Michael Wayne Perry was convicted of second degree murder and first degree felony murder related to the rape of Cynthia Louise Hamilton Boyle, with the trial court sentencing him to life without parole for the first degree murder, and twenty years for the second degree murder, subsequently merging the convictions into one. Perry appealed, raising several issues: the admissibility of his recorded confession, evidence from the vehicle he drove, photographs of the victim's body, the propriety of jury instructions, the sufficiency of evidence for a guilty verdict, and the conduct of law enforcement.
The incident occurred on April 8, 1997, when Perry was last seen with the victim before her body was discovered the next day, exhibiting signs of severe trauma and multiple injuries consistent with being struck and dragged by a vehicle. After his arrest on April 15, 1997, Perry was interrogated, during which he invoked his right to counsel after approximately forty-five minutes of questioning, stating he had nothing further to say. The trial court upheld the admissibility of his confession and ultimately affirmed the original judgment, with the opinion delivered by Judge Thomas T. Woodall and joined by Judges Joseph M. Tipton and David H. Welles.
Detectives conducted multiple interviews with the Defendant, beginning with a nine-minute session that concluded at 8:00 p.m., followed by two additional interviews on the same evening from 9:02 p.m. to 9:44 p.m. and the next day from 3:00 p.m. to 3:39 p.m. The Defendant was informed of his rights at the start of each interview and signed a waiver of rights form prior to the third interview. During these sessions, he admitted to leaving a bar with the victim and described an altercation in which she became aggressive, leading to her jumping out of the vehicle and being run over. He expressed uncertainty about whether he had raped her but acknowledged possibly having beaten her.
Subsequently, at 4:50 p.m. on April 16, 1997, a warrant for first-degree murder was served to the Defendant. The following morning, he requested to speak with Detective Burns and recorded a subsequent confession in which he admitted to killing the victim after she refused his sexual advances, expressing frustration that led to violent actions.
At a suppression hearing on July 12, 1999, the Defendant sought to suppress his statements, arguing they were made in violation of his right to counsel and were not voluntarily given. Detective Burns testified that the Defendant was informed of his rights before each interview and appeared to understand them, showing no signs of intoxication or coercion. Three signed waiver forms were presented as evidence, confirming that the Defendant was aware of his rights throughout the interrogation process. Burns explained the sequence of interviews, noting that the initial two took place at the police station, while subsequent interviews occurred at the jail.
During the Defendant's incarceration, he was held in a "holding cell" and requested assistance from Officer Burns to be moved, though it was uncertain whether he meant the holding cell or the interview room. Defendant did not request legal counsel, nor did Burns recall discussing the death penalty with him. Detective Bob Harrison mentioned that during the final interview, Defendant inquired about the implications of a capital offense, which Harrison clarified could lead to the death penalty. Harrison denied any coercion or inducement to elicit a confession from Defendant, who preferred to speak solely with Burns for a subsequent interview.
Testimony from a police officer indicated the holding cell's dimensions were disputed, with claims of it being either four by eight feet or twelve by eight feet, but no definitive measurements were provided. Defendant claimed he did not request Burns to visit him and was denied phone privileges. On July 22, 1999, the trial court addressed Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling that his statement requesting a lawyer warranted the cessation of questioning. Consequently, portions of the first interview after this request were suppressed, but subsequent interviews were not, as the court noted Defendant had the opportunity to seek legal counsel and had been advised of his rights. The court found that he initiated the fourth meeting with Burns, during which he confessed.
At trial, witnesses testified that Defendant and the victim left a bar together on the night of April 8, 1997. Rhonda Brymer, who worked at the bar, confirmed seeing them together and identified a vehicle involved, noting the victim's recent breakup and her tendency to seek accommodations with others. Brymer also acknowledged receiving a reward for providing information leading to Defendant's capture.
James Gann, a convicted felon and former boyfriend of Rhonda Brymer, testified about events surrounding the victim's murder on April 8, 1997. He observed the Defendant and the victim together at a bar, where the Defendant called the victim to leave with him. Days later, Gann saw the Defendant arrive on a bicycle and attempted to alert Brymer to call the police by winking at her; the Defendant noticed and fled. Gann, who was serving time for forgery at the trial, initially expressed suspicion towards Albert Branham, the victim’s boyfriend, regarding the murder but denied having bought multiple drinks for the Defendant, claiming he only bought one beer for him and a couple for the victim.
Dorothy Locke, Brymer’s mother, testified that the victim, who was often homeless, asked the Defendant for a ride on the night of her death and noted that he appeared sober. After the murder, she and her husband searched for the Defendant's house and reported it to the police. She acknowledged that she received a $350 reward for information and mentioned the victim had previously left the bar with different men.
