Willie D. Graham was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Ray Anthony Shervington, initially indicted for first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to six years as a Range I offender. Graham raised several issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction; (2) whether gender-based peremptory challenges by the state were permissible; (3) the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, specifically reckless and criminally negligent homicide; (4) the admissibility of prior convictions for impeaching the defendant; and (5) errors in sentencing and denial of probation. The appellate court found that the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser offenses necessitated a reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial.
The incident occurred on July 30, 1995, involving socialization between Graham, the victim, and family members, with significant alcohol consumption noted. Arguments escalated later in the evening, leading to a physical confrontation where Graham fatally stabbed Shervington. Eyewitness testimony detailed the moments leading up to and following the stabbing, including the victim’s injuries and subsequent attempts to seek medical help.
Ms. Shervington testified that a knife was discovered in her front flowerbed around 2:00 A.M., with Littlejohn, Byrum, Weaver, and Willis present. She acknowledged a prior conflict between the victim and Littlejohn. Keisha witnessed the victim and the defendant entering the Graham house and later saw them on the front porch, where the defendant allegedly stabbed the victim, who then fell to the ground with blood on his chest. Keisha denied having said that Weaver stabbed the victim and maintained a good relationship with the defendant.
Tommy Littlejohn arrived at the Graham house at 8:00 A.M., where he and others had been drinking. He recounted waking to Ms. Shervington's cries and hearing the defendant say he was going to jail while handing him a bloodied knife, which he placed inside an old television set in the backyard. After discovering the victim lying in blood, he informed Ms. Shervington about the knife's location. However, when police arrived, the knife was missing, having been discarded by Byrum. Littlejohn denied taking the defendant's knife to the front yard and noted the defendant’s unusual quietness that day, while also acknowledging past conflicts with the victim.
Paul "Bud" Byrum testified to being in the house when the victim arrived, leading to an argument that brought them to the front porch. He did not see a knife and left through the back door, later learning of the victim's death. He observed Littlejohn place a knife on a chair but noted that the blade was closed and visibility was poor. Byrum kicked the knife off the porch but indicated its location to police. Lieutenant Penny Baker later found a lock-blade knife on the Shervington property, also with the blade closed.
Hugh Kring, a paramedic, arrived at the Graham residence around 10:00 P.M. to find the victim in critical condition outside the house. Police arrived shortly thereafter, and Kring transported the victim to Lakefront Park, where a Lifestar helicopter took him to the University of Tennessee Hospital. During the flight, flight paramedic Rick Harrington chemically paralyzed the victim, intubated him, and administered fluids. Despite being conscious but not alert and in severe shock, the victim maintained a pulse, and no resuscitation was needed. Dr. Richard Clark treated the victim upon arrival at the hospital at 11:19 P.M., but life-saving efforts for about 15-16 minutes were unsuccessful, and the victim died at 11:31 P.M.
Forensic pathologist Dr. Cleland Blake conducted the autopsy, identifying the victim as a young black male, 5'11", 200 pounds, with three stab wounds to the chest. The first two wounds were lethal: one collapsed the right lung, and the other penetrated the heart and lung cavity. The third wound, while entering the chest wall, did not affect the lung. Dr. Blake noted that all wounds were likely inflicted by the same knife, a lock-blade knife, which he indicated could produce the observed injuries. He ruled out a kitchen knife due to its design. Dr. Blake could not determine the order of the wounds but suggested the possibility that they could have been inflicted while the victim was lying flat, noting the absence of defensive wounds aside from minor scratches.
Deputy Richard Carr observed significant blood at the scene, and Deputy Carl Bailey encountered the defendant, who was attempting to clean the area. Bailey confiscated a dishpan of water from the defendant and took him into custody. A subsequent search for the knife yielded no fingerprints. The victim's blood alcohol level was found to be 0.16 percent, with forensic scientist Michael Lyttle explaining the effects of such a level, including impaired judgment and coordination. He also noted that alcohol metabolism stops at death, with a typical rate of 0.01 to 0.02 percent per hour.
