00164
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; April 20, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Paul William Ware was indicted in 1994 on charges of felony murder and multiple counts of child rape. The State of Tennessee sought the death penalty. A jury in Hamilton County convicted Ware of felony murder and two counts of child rape, sentencing him to life without parole for the murder and concurrent twenty-five year sentences for the rapes, which were ordered to be served consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, Ware raised eight issues, including the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions, claims of withheld exculpatory information, the admissibility of mitochondrial DNA evidence, exclusion of evidence regarding a witness's alleged Satanic worship, perceived bias from the trial judge, cumulative errors warranting a new trial, the propriety of consecutive sentencing, and the trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial based on new witness testimony. The appellate court, led by Judge David H. Welles, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The background includes details of the victim, four-year-old Lindsey Green, who was under the care of her mother and others on the evening of her death, with significant events leading up to the crime outlined. Dye received a call from Ms. King at Ziggy’s, informing her that the victim's nose was bleeding due to an accidental bump from one of Ms. King's sons during play. Ms. King mentioned that the victim wanted her mother to return home, prompting Dye to agree to go back. Sylvia Kaye Dye and Jimmy Green share custody of the victim, who had been staying with her father the week prior but was visiting her mother on the weekend of the incident. The Defendant’s half-brother, David Ware, is also related to Sheila Sanders King, who referred to the Defendant as her “stepbrother,” despite no blood or legal ties. Danny Gaddis and Dye left for Ziggy’s around 7:30 or 8:30 p.m. and later departed for another bar around 10:30 p.m. After visiting another bar and a Waffle House, they returned to 414 Stringer Street around 2:30 a.m. During their absence, Ms. King’s sister, Carla Sanders, and her boyfriend Paul Crum arrived at the house, with Crum agreeing to babysit the children while Ms. King went out. Ms. King left around 10:45 p.m. with her father, later encountering the Defendant at another bar, where he appeared intoxicated. Ms. King, who had previously asked the Defendant to move out due to his disruptive behavior, invited him to stay at her house. Ron Anderson, a work acquaintance of the Defendant, observed him at the bar and noted a concerning comment from the Defendant about not harming his sister. Ms. King left the bar shortly after 2:00 a.m. and did not return until between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. Paul Crum was the sole witness regarding events at 414 Stringer Street prior to the victim's body being discovered. He arrived at the location around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. with Carla Sanders to deliver marijuana to the Defendant. After checking locations suggested by King, he found the Defendant at the Do Drop In Again and delivered the marijuana before returning to 414 Stringer Street. There, Carl Sanders, Carla Sanders, and Ms. King left Crum alone with the children while they watched movies. The victim and one boy fell asleep in the living room. The Defendant arrived around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., appearing intoxicated and unwell. Crum put the sleeping victim, wrapped in a comforter, to bed in her usual bedroom. Crum described the Defendant's behavior upon arrival, noting he made a sandwich, vomited, made a phone call, and then went to the bathroom. After the Defendant returned, he went into the bedroom where the victim was sleeping, leading Crum to believe he intended to sleep on the empty twin bed. While watching a movie, Crum heard two noises but did not regard them as significant. On cross-examination, he acknowledged the sounds could have been a car door shutting, occurring shortly before Dye and Gaddis arrived. When Dye and Gaddis arrived, Crum was calm and watching TV. About 15 to 20 minutes later, Dye inquired about the victim's whereabouts. After learning the victim and Defendant were in the locked bedroom, she attempted to open the door unsuccessfully and sought a knife from the kitchen. Crum assisted her and managed to unlock the door with the knife. Upon entering the room, Dye and Crum discovered that neither the Defendant nor the victim was in the beds. The bed where the victim had slept showed a wet urine stain and disheveled bedclothes. Crum found the victim’s clothing, including her top and shorts with her panties still inside, on the floor after shaking the bedclothes. Beige men’s pants containing the Defendant’s wallet were found between twin beds, alongside a pair of red men’s underwear whose owner was unidentified. Dye opened the adjacent utility room door to find the Defendant and the victim both nude; the Defendant was on his back and the victim was face down nearby. Dye observed that the victim was discolored, with a blue mouth, and he kicked the Defendant to elicit a response, but the Defendant did not move. Gaddis, reacting to Dye's alarm, rushed into the room and carried