David Locke, Dorothy’s husband, confirmed that the Defendant frequented the bar but did not buy anything on that night; he later saw the victim and Defendant leave together in a Chevrolet Blazer.
Terry Bowman from the Lebanon Police Department arrived at the murder scene on April 9, where he found the victim's body with signs of a struggle, including clothing that appeared forcibly removed. Photographs taken at the scene depicted the victim’s body and personal items scattered around. Mary Day Reynolds, a teacher, identified a child's drawing found at the scene as having been created by Defendant's son, Michael, linking the drawing to the Defendant’s family.
Detective Robert Harrison from the Lebanon Police Department testified about the procedures followed in interviewing the Defendant, including the signing of a consent form on April 15, 1997, which permitted a blood draw for a sexual assault kit. The blood was collected at University Medical Center Hospital and sent for analysis to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Crime Laboratory. During cross-examination, Harrison noted the victim’s history of residing in Lebanon intermittently, her multiple marriages, and her frequent visits to a local bar where she interacted with various men, including individuals known to Harrison.
The initial two interviews with the Defendant occurred at the Lebanon Police Department, while the third was held in a small room in the county jail, which Harrison described as somewhat uncomfortable. The Defendant had been in custody for less than twenty-four hours at that time. Harrison, trained in interrogation techniques, acknowledged that he began to assert his views on the case towards the end of the third interview, which led to the Defendant's fourth statement reflecting some of Harrison's phrasing, though it also included new elements not previously mentioned. Detective Burns corroborated that he participated in the interviews and noted that the fourth interview was unplanned, prompted by the Defendant expressing a desire to speak with him, during which the Defendant revealed distressing thoughts about the victim.
Defendant expressed a preference to speak into a tape recorder rather than engage in a traditional interview with Burns. After being read his Miranda rights and signing a waiver, he recorded a statement detailing events from the night of the incident. In his account, Defendant described consuming alcohol and valium before encountering a woman, whom he could not name. He recounted that after she refused his sexual advances, he became frustrated and assaulted her, acknowledging he beat her severely and expressed uncertainty about whether he had raped her. He admitted to running over her with his truck after the assault.
During cross-examination, Burns revealed that Defendant claimed he might have run over the victim but was too intoxicated to remember. Defendant also could not recall specific details of the alleged assault. Burns noted the conditions of Defendant’s detention, including lack of contact with family and limited amenities.
Forensic Agent Linda Littlejohn, investigating the homicide, testified about evidence collected at the crime scene, including tire tracks matching Defendant's father-in-law’s vehicle, buttons from the victim’s blouse, and human teeth found in the truck. Although hair samples were collected, they were not analyzed due to the TBI lab's protocols. DNA results from blood in the vehicle were obtained, but the hair analysis wasn’t pursued since initial evidence testing was conclusive. Littlejohn acknowledged that without DNA testing, the identity of the hair samples remained unknown, and she was unaware of any fingerprint comparisons conducted.
Littlejohn acknowledged that tire tracks at the murder scene might match those of a vehicle similar to the Blazer, but the tracks on the victim’s body lacked enough detail to ascertain how many times she was run over. Special Agent Joe Minor from the TBI conducted DNA analysis on blood samples from the Blazer and the Defendant’s jeans, finding that blood on the jeans, rear passenger seat, and one wrench matched the victim's DNA profile. The likelihood of another individual sharing this DNA profile was calculated to be 1 in 1,670 for Caucasians and 1 in 4,830 for Blacks. Minor could not analyze blood from a second wrench due to insufficient DNA. He conceded that the blood could belong to someone else with a matching profile and noted the absence of sperm or semen, explaining that such evidence would be expected only under specific circumstances.
Dr. Charles Warren Harlan, who autopsied the victim, determined the cause of death to be multiple injuries. He identified tire tread marks and various fractures and contusions on the victim’s body, along with drag wounds, indicating she had been run over and dragged by a vehicle. Dr. Harlan concluded the main cause of death was "being run over," though he acknowledged some injuries could result from the victim falling or jumping from the vehicle. The victim's blood alcohol level was recorded at .22. Following the State's presentation of evidence, the Defendant's motion for acquittal was denied, leading to his conviction for first-degree felony murder and second-degree murder. The court sentenced him to life without parole for the first-degree murder and twenty years for the second-degree murder, ultimately merging the counts into one conviction.
The Defendant contested the admissibility of his confession, claiming it was coerced due to his claustrophobia and discomfort during police interviews. He argued that Detective Burns improperly initiated contact leading to the confession, which he claimed was not made voluntarily. The State maintained that the trial court correctly found that the Defendant initiated the fourth interview and that his confession followed a valid waiver of rights.
