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United States v. Louisiana the Louisiana Boundary Case
Citations: 22 L. Ed. 2d 44; 89 S. Ct. 773; 394 U.S. 11; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 3110Docket: 9 ORIG
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 21, 1969; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the Court's opinion in United States v. Louisiana, establishing that the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted Louisiana the lands beneath the Gulf of Mexico within three geographical miles of its coastline, while the United States retained rights to lands further seaward. The "coast line" was defined as the ordinary low-water line along the coast in contact with the open sea and the seaward limit of inland waters. The Court reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings to enforce this decree. The current case involves cross-motions from the United States and Louisiana for a supplemental decree to delineate the boundary of the Gulf lands owned by Louisiana. While the boundary segments extending three miles seaward are generally clear, the dispute centers on the "line marking the seaward limit of inland waters." The United States references definitions from the international Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified in 1961, which the Court previously adopted for "inland waters" in United States v. California. Conversely, Louisiana claims this line was established by an 1895 Act of Congress and proposes an alternative decree based on that assertion. Louisiana also argues that even if the Convention definitions apply, the United States' proposed decree is overly restrictive and inconsistent with international law principles. Furthermore, the excerpt outlines the evolution of maritime navigation regulations, noting that comprehensive federal regulation began with the 1864 Act, which set rules for domestic vessels. Subsequent legislative actions, including the enactment of revised international standards in 1885 and the 1895 clarification, established that the rules from the 1864 Act would govern navigation within U.S. harbors, lakes, and inland waters, maintaining local authority over specific navigation rules in those areas. The 1895 Act authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the boundaries between high seas and inland waters using navigational aids. This authority has transferred to various officials over time and currently resides with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who designated lines along the U.S. coast. In 1953, following the Submerged Lands Act, the Commandant established new lines for Louisiana's coast, which the Louisiana Legislature accepted as the "Inland Water Line." Louisiana claims this line defines its inland waters and constitutes its "coastline" under the Submerged Lands Act, arguing that both acts should be interpreted consistently due to the shared term "inland waters." However, the contexts of the two statutes differ significantly; the Submerged Lands Act focuses on state versus national land boundaries, while the 1895 Act was concerned with navigation. Legislative history indicates no intent to link the meaning of "inland waters" across both statutes. A Senate Committee exchange highlighted the limited value of the 1895 Act's lines. The judicial precedent established in United States v. California concluded that Congress intended for the definition of inland waters to remain with the courts. Additionally, that case determined that definitions from the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone were the most applicable for the Submerged Lands Act. Louisiana contends that the California ruling does not prevent the adoption of the "Inland Water Line." The argument posits that the Convention is not meant to exclusively define inland or territorial waters or to strip nations of waters they have historically claimed. The United States claims that its long-standing, unopposed regulation of navigation within the "Inland Water Line" has established these waters as inland under international law. Louisiana contends that, even if the Convention is deemed exclusive to territorial waters, the assertion of sovereignty over the "Inland Water Line" could designate these as "historic bays" per Article 7 of the Convention. However, it is concluded that there is no evidence that the United States has treated this line as a territorial boundary. International law categorizes navigable waters into three zones: inland waters (fully sovereign), territorial sea (where innocent passage is permitted), and high seas (international waters). The status of waters as inland is influenced by historical and geographical contexts, recognizing that certain water bodies may qualify as inland through historical treatment by coastal nations. Notably, historic title requires a continuous assertion of dominion acknowledged by foreign nations, and mere regulation of navigation does not suffice for claiming historic inland waters, as such regulation is a function of jurisdiction over the territorial sea. Article 17 of the Convention recognizes that foreign ships must adhere to coastal State laws while exercising innocent passage in territorial seas. Enforcement of navigation rules by a coastal nation does not imply a claim to inland waters, as the territorial sea is measured from a defined seaward border. Even if a nation attempts to assert historic inland waters based on consistent navigation regulation, no historic title can arise if the nation explicitly disclaims territorial jurisdiction. Over the past 25 years, U.S. officials have maintained that the "Inland Water Line" serves solely navigational purposes, with the Coast Guard emphasizing that these lines do not denote Federal or State boundaries or jurisdiction. Historical practices have differentiated the "Inland Water Line" from territorial limits, with manuals on Admiralty Law clarifying the jurisdictional attributes of inland and territorial waters. The "Inland Water Line" is not a genuine demarcation between high seas and inland waters but merely indicates where Inland Rules apply. In United States v. California, the U.S. government’s disavowal of historic title was pivotal, supported by long-standing disclaimers regarding the jurisdiction over the "Inland Water Line." Congress did not intend for these lines to define territorial boundaries, as evidenced by the delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury for navigational purposes. The State Department also clarified in 1929 that these lines are not territorial boundaries. Consequently, Louisiana's assertion that the "Inland Water Line" is treated as a territorial boundary is rejected, and the argument for its adoption to ensure definitional stability in property rights is noted. Fines determined under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone would be subject to change due to the dynamic nature of the Louisiana coastline, which is affected by the Mississippi River and Gulf storms. This variability could lead to ongoing legal disputes regarding the coastline's definition under the Submerged Lands Act. Louisiana argues that the inland waters should not be uniformly defined across all U.S. coasts, and suggests that the Court should adopt a definition that better reflects Louisiana's unique coastal conditions, similar to how the Court permitted a tailored definition in United States