the victim outside, where they encountered Carl Sanders, who briefly grabbed the victim's arm before releasing it. Dye and Gaddis then took the victim to a nearby emergency room. At the hospital, Dr. Susan Hayes found the victim was "blue from lack of oxygen" and had no pulse. Resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful, and the victim was pronounced dead at 3:24 a.m. Following this, Dye requested a check for signs of sexual abuse. Dr. Hayes reported severe injuries, including torn vaginal and rectal areas, bruising, and indications of internal bleeding, consistent with rape from an adult male. However, she did not conduct a thorough examination to avoid compromising evidence. Crum, after the victim was taken to the hospital, attempted to contact Carla Sanders to report that "Paul Ware killed Lindsay Green." He later returned to the house where he saw the Defendant, who appeared dazed and was wearing different pants than earlier. Crum noted that the Defendant had a few drops of blood on his face. Crum waited outside for police after an incident on October 1, 1994. Officer Choquette and Officer Baker arrived on Stringer Street, where they found Crum, visibly shaken, who denied calling the police. Choquette later met Crum again at 414 Stringer Street, where Crum expressed concern about a child, either asking if the baby was dead or stating that the child was dead. Crum claimed the child had fallen and had been taken to the hospital, and indicated that a suspect, referred to as the Defendant, had fled to the back of the house. The officers found the Defendant in the laundry room, appearing disheveled and intoxicated. He was handcuffed after waking up, displaying confusion and aggression when informed he was being taken to the station. Officer Baker noted the Defendant's erratic behavior during transport, including moments of passivity and anger. At the police station, the Defendant lunged at Baker, who had to restrain him. The Defendant was wearing a light-colored shirt with suspected blood spots and dark pants. Blood alcohol testing indicated a level of .04 percent roughly ten and a half hours post-incident, suggesting a level of .20 or .21 percent earlier. Detective Mathis reported that the Defendant admitted to being drunk and having no recollection of the events. Dr. Frank King, the medical examiner, testified that the victim's cause of death was mechanical asphyxia, indicating she was unable to breathe due to physical obstruction. He detailed various injuries, including a contusion on the small of the victim's back, suggesting she pressed against a flat surface with applied pressure. Dr. King highlighted the significance of hairs found on and inside the victim, including a reddish hair on her lip, a dark brown hair near the rectum, and a reddish pubic hair in the pharynx. He noted that the dark brown hair required direct contact and pressure to adhere to the mucosal lining, implying potential contamination during body handling. The presence of pubic hair in the pharynx was particularly unusual, as a living person would typically cough in response to such an intrusion. Dr. King estimated the victim had been dead for one to two hours, based on the absence of rigor mortis in the jaw area, which would develop within two to four hours post-mortem. In contrast, defense witness Dr. Cleland Blake argued that livor mortis would first become noticeable after one to two hours, depending on body position, and estimated that the child had been dead for at least three hours to be perceived as cool. He maintained that rigor mortis in a child would not appear before two hours and emphasized it progresses over time. Movement and handling of a deceased child can disrupt early rigor mortis, potentially delaying its visibility for three or more hours. Medical testimony indicated that the victim might have been deceased at the time of injury, contingent on whether evidence was cleaned by the pathologist. Dr. King asserted that all injuries were inflicted before death but expected bleeding consistent with those injuries. He noted petechial hemorrhages in the victim's mouth, which could indicate asphyxia or aggressive resuscitation, but concluded that these alone do not provide conclusive evidence. There was no indication of oral rape, and no seminal fluid was found on the victim. Dr. King speculated that the injuries could result from blunt force but could not definitively confirm penetration by an adult male. FBI Special Agent Chris Hopkins presented evidence of hairs found at the crime scene and on the victim. He identified a red Caucasian pubic hair in the victim's pharynx and at least ten similar hairs from a bed sheet. These hairs were deemed naturally shed, which can occur during routine activities or contact with another person. Hopkins emphasized that the presence of a significant number of pubic hairs on a recently slept-in bed was unusual, suggesting prior activity. While the hairs were consistent with originating from the Defendant, he could not confirm ownership due to the nature of hair comparison, which does not allow for definitive identification. The other individuals were eliminated as potential sources. Additionally, a red hair found on the victim's lip was likely from the chest, while a brown hair from the anus was unsuitable for comparison, as only head and pubic hairs provide reliable