Mark Squibb, a TBI serologist, found no blood on a serrated knife but detected human blood on a lock-blade knife, which he could not conclusively type. Human blood was also identified on the defendant's shirt in multiple areas. Blood on the defendant’s shoes showed mixed results, being consistent with the victim in one test and inconsistent in another. Sergeant William Breeding took three statements from the defendant, who appeared sober. In the first statement, the defendant described an argument between Ms. Shervington and the victim, claiming he went to the kitchen and later saw Ms. Shervington over the victim outside. During a second questioning, he reiterated that he had walked away after asking the victim about bringing fights to his home, only to hear Ms. Shervington call for help minutes later.
In a third, detailed statement made after the victim's death, the defendant recounted being at his home with several individuals, including the victim, who had been arguing. He claimed that after a physical confrontation where the victim pushed him, he stabbed the victim with a knife while trying to diffuse the situation. The defendant stated he placed the knife down and later heard screams, leading him to find the victim injured outside. This statement was signed but not recorded, and the previous statements were neither recorded nor written down. Breeding seized the serrated knife and other weapons from the Graham house, but only the serrated and lock-blade knives were tested. Breeding noted the lock-blade could be opened one-handed and acknowledged the victim's clothing had not been tested.
Defense witness Alex Witherspoon, the defendant's six-year-old nephew, testified about the events, initially stating he saw the defendant put down a knife before seeing another individual, Weaver, pick it up and later raise a butcher knife. He clarified that he did not witness the stabbing.
Mary Graham, sister of the defendant, returned home around 10:00 P.M. on the night of the homicide. She confirmed that her son, Alex, had gone to his grandmother's to retrieve a toy and returned about ten minutes later. Shortly after, her sister, Ms. Shervington, was screaming at the door; Ms. Graham did not respond, leading Ms. Shervington to leave. Ms. Graham noted that her sister often fought with the victim and that her concerns were usually unfounded. A few minutes later, Keisha and Tamisha asked her to call an ambulance, but Ms. Graham did not believe them initially. She eventually called the police and went to her mother's house, where she saw the victim lying on his back and Ms. Shervington tending to his stab wounds.
The defendant testified about his background and described the events leading to the altercation. He claimed to have been preparing supper when the victim entered and began arguing. He stated that he walked away from the conflict, and that his mother had instructed both the victim and Ms. Shervington to leave. According to the defendant, the victim became aggressive, which led to a physical confrontation where the defendant, holding a knife, pushed the victim off of him, resulting in a stab wound. He claimed he stabbed the victim only once and denied any intent to kill, asserting that he bore no animosity toward the victim.
The defendant acknowledged his two felony convictions for selling marijuana in 1992. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him. In reviewing the appeal, the court noted that the state is entitled to the strongest view of the evidence, with the jury responsible for assessing witness credibility and resolving conflicts. The relevant legal standard is whether a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Tennessee law, voluntary manslaughter is defined as an intentional or knowing killing in a state of passion due to adequate provocation.
"Intentional" denotes a person's conscious objective to engage in specific conduct or achieve a particular result, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-302(a). "Knowing" indicates a person's awareness of the nature of their conduct or the surrounding circumstances, specified in Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-302(b). Evidence presented showed the defendant removed a knife, opened it, and stabbed the victim in the chest, with a pathologist confirming that two of the three chest wounds were lethal, supporting a reasonable certainty of death. Witness Ms. Shervington testified she saw the defendant inflict these wounds. The jury could infer provocation due to a prior argument and the victim's actions towards the defendant's elderly mother, resulting in sufficient evidence for a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The defendant also claimed purposeful gender discrimination in the state's peremptory challenges against male jurors. The state countered that neutral reasons were provided. Citing Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court ruled that excluding jurors based on race violates equal protection rights, a principle later extended to gender discrimination in J.E.B. v. Alabama. Following these precedents, if the defendant demonstrates a prima facie case of gender discrimination in juror challenges, the prosecution must offer a gender-neutral explanation. This explanation must relate to the case and not be pretextual. The court is responsible for determining whether purposeful discrimination occurred, with even a single discriminatory peremptory challenge violating equal protection.