A trial court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing enjoy a presumption of correctness and can only be overturned on appeal if the evidence strongly contradicts them. The determination of a confession's voluntariness is also presumed correct on appeal. However, the court’s application of law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions protect a defendant from self-incrimination, requiring that confessions during custodial interrogation be made voluntarily and with a knowing waiver of the right to remain silent or to have an attorney present. If a suspect unequivocally requests an attorney, all interrogation must cease until the suspect initiates further communication. A valid invocation of the right to counsel must reasonably express a desire for legal assistance. The trial court found that the defendant invoked his right to counsel during an initial interview, which placed the burden on the State to demonstrate that the defendant initiated the subsequent discussion leading to his confession and that he validly waived his right to counsel. The court concluded that the detectives had finished their interviews on April 16, and the defendant had requested a meeting with Detective Burns on April 17, during which he was informed of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver before recording his confession without further police questioning. The evidence supported the trial court's findings, and the court's credibility determinations were given significant weight, as the defendant did not dispute being left alone to make his statement or signing the waiver before the confession.
Defendant's claim that his confession was coerced relies primarily on his discomfort in the interview room and Detective Harrison's comments about the seriousness of the offense. However, these factors alone do not demonstrate police coercion, leading to the conclusion that the trial court correctly admitted the confession as evidence. Additionally, Defendant contests the admission of evidence obtained from his Chevrolet Blazer, arguing it should be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine because it was derived from statements made after he requested an attorney. The State counters by invoking the "independent source" and "inevitable discovery" doctrines, asserting that the detectives already knew about the vehicle's connection to the crime and that the only specific detail provided by Defendant post-request was the location of his father-in-law's house, which would have been discovered through other means. The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled against a blanket exclusion of non-testimonial evidence obtained after a failure to give Miranda warnings, stating suppression is warranted only if there is actual coercion or a failure to honor the right to counsel. The prosecution can admit evidence if it can establish an independent source or inevitable discovery, applicable in this case as Defendant had already disclosed that he had driven the Blazer and returned it to his father-in-law before requesting legal counsel.
Defendant provided only the location of his father-in-law’s house after requesting an attorney, which the court deemed information that would have been discovered through standard police procedures. Consequently, evidence seized from the Blazer was properly admitted at trial, and Defendant was not entitled to relief on this matter.
Regarding the admissibility of photographs of the victim’s body, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by allowing three crime scene photographs and five photographs of the victim, including autopsy images, asserting they were excessively gory and prejudicial. He claimed these images served primarily to inflame the jury's emotions and that the medical examiner could have described the injuries without displaying graphic photographs.
Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value. The trial court has discretion in determining admissibility, which is generally upheld unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Courts in Tennessee are liberal in admitting photographs in both civil and criminal cases.
The photographs presented by Commander Bowman included three views of the crime scene, with one showing the victim’s body in a non-gruesome manner. These images were relevant to counter Defendant's claims regarding the victim’s conduct, thus their probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect. The five photographs of the victim's body used by the medical examiner were similarly justified, as they were pertinent to illustrating the injuries relevant to the charges against Defendant.
Medical testimony is generally sufficient to describe a victim’s injuries, rendering gruesome photographs unnecessary; however, there are exceptions where photographs may effectively convey the nature and extent of those injuries. In this case, the trial court held a hearing to assess the admissibility of photographs showing the victim's injuries, including tire tracks, fractures, and autopsy images revealing missing teeth and a laceration. The court ruled the photographs were admissible as the “best evidence” for the medical examiner’s findings and the cause of death. The court found no reversible error in this decision, noting the photographs, while unpleasant, were not excessively graphic and were relevant to counter the defense's claim regarding the cause of the injuries.
Regarding jury instructions, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by not properly instructing the jury on felony murder and intoxication. Specifically, he argued the court failed to clarify that the killing was closely connected to the alleged attempted rape and did not adequately instruct on the use of force or coercion. The defendant also pointed out the omission of the word “generally” in the instruction about intoxication not being a defense. The State responded that the defendant waived these issues by not objecting during the trial, and any error was harmless. While acknowledging the trial court did not use precise language from pattern jury instructions, the State argued that the overall instructions effectively conveyed the necessary concepts. The court instructed the jury that to convict for felony murder, it must find the killing occurred during the defendant’s attempt to commit rape, despite failing to provide a legal definition of “attempt,” which the State deemed harmless due to general public understanding.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of rape, and the State contended that the omission of the term "generally" in the instruction regarding intoxication was not an error. Tennessee law, specifically T.C.A. § 39-11-503, states that intoxication is not a defense to prosecution, except in cases of involuntary intoxication, which was not evidenced in this case. The State highlighted that comprehensive instructions on voluntary intoxication were provided. The court emphasized that jury instructions should not be held to a standard of perfection, and jurors are expected to use common sense when interpreting them. Although the trial court did not adhere strictly to the pattern jury instruction regarding the timing of the murder in relation to the rape, the court found that the meaning was effectively conveyed. Additionally, any potential errors regarding the phrasing of the force requirement in the rape instruction and the absence of an attempt instruction were deemed harmless. The defendant claimed the trial court erred by not providing instructions on lesser-included offenses such as voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, but the State argued that this omission did not constitute reversible error.