comparison data. Human blood was discovered on a bean bag chair in the laundry room, as testified by FBI Special Agent Keith Howland, who noted that DNA profiles were developed but no conclusions could be drawn at that time. After his transfer, comparisons were made to a known individual, Carl Sanders, but Howland did not conduct those tests himself. Additionally, Officer Mike Taylor, who videotaped the crime scene on October 1, 1994, mentioned a dark stain on the master bedroom bedspread that was visible on the tape but never tested. Testimony was also provided regarding Paul Crum's background and behavior around the time of the crime. Crum recounted being sexually, mentally, and physically abused by his father and expressed fears to the Defendant about potentially abusing his own children. Following the incident, he sought psychiatric help and briefly checked into a treatment facility. Wilma Jean Pack, a former landlord of Crum, described artwork he gave to her eleven-year-old son, which included skulls and skeletons, and recounted an incident where Crum showed the boy a sexualized Disney image from a magazine. Crum acknowledged this but claimed it was unintentional, stating it appeared at the bottom of a page. He also admitted to smoking marijuana with the boy, asserting that he had parental permission. Furthermore, David and Carol Ware, the Defendant’s half-brother and wife, testified that Crum visited their home on October 1, 1994, the day after the crime. David observed Crum as “fidgety,” while Carol noted his protective stance regarding his private area and described him as “stiff legged,” with frequent adjustments to his pants, suggesting possible irritation. The Defendant contends that the evidence is inadequate to support the jury's convictions for felony murder and child rape, arguing that another individual, Paul Crum, had greater opportunity to commit the crimes. He cites various trial evidence, including Dr. Cleland Blake's testimony on the victim's time of death, investigative oversights like untested stains and lack of immediate examination of potential suspects, and the discovery of brown hair in the victim's rectum. Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e), a jury’s findings must be upheld unless insufficient evidence exists to support them beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility and weight of evidence are determined by the trier of fact, not the appellate court, which cannot re-evaluate the evidence. A jury verdict approved by the trial judge affirms the state’s witnesses and resolves conflicts in favor of the state. On appeal, the state is entitled to the strongest interpretation of the evidence. The burden rests on the Defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence supporting the verdict. Significant circumstantial evidence presented at trial suggests the Defendant's guilt, including the discovery of the Defendant and the victim nude in a locked room and hair samples linking the Defendant to the crime scene. While some evidence suggests the Defendant’s innocence, substantial evidence points to his involvement, and the appellate court must defer to the jury's findings. Evidence was viewed favorably for the prosecution, leading to the affirmation of the jury's conclusion regarding the Defendant's guilt. The Defendant claimed a Brady violation, asserting that the State failed to disclose exculpatory information prior to trial, which resulted in an unfair trial. The withheld information included the color and description of hair found in the victim, the discovery of blood from Carl Sanders on the Defendant's pubic hair, a witness statement about a cry heard on the murder night, and a statement from the victim’s father regarding unanswered calls made around the time of the murder. To establish a Brady violation, the Defendant must show: (1) a request for the information was made, or it was obviously exculpatory; (2) the State suppressed the information; (3) the information was favorable to the accused; and (4) the information was material. Materiality requires demonstrating that the undisclosed evidence could reasonably alter the case's outcome, as per Kyles v. Whitley. The cumulative effect of suppressed evidence is also considered. The State is not obligated to disclose information already known to the accused or not in their possession. Furthermore, prosecutors must be aware of favorable evidence held by others on the government’s behalf. Specifically concerning the hair found in the victim, the Defendant argued that the FBI's examination of the hair was not disclosed, preventing the defense from using it for comparison with a known sample of Paul Crum’s hair. This lack of information hindered the defense's ability to engage an independent hair expert. Defense counsel noted the existence of the hair in inventories but stated they had not received any photographs or evidence related to it. The hair in question was collected from the victim's anal orifice during an autopsy on October 1, 1994, and was not subjected to testing by the FBI, as it was deemed unsuitable for comparison. The State maintained that it had provided the defense with all relevant test results, including the existence of the hair, and that the defense had possession of the evidence receipt for approximately one year. The defense did not request independent testing of the hair