Bull v. Bull

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03A01-9708-CV-00373

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; March 24, 1998; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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On March 25, 1998, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed and remanded a case regarding the adoption of Summer Sierra Massengale. The circuit court had determined that Craig and Debra Faye Bull, the petitioners, did not present clear and convincing evidence to terminate the parental rights of Christopher Wayne Randolph, the child's father. This ruling prevented the Bulls from proceeding with the adoption. The Bulls argued that the trial court improperly assessed evidence of abandonment and maintained that the record supported a finding of abandonment under the correct legal standard. They also contended that Randolph's parental rights should be terminated based on specific provisions of T.C.A. § 36-1-113. The trial judge issued a memorandum opinion reflecting these findings of fact and legal conclusions. The case was heard on April 8, 1997, stemming from a petition filed by the Bulls, who had custody of the child due to a juvenile court order. The natural mother, Karen Massengale, consented to the adoption, while Randolph filed an answer contesting both the adoption and custody. The Bulls had obtained the child when she was approximately six weeks old.

Mr. and Mrs. Bull have custody of a minor child, originally from the natural mother, Karen Massengale, who is currently incarcerated. They filed a petition in Juvenile Court, claiming ignorance of the natural father's whereabouts, Christopher Randolph, and stating he was never served notice of the proceedings. The Court found that the natural mother was aware of how to contact Randolph and intentionally did not notify him of the hearing. Neither the Bulls nor Massengale made efforts to contact Randolph. Evidence showed Randolph filed a petition to legitimize the child and visited her in the hospital after birth, alleging he made several payments to the mother, which she disputes. Randolph lost track of the child after the mother was incarcerated and could not find her until served with an adoption petition. He has attempted to contact both the child's grandmother and the mother, but they did not disclose the child's location. Both the natural father and mother have served time in prison, and the mother was using cocaine during pregnancy, which affected the child. Randolph provided clothes and diapers when he knew the child's whereabouts. Testimonies were conflicting, and the Court could not decisively determine the burden of proof regarding the termination of Randolph's parental rights.

The Court finds insufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of the father's parental rights under T.C.A. 36.1113. The father has not abandoned the child or violated any relevant provisions. Currently employed at Aladdin Industries, Georgia, he earns approximately $518.40 weekly. Despite admitting past alcohol and drug issues, the father claims to be clean and has completed a recovery program. At trial, he presented himself well and maintained control. Evidence shows he consistently sought to establish a relationship with his child, even reaching out to the mother during her incarceration. Neither parent qualifies as "totally responsible" according to the Court's standards. Consequently, the child will remain in the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Bull, with child support set at $85.00 per week from the father. The case will return to Juvenile Court to establish visitation rights and further determine temporary custody. The Court recommends counseling for all parties and, if necessary, assistance from the Department of Human Services to create a reasonable visitation schedule. The Tennessee Supreme Court precedent emphasizes that a legitimized father can defeat an adoption by withholding consent, and a party seeking a declaration of abandonment must meet a heightened burden of proof to protect biological parental rights.

A finding of possible abandonment in adoption proceedings regarding one parent does not necessarily imply abandonment by the other parent. The court evaluates various factors to determine abandonment, including the parent's ability to support the child, the support actually provided, the nature and frequency of contact between the parent and child, efforts to visit, and any gifts given on special occasions. The court concluded that the natural father did not voluntarily relinquish custody, noting the child had been separated from the parent for approximately one year. Concerns were raised about the home environment and conduct of the parents prior to the child's removal. The natural father had minimal contact with the child, comprising only periodic visits, and there was a lack of evidence indicating he had clearly and convincingly relinquished all parental rights. The relevant statute (T.C.A. 36-1-113) addresses termination of parental rights based on abandonment, defined as a parent's failure to maintain a relationship with the child, particularly over a four-month period prior to the filing of a termination petition.

Parental rights may be terminated if a parent has willfully failed to visit or support the child, as evidenced by a lack of reasonable payments for the child's support. This applies to both biological and legal fathers, specifically during the four months preceding the child's birth. A final order for termination cannot be issued until at least 30 days after the child's birth. The Trial Court referenced the case Koivu v. Erwin, which established the legal definition of abandonment. Abandonment is defined as any conduct by a parent that indicates a settled purpose to relinquish all parental duties and claims. The legislature amended the statutory definition of abandonment, clarifying that a parent does not need to demonstrate an intent to forgo all parental rights for abandonment to be established. Courts are thus bound by this legislative definition, and previous contrary rulings are overridden.

The court's opinion emphasized reliance on case law repealed by the legislature, noting that the credible testimony of Mr. Randolph and his witnesses was favored over that of the mother and her witnesses regarding the wilfulness of his conduct. The Bulls asserted entitlement to terminate Mr. Randolph's parental rights under specific sections of the Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.). Parental rights can be terminated if a person fails, without good cause, to pay a reasonable share of prenatal and postnatal expenses upon notification of the child's impending birth or fails to file a paternity petition within 30 days of being notified of alleged paternity by the mother.

The trial court found that Mr. Randolph had provided financial support to the mother but that his offers to pay medical bills were refused because they were covered through TennCare. The record did not support claims that the mother provided notice regarding alleged paternity. Mr. Randolph had voluntarily legitimized the child, which was acknowledged by a juvenile court recommendation prior to the trial court hearing. The provisions regarding termination of rights apply to individuals not recognized as legal parents, defined specifically in T.C.A.

The opinion concluded that the trial court's credibility assessment and the correct standard of evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Randolph was guilty of actions justifying the termination of his parental rights. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was affirmed, with the case remanded for further proceedings as necessary and costs of the appeal assessed against the Bulls and their surety.