Prior to jury instructions, the trial court consulted with both the prosecution and defense regarding the lesser-included offenses. The only objection came from the prosecutor about the order of the charges. The court first instructed the jury on felony murder and its lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide, followed by second degree murder and its lesser-included offenses, including voluntary manslaughter. The defendant objected to the court’s omission of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, assault, and vehicular homicide as lesser-included offenses. The State contended that this omission constituted harmless error, referencing State v. Williams, where a similar failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was deemed harmless because the jury's conviction of a higher offense indicated a rejection of lesser charges. The trial court's instructions emphasized that a not guilty verdict on the higher charge would lead the jury to consider the lesser offenses. The court concluded that jurors are presumed to follow instructions and that the jury's conviction of first degree felony murder and second degree murder, excluding lesser offenses, implies they would not have convicted on more remote lesser-included offenses. Thus, any instructional error was deemed harmless, and the defendant is not entitled to relief on these grounds.
Defendant claims the trial evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree felony murder, arguing that there was no evidence of rape or attempted rape during the commission of the crime, as indicated by the absence of sperm or semen. In contrast, the State contends that the lack of semen does not negate the evidence of rape or attempted rape, citing Defendant's confession where he believed he had raped the victim, and the condition of the victim's clothing, which showed signs of being forcibly removed. The reviewing court's role is to assess whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution. The court does not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations; these are reserved for the jury. A guilty verdict, supported by the trial judge, indicates that the jury credited the State's witnesses and resolved conflicts in its favor. On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence was insufficient. Under Tennessee law, first-degree felony murder includes killings occurring during the commission of specified felonies, including rape, without needing to prove a culpable mental state beyond the intent to commit the underlying offense. Rape is defined as the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim through force or coercion.
Evidence at trial indicated that the Defendant assaulted the victim after leaving a bar, exhibiting anger when she declined to engage in sexual intercourse. The Defendant physically attacked her with wrenches and his hands and feet, forcibly removed her clothing, and either raped or attempted to rape her. He then discarded her from his vehicle and intentionally ran over her body. This evidence was deemed sufficient for a rational juror to convict the Defendant of first-degree felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Defendant challenged the conduct of law enforcement, claiming it was so egregious it warranted a reversal of his conviction. Specific allegations included the continued interrogation after he requested an attorney, the initiation of further interviews, the use of information obtained post-request to locate the vehicle, a delay in charging him, coercion of his confession, and perjury by Detective Burns during a suppression hearing.
The State countered that the Defendant did not clearly request an attorney, that any improper interviews did not prejudice him since they were not introduced at trial, and that they had sufficient information about the vehicle independent of the request for counsel. They also argued that the timing of the charges was reasonable, that the confession was not coerced, and that no perjury occurred.
The court found that the detectives violated the Defendant's constitutional rights by continuing interrogation after his request for an attorney and improperly initiating additional interviews. However, it concluded that the Defendant was not prejudiced by these violations because the State did not present the interviews as evidence at trial, applying the harmless error doctrine.
The trial court's findings that the Defendant initiated the fourth interview leading to his confession are upheld, with evidence indicating that the confession was given freely and voluntarily following a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court also determined that the evidence seized from the Defendant's vehicle was admissible, as it could have been discovered through standard police procedures. The Defendant's claim of unreasonable delay before being charged with murder is dismissed; he was charged within twenty-four hours, well within the supreme court's standard for prompt judicial determination of probable cause. The court found no evidence that this delay was a tactic to harass or intimidate the Defendant.
Furthermore, the assertion that Detective Burns committed perjury during the suppression hearing is rejected. The review of evidence indicates that the Defendant did not explicitly request an attorney during the initial interview. Although the detectives violated the Defendant's rights by continuing the first interview after he asserted his right to counsel, and by improperly initiating the second and third interviews, these violations did not prejudice the Defendant, as those interviews were not presented at trial. No significant misconduct by the detectives was found that would warrant a reversal of the conviction. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