before trial, which led to the conclusion that there was no Brady violation, as the State fulfilled its obligation to disclose information regarding the hair. Moreover, even if a Brady violation had occurred, the hair did not constitute exculpatory evidence due to its unsuitability for testing and lack of linkage to any individual. The unsanitary condition of the victim's home further diminished the evidential value of the hair, as it could have belonged to various visitors and potentially transferred to the victim during the crime or body transport. Additionally, the defendant raised three other alleged Brady violations, claiming the State failed to inform the defense about blood found on his pubic hair. However, the only evidence presented was an affidavit from David Ross, which did not substantiate the claim. Overall, the record did not support the defendant's assertions of Brady violations. Wa re belonged to Carl Sanders, father of Sheila Sanders, where the homicide of Lindsey Green allegedly occurred. The Defendant claims Paul Crum informed Officer Baker that he heard a cry on the night of the murder at 414 Stringer Street; however, this was not mentioned in later statements or testimony. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that District Attorney Davis had a conversation with Jimmy Green, the victim's father, who suggested he may have made phone calls to 414 Stringer Street on the murder night. This detail was briefly mentioned during the trial but not in the jury's presence, and Green was never called to testify. The court found the evidence presented to be neither exculpatory nor material, deeming the issue without merit. In the third assignment of error, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted testimony regarding mitochondrial DNA analysis, claiming it led to an unfair trial. The court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, stating that no admissibility hearing was conducted prior to the trial. Testimony concerning mitochondrial DNA evidence was presented both at trial and during a motion for a new trial. The analysis involved hairs examined by the FBI, including one found in the victim's pharynx and another from a bed sheet where Crum claimed the victim had been sleeping. Under Tennessee law, DNA analysis results are generally admissible without expert testimony affirming their reliability, as long as they comply with the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Mitochondrial DNA analysis, a method first adopted by the FBI in 1996, utilizes the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) method, which is widely accepted as reliable in courts. However, the database for comparison of mitochondrial test results is still under development, and this case marks a precedent regarding the admissibility of mitochondrial DNA evidence in Tennessee appellate courts. At the time of the trial, Special Agent Wilson of the FBI testified regarding a database comprising 742 individuals, including 319 of African descent and 423 of European or Caucasian descent. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing was conducted on hairs recovered as evidence, specifically from the victim's throat and a bed sheet, which were compared with saliva from the defendant. The analysis revealed that all three samples shared a common mtDNA sequence, though this sequence did not match the victim's blood sample. Wilson clarified that the hairs shared 600 bases, while the victim's blood sample shared only 593 bases with the other samples. He noted that the average number of differences between any two Caucasian individuals is about six, suggesting a close but not definitive match. Wilson acknowledged that while the hairs were consistent with belonging to the defendant, the tests did not exclude the possibility that they could belong to others. He refrained from assigning a frequency rate to the mtDNA results, stating the database was not large enough to determine a statistical frequency but confirmed that the specific sequence had not been previously observed in the FBI's database. Wilson also indicated that FBI mtDNA testing protocols had changed since the trial, expanding to include hairs not typically suitable for significant microscopic comparison, such as body hairs. In the Ware case, the decision on which hairs to analyze was influenced by their probative value and suitability for microscopic comparison. He emphasized the importance of probative evidence, noting that the victim's circumstances—found naked in an unkempt laundry room—would likely result in extraneous hairs being present. The presence of a pubic hair in the victim's throat was deemed particularly significant due to the nature of her death by asphyxiation, while hairs on the sheet were relevant given the victim's prior presence in the bed. Additionally, an affidavit submitted by Dr. William M. Shields, a geneticist, during the trial indicated a mistaken statement by Wilson regarding the location of a brown body hair found on the victim. Hairs from Ware are unlikely to be found at the attack site since Ware neither lived there nor was a frequent visitor. The reliability of mitochondrial DNA typing proposed by the FBI is questioned, as critical validation steps have not been completed or were conducted with insufficient sample sizes for statistical reliability. Dr. Shields, who provided