State v. Almeer Nance

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2000-00170-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; September 26, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Almeer Nance was indicted by a Knox County grand jury on multiple charges, including premeditated murder and various robbery and kidnapping offenses, after his case was transferred from juvenile court. He was convicted on seven counts, including felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and sentenced to life plus twenty-five years in prison. Nance's motion to suppress his statement to authorities was denied before trial, and he later filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial, again challenging the suppression ruling. The appeal, which focused on the suppression issue, was reviewed alongside the trial record and applicable case law, leading to the affirmation of the trial court’s decision. The factual background detailed that on January 16, 1996, Nance and accomplices robbed Scott’s Market, resulting in a fatal shooting of the clerk. Subsequent attempts to rob a Radio Shack and a home involved armed threats and kidnapping. Authorities apprehended Nance based on information obtained from his accomplices, and he provided a signed confession after being arrested. The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion, which included testimony from four witnesses.

Detective Clyde Cowan described events at the defendant’s home and the Knox County Central Facility. He noted that Sergeant Andy Young and Lieutenant Fred Ludwig were speaking with the defendant’s mother when he arrived. Cowan conversed with her about the police presence but did not obtain her consent to speak with the defendant. The defendant was taken to the facility for an interview, where Detective Dan Stewart joined Cowan and informed the defendant of the interview's purpose and his constitutional rights. The defendant requested an attorney, prompting Stewart to attempt to contact the public defender's office, but he reported back that he could not reach anyone. After leaving the defendant alone, the defendant expressed a desire to talk, leading to Stewart re-entering the room. The defendant was again advised of his rights, signing a waiver form at 2:45 a.m., after which he provided a recorded statement about the events in question. Cowan asserted that no coercion or promises were made to elicit this statement.

Stewart later acknowledged he had mistakenly claimed during a juvenile court hearing that the defendant had not requested an attorney but corrected this after reviewing his notes. He explained that the call to the public defender was answered by a recording instructing him to call during business hours. After communicating this to the defendant, who then decided to speak without legal counsel, Stewart took the defendant's statement, confirming that the defendant had waived his rights. Additionally, Sergeant Young testified about his presence during the defendant's arrest, stating he informed the defendant’s mother that they were there to discuss a criminal offense and search for related weapons. Young admitted he did not advise the defendant of his rights nor inform the mother about the defendant's transport to the facility.

The defendant provided an account of events during his arrest, claiming he was not informed of his rights or questioned at the scene. He asserted that officers at the Central Building pressured him to sign a waiver to obtain an attorney, while implying that the public defender's office was unavailable to assist him. He recounted that he repeatedly requested an attorney before speaking with detectives. During cross-examination, he acknowledged previous arrests and having been read his rights before, as well as having had prior representation from the public defender's office. Despite this, he believed that a tape recording of his statement was for his future attorney's use. The trial court denied his motion to suppress his statement, which he argued was taken in violation of his constitutional rights, especially noting his status as a minor. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement, asserting that his right to counsel was compromised. The appellate review indicates that the trial court's findings on whether the confession was given knowingly and voluntarily are binding, unless contrary evidence is presented. The trial court found that although the defendant invoked his right to counsel, he later initiated further communication, aligning with the precedent set in Edwards v. Arizona, which allows for continued questioning if the accused initiates contact.

An accused individual's right to remain silent must be strictly respected, as established in *Michigan v. Mosley*. If a statement is made after invoking the right to counsel, it is essential to determine if the accused initiated the conversation and if the waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently, as outlined in *Oregon v. Bradshaw* and *State v. Claybrook*. The evidence indicated that the defendant did initiate further dialogue after requesting a public defender, leading the court to examine whether the waiver of rights was valid. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court in *State v. Callahan* mandates that juvenile waivers be assessed through a totality-of-the-circumstances test, considering factors such as age, experience, understanding of rights, and presence of guardians. In this case, despite concerns about the timing of the interrogation and absence of the mother, the trial court determined that the defendant's statement was admissible. The defendant, nearly seventeen, had prior experience with the legal system, demonstrated average intelligence, and had read and understood his rights, as confirmed by Detective Cowan’s procedures. No intoxication or mental impairments were indicated, supporting the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily chose to speak with police. 

Consequently, the trial court's judgment was upheld, affirming that the defendant's waiver of rights was both knowing and voluntary.