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Rowan v. United States Post Office Department
Citations: 25 L. Ed. 2d 736; 90 S. Ct. 1484; 397 U.S. 728; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 44Docket: 399
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 15, 1970; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The Court, led by Chief Justice Burger, addressed the constitutionality of Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, specifically 39 U.S.C. § 4009, which allows individuals to request the removal of their names from mailing lists to stop unsolicited mailings deemed sexually provocative. The appellants, consisting of publishers and mailing service operators, challenged the statute, arguing it infringes on their First and Fifth Amendment rights by being unconstitutionally vague and lacking clear standards. Section 4009 outlines a procedure for individuals to notify the Postmaster General about unwanted advertisements, leading to an order that halts further mailings and removes the individual's name from relevant mailing lists. The Postmaster General is empowered to enforce compliance and can involve the Attorney General if violations occur. The appellants sought declaratory relief, claiming numerous prohibitory orders had been issued against them. A three-judge court upheld the statute, interpreting it as prohibiting only advertisements similar to those initially sent to the addressee, a view contested by the Court. The legislative intent behind § 4009 was to address public concerns regarding the distribution of offensive unsolicited advertisements, particularly those targeting minors, as noted by the significant increase in complaints to the Postmaster General from 50,000 to 250,000 annually. The legislative history indicates that there was significant concern from child psychology experts about the effects of certain materials on children's development. Congress aimed to safeguard minors and ensure the privacy of homes by allowing addressees to judge what constitutes an offensive invasion. To achieve this, the legislation includes provisions that empower the Postmaster General to order mailers to cease sending materials to specific addressees. Subsection (a) allows for an order to refrain from future mailings, while subsection (b) mandates that the Postmaster General instruct the sender accordingly. Subsection (c) specifies that the sender must not only stop mailings but also remove the addressee’s name from all mailing lists and prohibits sharing those lists. There are three interpretations of the statute regarding the scope of prohibitory orders: they could ban all future mailings, only advertising materials, or similar materials. The original proposal used terms like "pandering advertisements," but subsequent amendments aimed to minimize the Post Office's censorship role, focusing solely on whether the mailer had complied with the name removal requirement. Proponents of the legislation expressed a clear intent to prevent any further mailings from senders once an objection was raised by an addressee. Congressman Waldie emphasized that individuals could request their names be removed from mailing lists if they found the received materials objectionable. This intent is echoed in the Senate Committee Report, which allows individuals to notify the Postmaster General about materials they deem erotically arousing, triggering an order to stop all future mailings to that address. Senator Monroney reinforced that if an addressee identifies mail as provocative, the Postmaster General must act to prevent further correspondence from the sender. The legislative history of subsection (a) supports a broad interpretation that prohibits all future mailings without the need for an objective test, aligning with related subsections. Subsection (c) mandates that the Postmaster General instructs senders to remove designated addressees from all mailing lists and prohibits any transactions involving these lists. Interpreting the statute to apply only to similar materials would create inconsistencies and imply governmental censorship, undermining the intent to grant addressees complete discretion over receiving material. This approach would burden recipients with evaluating incoming mail and could blur the lines of communication freedom, as articulated by appellants claiming the statute infringes on their constitutional right to communicate. The discussion emphasizes the tension between individual autonomy to refuse unwanted mail and the necessity of open communication in society. The evolution of mass mailing practices and the commercialization of mailing lists complicate this dynamic, leading to an overwhelming amount of unsolicited mail. The document references Martin v. Struthers, highlighting the necessity of allowing homeowners to control who may approach them for communication, balancing the rights of senders and recipients. The right to communicate must yield to an addressee's desire to refuse unwanted mail, aligning with the principle that individuals have the right to protect their homes from unsolicited communication. The legal framework respects a householder's authority to restrict mail from specific senders, echoing the long-standing view that a person's home is inviolable. A mailer’s right to communicate ceases at the mailbox of an unwilling recipient, emphasizing that no constitutional obligation exists to accept unsolicited communications, regardless of their content. Congress has empowered individuals to prohibit unsolicited mail, thereby safeguarding privacy and avoiding potential constitutional issues associated with governmental discretion over content. Once a mailing ban is established, it remains effective without requiring the recipient to continuously reassess the acceptability of future communications, preventing unwanted material from reaching vulnerable household members. The statutory process allows an addressee to request a prohibitory order from the Postmaster General, who can take action if the sender violates the order. The sender has the opportunity to contest the order through an administrative hearing, ensuring due process under the Fifth Amendment. The initial issuance of the order does not require a hearing, but further enforcement actions do. Overall, the framework ensures that no sender has a constitutional right to deliver unsolicited materials to another's home. Failure to comply with the order does not immediately sanction the sender, thus it does not violate due process as it serves as a precursor for potential future actions. Defenses, such as proving no mail was sent, can be presented before a contempt finding. The requirement to remove the addressee’s name from mailing lists does not violate the Fifth Amendment, as appellants can still use or sell their lists but must delete the names of complainants and cease mailings. The District Court found that the costs associated with compliance are not prohibitive enough to constitute a due process violation, especially for commercial entities. The statute is not vague; appellants are clearly informed of their obligations upon receiving a prohibitory order. A sender risks contempt only if they continue mailing after legal proceedings. The judgment is affirmed. Subsection (g) mandates that upon request, the order also includes names of minor children of the addressee. Judge Hufstedler suggests the District Court should ascertain if the sender has mailed pandering advertisements before issuing compliance orders. Title III allows recipients of obscene mail to return it to the Postmaster General to request cessation of mailings. Subsection (d) assigns the Postmaster General the task of determining violations of the order, primarily in a ministerial capacity regarding whether advertisements were sent post-order. The statute does not require the Postmaster General or District Court to assess the good faith of the addressee or independently judge the nature of the material, leaving that discretion solely to the addressee.