A conviction must be reversed if the court finds no neutral reason for the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. The defendant must demonstrate that relevant facts suggest the prosecutor excluded jurors based on gender. The trial court evaluates the totality of circumstances to assess potential discriminatory intent. Peremptory challenges can be exercised by both the prosecution and defense for any reason not legally prohibited. In the case discussed, the jury consisted of five men and seven women, with the defense removing two male jurors and the state using three out of four peremptory challenges. The prosecutor justified challenges based on previous juror experiences with law enforcement and opposition to the death penalty, asserting this could indicate a bias toward the defense. The trial court, after an in camera review, found no systematic exclusion or intentional discrimination by the state, a ruling that is given deference on appeal.
Additionally, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser included offenses when charged with first-degree murder. While the trial judge instructed on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the state contested that evidence did not support lesser charges. Tennessee law recognizes both lesser grades of the charged offense and lesser included offenses, with the trial judge obligated to instruct on those supported by evidence. The determination of lesser included offenses is based on statutory definitions and established tests for inclusion as clarified in prior case law.
The court established a framework for determining lesser included offenses, referencing Justice Weldon White's definition from *Johnson v. State*, which states that a lesser crime is one whose elements are fully contained within a greater crime. This principle was reinforced in *Wright v. State*, where it was determined that an offense is necessarily included if all its elements are encompassed within the indictment of the greater charge. The trial judge is required to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses when there is supporting evidence. Specifically, second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide are recognized as lesser included offenses of first degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter is a lesser grade offense.
The trial court has a duty to provide a complete legal instruction based on the facts, and failing to do so infringes on the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. The law mandates that if any facts suggest the possibility of guilt for a lesser offense, the trial judge must include it in the charge. An omission of such instructions can necessitate a new trial, as established in *State v. Boyce*. The case at hand involved a defendant charged with first degree murder, and the failure to instruct on lesser offenses such as reckless and criminally negligent homicide deprived the defendant of a jury’s consideration of those charges. Evidence indicated that the defendant's actions could be construed as reckless or negligent, particularly given his testimony regarding the circumstances of the incident.
The defendant is accused of voluntary manslaughter, with the theory being that he either ignored or was unaware of the risk of stabbing the victim. He described the incident as a reaction to the victim grabbing him, leading to a stabbing in the shoulder. After the event, the defendant stayed at the scene and surrendered to police. During jury deliberations, the jury inquired about the possibility of alternative verdicts such as involuntary manslaughter, indicating they might have considered a lesser charge if it had been available. The court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide warranted a reversal of the conviction and a new trial.
Additionally, the defendant challenged the trial court's decision to allow evidence of a prior marijuana conviction for impeachment purposes, referencing Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The state argued that the defendant did not show prejudice from this evidence, especially given jury instructions. The rules permit prior convictions to attack a witness's credibility if certain conditions are met, including prior notification to the accused and a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. The court's ruling on the admissibility of such evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, emphasizing the need to consider the similarity of the impeaching conviction to the current charges.
The relevance of a defendant's impeaching conviction to credibility was analyzed in State v. Farmer, where the court upheld that such convictions could be considered for credibility assessments, particularly when they are closely related to the current charges. The defendant argued that his marijuana sale conviction lacked relevance, claiming that if the amount sold had been lesser, it would have been a misdemeanor and thus inadmissible. The trial judge concluded that the jury should determine if the defendant's conviction could indicate a likelihood of dishonesty. Following impeachment, the judge instructed the jury to limit their consideration of prior convictions solely to credibility, noting that the prejudicial effect was minimal since the prior convictions did not involve violent crimes or weapons.
