A coverage dispute arose under a homeowners insurance policy between State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (Appellee) and John E. White, Lisanne White, and their minor son John Austin White (Appellants). The Whites had a homeowners policy with State Farm while residing at their home in Eads, Tennessee. Following their separation in March 1996, Lisanne moved to an apartment, and John Austin lived with her but spent time with his father. On October 5, 1996, John Austin was injured in a lawn mower accident while staying with his father. State Farm's policy provided liability coverage but excluded "bodily injury to you or any insured" as defined in the policy. State Farm sought a declaratory judgment to clarify its obligations, asserting that the exclusion applied. The trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and denied the Whites' cross-motion. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in its rulings. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The moving party in a summary judgment must prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists, as established in Bain v. Wells. The court must view evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and consider reasonable inferences while disregarding opposing evidence. The nonmoving party must then provide specific facts through affidavits or discovery materials to demonstrate a genuine dispute. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts permit a single legal conclusion. There is no presumption of correctness in a trial court's summary judgment as it involves only legal questions, allowing for de novo review.
In this case, State Farm asserts that Austin is an insured under the homeowner’s policy, which excludes coverage for his injuries for two reasons: Austin was a resident of Father’s household, and Mother, also a named insured, resided with Austin. Appellants argue that they ceased being residents after moving out in March 1996, thus the exclusion should not apply. Insurance policies must be interpreted to reflect the parties' intentions, with family member exclusions deemed valid under Tennessee law.
Ambiguous insurance provisions are construed against the insurer, but clear terms should be understood in their ordinary meaning without favoring either party. A well-defined exclusion that limits coverage is not inherently contradictory to a general coverage statement. Additionally, it is established that an individual can have multiple residences while maintaining a single legal domicile.
No Tennessee case specifically addresses the residency of a minor child in similar circumstances. However, case law from other jurisdictions indicates that a minor child of divorced parents may be considered a resident of both households. In Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., the court ruled that a child could reside in both the mother’s and father’s homes, despite legal custody being held by the mother. Similarly, in Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Olson, the court found that having a child recognized as a resident of another household does not negate residency in the primary household. Pellegrino v. State Farm Ins. Co. affirmed that a child maintains residency at both parents' homes despite primary custody being awarded to one parent, emphasizing the importance of regular contact post-divorce. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Phillips also supported the idea that a child can have multiple residences, particularly in the context of divorced parents. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Williams stressed that a child remains a member of both households, while Alava v. Allstate Ins. Co. confirmed that a child spending time with both parents is a resident of both homes, reflecting the intention of maintaining relationships with both parents. Overall, the consensus across these cases is that a child can simultaneously reside in the households of both custodial and non-custodial parents, emphasizing the importance of maintaining familial bonds regardless of custodial arrangements.
The court determined that the lack of a formal custody order did not affect the residency status of the minor child. In Archer v. Nationwide Ins. Co., the court found that despite a revised visitation arrangement for the father, which allowed him time with the children during specific periods, the children had consistent residential contacts with him, establishing residency in both parents' homes. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Summers, the court addressed a liability insurance exclusion concerning a minor child involved in a fatal accident. The child's mother argued that he was a resident of her household, citing extensive visitation. The court reviewed case law that supported the notion of dual residency for minor children of divorced parents. It concluded that despite the child residing with his mother for part of the year, he was also a resident of his father's household. The court denied insurance coverage based on the exclusion, clarifying that temporary residency with the mother did not negate the child's status as a member of his father's household. The Summers court referenced previous cases, including Alava v. Allstate Ins. Co., which established dual residency under broader interpretations for coverage. However, the Progressive Ins. Co. case distinguished itself by emphasizing a narrower interpretation of exclusions in insurance policies, which the court found unconvincing in this context.
The Progressive Court limited its ruling in Alava to cases involving grants of coverage, whereas the Summers Court applied the rationale from Alava to deny coverage based on an exclusion in the policy, disregarding this distinction. The Progressive Court addressed ambiguous policy language, but in the current case, the insurance policy's language is clear and unambiguous. The appellants argue that Austin ceased to be a resident of his father's household after he and his mother moved, citing several cases involving adults, which the Court finds not necessarily applicable to minors. The Court concludes that Austin was a resident of both his mother’s and father’s households. At the time of the accident, Austin was very young, and there was no formal custody arrangement; instead, the parents informally agreed on his custody. Austin primarily resided with his mother, but his father maintained a close relationship with him and kept Austin's belongings at his residence to foster this connection. The evidence indicates a strong family bond existed between Austin and both parents, affirming his status as a resident in both households. Consequently, the homeowner’s policy exclusion applies, denying coverage for the injuries Austin sustained in the lawn mower accident. Additionally, State Farm argues that Austin is excluded from coverage because he resides with his mother, a named insured. Although there are no relevant Tennessee cases, the case of Murphy v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. is cited as persuasive, where similar circumstances led to a ruling of exclusion from coverage.
The policy includes exclusions from coverage and defines 'insured' in a manner that aligns with the case at hand. The mother argued that her minor child was not an insured under the policy since he lived with her and not with the father at the insured premises. The court emphasized that clear and unambiguous terms of an insurance policy, including exclusions, must be enforced. It determined that, because the mother is a named insured and the child resides with her, he qualifies as an insured under the policy's terms, which subsequently triggers the exclusions. Since the mother is the named insured on the homeowner’s policy for the marital residence and the child lives with her at a new residence post-separation, he is excluded from coverage. Consequently, the trial court's order is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of appeal are charged to the Appellants.
