State v. Robert Crisp

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02C01-9810-CC-00311

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; May 20, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Robert Crisp, Jr. was convicted in the Hardeman County Circuit Court for the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, classified as a class C felony, and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction, with thirty days to be served and the remainder on probation. In his appeal, Crisp raised two arguments: (1) the existence of newly discovered evidence that could have changed the trial's outcome, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. The court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. 

The case background reveals that Kenneth Jones, an investigator, was involved in an undercover operation targeting drug activities in Bolivar from July 1997 to January 1998. On July 15, 1997, he attempted to purchase crack cocaine at a residence on Margin Street, where he encountered co-defendant Rickey Bowles and subsequently Crisp, who facilitated the transaction. Officer Jones completed the purchase of three rocks of crack cocaine, totaling .3 grams, which were later identified as evidence. Crisp was indicted in January 1998 following the operation. During trial, Officer Jones testified that he recognized Crisp from prior photographs, despite having never met him before the drug transaction. 

The appeal also referenced an assertion regarding the sentence's excessiveness, which the appellant conceded was not an issue if he committed the crime. Thus, the court did not address this point further.

Kenneth Jones identified the appellant as the individual who sold him cocaine, stating he was "100 percent positive." Officer Mike Jones testified that he recovered the drugs from Kenneth immediately after the transaction and sealed the evidence, omitting Kenneth's name to protect his identity. The appellant claimed an alibi, supported by his cousin Monica Woods, who testified they were at casinos in Tunica, Mississippi, on July 15, 1997, and by co-defendant Rickey Bowles, who asserted he was never with the appellant that day but invoked his Fifth Amendment rights during questioning. The appellant acknowledged owning several houses but stated he did not reside in any of them, claiming Bowles and another individual lived at one location. He maintained he was in Tunica during the alleged drug sale. The jury convicted the appellant of delivering less than .5 grams of cocaine.

Following the conviction, the appellant sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, specifically an affidavit from Laray Charles Buntyn. Buntyn asserted that he and Bowles sold drugs to the undercover officer on the date in question and that the appellant was not present. He was unable to testify during the trial due to his incarceration. The appellant argued that Buntyn's statement was material and could have led to a different trial outcome. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must demonstrate reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence, its materiality, and that it would likely alter the trial's outcome.

Failure by the defendant or his attorney to demonstrate reasonable diligence in procuring a witness during the original trial may result in the denial of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in such matters, and its decision is unlikely to be overturned unless there is clear abuse of discretion. The appellant asserts that he and his attorney exercised reasonable diligence, had no prior knowledge of new evidence, and were unaware of the facts contained in a witness affidavit. However, the court concluded that the appellant did not provide sufficient proof of reasonable diligence in obtaining the witness statement of Laray Buntyn. The appellant's 'Notice of Alibi' identified Buntyn as a witness, indicating prior knowledge. Furthermore, minimal diligence would have required trial counsel to investigate the second individual involved in the drug transaction. Buntyn's affidavit stated that the appellant contacted him before the trial, suggesting a lack of effort to secure his testimony. The mere fact that Buntyn was incarcerated did not inhibit him from testifying. Thus, the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial was upheld as there was no competent proof of reasonable diligence.

Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant challenges the credibility of Officer Kenneth Jones, the sole eyewitness in the undercover drug transaction. He points out that Jones had been drinking, was uncertain about the transaction's exact location, was not identified on the evidence envelope, and was not identifiable on video footage. The court addressed these concerns: Jones clarified that he consumed alcohol to blend in while undercover but was not impaired. He also stated that he needed his field notes to recall the precise location, and the absence of his identification on the evidence envelope adhered to police procedures for undercover operations.

Officer Kenneth Jones testified that a 'pin hole' camera was located inside a Cadillac, which would not have captured video of transactions occurring inside a house. The appellant's defense primarily questioned Officer Jones's credibility. A guilty verdict, supported by the trial judge, affirms the credibility of State witnesses and resolves evidence conflicts in favor of the State's position, referencing State v. Hatchett. The appellate court does not reassess witness credibility, as this is the responsibility of the jury. In this case, the jury accepted Officer Jones's testimony and rejected the defense's alibi. The appellant did not demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient for a rational jury to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was agreement on the details of the drug sale. Officer Jones identified the appellant and a co-defendant as the individuals who sold him crack cocaine on July 15, 1997. Consequently, the court found the appellant's issues meritless and affirmed the trial court's conviction and sentence.