Sarah v. Peltz
Docket: 01A01-9711-CH-00659
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; October 14, 1998; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee, in a case involving Philip Peltz and Sarah V. Peltz, Jesse V. Nichols, and Nancy S. Nichols, reversed the Chancery Court's ruling which dismissed Peltz's action against the Nichols based on the seven-year statute of limitations for adverse possession outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. 28-2-103. The court found that no ouster of Peltz occurred, which is necessary to establish adverse possession among co-tenants. The case dates back to 1974 when Peltz and the Nichols family jointly purchased a 48-acre property. After Peltz ceased visiting the property, Mrs. Peltz forged her husband's signature to convey the property to her parents in 1985 without his knowledge. Peltz learned of the forgery only in 1994 during a divorce proceeding. The lower court ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, but the appellate court determined that since there was no evidence of ouster, the statute of limitations had not begun to run. The court also clarified that mere occupation by one co-tenant does not equate to adverse possession and dismissed the Nichols' reliance on a precedent that involved actual ouster. Peltz was awarded a judgment against Mrs. Peltz for $7,500, subject to division in the divorce proceedings, while he voluntarily dismissed claims against the notary involved. Mr. Peltz’s signature on the deed was found to be forged, rendering the deed null and void with respect to him. Citing relevant Tennessee case law, it is established that a forged signature cannot support any legal claim unless ratified by the person purportedly signing. Additionally, since a deed falls under the statute of frauds, a forged signature does not meet the requirement for a writing signed by the liable party. Consequently, the deed does not affect Mr. Peltz’s rights. The lower court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for retrial concerning Mr. Peltz’s request for partition, allowing the court to adjust the parties' interests based on their contributions. Costs on appeal are to be equally divided among the appellees.