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State v. Glenn Lucas
Citation: Not availableDocket: 02C01-9801-CR-00005
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; August 10, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Glenn Lucas appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's ruling that declared him a motor vehicle habitual offender. He raises two main issues: first, he asserts that he was denied a hearing on material disputed facts as mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-610; second, he argues that the court lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process and that the statute of limitations for his classification had expired. The State filed a petition on January 5, 1996, citing three prior convictions for driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. Although a show cause order was issued, service was not successfully completed until after a capias was issued for his arrest. Following his arrest, Lucas, represented by counsel, filed an answer contesting the validity of prior convictions and the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. At a court hearing on December 11, 1997, the court found no material disputed facts and declined to conduct a further hearing, subsequently declaring him a habitual offender. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no reversible legal errors. The appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the requirement to demonstrate a material disputed issue of fact before a hearing under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. Citing relevant case law, the appellant contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-610 should be treated like a motion for summary judgment, which necessitates that there be no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Previous rulings have established that a trial court can render a judgment when no disputed issues of fact exist. The definition of a "Habitual offender" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-603(2)(A) includes individuals with multiple convictions within specified time frames. The trial court has no discretion if a defendant is found to have the requisite number of convictions. The appellant admitted to having three convictions in a five-year period but challenged the validity of a 1995 conviction, claiming it was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. However, established law dictates that a valid judgment of conviction cannot be collaterally attacked in such proceedings. As a result, the trial court correctly excluded evidence regarding the 1995 conviction's validity, concluding that no factual disputes existed, and the matter was purely legal regarding the number of convictions within the time frame specified. The computation of these convictions begins from the date of the initial conviction. A defendant's conviction is counted if the offense was committed within the applicable period, even if the conviction is entered afterward. In the case referenced, the appellant's first conviction was recorded on May 10, 1990, and the third qualifying offense occurred on April 7, 1995, thus falling within the five-year period for consideration. The appellant raised multiple affirmative defenses during the court proceedings, including laches, comparative fault, and res judicata, but failed to prove any genuine issues of material fact. Consequently, he was not entitled to a jury trial under the Tennessee Constitution. The appellant also challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the method of service via capias was improper, which he claimed invalidated the court's jurisdiction. However, the court found that these objections were waived because they were not raised in the appellant's initial answer. Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12.08 states that certain defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction, must be presented in the initial response to avoid waiver. The court noted that there is no statute of limitations for the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act and that principles of equity do not apply to habitual offender declarations. Moreover, the appellant did not demonstrate inexcusable delay that would invoke the defense of laches. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's order declaring the appellant a motor vehicle habitual offender, finding no violation of statutory or constitutional rights.