The Court of Appeals of Tennessee addressed an appeal involving Baxter Neal Helson (Plaintiff/Appellant) and Leticia Finley Cyrus (Defendant/Appellee) regarding custody and visitation issues. The court reviewed a lower court's order that included two key provisions: (1) the nine-year-old child would not be required to visit his father against his wishes, and (2) the mother was to facilitate a weekly private phone call between the child and father. The appellate court reversed the visitation aspect of the order while affirming the remainder.
The background involved a prior custody agreement from Boyd County, Kentucky, which granted primary custody to the mother and established visitation rights for the father. After the mother moved to Williamson County and remarried, the father sought enforcement of the Kentucky orders. The mother opposed forced visitation and requested an injunction against the father making derogatory remarks about her in the child's presence.
The lower court's order, which adopted the Kentucky visitation schedule, stipulated that visitation would not be coerced, and the child could choose whether to participate. The order also mandated that the mother inform the child of his right to refuse visitation. Additionally, it required the mother to arrange for the child to call the father weekly. The court denied the mother's request for supervised visitation and granted her motion to prevent both parties from making derogatory comments about each other in front of the child.
The court's decision was influenced by testimony from the mother, grandmother, and a psychiatrist, all indicating the child's strong reluctance to engage with his father, stemming from past negative experiences, including a haircut incident and the father's use of the child's birth name instead of his preferred name.
The child primarily resides with his grandmother and half-sister despite the mother holding custody. Testimonies indicate the child is reluctant to visit his father, exhibiting distress and agitation during and after visits. The child has expressed a desire to avoid communication with his father and has a long-standing fear of haircuts administered by him. A psychiatrist treating the child since 1994 diagnosed him with attention deficit and anxiety disorders, noting that forcing visitation would exacerbate his anxiety. The psychiatrist's observations suggest that the child's fear of separation from his grandmother and dislike for haircuts are significant issues affecting his relationship with his father.
In contrast, the father claims the child consented to haircuts and that the child's grandmother is the primary source of objections regarding his name. The court acknowledged the complexities of the child's feelings, particularly highlighting the disproportionate significance he places on haircuts and his name. The judge expressed skepticism about the grandmother’s influence on the child's relationship with his father but refrained from making definitive findings. Ultimately, the judge indicated that visitation should remain unchanged and not be increased or supervised, considering the child's expressed reluctance to visit.
The court sustains the motion against forced visitation, emphasizing that the child should not be compelled to visit the father if he does not wish to do so. The court instructs that the child must be informed of his right to choose not to visit until he desires a relationship. An order is to be issued requiring the mother to facilitate weekly telephone calls between the child and the father, ensuring privacy during these conversations. The chancellor did not find that visitation would harm the child, and existing visitation rights remain intact, contingent upon the child's wishes.
The court references the general principle that custody and visitation details fall within the trial judge's discretion and acknowledges that visitation may be restricted if it poses physical or emotional harm to the child. However, without such findings, state policy supports enabling a parent-child relationship through visitation. The chancellor's orders, originating from a Kentucky court, grant the father specific visitation rights that are not currently under appeal.
While a psychiatrist suggested that forced visitation might cause anxiety for the child, the court concludes this does not equate to severe emotional harm as defined by statute. Ultimately, the court asserts that allowing a nine-year-old to dictate visitation terms undermines judicial discretion, as the child's preference should not be the sole determining factor in visitation decisions.
At least two prior court opinions appear to conflict with the current holding, leading to misinterpretation that trial courts cannot order a child to visit a non-custodial parent against the child's wishes. The leading case referenced is Jones v. Jones, where the court mandated meaningful visitation and warned of potential legal action against the child for non-compliance. The court emphasized the need for custody and visitation orders to reflect the realities of family dynamics and to be sufficiently detailed to inform all parties of expectations and consequences. The concept of "meaningfulness" in visitation is criticized as vague and subjective, lacking a reliable standard for enforcement, and coercive visitation is deemed counterproductive, often exacerbating familial estrangement.
The trial court's order for meaningful visitation and the requirement for parents to enforce compliance were deemed excessive and have been modified to eliminate those stipulations. The remaining obligations for the parents center on refraining from disparagement in front of their children and cooperating with visitation efforts as prescribed. The notion that trial judges cannot mandate visits is likely misinterpreted, especially since the children in Jones were near adulthood and had not been alienated by the custodial parent. In the current case, the child has lived most of his life apart from the father and has expressed reluctance to visit him. However, the court maintains that it still has the authority to facilitate the father-child relationship.
After reversing the more radical provisions from the case of Jones, the obligation for both parties to facilitate visitation as prescribed by the trial courts remains intact. In this instance, the chancellor permitted the mother to inform the child that he could refuse visitation with his father, which risks ensuring the child will not visit as long as he is under the mother's and grandmother's control. The case of Collins v. Collins is referenced, wherein a court found that forcing a fourteen-year-old to visit her mother against her strong religious objections would harm the child-parent relationship, advocating instead for unmonitored telephone contact and cautioning against actions that could alienate the child from the mother. The current ruling reverses the chancellor’s order allowing the child to refuse visits, emphasizing that without evidence that visits would harm the child, such a stance contradicts public policy.
The court notes the difficulty of enforcing visitation orders, suggesting that while custodial parents should remain neutral, the onus lies on the non-custodial parent to build trust. Acknowledging potential separation anxiety due to lengthy visits, the court recommends shorter visitation periods now that the parties live closer together. The court addresses the issue of the child's hair, stating that styling decisions typically rest with the custodial parent, and both parents should respect the child's preferences regarding his name. The mother's appeal regarding telephone conversations between the father and child is deemed meritless. The court's order is reversed in part and affirmed in other respects, remanding the case for further proceedings and equally taxing the costs of the appeal to both parties.