v. California. However, the Court insists on a consistent interpretation of terms under the Submerged Lands Act, emphasizing that it has the authority to define terms but not to create state boundaries arbitrarily. There is no indication that Congress intended for the Act to allow varying interpretations in different contexts without clear congressional intent. If the shifting coastline poses significant challenges, legislative or mutual agreements could establish a fixed coastline. The Court expresses that a stable and uniform coastline is preferable for the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and international relations, indicating that a new definition for Louisiana could lead to confusion and disputes for other states. Ultimately, the Court concludes that Louisiana's coastline should be defined according to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, while acknowledging that some issues regarding its application to Louisiana’s unique geography remain unresolved and may require further factual examination. Several factual disputes require evidentiary hearings, and it is prudent to engage a detached referee to evaluate specific disputes regarding the boundary between submerged Gulf lands owned by the United States and those belonging to Louisiana. A Special Master has been appointed to address these disputes initially. One key issue is whether dredged channels in the Gulf, which lead to inland harbors, can be classified as inland waters. Louisiana argues that dredged channels are integral to the harbor system and thus qualify as "harbour works" under Article 8 of the Convention, which states that outer permanent harbor works are considered part of the coast for territorial sea delimitation. Louisiana cites the significant investment by the United States in these channels as evidence of their importance. Conversely, the United States contends that Article 8 only pertains to raised structures that physically enclose and protect the waters, asserting that dredged channels do not meet this criterion. The interpretation of "harbour works" discussed at the 1958 Geneva Conference supports the view that such works must be connected to the coast and that dredged channels, being underwater, do not qualify. Consequently, Article 8 does not designate dredged channels as inland waters. Additionally, Louisiana points to the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act, suggesting that earlier definitions of "inland waters" included channels, which were later removed to avoid limiting the scope of what might be included. However, previous rulings indicate that this deletion implies Congress intended for courts to determine these technical issues, and it remains uncertain if "channels" referred to dredged channels in the open sea. Another topic addressed is low-tide elevations, defined in Article 11 of the Convention as naturally formed land areas submerged at high tide but above water at low tide. These elevations can be used as baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea if they are located within the territorial sea's breadth from the mainland or an island. A low-tide elevation located beyond the territorial sea's breadth from the mainland or an island lacks its own territorial sea. The key issue for the Louisiana coast is whether the three-mile territorial sea grant under the Submerged Lands Act is measured from low-tide elevations within three miles of the baseline across a bay but over three miles from the mainland or an island. The United States argues that "at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland" refers to distance measurement, with "mainland" defined as the low-water mark on dry land, not including baselines across bays. Conversely, Louisiana contends that all low-tide elevations within the territorial sea are covered, emphasizing that drawing baselines across bays is essential for determining territorial sea boundaries and that "mainland" includes inland waters. The parties acknowledge that Article 11 does not decisively resolve the issue, necessitating reliance on its origins and the drafters' statements. Initial drafts from the International Law Commission in 1952 and 1954 included all low-tide elevations within the territorial sea for baseline determination. However, concerns arose that allowing every low-tide elevation to have its own territorial sea could lead to excessive claims, prompting amendments to restrict this. The final draft permits drying rocks and shoals within the territorial sea to serve as points of departure for measuring the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, clarifying that this can only occur once to prevent "leapfrogging" claims. The United States argues that these changes in language during the Geneva Conference also altered the article's meaning. The historical context of the Convention indicates that the amendment proposed by the United States did not intend to alter the fundamental meaning of Article 11, as evidenced by a lack of discussion regarding changes in the interpretation of the territorial sea. The proposal aligns with the intentions of the International Law Commission. Consequently, low-tide elevations in the territorial sea, measured from bay-closing lines, are considered part of the coastline relevant to the three-mile grant of the Submerged Lands Act. Further, Article 7(2) defines a bay as a well-marked indentation that must meet a semicircle test, which requires that the area of the bay be at least as large as that of a semicircle whose diameter is the mouth of the indentation. The state of Louisiana posits that certain indentations, such as "Outer Vermilion Bay," can be included in the calculations for this semicircle test if they are connected to larger bodies of water. Louisiana's argument hinges on the inclusion of tributary bays or indentations within a primary indentation, as supported by Article 7(3), which directs the perimeter to follow the low-water mark around the indentation and suggests that areas of smaller bays should be considered when calculating the semicircle test. However, the United States acknowledges that while tributary indentations may sometimes be included, there is no established rule mandating that all such waters be counted. The interpretation of "that indentation" in Article 7(2) implies that inclusion of inner bays is contingent upon their reasonable connection to the outer indentation, which does not apply to waters like Vermilion Bay and Barataria Bay-Caminada Bay that are separated from outer waters by islands and narrow channels. Outer Vermilion Bay does not qualify as a bay under the semicircle test, as it must include the waters of Vermilion Bay, which is part of a larger indentation that encompasses West and East Cote Blanche Bays and Atchafalaya Bay. This larger indentation opens to the sea between Marsh Island and Point au Fer. According to Louisiana's interpretation, if the western headland is at Tigre Point, the closing line to Point au Fer exceeds the 24-mile limit specified in Article 7 (4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Consequently, "Outer Vermilion Bay" is neither a bay nor part of a larger bay under the Convention. In contrast, "Ascension Bay" includes the Barataria Bay-Caminada Bay complex, which meets the semicircle test. Despite being separated by islands, the bays can be regarded as a single indentation when the islands are treated as part of the