State v. Frankie Lee Lunsford

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03C01-9804-CR-00152

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; May 21, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Frankie Lee Lunsford, the appellant, pleaded guilty to a Class D felony charge of child abuse and was sentenced to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction by the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The trial court, despite the State's agreement not to oppose alternative sentencing, denied Lunsford’s request for such an option. The Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a de novo review of the sentencing, affirming the trial court’s decision. 

In this review, the appellate court noted the presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court's determinations, provided there is an affirmative showing that the sentencing principles and relevant facts were considered. The review included evaluating evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, sentencing principles, characteristics of the crime, mitigating or enhancement factors, the defendant's statements, and potential for rehabilitation.

The court emphasized that standard offenders convicted of lower-level felonies are generally presumed eligible for alternative sentencing unless evidence suggests otherwise. However, those with serious criminal histories or who demonstrate a disregard for the law are prioritized for incarceration. The appellate court concluded that the trial court adhered to statutory sentencing procedures and made supported findings, thus affirming the original sentence.

The act stipulates that not all offenders meeting certain criteria are automatically entitled to relief; sentencing must be based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, as established in State v. Taylor. Sentencing principles dictate that the punishment should be proportionate to the offense and the least severe necessary to fulfill sentencing purposes, with consideration given to the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. During the sentencing hearing, the Defendant, who is married to Tammy Michelle Lunsford and is the father of the victim, Isaiah Alexander Lunsford, testified about an incident on February 12, 1997, when he, struggling with alcoholism and anger management, tossed his crying son onto the bed. The child fell, hit his head, and was later found unconscious. The Defendant asserted that he never intended to harm his son and had no prior history of child abuse. Following the incident, Alex was hospitalized for nine days, and the Defendant had not regained custody since. He has since completed alcohol treatment and counseling, has been employed consistently, and has not consumed alcohol since starting treatment. The Defendant admitted to past incidents of domestic abuse and other offenses but denied any violent encounters with police. Tammy Lunsford corroborated the Defendant’s involvement in childcare and stated she had never witnessed abuse towards Alex. She acknowledged his alcohol issues and their resulting conflicts but indicated that he had improved since seeking help, managing his anger by removing himself from confrontations.

Tammy Lunsford testified during cross-examination that she opted to stay with the Defendant instead of pursuing custody of her son, Alex, and acknowledged that the Defendant misrepresented how Alex was injured. In sentencing, the trial court noted that the Defendant was initially presumed suitable for alternative sentencing. The case involved a six-month-old baby who suffered serious injuries, including a fractured skull and subdural hematoma, attributed to the Defendant throwing the child into a bed, causing the baby to strike a footboard and fall to the floor. Initially, the Defendant claimed the child fell from the bed, but later admitted to losing control and causing the injuries. The court highlighted the Defendant's history of domestic violence, including past assaults on his pregnant wife, and noted multiple domestic violence calls reported prior to the incident.

The trial court concluded that the victim's vulnerability due to age constituted a violation of trust. The Defendant's prior misdemeanors had previously resulted in alternative sentencing, but his educational and substance abuse history, along with his recent marijuana use, were considered. Although the Defendant expressed remorse and a desire to change, the court found that negative factors outweighed the positive ones, leading to the denial of alternative sentencing. The trial court's decision was informed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103, which mandates considerations against alternative sentencing, such as the need to protect society from a defendant with a lengthy criminal history, deterrence, seriousness of the offense, and the ineffectiveness of less restrictive measures. Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of total confinement.

The trial court justified the Defendant’s sentence of total confinement based on his prior criminal history, including previous assaults on his pregnant wife, and his failure to comply with past alternative sentences. The court determined that the Defendant's history demonstrated a disregard for societal laws and morals, thus not abusing its discretion in denying probation. In evaluating probation eligibility, the court considered multiple factors, including the nature of the offense, the Defendant's criminal record, social history, mental and physical condition, deterrent effects on criminal activity, and public interest. The Defendant bears the burden to prove that his sentence is improper. The court noted the Defendant's dishonesty regarding the circumstances of his offense, particularly contradictory statements about how his child was injured. The trial court emphasized that a defendant's truthfulness is relevant in probation considerations. The Defendant's claims regarding improper application of enhancement and mitigating factors were dismissed, as he had entered a negotiated plea agreement for a three-year sentence as a Range I Offender. The court confirmed that the hearing's purpose was solely to assess eligibility for alternative sentencing, rendering any arguments on the sentence's length moot. After reviewing the case, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.