State v. Clyde Hambrick Jr.

Citation: Not availableDocket: E1998-00893-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; June 27, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Clyde Hambrick, Jr. was convicted on four counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of sexual battery, and eight counts of assault, receiving a sentence of forty-eight years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days as a Range I standard offender. His convictions were reversed due to multiple errors, including the trial court's failure to sever the trials, admission of evidence regarding other crimes, lack of proper election of offenses, incorrect jury instructions regarding aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape, and plain error concerning the assault convictions. The court remanded the case for a new trial on the eight counts of sexual battery related to victim C. but barred retrial for the eight counts of assault concerning victim J. 

Originally, Hambrick faced a total of fourteen counts of sexual battery and rape involving two victims, C. and J., and one count of sexual battery involving a third victim, A. Eleven counts were nolle prosequi prior to trial, leading to the charges brought against him. The jury convicted him on all four counts of sexual battery against C. but acquitted him of the corresponding rape charges, instead finding him guilty of aggravated sexual battery as lesser included offenses. For victim J., the jury found him not guilty of sexual battery and rape but guilty of assault.

The appellate court, after reviewing the case, concluded that the cumulative errors compromised Hambrick's due process rights, necessitating a reversal of the lower court's judgment and a remand for a new trial.

The case establishes that the defendant raped and molested his stepdaughters multiple times between March and June 1991 in Unicoi County. The defendant married Connie Taylor in 1980, adopting her three daughters, A., J., and C. They moved frequently, residing in over twenty locations. In February 1991, they relocated to Whispering Pines, where A. was 17, J. was 16, and C. was 13. During this period, Connie worked long hours, while A. worked at McDonald's and attended high school, while J. and C. attended elementary school.

Marital issues arose in May 1991, culminating in the defendant moving out on July 10, with the divorce finalized on September 3. A reconciliation attempt occurred in October 1991 when the family moved to Washington County, where A. and her family briefly lived with her mother and the defendant. An argument led A. to hint at the defendant's inappropriate behavior, but she refrained from disclosing specifics due to fear of him and concern for her mother's safety. A. reported that when she questioned her sisters about the defendant's conduct, they confirmed it without further details. J., also a victim, had similar challenges in recalling events due to the family's instability and frequent relocations.

J. testified that she was molested by the defendant starting around age ten in Carter County. The defendant, claiming to have a headache, would send her younger stepbrother, Jason, outside to play, allowing him to take J. into the bedroom where the abuse began with her rubbing his head. Over a few weeks, the molestation escalated to him rubbing her legs, kissing her, and eventually having her rub his exposed penis, with threats of dire consequences if she told anyone. He leveraged his position as her basketball coach to manipulate her cooperation, promising more playtime. By age eleven, he forced her to perform fellatio, which included ejaculation, and later had intercourse with her at age thirteen. During the abuse, he instructed her sister, C., to act as a lookout.

C., who was two when her mother married the defendant, corroborated J.’s account, detailing similar experiences of being recruited to help with his "headaches" and being threatened if she spoke out. She began engaging in sexual acts with the defendant around age thirteen and later disclosed the abuse to a friend and a school counselor, leading to intervention by the Department of Human Services. C. estimated performing fellatio on the defendant multiple times over several months and confirmed that he had intercourse with her regularly.

Jason, their stepbrother, also testified, confirming the defendant’s pattern of behavior and that he was aware of the abuse but did not report it at the time. Medical testimony was provided by Dr. Daniel Earl, who examined the sisters in February 1993 after they were referred by the Department of Human Services.

The defendant denied allegations of raping or sexually assaulting his stepdaughters, asserting that he threatened to involve the Department of Human Services due to concerns about the care of his grandchild, Tyler. He claimed not to have witnessed any discussions regarding his treatment of the stepdaughters. Several witnesses, including family members and a former co-worker, testified positively about the defendant’s character and his relationships with his family.

In the analysis of legal proceedings, the state is allowed to introduce evidence of uncharged offenses if the indictments are not time-specific. However, the state must identify which offenses support potential convictions, which can be complicated when victims are unable to recall specific incidents due to the elapsed time. The trial court also had to address issues of severance and evidence due to multiple victims. 

The defendant faced multiple counts of offenses against two individuals, C. and J., and claimed the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request to sever these charges. Under Tennessee law, offenses may be joined if they are part of a common scheme, similar in character, or related transactions. The trial court must evaluate the circumstances of the offenses and determine whether the evidence of one charge would be admissible in a trial for another charge, requiring a pretrial hearing. The court's decision to deny a motion to sever charges is typically upheld unless there is an abuse of discretion. Although the defendant contested the common scheme aspect, he initially agreed to this point during the pretrial hearing, focusing his argument on evidentiary issues. The state contended that the evidence presented indicated a distinctive design and a continuing plan regarding the alleged sexual offenses against the stepdaughters. The definition of a common scheme for severance aligns with its definition for evidentiary purposes.

In severance cases, the primary issue is whether evidence of one offense would be admissible in the trial of another if they were severed, focusing on evidentiary relevance. Generally, evidence of unrelated crimes is inadmissible due to its lack of relevance and potential to suggest guilt based on propensity. However, such evidence may be relevant for proving contested issues like motive, intent, or identity, as outlined in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Recent Tennessee Supreme Court rulings emphasize that the admission of "common scheme or plan" evidence must relate directly to specific issues and not merely serve as propensity evidence. 

In a case involving a defendant charged with multiple counts of child rape, the Supreme Court found that evidence of an earlier offense was inadmissible because issues like identity were not contested. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the defendant’s motion to sever was deemed erroneous. To establish reversible error from this denial, the defendant must demonstrate that the error likely influenced the judgment. Based on the Spicer decision, the error was not harmless as the evidence supporting the conviction was not overwhelming, primarily relying on the victim's testimony and medical evidence, which indicated multiple acts but did not provide strong corroborating evidence.