water areas of the indentation, consistent with Article 7 (3), which aims to prevent islands from undermining the semicircle test. Regarding East Bay in the Mississippi River Delta, it fails to meet the semicircle test based on a closing line between its seaward headlands. Although Louisiana contends a line can be drawn within East Bay that satisfies the semicircle test, this argument is flawed; an indentation that does not meet the semicircle test is considered open sea, not a bay. The United States maintains that the area within East Bay does not qualify as a bay due to the lack of a "well-marked indentation" and identifiable headlands. The court does not resolve whether East Bay meets these criteria but emphasizes that they must be satisfied. It rejects Louisiana's assertion that an indentation meeting the semicircle test automatically qualifies as a bay, as this contradicts Article 7 (2), which establishes the semicircle test as a minimum requirement. The history of the Convention does not support a complex interpretation regarding the treatment of islands at the mouth of a bay. Article 7(3) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone defines the area of an indentation for measurement purposes, stating that the semicircle should be drawn based on the lengths of the lines across multiple mouths if islands are present. Islands within an indentation are treated as part of the water area. Key questions arise regarding where to draw closing lines between the islands and whether these lines should be drawn landward of a direct line between mainland entrance points. Louisiana's primary argument is that closing lines should connect the mainland headlands and the seawardmost points of the islands. However, this contradicts Article 7(3), which specifies that baselines are to be drawn "across the different mouths," not at the islands' outermost points. The definition of "natural entrance points" suggests that these may coincide with the islands' edges, but there is no automatic link, and entrance points must be established according to the same principles applicable to the mainland. Alternatively, Louisiana contends that closing lines should never be drawn landward of a direct line between mainland entrance points. The purpose of Article 7(3) is to indicate that islands at a bay's mouth can link it to the mainland, potentially justifying adjustments in the area ratios of the indentation. Louisiana argues that Article 7(3) aims to expand rather than limit inland waters, and allowing islands to pull the line inward would counteract this objective, especially since the bay would qualify as such without the islands. However, Louisiana's argument is weakened by the Commentary's assertion that islands at the mouth of an indentation can separate inland waters from those outside the bay. Waters considered "landlocked" in the absence of islands are excluded from a bay if they lie seaward of the mouths formed between the islands. It is illogical to classify waters as part of a bay if they are outside its natural entrance points. In cases like the Lake Pelto-Terrebonne Bay-Timbalier Bay complex, where multiple islands create distinct mouths, waters beyond these mouths cannot be deemed "inland." Louisiana's interpretation of Article 7(3), which includes islands within an indentation as part of its water areas, is rejected. An island intersected by a direct closing line between mainland points is not "within" the indentation, and islands forming the mouth of an indentation cannot be classified as such. Article 7(3) differentiates between islands contributing to the bay's perimeter by creating multiple mouths and those entirely "within" the bay. Consequently, when islands intersected by a closing line create multiple mouths, the bay should be closed by lines connecting natural entrance points on the islands, even if those points are landward of the direct mainland line. Regarding whether an island can serve as a headland for a bay, the United States contends that the Convention prohibits closing lines to islands, asserting that a true bay must be an indentation along the mainland. The U.S. further argues that the requirement for a continuous perimeter around a bay eliminates openings between islands and the mainland, which would compromise the "landlocked" status of the waters. However, the Convention's language does not explicitly exclude islands from being considered natural entrance points, and waters can retain their landlocked quality even with additional narrow openings to the sea. The definition of the bay's area does not necessitate a continuous low-water mark. The excerpt addresses the legal interpretation of landforms, particularly in the context of the Louisiana coast, concerning their classification as headlands or islands in relation to bay delimitation under international law. It clarifies that there is no definitive rule preventing technically classified islands from being considered headlands of bays. While traditionally, bays are defined as indentations in the mainland, the unique geography of the Louisiana coast—characterized by marshy land and numerous small islands—challenges this conventional understanding. The United States has acknowledged some of these landforms as part of the mainland, as seen in the example of the western shore of Lake Pelto-Terrebonne Bay-Timbalier Bay. Historical case law, such as Louisiana v. Mississippi, supports this flexible interpretation, suggesting that certain marshy areas, despite being surrounded by water, should not strictly be deemed islands. The text emphasizes a "common-sense" approach to categorizing coastal formations, noting that both single and multiple islands can realistically be integrated into the concept of the coast. Key factors influencing whether an island is treated as part of the mainland include its size, proximity to the mainland, depth of surrounding waters, shape, and overall relationship to the coastline. The determination of whether specific islands designated by Louisiana as headlands are integral to the mainland will be evaluated by the Special Master, who will consider these factors and any additional relevant evidence. The excerpt also raises the issue of whether areas between the mainland and island chains should be classified as inland waters. Parties agree that the Convention does not explicitly classify certain areas as inland waters. Louisiana contends these areas qualify as inland waters based on several theories: the island fringes form the perimeters of bays per Article 7, straight baselines should be drawn along these islands under Article 4, and the waters should be recognized as “inland” under customary international law predating the Convention. The United States counters that island chains can only be considered as enclosing inland waters through straight baselines, a decision solely at the Federal Government's discretion, which it has chosen not to exercise. The conclusion reached is that Article 7 does not apply to bays partially formed by islands that are not realistically part of the mainland, as the term "coast" in Article 7 contrasts with "islands." Historical context indicates that such islands should be regulated by Article 4 concerning straight baselines. Article 4 allows for the use of straight baselines in deeply indented coastlines or where there are islands nearby. The Convention's drafters recognized that international law could permit island