Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 17, 1968; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the Court's opinion regarding the constitutionality and scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees all U.S. citizens the same rights as white citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey property. The case arose when petitioners, Joseph Lee Jones and others, alleged refusal of a home sale solely based on Jones's race. Initially, the District Court dismissed their complaint, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that § 1982 only applies to state actions and does not cover private refusals to sell.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's judgment, ruling that § 1982 prohibits all forms of racial discrimination in property transactions, both private and public, and is a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court clarified that § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law like the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as it solely addresses racial discrimination and does not cover other forms of discrimination such as religion or national origin. It does not regulate service or facility discrimination, advertising preferences, financing arrangements, or brokerage services, nor does it establish a federal enforcement mechanism or allow for damages.
The Court highlighted that while § 1982 is significant in banning private discrimination, the need for further Congressional action remains to create a federal enforcement framework for these rights. This was echoed in a Senate Subcommittee hearing, which emphasized the difficulties faced by private litigants and the necessity for additional legislation for effective enforcement. Representative Kelly later referenced the case in Congress, noting the differences in scope and remedy between § 1982 and the new legislation being proposed, reinforcing the need for both.
The House passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which, while not impacting the 1982 statute or current litigation, highlighted the contrast between general statutes regarding racial discrimination in property transactions and comprehensive housing laws with federal enforcement mechanisms. The excerpt discusses the landmark case Hurd v. Hodge (1948), where the Supreme Court addressed the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 concerning racially restrictive covenants. In that case, a federal district court upheld such covenants that denied Negro purchasers the ability to buy homes, affirming the notion that enforcement of these covenants did not negate the general right to purchase property. However, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1982 more broadly, asserting that it prohibits actions that deny Negro citizens the same property rights enjoyed by white citizens, regardless of whether such actions stem from private individuals or government involvement. The case did not resolve whether purely private discrimination violated § 1982, but previous rulings indicated that private conspiracies preventing Negroes from leasing property could indeed violate the statute. The current issue for the Court involves interpreting the statute’s language, which clearly grants all citizens the same rights to property transactions, emphasizing that these rights can be impeded by both private market actions and governmental actions.
A property market that excludes individuals based on race inherently denies rights to non-white citizens, particularly African Americans, who are unable to purchase or lease property on equal terms with white citizens. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 explicitly prohibits racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property, extending this prohibition to actions by both private property owners and public authorities. The respondents acknowledge that if 1982 is interpreted literally, it covers all racially motivated refusals to sell or rent, not just those endorsed by the government. However, they argue that such a reading would lead to unintended consequences that Congress could not have intended. Historical context indicates that Congress intended to guarantee equal property rights to all citizens, regardless of race, countering both government and private discrimination. The structure and language of the Civil Rights Act reveal that its purpose was to secure these rights universally, not merely against government interference. The Act included provisions for penalizing private infringements of these rights, reinforcing the notion that the rights granted were meant to be comprehensive and inclusive of all racially motivated deprivations. Respondents’ reliance on the desire to dismantle the Black Codes highlights the intent to eliminate severe restrictions that limited the freedoms of African Americans.
The respondents argue that Congress aimed solely to eliminate racially discriminatory laws in former Confederate States; however, the Civil Rights Act was intentionally drafted to have a broader application across the entire country. The language of the Act was not merely a legislative oversight, as Congress had substantial evidence of mistreatment of Black individuals by private entities, independent of any state legislation. Various sources, including newspapers and official documents, highlighted the daily violence and discrimination faced by freedmen, such as white employers denying payment and local agreements to exclude freed slaves from employment opportunities.
Congress addressed the systemic issues of private hostility toward Black individuals, noting the existence of laws that restricted property ownership for Negroes and recognizing these as indicative of a pervasive societal problem rather than isolated incidents. The prevailing attitude suggested that even if discriminatory laws were repealed, true equality would not be achieved.
During the congressional session in December 1865, it became apparent that lawmakers, particularly Senator Trumbull, believed stronger legislation was necessary. Initial proposals to invalidate only discriminatory state statutes were dismissed as insufficient. Senator Trumbull emphasized that Congress would have the authority, under the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment, to enact comprehensive measures to protect the rights of freedmen. He indicated his commitment to introduce legislation ensuring that freedmen could exercise their rights fully, including the freedom to travel, contract, and conduct business, asserting that these rights were essential for their status as free individuals.