Open-dated indictments involving multiple victims can be prejudicial, as they allow the introduction of extensive evidence of sexual offenses, potentially overwhelming the jury and influencing their decision based on perceived propensity rather than specific incidents. In the Spicer case, the Supreme Court found this to be true, as the testimonies of the victims regarding frequent assaults and unrelated sexual encounters led to a consolidation error that negatively impacted the trial's outcome. Similarly, in the current case, while there was sufficient evidence for a conviction, the jury was subjected to numerous ongoing accusations from the victims, which likely prejudiced their judgment. 

The trial court admitted evidence of other sexual offenses against the sisters from different counties, attempting to provide context for the victims' testimonies. However, the defendant argued this evidence was improperly used to suggest a pattern of behavior rather than to establish material issues. The trial court correctly conducted a jury-out hearing and identified the material issues of motive, intent, and common scheme, balancing the evidence's probative value against its potential for unfair prejudice. Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the evidence was excessively prejudicial and that the denial of severance constituted an error, warranting a remand for a new trial.

The trial court excluded the defendant's evidence of acquittal, determining it irrelevant and not consequential to the case, as per Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. In cases with multiple sexual assault allegations lacking specific dates, the court requires the State to elect a specific offense for which it seeks conviction at the conclusion of its evidence. This ensures the jury's verdict is unanimous and allows defendants to prepare their defenses, while also protecting against double jeopardy. Although federal unanimity requirements for criminal convictions have not been applied to the states, such requirements are mandated by the Tennessee Constitution. 

The State is not obligated to specify the date of the offense unless it is a critical element of the crime. To assist jurors in maintaining focus and achieving unanimity, the State may link incidents to unique contextual details in the victim’s life. During the trial, the defendant faced sixteen counts of sexual assault related to two victims, with charges spanning March to June 1991. The State elected to rely on the first occurrence of the offense for each month during closing arguments, which led to confusion among jurors regarding the specifics of the election. The trial court clarified that the election pertained to the first incident of each month, and it facilitated further discussion on the evidence during jury instructions.

The trial court presented the jury with a complex case involving multiple charges of rape and sexual battery against two alleged victims, specifying that the State had selected only one incident of rape and one incident of sexual battery per month for consideration. The court instructed the jury that they needed to agree unanimously on whether the defendant was guilty of these charges, emphasizing that evidence suggested incidents occurred frequently over the months.

However, the election and guidance provided by the trial court failed to meet the unanimity requirement, as the jury was presented with testimony of multiple offenses without specific identification of dates or events. This lack of specificity mirrored a precedent case, State v. Tidwell, where the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed convictions due to similar issues. The court found that in Tidwell, the jury could not determine which acts occurred at specific times, as the charges were too vague.

In the current case, the jury was instructed to select from multiple offenses for a given timeframe, but without a clear connection to specific events or dates, which compromised the reliability of their verdict. The trial court did not effectively narrow the timeframe or provide a method for the jury to match a specific act to a specific count, leading to concerns about the validity of the jury’s findings. Consequently, the court concluded that neither a proper election nor a workable alternative was evident in this case.

The trial court charged the jury with aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape. The state contends that aggravated sexual battery, while not a 'lesser included' offense of rape, is a 'lesser grade' of that crime. The defendant argues that this charge was erroneous, asserting that aggravated sexual battery does not qualify as a lesser included offense and that the evidence did not support the charge. Under Tennessee law, offenses are classified by the legislature (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-110), establishing a hierarchy where offenses of the same or greater classification cannot be considered lesser included offenses. Since both rape and aggravated sexual battery are classified as Class B felonies, the trial court erred in charging aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense of rape. Although the defendant's convictions for eight counts of sexual battery would have been affirmed based solely on this error, additional errors necessitate a reversal of the convictions for four counts of aggravated sexual battery and a remand for a new trial. The state may retry the defendant on eight counts of sexual battery, with four counts resulting from this error and four from previous errors identified. Cumulative errors regarding election, severance, evidence, and lesser included offenses also raise concerns about the reliability of the verdict, warranting a new trial despite sufficient evidence for the sexual battery convictions. The court may consider issues not formally presented under the 'plain error' standard, which requires that the error affects a substantial right of the accused and meets specified criteria. The analysis indicates that the trial resulted in the defendant being convicted of eight assault counts against victim J, with four counts improperly charged as lesser included offenses of rape.

Under Tennessee Code § 40-2-102, prosecutions for misdemeanors must commence within twelve months of the offense, which in this case pertains to assaults alleged to have occurred in 1991. The defendant was indicted on October 11, 1994. Following the precedent set in State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1993), a conviction for misdemeanor assault is barred by the statute of limitations unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives this right. Since no evidence indicates that the defendant was aware of this issue, the court ruled that he could not have waived any objection regarding the jury's consideration of the misdemeanor charges. Consequently, the eight assault convictions involving victim J. were reversed and dismissed due to the statute of limitations.

Regarding sentencing, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by imposing maximum sentences for aggravated sexual battery and sexual battery, as well as by ordering consecutive sentences. The court clarified that if the trial record shows the court considered the relevant sentencing principles, it would review the sentences with a presumption of correctness. The trial court identified one enhancing factor (abuse of a private trust) and two mitigating factors (absence of serious bodily injury threat and the defendant's provision for his family) but chose not to weigh the mitigating factors. The court found no error in this approach. Additionally, consecutive sentencing was deemed appropriate as the defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving a minor. 

In conclusion, the trial court's judgment is reversed and remanded for the eight counts of sexual battery involving victim C., while the eight assault convictions involving victim J. are dismissed.