fringes to enclose inland waters under certain circumstances, as demonstrated in the International Court of Justice's 1951 Fisheries Case involving Norway. However, lack of consensus among nations on uniform rules led to the decision that each country could independently decide to draw straight baselines. The drafters intended for island formations to be treated like other islands unless a coastal nation opts to draw straight baselines. In the case of United States v. California, the court determined that the authority to decide on the use of straight baselines for determining inland waters lies with the Federal Government, not individual states. Since the U.S. has not drawn such baselines along Louisiana's coast, this position is definitive under the precedent established in the California case. Louisiana contends that its coast is ideally suited for the straight baseline method of defining maritime boundaries, and argues that the U.S. would adopt this method in international matters if not hindered by the current litigation. While acknowledging the suitability of this method for the Mississippi River Delta, the court asserts that the decision to use it should rest with the branches of government responsible for foreign policy, rather than be determined judicially. Louisiana also claims that the waters of the Mississippi River Delta, particularly East Bay, qualify as “historic bays” under international law, despite not meeting the geographical criteria outlined in Article 7. The term "historic bays" lacks a definitive definition in the Convention, leading to ambiguity regarding its application. The court defers the determination of whether these waters are historic bays to a Special Master, as was done in United States v. California. In its argument, Louisiana emphasizes its own authority and that of the federal government over the Delta waters, while the U.S. argues that such state actions do not establish historic title in this context. The U.S. maintains that it can reject a state’s claim to historic title by merely stating its disclaimer in court. The court notes that previous rulings suggest a historic title claim requires federal endorsement, which was not met in the case of California, thus establishing a precedent for the current situation. The United States' disclaimer regarding dominion over certain waters was acknowledged due to the questionable evidence of continuous and exclusive claims. The Court highlighted its reluctance to allow the United States to unconditionally block historic inland water claims, suggesting that a case might arise with clear evidence supporting such claims. It determined that Louisiana’s assertion of historic waters is not definitively questionable and should be evaluated alongside state exercises of dominion. The application of international law principles to domestic disputes was emphasized, stating that it would be unjust for the National Government to disregard historical actions in the name of its foreign relations authority. The Court ordered the appointment of a Special Master to delineate the submerged lands owned by Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. The Chief Justice and Justice Makshall did not participate in this case. The Submerged Lands Act was passed following earlier Supreme Court decisions that denied states ownership of submerged lands off their coasts, granting the United States paramount rights. The United States then initiated an action against Louisiana for exclusive possession of submerged lands beyond three geographical miles from the coast. This suit was later expanded to include other Gulf States. Texas and Mississippi sought to exclude considerations of lateral boundaries with Louisiana, but the Court indicated that the forthcoming decree would only address the rights between Louisiana and the United States, leaving lateral boundaries between states unaffected. In 1965, a supplemental decree was issued with the consent of involved parties, resolving disputes over large areas and mandating an accounting and distribution of funds collected under the 1956 Interim Agreement related to these areas. The International Law Commission, established by the UN General Assembly in 1947, had been working on codifying international law, particularly concerning the territorial sea. Following deliberations that began in 1952, the Commission adopted a final report in 1956, which led to the First U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958. This conference resulted in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, along with three other conventions addressing maritime law issues. The legislative history includes various acts and reorganizations affecting the authority over maritime rules, eventually transferred to the Secretary of Transportation and delegated to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Additionally, the "Inland Water Line" is referenced as defined in Louisiana's legislation, although it was not considered relevant in United States v. California, where both parties disclaimed its importance. Historical congressional hearings revealed that Louisiana representatives argued previous legislation did not adequately acknowledge the defined inland waters of coastal states. Louisiana's assertion that the United States cannot modify the boundary established in 1954 lacks merit, as the current issue involves the boundary of land quit-claimed to Louisiana in 1953, which is unaffected by later actions of the Louisiana Legislature. The prior case, United States v. Louisiana, clarified that state boundary matters do not influence the current dispute. Article 7 outlines specific mathematical conditions for bays to qualify as inland waters, although historic bays are exempt from these criteria. The breadth of territorial sea claims varies by nation, complicating uniformity at the Geneva Conference. The Convention on the Territorial Sea allows all states the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, while the high seas remain beyond any state's sovereignty. However, coastal nations may exert limited jurisdiction over ships beyond their territorial waters. The Convention also permits coastal states to control a contiguous zone up to 12 miles from shore to enforce regulations. A United Nations study identified three essential factors in determining a state's acquisition of historic title to a maritime area: the state's exercise of authority, the continuity of that authority, and the response of foreign states. The third factor regarding the emergence of historic titles involves the stance of foreign states towards the asserting state’s authority. Some legal scholars argue that acquiescence from other states is necessary, while others believe that mere absence of opposition suffices. Historic titles can be claimed over both territorial and inland waters, contingent on the type of jurisdiction exercised. If a state claims sovereignty over an area as if it were internal waters, it is classified as internal waters; if as territorial sea, it is deemed territorial sea. Modern legal authorities unanimously support this distinction. Jessup asserts that transient vessels must adhere to reasonable regulations set by the coastal state for safe navigation and maritime policing, citing U.S. Inland Rules as an example. Shalowitz notes that the right of innocent passage through territorial waters can be subject to specific regulations imposed by the