testimony during a motion for a new trial, has extensive experience in DNA typing and indicated that he had been involved in related forensic cases since 1990. He asserted that the defense did not call him to testify at trial based on a strategic legal decision regarding the admissibility of the DNA evidence under the Daubert standard. Shields noted discrepancies between FBI protocols in different cases, highlighting that protocol adjustments might be influenced by prosecutorial needs. He referenced letters from Dr. Frederic Whitehurst detailing violations and errors by FBI agents and cited a 1993 article demonstrating significant matching rates in mitochondrial DNA testing, indicating potential issues with the methodology. A piece of DNA can differentiate individuals, but without a comprehensive database to assess the frequency of matches, claims of identity are misleading. Shields testified that the FBI's validation studies on mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) were inadequately published, specifically in the International Journal of Legal Medicine, which has limited circulation, making peer review challenging. He argued that scientific validation requires widely circulated journals for the community to evaluate findings effectively. Shields further critiqued the sample sizes used by the FBI as insufficient and concluded that mtDNA analysis lacks the necessary scientific validation for reliable forensic use. He noted that there is a small pool of experts familiar with mtDNA methodologies and their courtroom applications. Historically, Tennessee courts followed the Frye standard, which required scientific evidence to gain general acceptance in its field. However, in 1997, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the adoption of Rules 702 and 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence replaced the Frye standard. Rule 702 allows expert testimony if it significantly assists in understanding evidence or determining facts, while Rule 703 permits experts to base opinions on facts not necessarily admissible in evidence, provided they are reliable. The court may exclude opinions if the underlying data is deemed untrustworthy. A trial court must evaluate whether evidence will substantially assist the trier of fact in determining a relevant fact and assess the trustworthiness of the underlying data. Scientific evidence must be valid to assist the trier of fact, although it need not be generally accepted. Discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony lies with the trial court, and its decisions can only be overturned if there is an abuse of discretion. In the case reviewed, the trial judge was found not to have abused discretion in admitting mitochondrial DNA test results despite questioning their substantial assistance to the jury. Testimony indicated mitochondrial DNA analysis is well-studied and meets the Frye standard of general acceptance, but even if it was improperly admitted, any error was deemed harmless as it did not provide significant information for the jury. The jury could only conclude that the DNA sequence matched the defendant's saliva without a strong scientific basis for interpretation. Moreover, other clearer scientific evidence pointed towards the defendant being the source of the hairs in question, leading to the conclusion that there was no reversible error. Additionally, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Paul Crum's alleged Satanic worship. The court allowed the introduction of various artworks by Crum, which depicted imagery that could be interpreted as related to Satanism. Crum denied these interpretations and provided alternative meanings for the artwork. Witnesses testified outside the jury's presence about Crum's interest in Satanic worship, but the court's handling of this evidence did not result in reversible error. Crum's sister's brother testified that Crum claimed to have sacrificed a dog due to voices instructing him to do so. While visiting Crum's sister, the group watched a video on devil worship, during which Crum expressed disapproval of being discussed in relation to the video. The witness reported Crum referred to a picture of Jesus as “dog” (God spelled backward) on multiple occasions. She recounted an incident where Crum described the Defendant's vomiting during a crime as a demonic transfer. Crum's sister allegedly mentioned that Crum had offered his soul to Satan to save his child from spinal meningitis, fearing that an exorcism might lead to the child's loss to Satan. Additionally, a friend of Crum's sister testified that Crum requested a leather bracelet marked with the number six, implying a connection to the "mark of the beast." Crum reportedly claimed to follow the "laws of Lucifer" and listened to the devil's instructions. The Defendant sought to further investigate Crum's connection to satanic worship to challenge his credibility and suggest Crum was the true perpetrator. While the Defendant presented considerable evidence regarding Crum's alleged satanic interests, the trial judge retained discretion over the admission of such evidence and did not abuse that discretion by denying further evidence. The Defendant also alleged bias from the trial judge, citing three brief comments made during the trial. Under Tennessee law, judges have significant discretion in trial management and must