Michael George Long appeals a trial court judgment awarding alimony in futuro to his ex-wife, Diana Sue Long, following their divorce after over 27 years of marriage. The couple has two children, one of whom is a minor. They agreed on grounds for divorce due to inappropriate marital conduct, custody of the minor daughter, and an equal division of marital property.
Diana, 48 at the time of divorce, had ceased working for 20 years to raise their family and only returned to part-time work in 1994, earning approximately $400 per month. She expressed a desire for full-time work limited to daytime hours due to her responsibilities and a physical ailment affecting her hand, which restricts her ability to perform certain jobs. Michael, 49, was employed with a gross annual income of about $87,000 and lived with his girlfriend, contributing $300 monthly to household expenses. He acknowledged the capacity to pay the requested alimony but expressed concerns about the permanence of such payments.
The court’s decision to award alimony in futuro, rather than rehabilitative alimony, is justified when rehabilitation is deemed infeasible. The amount of alimony is at the trial court's discretion, taking into account the unique circumstances of the case.
The determination of alimony hinges primarily on the real need of the spouse seeking support, alongside the obligor spouse's ability to provide it. Courts aim to ensure that the divorce does not leave the disadvantaged spouse in a worse financial position than before the misconduct that led to the divorce. Alimony is intended to foster equity between the spouses rather than provide financial ease for the recipient.
In a precedent case, *Aaron*, the court upheld a significant award of alimony in futuro, noting the disadvantaged spouse's lack of rehabilitation potential and the obligor's ability to pay. In comparing the *Long* case to *Aaron*, it is evident that the Longs were married for a longer duration and faced similar circumstances regarding their standard of living, with the husband as the primary wage-earner and the wife primarily a homemaker, lacking a college degree and work experience.
Ms. Long demonstrated a need for $4,600 monthly to maintain her pre-divorce standard of living, while her husband recognized a need of at least $3,600. A critical distinction is Ms. Long's medical issues, which limit her employment options, further solidifying her status as a disadvantaged spouse. The trial court's award of alimony in futuro is deemed necessary for her to sustain a reasonable standard of living.
The husband challenged the trial court’s position that the wife's potential full-time employment would not justify a reduction or termination of alimony. The court acknowledged that the long duration of the marriage and the wife's current impediments to income generation justified the award of alimony. The court concluded that the alimony in futuro awarded to Ms. Long is appropriate and necessary, rejecting the husband's objections.
The husband contends that the trial court's language restricts his ability to modify the alimony award due to a substantial change in circumstances, which he claims contradicts Tennessee law. However, the court clarifies that it anticipated the wife’s future full-time employment, indicating this would not constitute a significant change. Citing *Norvell v. Norvell*, the court emphasizes that the husband failed to prove that the wife's post-divorce employment was unforeseen at the time of the original decree, where she was already tasked with mortgage payments. The trial court's explicit acknowledgment of the wife’s likely employment does not impede the husband’s statutory right to seek modification under appropriate conditions. Should the wife earn more in the future than currently indicated, he remains free to pursue modification. Additionally, the wife's counsel has requested attorney fees, and the court finds no valid arguments from the husband to overturn the trial court’s decision, suggesting his appeal aims to evade his responsibilities. Under Tennessee law, the court is authorized to order a spouse to pay necessary fees for legal representation. Consequently, the court determines that the wife is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, directing the trial court to assess the amount due from the husband. The judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, with costs assigned to the husband, Michael George Long.