coastal state for navigation safety and local interests. Discussions about jurisdiction clarify that while the U.S. has authority over its inland waters, this does not equate to complete sovereignty but rather to control of the territorial sea. Historical context highlights that the regulation of navigation in the territorial sea has been recognized since at least 1895, when the International Law Association established rules affirming that vessels must comply with the coastal state's regulations for safety and security during passage. This principle was similarly endorsed by the Institute of International Law in 1894 and reflected in various scholarly works of the time. The power of coastal nations to regulate navigation in their territorial seas is well-established, supported by international law as reflected in various historical documents and conferences, particularly the 1930 Hague Conference. Article 6 of the proposed codification asserts that foreign vessels must adhere to coastal State regulations regarding navigation safety. The commentary emphasizes that coastal States have a recognized right to impose specific regulations for the general interest of navigation in territorial waters. A recent United Nations study indicates that if a state permits innocent passage for foreign ships, it cannot claim historic title to those waters as internal waters, only as territorial sea. Consequently, the United States' lack of a claim to exclude foreign vessels from its "Inland Water Line" limits that area to historic territorial waters. The distinction between inland and international waters, as delineated by the Coast Guard Commandant, serves only to apply different navigational rules and does not relate to territorial boundaries. This dividing line may be positioned both inside and outside the U.S. territorial waters, depending on the location. The Commandant's proposal to adjust the Gulf of Mexico demarcation line aims to clarify its placement within territorial waters, thus eliminating questions of international law. Judicial views, including those expressed by Judge Hough in United States v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co., align with the notion that the significance of the "Inland Water Line" is limited. The 1895 Act was enacted to define the inland waters of the United States, clarifying where inland navigation rules apply, distinct from international rules. It does not alter federal district boundaries or expand federal court jurisdiction. Louisiana cites the Supreme Court case The Delaware, which established that the Inland Rules govern collisions in specific channels, reaffirming that enclosed waters are considered part of the inland waters under this Act. The Court emphasized that the term “Inland Water Line” has a limited purpose, serving only to distinguish navigation rules. Legal commentators agree that the “Inland Water Line” is a regulatory tool, not a measure of territorial limits. Care must be taken not to conflate “internal waters” in international law with “inland waters” relevant to U.S. navigation law. The boundaries for U.S. Inland Rules do not align with international definitions of internal waters. The legislative intent focused solely on navigation regulation, with the designation of the “Inland Water Line” added at the request of maritime interests. Louisiana argues that the 1889 International Marine Conference's exclusion of certain inland waters from international rules reflects a limited scope of coastal national power. Nonetheless, both the Conference and Congress recognized the coastal nation's authority to regulate navigation in territorial seas, advocating for standardized international navigation rules where delineation of national waters was unclear. Recent changes to navigation regulations have been documented in various Federal Register entries from 1966 to 1968. A significant change in 1966 aimed to update regulations regarding aids to navigation, as noted in 31 Fed. Reg. 4401. The 1953 changes to the "Inland Water Line" across the Gulf Coast were proposed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, emphasizing that fines were established for safety in navigation, as indicated in 18 Fed. Reg. 2556. When the 1953 fine was adopted, any comments unrelated to navigation safety were dismissed, reinforcing that the demarcation was solely for navigation and shipping purposes (18 Fed. Reg. 7893). In 1967, further alterations were proposed due to the existing demarcation line's inadequacy in informing mariners, highlighted in 32 Fed. Reg. 8763. However, after hearings, these modifications were withdrawn, with many comments deemed irrelevant to the demarcation's purpose under 33 U.S. Code 151, focusing instead on unrelated topics such as state boundaries and fishing rights (32 Fed. Reg. 14775). The only exception noted is a set of Coast Guard orders from May 20, 1925, during Prohibition, which defined "territorial waters" as extending three nautical miles from the coast and included specific delineations by the Secretary of Commerce. While these orders suggest a broader jurisdictional role for the "Inland Water Line," they do not substantiate Louisiana's claims, as they equate "inland waters" with the territorial sea. Louisiana argues that the line's jurisdictional significance is reflected in its adoption by several Congressional Acts, but these statutes merely apply the line seaward without asserting jurisdiction over inland waters. A 1953 congressional committee report acknowledged the difficulty in defining "inland waters" uniformly, particularly concerning Louisiana, noting the importance of geographical factors in the hearings. The subcommittee's aerial survey of Louisiana's coastline revealed significant geographical differences compared to Florida, Texas, and California, suggesting that these areas should not be uniformly classified regarding inland waters. A 1953 House Committee report recommended that Congress establish general guidelines for defining inland waters and delegate specific boundary determinations to a special commission; however, this was rejected in the Submerged Lands Act. The Attorney General also advocated for a defined boundary line on maps to minimize uncertainty and litigation costs, which was similarly dismissed in the statute. The document notes eleven dredged channels along the Louisiana coast, including notable passages such as the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet and Calcasieu Pass. Additionally, an explanation from a member of the International Law Commission emphasizes that jetties and piers should be considered part of the coastline due to their integral role in coastal geography. This perspective was supported at the 1958 Geneva Conference, which highlighted the importance of harbor works to both coastal states and international shipping. The legal status of such works, as outlined by the Commission, is critical to ensuring the stability of port facilities, reflecting a broader consensus on definitions related to harbors and associated infrastructure. The baseline for measuring the territorial sea is typically the low-water line along the coast, as indicated on large-scale charts recognized by the coastal State. Louisiana contends that the United States cannot assert that a dredged channel is not a baseline merely because it lacks a low-water line. Louisiana claims that Article 8, which outlines certain structures as part of the coast, is relevant to this exception in Article 3. However, this argument is undermined by the clear language in Articles 3 and 8. Article 3's exception refers to alternative methods for determining the baseline, which Article 8 does not provide. The United States argues that if dredged channels were considered part of the coast under Article 8, their seaward extensions could function as headlands for drawing closure lines for bays. The International Law Commission Commentary indicates that waters up to a line drawn between outer port installations are internal waters of the coastal State. Louisiana has acknowledged that using the ends of dredged channels as headlands is inappropriate. The definition of 'coastline' as per H. R. Rep. No. 215 encompasses not only the low-water line but also marks the seaward limit of inland waters, which include various bodies of water like ports and channels. Opposing this definition, Senator Cordon advocated for more general language to avoid unintended exclusions. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained the removal of specific references from the Submerged Lands Act, believing that the classification of inland waters should be left to Congress's determination. The bill H. R. 4198 elaborated on inland waters but did not clarify the status of dredged channels. Louisiana also argues for the inclusion of low-tide elevations near Atchafalaya Bay and claims there are islands within the Bay, which the United States disputes regarding their existence and classification. The resolution of factual questions regarding the existence of a spoil bank at Pass Tante Phine, which Louisiana asserts is above water at low tide while the United States contests this claim, is to be determined by the Special Master. If the spoil bank, which may be an extension of the mainland and uncovered at low tide, is confirmed to be above water, it must be included in the baseline for measuring territorial sea under Article 3 of the Convention. The United States argues that the spoil bank should not be considered part of the coast due to its unauthorized creation by Gulf Refining Co. under a 1956 permit that allowed channel dredging but not spoil bank construction. However, even if the construction was unauthorized, it does not negate its status as part of the coast, and the U.S. has the authority to address unauthorized extensions. The argument that the spoil bank should be disregarded as a "mere spoil bank" lacking purpose or utility is also rejected, as the Convention does not stipulate such criteria. The United States claims that the issue was resolved in United States v. California, but it is acknowledged that the current issue was not presented in that case, leaving it unresolved by that precedent. The legal reports referenced emphasize that drying rocks and shoals within the territorial sea are treated similarly to islands, impacting the delineation of the territorial sea. The 1952 proposal to the Commission established that elevations of the sea bed, even if only exposed at low tide, extend the limits of the territorial sea if located within it. This interpretation aligns with prior observations from the Preparatory Committee of the 1952 Hague Conference and reflects similar provisions adopted in the 1930 Hague Conference. The inclusion of such elevations is critical for determining the baseline of the territorial sea, as noted in the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882. The U.S. argues that a prior Fisheries Case implied that low-tide elevations must be within a specific distance from land to qualify for territorial sea designation. However, the International Court of Justice did not resolve this issue in that case, as the drying rocks in question were all within four miles of land. The U.K. has maintained that low-tide elevations are relevant to territorial waters only if they are within a designated distance from the low-water mark, but this does not preclude those within territorial waters defined by closing lines across bays. The U.K. further clarified that low-tide elevations within four sea miles of land could affect the territorial sea limits. The U.S. supports its interpretation of Article 11 by noting the International Law Commission's rejection of the U.K.'s proposal to clarify that territorial seas should be measured from low-water marks or baselines, suggesting that the Commission's preference for a phrase referring to the mainland indicates both terms were considered equivalent. The United States contends that its proposal was clear, referencing a previous amendment that introduced the term "mainland" to exclude water crossings. However, the existing Conference draft of Article 11 already included "mainland" in a manner suggesting that bay-closing lines would not exclude measurement of the territorial sea. If the U.S. sought to exclude water crossings, it likely would have explicitly stated this, as it did with the prior amendment. Mr. Francois, a noted expert and Special Rapporteur for the International Law Commission, aligns with the understanding that Article 11 allows for a reasonable exception concerning low-tide elevations within territorial seas, which can generate an extraterritorial sea but does not allow further extensions from drying rocks not within the original territorial sea. This is to prevent "leap-frogging" practices that could unjustly extend territorial waters. Additionally, the U.S. argues that “Ascension Bay” is not a true bay, characterizing it as a mere curvature of the coast rather than a significant indentation with landlocked waters. If accepted, this would nullify the relevance of whether it meets the semicircle test. Whether “Ascension Bay” qualifies as a bay under Article 7 is a factual issue for the Special Master, and if it does qualify, it would be classified as an oversized bay due to its closing line exceeding 24 miles. The procedure outlined in Article 7 (5) specifies that when the distance between low-water marks of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of that length should be drawn to enclose the maximum water area possible. Louisiana's chosen straight line from Caminada Pass to Empire Canal is deemed valid. The United States contends that only one or a total of 24 miles of closing lines should be permitted within an oversized bay, yet Louisiana has established additional lines across other indentations within Ascension Bay, which qualify as inland waters. The United States argues that these tributary bays should not be included in the calculation for the semicircle test but should be disregarded when measuring the enclosing area. The ruling finds no support for this position in the Convention or its history, reaffirming that the inclusion of smaller bays does not negate their status as inland waters. If Ascension Bay is deemed not a "well-marked indentation" preventing the straight baseline from being drawn, the status of beach erosion jetties on Grande Isle under Article 8 of the Convention will be considered. The United States asserts that Article 8 applies only to integral harbor structures, claiming no harbor exists between Grande Isle and the jetties. However, commentary from the International Law Commission indicates that such jetties are included as artificial structures relevant to Article 8 and are essential for protecting Grande Isle, which shelters adjacent harbor waters. Additionally, a dispute arises over the proper