A legal dispute arose between neighbors W. J. Crowell and Mildred P. Crowell (plaintiffs/appellants) and Larry Don Hasty and Connie Marie Hasty (defendants/appellees) regarding the location of approximately five acres of property in Bedford County, Tennessee. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were trespassing on their property and sought a judicial determination of its location. The defendants countered that they owned the disputed property and that the plaintiffs were mistaken about their property’s boundaries.
After a bench trial, the Chancery Court, presided over by Chancellor Tyrus H. Cobb, found that the plaintiffs' property was over 1,150 feet south of their believed location and ruled against the plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the evidence did not support the trial court's findings. However, the appellate court, led by Judge William C. Koch, Jr., affirmed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, indicating that the plaintiffs failed to establish their claims.
The Crowells had purchased a 14-acre tract and a 5-acre tract in 1966, believing the latter's western boundary aligned with the former's eastern boundary. Over the years, Mr. Crowell acquired additional adjacent properties, clearing and using the land primarily for cedar cutting and deer hunting. The court's decision confirmed that the plaintiffs' understanding of their property's location was incorrect.
The southern boundary of the Arnolds’ property coincides with the northern boundary of the tract purchased by the Crowells from the Comptons in March 1966. The remaining Arnolds’ property, excluding the Crowells' acquisition, is a strip 270 to 297 feet wide and 1,985 to 2,100 feet long along Old Virginia Road. Following the Arnolds’ divorce, their property was sold at auction on April 3, 1980, to Larry Don and Connie Marie Hasty, who received a deed for the 59.1 acres, excluding the Crowells' tract. Mr. Hasty, upon hiring surveyor Rex Northcutt, discovered that the purchased property included a 13-acre strip adjacent to Old Virginia Road and that Mr. Crowell’s tract was located on the southern portion of this strip, contrary to Mr. Crowell's belief.
In response, Mr. Hasty erected a fence along Old Virginia Road, prompting Mr. Crowell to send a registered letter on June 26, 1985, requesting the removal of the fence from his property within ten days. Mr. Hasty did not respond, and neither party discussed the matter further. Mr. Hasty subsequently used the property for pasture and hay.
In May 1992, the Crowells sued the Hastys for trespass in the Chancery Court of Bedford County, seeking $60,000 in damages and a boundary declaration. The Hastys denied the trespass claim, asserting that the Crowells' property was further south. After including the Bomars as third-party defendants, a bench trial took place in September 1995. The Hastys presented Northcutt's survey, which illustrated the location of the property in dispute.
In November 1995, the court determined that the Crowells' tract purchased from the Bomars was actually Tract A and dismissed the Crowells' claim of adverse possession. The Crowells contended that the trial court erred in this determination, arguing it conflicted with their deed and the intentions of the parties involved. However, the court found the interpretation of the deeds, despite clerical errors causing ambiguities, to be sensible and consistent with field monuments, supporting the trial court's conclusion regarding the location of the Crowells' property. The Crowells based their challenge on the description of their western boundary line in the deed, which they argued could only correspond to Tract B at the time of conveyance.
The southern boundary of the property purchased by the Crowells from the Bomars in March 1966 is aligned with the northern boundary of Thompson. The trial court found that the southern boundary could only coincide with Thompson’s boundary if the property was located where the surveyor identified Tract A. The surveyor confirmed the precise location of the southeastern and southwestern corners of the tract, emphasizing that the property description began at the southeastern corner of the tract conveyed to Mr. Bomar, which must be at the southernmost point, not 1,100 feet north. Courts prioritize natural objects, artificial monuments, neighboring boundaries, and then courses and distances in resolving boundary disputes. The trial court's decision relied on artificial monuments and adjacent land boundaries, which was upheld as not being against the preponderance of evidence. Although the Crowells argued that both they and Mr. Bomar intended to convey Tract B instead of Tract A, such intent is usually derived from the deed calls. While adjacent property owners can agree on boundary lines when there is ambiguity, they cannot alter boundaries through informal agreements when the descriptions are clear. No evidence was presented showing any disagreement or informal agreements regarding boundary lines among the involved parties.
Additionally, the Crowells claimed title to Tract B by adverse possession, citing Tenn. Code Ann. 28-2-105 and common-law prescription, but failed to prove assurance of title or that they possessed the disputed property adversely for the required twenty years. Under Tenn. Code Ann. 28-2-105, continuous possession for seven years under a valid title assurance can lead to acquiring fee simple interest, even if the deed is invalid, provided the disputed area falls within the calls of the possessor's deed.
The statutory prescriptive period for claiming title through adverse possession begins only when a party possesses the property under assurance of title. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming adverse possession. In this case, the court determined that a deed from the Bomars to the Crowells conveyed only Tract A, not Tract B, which the Crowells claimed to possess adversely since 1966. Consequently, the Crowells failed to prove their adverse possession claim under Tenn. Code Ann. 28-2-105.
Under common law, a fee simple interest in property can be acquired through continuous possession for twenty years without assurance of title, provided the possession is actual, adverse, continuous, exclusive, visible, and notorious. Claimants must provide clear and positive proof of their possession that leaves no doubt regarding their ownership claim. The nature of possession must be consistent with the land's circumstances.
The Crowells began possessing the disputed property in March 1966 but did not demonstrate possession for the requisite twenty years, as the property was conveyed to the Arnolds in October 1970, who subsequently sold it to the Hastys in April 1980. The Hastys fenced part of the property in June 1985, and there was no evidence that they or the Arnolds were aware of the Crowells' claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, taxing the costs of the appeal to the Crowells.
