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Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.
Citations: 24 L. Ed. 2d 386; 90 S. Ct. 400; 396 U.S. 229; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 8Docket: 33
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; December 15, 1969; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The Court, represented by Justice Douglas and announced by Justice Black, addresses a case involving alleged discrimination against a Black family regarding access to community facilities. The Virginia trial court dismissed the family's complaints, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia denied their appeals, citing non-compliance with procedural rules regarding notice to opposing counsel. The case was brought to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, vacated the lower court's judgments, and remanded the case for further consideration based on precedents set in Jones v. Mayer Co. Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Appeals maintained its lack of jurisdiction over the case and reiterated its prior orders denying the appeals. The case returned to the Supreme Court on a second petition for certiorari. During the proceedings, the petitioners provided oral and written notice to the respondents about submitting transcripts to the trial judge, with a request to defer action on corrections to allow for the respondents' review. The judge, initially absent, ruled he had not received the transcripts until three days later. After reviewing the transcripts and upon receiving no objections from the respondents, the proposed orders were signed by both parties and approved by the judge. The Supreme Court of Appeals emphasized that the requirement for opposing counsel to have a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcripts and make objections serves the purpose of providing reasonable notice. This principle is illustrated by referencing a prior case, Bacigalupo v. Fleming. Opposing counsel had seven days to review the record and raise objections in a previous case, whereas they had only three days in the current case, with no complaint about the limited time being recorded. Petitioners’ counsel did not argue that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals established a new procedural requirement, as previous cases (e.g., Bacigalupo v. Fleming, Bolin v. Laderberg, Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries) indicate consistency in procedural application. However, the court's notice requirement is viewed as discretionary, allowing for certiorari review. Little Hunting Park, Inc., a Virginia nonstock corporation, serves a community park and permits membership shares to be assigned to tenants with board approval. Paul E. Sullivan leased his home to T. R. Freeman, Jr. and assigned his membership share, which the board denied based on Freeman's race. Sullivan protested and was subsequently expelled from the corporation. Both he and Freeman sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 for damages and injunctions, although Freeman's claim for relief is limited to damages as he no longer resides in the area. The trial court denied relief, but the judgments are reversed. The case references Jones v. Mayer Co., which established that § 1982 reaches beyond state actions and addresses private discrimination, asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment guarantees the right for Black citizens to have equal opportunities in property and residence. The Virginia trial court classified Little Hunting Park as a private social club, but the record does not support this characterization. The park is accessible to all white individuals in the area without any selective criteria apart from race, resembling a racially restrictive covenant invalidated by Shelley v. Kraemer under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case involves a leasehold and membership share in a nonprofit entity providing recreational facilities, which is protected under Section 1982, encompassing both real and personal property rights. The suggestion that corporate transfer of Freeman's share falls outside the scope of Section 1982 is unfounded, as Freeman's payment included the membership share, affirming it as part of the lease. Respondents' refusal to approve the assignment of this share constitutes an interference with Freeman's leasing rights, which Section 1982 protects against third-party actions. A narrow interpretation of Section 1982 would contradict the broad protections intended by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which it derives. The case also addresses Sullivan's expulsion for advocating on Freeman's behalf, which could deter efforts to challenge racial property restrictions, reinforcing the idea that white property owners can effectively oppose such covenants, as noted in Barrows v. Jackson. Sullivan has standing to pursue this action, and the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not undermine Section 1982's provisions. The 1964 Act includes a saving clause for rights based on federal law, affirming that Section 1982 is compatible with it. Although Section 1982 lacks explicit enforcement mechanisms, federal courts can provide equitable remedies, which are also available in state courts with general injunctive relief authority. Additionally, Congress established federal jurisdiction for civil rights damages through 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), allowing for the pursuit of damages or other relief under relevant federal statutes. In Jones v. Mayer Co., the court reserved the question of recoverable damages for violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The court referenced Bell v. Hood, emphasizing that when federally protected rights are violated, courts should adjust remedies to provide necessary relief, even if the federal statute does not explicitly offer a remedy. The court affirmed that the existence of a statutory right implies appropriate remedies, stating that a violation of such a statute constitutes a wrongful act, allowing affected individuals to recover damages. Compensatory damages for federal rights are governed by federal standards as articulated in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows federal and state rules on damages to be used as appropriate, ensuring responsiveness to impaired federal rights. The court indicated that the issue of damages was not litigated in the lower court and noted a dissenting suggestion that relief should wait for the fair housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. However, the court rejected this notion, pointing out that the petitioners' claims predated the Act's enactment, rendering it inappropriate to dismiss the case based on subsequent legislation. Additionally, Rule 5:1 outlines the procedure for the record on appeal, specifying that a transcript or statement not signed by counsel for all parties becomes part of the record if delivered to the clerk within specified timelines and after the judge's signature. It also stipulates that counsel must provide reasonable notice to opposing counsel regarding the tendering of the transcript or statement. The judge's signature serves as certification that notice was given and the document is authentic. In Bolin v. Laderberg, the court addressed an appeal dismissal motion based on the claim that appellees had not received "reasonable notice and opportunity" under Rule 5:1. The court overruled the motion, citing that the trial judge's signature on the transcript served as certification that appellees' counsel had the required notice and opportunity to review the transcript. In Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, although the notice of transcript tendering was given timely, the appellee's counsel argued insufficient notice because they received the transcript only one day before the hearing. However, the court noted that both parties reviewed and agreed on changes to the transcript before the hearing. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the amended transcript, reflecting appellee's suggested changes and signed by the judge, satisfied Rule 5:1. The excerpt also references 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees equal property rights to all U.S. citizens, and highlights that the remedies for enforcing these rights are exclusive but do not preclude other legal rights or remedies. Notably, the act is not fully effective until December 31, 1969, and will not apply to certain transactions involving single-family homes sold without a real estate broker and specified notice, leaving ambiguity about its applicability to older transactions.