closing line in West Bay, with the United States challenging Louisiana's selection of the jetty's tip at Southwest Pass as the southern headland, arguing that it fails the semicircle test unless separated areas are included, which they argue are too distinct from West Bay. The determination of headland locations is a factual issue assigned to the Master. In evaluating coastal indentations, the water of bays within bays can be counted as part of the outer bay's water surface. The semicircular rule is applied to compare the total area of an indentation, including its pockets, coves, and tributary waterways, against a semicircle. A challenge arises in deciding how far into tributary waterways to measure, which may necessitate establishing a width limit for inclusion in the primary waterway. An alternative method involves applying the semicircle test to tributaries first; if they qualify as inland waters, a closing line is drawn, and the primary waterway is then assessed. The United States disagrees with Shalowitz’s suggestion to exclude qualifying bays from the area calculation of a large indentation, asserting that in West Bay, areas sought to be excluded are merely separated by strings of islands. Louisiana argues that East Bay qualifies as a historic bay, which would exempt it from the geographic tests of Article 7, including the 24-mile closing line rule applicable to internal waters. The resolution of these issues hinges on the precise location of the headlands on the mainland, with the United States and Louisiana presenting differing points. The United States' proposed straight line between mainland headlands does not fully account for the mouths between islands as claimed by Louisiana. Louisiana's direct line across the Lake Pelto-Terrebonne Bay-Timbalier Bay area meets the 24-mile requirement, while the U.S. line does not. However, the specific length of the U.S. line is not essential for the current discussion, as there is no distinction between indentations qualifying as bays with or without islands. Article 7 (3) does not limit its application solely to indentations that would not qualify as bays if islands were absent. If islands intersected by a direct line create multiple mouths, the closing lines must be chosen accordingly. Shalowitz's interpretation supports enclosing the maximum inland water area but suggests that lines should extend to islands only if they are seaward of a direct mainland line. The issue of drawing lines to islands could arise in the Caminada Bay-Barataria Bay indentation case. The classification of “Ascension Bay” as a true bay affects the ability to draw a straight 24-mile baseline and may complicate the proper closing lines for the indentation. Louisiana contests the U.S. baseline proposal, arguing for a closing line that remains entirely seaward of the islands. The resolution of whether to draw lines inward to islands not aligned with a direct mainland closing line will be left to the Special Master, as it involves interpretation of the Convention rather than factual determination. The outcome may depend on whether “Ascension Bay” is classified as a true bay or if the direct line intersects the islands, and there has been no comprehensive advocacy on this point from both sides. Louisiana's argument regarding the treatment of islands intersected by a straight mainland-to-mainland closing line has been rejected, suggesting that lines should be drawn inward toward islands that create distinct mouths to the indentation. Article 7(3) indicates no requirement for islands to be intersected by such a line, only mentioning multiple mouths due to the presence of islands. However, Article 7(3) also states that islands wholly within the indentation are considered part of the water areas. The complexity of this issue, being one of first impression with limited precedent, warrants referral to a neutral referee for clarity. The discussion includes low-tide elevations, positing that they should not be distinguished from islands in this context. Article 7(4) specifies that bay-closing lines are to be drawn between the low-water marks of natural entrance points, applicable to both islands and low-tide elevations. The United States contends that straight baselines cannot be drawn to low-tide elevations without permanent installations, as stipulated in Article 4. This argument, however, fails to recognize the differing policy considerations between Articles 4 and 7. Under Article 4, baselines can only be drawn to islands closely linked to the land, which low-tide elevations do not fulfill, potentially extending the distance between baselines and the coastline unnecessarily. Additionally, the International Law Commission highlights the impracticality of identifying baseline departure points at high tide on low-tide elevations, emphasizing that bay-closing lines are measured from low-water marks. Historical references illustrate the evolving understanding of how islands relate to bays, aligning with the modern interpretation in Article 7(3) that recognizes islands as creating multiple mouths to bays, thereby linking the waters more closely to the mainland. Some authors reference an 1839 Franco-English convention on English Channel fisheries to suggest that bay-closing fines should be established between "extreme points of the mainland and sand banks." This formulation may imply that fines should extend to land closely associated with the mainland but completely surrounded by water, akin to sand banks. The United States contends that Article 7(3) of the Convention acknowledges that islands can create multiple bay mouths but does not allow islands to create bays themselves. The government further argues that if a closing fine can be drawn from one side of a bay to an island acting as a headland, it should then extend from the island to the nearest mainland point, with this distance factored into the 24-mile test. However, this interpretation misrepresents the concept of headland location, which considers the island an integral part of the mainland, indicating no "mouth" exists between them. In the case of The “Anna,” the British High Court of Admiralty addressed a claim regarding an American ship seized near the Mississippi River Delta, ruling in favor of the claimant. The court acknowledged the complexity in defining the shore due to various small islands formed by river debris, which some argued were not part of American territory. However, the court maintained that these islands are natural extensions of the coast and should be included in territorial boundaries based on principles of alluvium and increment. The United States argues that this case does not pertain to bay delimitation but rather confirms that the three-mile territorial limit is measured from islands similarly to the mainland, as now stipulated in Article 10 of the Convention. The court's consideration of whether the three-mile territorial belt extends from both islands and the mainland is crucial, as it influences the classification of mud islands as part of the shore. Historical legal authorities assert that the term "coasts" includes natural islands, regardless of their inhabitable status. Specifically, islands formed by sedimentation at river mouths are integrated with the mainland and considered part of a nation's territory, marking the start of its coastal waters. However, this integration is context-dependent and must be assessed individually, without a