avoid any expression suggesting favoritism toward either party. After reviewing the record, the court found no evidence of bias from the trial judge and determined that his conduct was appropriate within his discretionary authority. No errors were found on the part of the trial court, and any potential errors were deemed harmless. The Defendant claimed that cumulative errors at trial deprived him of a fair trial, asserting that the jury was not allowed to hear significant favorable evidence. However, after reviewing the record, it was concluded that the Defendant received a fair trial. Regarding sentencing, the Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for felony murder, with additional concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for rape, served consecutively to the life sentence. The Defendant challenged the consecutive nature of these sentences. In response, the court conducted a de novo review, presuming the trial court's determinations were correct, contingent upon the trial court having considered relevant sentencing principles and facts. The review included examining trial evidence, the presentence report, sentencing principles, the nature of the crimes, statutory mitigating or enhancing factors, the Defendant's statements, and rehabilitation potential. The trial judge conducted a thorough analysis of these factors and found two statutory reasons for imposing consecutive sentences: the Defendant was classified as a "dangerous offender" with a blatant disregard for human life and was convicted of multiple offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor, taking into account the nature of the offenses and their impact on the victim. Factor (5) is viewed as potentially inapplicable in this case, as the statutory language suggests it is meant for ongoing sexual abuse scenarios. Evidence indicates that the acts in question occurred in close temporal proximity, with no indication of a prolonged sexual relationship between the defendant and the victim. Consequently, applying factor (5) alone would unlikely justify consecutive sentences. However, if applicable, it might support consecutive sentences for multiple child sex crimes rather than concurrent ones or concurrent with a murder sentence. Despite affirming the trial court's classification of the defendant as a "dangerous offender," it is essential to consider the state supreme court's mandates regarding consecutive sentencing, specifically that such sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of offenses and protect the public from further criminal conduct. Although there is a logical argument against the necessity of consecutive sentences for a defendant sentenced to life without parole, the supreme court has previously denied merit to this claim by upholding consecutive sentences in similar cases. Thus, the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences, supported by the application of factors (4) and (5), aligns with established legal precedents. In State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 191 (Tenn. 1991), the court affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences based on the discretion of the trial judge and guidance from the supreme court. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial or halting jury deliberations due to newly discovered testimony from Donna Pickett, who contacted the defense after closing arguments. The trial court denied the motion to consider this new evidence but allowed for its preservation for future reference. Pickett, who is the defendant’s aunt by marriage, testified post-trial that Crum, a key witness, recounted events following the victim's murder. Crum claimed he found the defendant and the victim in a compromising situation and described how he and another individual, Carl Sanders, discovered the victim’s lifeless body. The testimony revealed Crum's actions and state of mind during the incident. Pickett explained that she initially refrained from testifying due to her absence from the trial and familial pressure. The court acknowledged that the decision regarding a new trial based on newly discovered evidence lies within the trial court's discretion, referencing State v. Goswick, 656 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 1983). Sanders was found inside his truck parked on the street in front of 414 Stringer Street, though Pickett's testimony does not clarify his presence there. In considering a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must demonstrate reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence, its materiality, and that it would likely alter the trial's outcome. Newly discovered impeachment evidence generally does not warrant a new trial unless it is so pivotal that its inclusion would likely lead to an acquittal. In this case, Pickett's testimony aimed to contradict Crum’s account of the murder. However, the court determined the testimony's materiality was questionable; it provided a different narrative but did not diminish the defendant's culpability. For the testimony to support an acquittal, it would need to be accepted as true, which the court found difficult, as it did not implicate anyone other than the defendant in the crime. Consequently, the court concluded that the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for a new trial, affirming the trial court's judgment.