State v. Ernest E. Pride

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2000-00319-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 18, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Ernest E. Pride was convicted by a jury in Davidson County for various offenses: tampering with evidence (class C felony), possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell (class C felony), simple possession of marijuana (class A misdemeanor), criminal trespass (class C misdemeanor), resisting arrest (class B misdemeanor), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (class A misdemeanor). The trial court sentenced him, as a Range II offender, to a total of eight years for each felony conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for marijuana possession, thirty days for trespass, and six months for resisting arrest, with all sentences served concurrently. He was acquitted of the drug paraphernalia charge.

Pride raised two issues on appeal: the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions for cocaine possession with intent to sell and tampering with evidence, and the imposition of excessive sentences for those felonies. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's judgment. 

The factual background reveals that on October 31, 1998, officers observed Pride and three others near his vehicle in a known drug trafficking area, prompting a police stop. Upon approaching, officers noticed Pride's unusual hand positioning, leading to the discovery of substances resembling crack cocaine in his hand when he opened the glove compartment.

Sgt. DeLap inquired about the contents in the appellant's hand, leading the appellant to attempt to ingest most of the 'rocks' while one dropped to the car floor. Officers forcibly removed the appellant from the vehicle and commanded him to spit out the substance, which he refused, ultimately swallowing the rocks. After resisting arrest, the appellant was subdued with pepper spray. Officer Tomblin recovered the fallen rock, which tested positive for cocaine. Forensic chemist Donna Flowers confirmed it was .05 grams of crack cocaine. The appellant was convicted in Davidson County Criminal Court on multiple charges, including tampering with evidence and possession of cocaine with intent to sell, both classified as class C felonies, along with other lesser charges. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to concurrent terms, including eight years for the tampering and cocaine charges, and lesser sentences for the remaining convictions. He was found not guilty of possessing drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court's sentencing decisions. The appellate court emphasizes that the jury determines witness credibility and evidence weight, and the appellant must demonstrate the evidence is insufficient to uphold the convictions. A jury may base its verdict on both direct and circumstantial evidence.

A guilty verdict based solely on circumstantial evidence requires that the evidence must be so compelling as to exclude all reasonable hypotheses other than the defendant's guilt, as established in State v. Crawford. To convict for possession of crack cocaine with intent to sell, the State needed to demonstrate that the appellant knowingly possessed crack cocaine with the intent to sell it. Evidence presented at trial indicated that the appellant did not reside in the Edgehill housing projects but was seen with others in the area, which is known for drug activity, at an early hour, suggesting illicit behavior. The appellant attempted to flee upon noticing police and was observed holding six to ten white 'rocks' of crack cocaine, which could be subdivided for resale. No evidence of personal use paraphernalia was found. The appellant's assertion that a prior case (State v. Jones) was controlling was rejected, as the circumstances differed; in Jones, there was insufficient evidence regarding the amount of cocaine for sale versus personal use. In this case, testimony confirmed the rocks were each valued for sale, supporting the conclusion that the appellant possessed the crack cocaine with intent to sell. Additionally, to prove tampering with evidence, the State needed to show the appellant knowingly altered or concealed evidence relevant to an ongoing investigation. Officer testimony indicated that the rocks were consistent in size and appearance, supporting the assertion that they were crack cocaine.

The appellant, in response to Sgt. DeLap’s inquiry about the contents of his hand, quickly concealed most of the rocks in his mouth, impeding the police investigation. This behavior led the jury to reasonably conclude that the appellant was guilty of tampering with evidence. The court's review of the appellant's sentence is de novo, according to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-401(d) (1997), which includes a presumption of correctness if the trial court adequately considered sentencing principles and relevant facts. Key factors reviewed include trial evidence, the pre-sentence report, sentencing principles, the nature of the crime, enhancement and mitigating factors, any statements from the defendant, and potential for rehabilitation.

The appellant challenges the length of his sentences for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and tampering with evidence, both classified as class C felonies with a sentencing range of six to ten years. The trial court, having sentenced the appellant to eight years for each charge, placed him at the midpoint of this range. The appellant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender based on two prior felony convictions, a classification he does not contest. The trial court applied enhancement factors, including the appellant's prior criminal behavior and noncompliance with community release conditions. However, since the trial court did not provide findings of fact for these enhancements, the review will occur de novo without a presumption of correctness. The appellant does not dispute the validity of the first or thirteenth enhancement factors.

The appellant has multiple misdemeanor convictions and two felony convictions, placing him in Range II, justifying the application of enhancement factor (1) by the trial court. The appellant's admission of committing offenses while on parole supports the application of enhancement factor (13). However, he contests the application of enhancement factor (8), arguing that a parole violation does not indicate a prior unwillingness to comply with community release conditions. The court agrees with this general principle, referencing State v. Hayes, but notes that the appellant's admissions of cocaine use while on parole and possession of cocaine while on bond for murder indicate a previous history of noncompliance. Therefore, the trial court's sentencing of the appellant to eight years for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and tampering with evidence is upheld, and the appeal is denied. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.