strict criterion based solely on size. Factors such as the shape, orientation, and proximity of islands to the mainland are essential in determining their connection to it. The Director of the Coast and Geodetic Survey has outlined that coastlines should generally not extend to include offshore islands unless these islands significantly contribute to the mainland's coastal integrity or are enclosed by waters that qualify as inland. Each case regarding the assimilation of islands into the mainland must be evaluated on its unique circumstances, with specific examples provided, such as Caillou Bay and the waters between the Mississippi River Delta and the Chandeleur Islands. The United States acknowledges that certain sounds, while not necessarily classified as inland waters under the Convention, belong to Louisiana, a concession made early in the litigation that remains unwithdrawn despite the Convention's ratification. Louisiana asserts that some Chandeleur Islands are part of "Isle au Breton Bay," which encloses inland waters near the Mississippi River Delta's North and Main Passes, though the U.S. disputes this characterization. Louisiana does not claim that these islands are closely aligned with the mainland, which is agreed upon. The excerpt outlines criteria for employing straight baselines to measure the territorial sea, including conditions for deeply indented coastlines or island fringes, maintaining alignment with the coastline, and ensuring that enclosed sea areas are sufficiently connected to the land for internal water regime application. Baselines cannot originate from low-tide elevations unless supported by permanent structures like lighthouses, and economic interests may be factored into baseline determinations if evidenced by longstanding usage. States cannot apply straight baselines in a way that disconnects another State's territorial sea from the high seas, and they must clearly mark these baselines on public charts. Additionally, while the concept of straight baselines along islands is relatively recent, earlier principles exist, including discussions from various international law conferences. Notably, the 1930 Hague Convention did not finalize recommendations on measuring territorial seas from archipelagos or coastal islands, suggesting a ten-mile distance as a potential basis, which was ultimately not adopted due to insufficient technical detail. The excerpt outlines the development of legal frameworks concerning groups of islands and their territorial waters as discussed by the International Law Commission (ILC). Initially, a special rapporteur proposed an article (Article 10) that defined a ten-mile baseline for measuring the territorial sea around groups of islands, designating the waters within as inland waters. This proposal was intended for discussion rather than as a reflection of existing law. The rapporteur referenced the International Court of Justice's statement that state practice did not support any general legal rule regarding islands. In subsequent reports, the rapporteur refined the proposal, ultimately defining "group of islands" as three or more islands enclosing a sea area with straight lines not exceeding five miles, although one line could extend to ten miles. These lines would serve as the baseline for measuring territorial seas, with the enclosed waters classified as inland waters. The rapporteur also noted that a group could include islands and adjoining mainland. The ILC postponed decisions on these proposals, ultimately deciding that Article 5 regarding straight baselines could apply to groups of islands, while general rules would apply to other island formations. This stance was reaffirmed in 1956, highlighting the lack of consensus on territorial sea breadth and insufficient technical data. The Commission expressed hope that future international conferences would address these issues. The 1958 Geneva Conference acknowledged the significance of these problems but similarly could not finalize rules for groups of islands, with Article 10 generally applying to individual islands, defined as naturally formed land above water at high tide. Territorial sea measurements for islands follow specific provisions, as noted by Shalowitz, who also discusses how a fringe of islands can form one side of a bay, with Article 4 of the Convention as the only provision permitting such baselines. References to insular formations as bays do not contradict this conclusion. The United States argues that the chain of Keys, linked by a permanent highway, is considered part of the mainland, and that the determination of a "fictitious bay" is at the Federal Government's discretion. Louisiana claims that the U.S. is estopped from denying the “inland water” status of certain areas due to previous concessions that these waters are inland. The government acknowledges that islands within three leagues of Louisiana's shore, which belong to the state, enclose inland waters, granting Louisiana rights to the lands beneath them. Additionally, Louisiana is entitled to three miles of submerged lands beyond these islands under the Submerged Lands Act. However, the court does not intend to finalize the location of Louisiana's coastline or any other state’s coast, and emphasizes that the U.S. is not bound by previous concessions made for negotiation purposes. The submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico are classified into four zones, as indicated in an attached exhibit reflecting the Chapman-Line as the baseline. No inference or conclusion regarding the use of the 'Chapman-Line' or any boundary of the designated zones benefits or prejudices any party involved. Louisiana's "Isle au Breton Bay" is noted as not being included as inland waters in the concession. The United States’ concession may reflect a consistent international policy to classify inland waters within island fringes, but it is not currently argued that this policy equates to adopting the straight baseline approach endorsed by Article 4 of the Convention. Such an abandonment of past international stances for litigation advantages would be problematic, as any reduction of a state's recognized territory by the federal government for foreign policy reasons is questionable. Louisiana retains the right to argue that the U.S. has historically drawn its international boundaries in line with Article 4 principles. It contends that the indentations at the Mississippi River Delta should qualify as inland waters under Article 13, which outlines that a straight baseline may be drawn across the river mouth. However, the definition does not extend to indentations not containing the river itself. The U.S. asserts that the Convention only acknowledges historic bays, but it is noted that historic bays need not meet strict geographic criteria. While private citizen actions cannot typically establish historic title, actions by local governments can assert dominion against foreign nations if not opposed by national interests. Claims to historic title have been supported by such actions. The distinction is made that while the U.S. should not be compelled to extend its territory by adopting straight baselines, it should not negate the recognition of a historic title that may have already been established before being challenged in a domestic lawsuit. This situation approaches the unacceptable contraction of territory previously cautioned against in United States v. California.