Regarding sentencing, the defendant contested the imposition of the maximum six-year sentence, asserting that the trial court improperly identified enhancing factors and disregarded mitigating ones. The state maintained that the sentence was presumptively correct based on compliance with the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. Although the court had decided on a new trial, it addressed the sentencing issue, emphasizing that challenges to the sentence require de novo review, presuming correctness if the trial court considered relevant sentencing principles and facts. The court's analysis must include various factors such as trial evidence, the presentence report, and the nature of the offense, alongside any mitigating or enhancing factors and statements made by the defendant regarding rehabilitation potential.
At the time of the offense, the presumptive sentence was the minimum unless there were enhancement or mitigating factors. Under Tennessee law, if such factors exist, the trial court begins with the minimum sentence, applies enhancement factors to increase it, and then mitigates based on any applicable mitigating factors. The trial court has discretion in weighing these factors, provided its findings are supported by the record and comply with the 1989 Act. Specific findings must be made on record regarding the application of sentencing principles.
During the sentencing hearing, a former probation officer testified positively about the defendant's prior probation for two felony convictions. The defendant showed remorse for the victim's death but denied the extent of his actions, claiming he only "hit" the victim once. The trial judge identified three enhancing factors: lack of candor, a history of criminal behavior, and the use of a deadly weapon, but found no mitigating factors, resulting in a maximum six-year sentence. Notably, lack of candor is not a recognized statutory enhancement factor, and the trial court is restricted to legislatively defined factors.
The defendant contested the existence of a criminal history, asserting that his prior felony drug convictions and traffic violations were irrelevant to his manslaughter sentence. However, the statute permits consideration of prior offenses for sentence enhancement. Additionally, the defendant argued that using a deadly weapon should not enhance his sentence as it is an element of voluntary manslaughter, a claim previously rejected by the court.
The defendant presented six mitigating factors during sentencing, but the trial court did not find them persuasive. Although acting under strong provocation was recognized as a basis for the jury's voluntary manslaughter conviction, the court noted that such provocation does not automatically require mitigation in manslaughter cases. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the victim was not armed, which influenced its decision against granting any mitigating factors.
The provocation in this case, while potentially adequate to lessen the defendant's culpability, does not meet the threshold for "strong provocation" necessary to mitigate his sentence, aligning with the trial court's findings. The defendant claims his actions were justified under Tennessee law, citing his weakened physical condition and the need to maintain peace in his mother's home. However, evidence showed that during an argument, the victim pushed the defendant's mother without causing harm, leading the defendant to intervene with deadly force, stabbing the victim multiple times. The court found insufficient evidence to support the claim that the defendant acted out of necessity or due to a physical disability.
The jury determined that the defendant acted out of frustration or anger, rejecting his self-defense argument. The notion that he was protecting his family from the victim, who was unarmed despite being drunk, was also dismissed by the trial court. The defendant's assertion that his actions did not reflect sustained criminal intent was countered by evidence indicating he armed himself and deliberately stabbed the victim.
The defendant faced a sentencing range of three to six years, with the trial court appropriately applying two enhancement factors, resulting in a six-year sentence. The court rejected all six proposed mitigating factors, affirming that the sentence was justified given the defendant's criminal history and use of a deadly weapon. The defendant sought probation, but the court considered various factors, including the nature of the offense and the defendant's background, ultimately indicating that he was not a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing.
Probation must be automatically considered by the trial court for sentences of eight years or less, except for specific statutory exceptions not applicable in this case. The defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving suitability for probation. Each case's consideration of alternative sentencing must be based on its unique facts. In this instance, there is no evidence that the trial court considered probation despite the defendant's request. The defendant had been living with his mother and maintained steady employment until health issues arose in 1986. He successfully completed probation in 1992 and had no new charges except traffic violations prior to this offense, which favorably impacts his eligibility for probation. However, his prior felony offenses and the serious nature of the current offense, characterized by violent conduct, weigh against probation. Specifically, the stab wounds inflicted are significant enough to render probation an unreasonable alternative. Additionally, a lack of honesty from the defendant supports a sentence of incarceration rather than community release. The conviction is reversed, necessitating a retrial for the voluntary manslaughter charge following an acquittal on more serious offenses.