On December 18, 1865, the Secretary of State certified the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery. Senator Trumbull emphasized the urgency of enacting a comprehensive bill to address concerns about the ongoing oppression of African Americans due to local laws and public sentiment. On January 5, 1866, he introduced what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1866, asserting its importance as a measure to ensure the practical application of the freedom declared by the Thirteenth Amendment. Trumbull highlighted that the bill aimed to eliminate the discriminatory Black Codes and secure fundamental rights for all individuals, regardless of race, including property rights, freedom of movement, legal recourse, contract formation, and inheritance.
Supporters saw the bill's broad scope as a strength, while critics viewed it as a threat to state autonomy and community membership decisions, fearing it would disrupt local governance. Nonetheless, proponents defended the use of federal authority to counteract local prejudices. The Senate passed the Civil Rights Act on February 2, 1866, fully aware of its extensive implications. In the House, discussions focused on dismantling the Black Codes while aiming to provide meaningful enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. Representative Thayer articulated that the bill's purpose was to ensure that the amendment did not remain merely theoretical but translated into real protections for newly freed individuals, emphasizing the necessity of safeguarding their newfound rights.
Representative Cook of Illinois asserted that without federal legislation, local groups could effectively deny African Americans access to basic civil rights, including property rights. Cook and others believed that Congress needed to ensure there would be no racial discrimination in property transactions. When the House passed the Civil Rights Act on March 13, 1866, it was under the assumption that the legislation would prohibit all forms of racial discrimination in civil rights. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act on March 27, 1866, but during the ensuing debate, supporters emphasized its comprehensive scope, including the right to purchase real estate without restrictions and the prohibition of preferential treatment for whites in public accommodations. The House and Senate subsequently overrode the veto, enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Act was intended to prohibit all racial discrimination concerning the rights it enumerated, including property rights, and its scope remained unchanged when it was re-enacted in 1870 after the Fourteenth Amendment. Some members of Congress supported the Fourteenth Amendment to confirm the Act's constitutionality against state action, but there is no historical evidence suggesting that Congress intended to limit the Act's application to state actions only. By 1870, many former Confederate States had renounced racial discrimination, and congressional attention had shifted to organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, acting outside the law.
It is argued that Congress did not implicitly exempt private discrimination from the Civil Rights Act through the 1870 re-enactment, as that would contradict the principle against implied repeals. Congress simply reaffirmed the 1866 law. The historical context supports a broad interpretation of the law. The Attorney General noted that the statute's earlier dormancy does not diminish its current applicability. The question remains whether Congress can constitutionally prohibit all racial discrimination in property transactions, with the Thirteenth Amendment serving as the constitutional basis for the enactment of what is now referred to as the 1982 statute.
The Amendment consists of two parts: Section 1 prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude in the United States, except as punishment for a crime where the party has been duly convicted. Section 2 grants Congress the power to enforce this article through appropriate legislation. The Thirteenth Amendment is an unequivocal declaration against slavery and involuntary servitude, extending beyond merely prohibiting state laws. Congress possesses the authority to enact laws that directly address individual actions, irrespective of state law. The central constitutional question is whether Congress can eliminate racial barriers to property acquisition under the Thirteenth Amendment. The answer is affirmative, as the Amendment abolished slavery and established freedom, empowering Congress to enact necessary laws to eradicate all badges and incidents of slavery. Historical opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 argued for a limited interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, but the authors of the Amendment intended for Congress to have broad legislative powers to protect the rights of African Americans. Senator Trumbull, a key figure in the Amendment's passage, asserted that any narrow interpretation would undermine the promise of freedom. The authority to define appropriate legislation rests with Congress, which is tasked with determining the means to achieve the Amendment's goals.
Congress possesses the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to identify and legislate against the badges and incidents of slavery. The Court affirms that Congress's determination is rational, recognizing that the burdens of slavery included fundamental rights related to property ownership, such as the ability to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property equally as white citizens do. The historical context of the Black Codes, which aimed to restrict these rights, and the subsequent racial segregation practices are framed as continuations of slavery's legacy. The Court emphasizes that failing to ensure equal property rights for Black citizens would render the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of freedom illusory.
Congress is empowered to guarantee that African Americans can purchase property and reside in communities on the same basis as white citizens. The argument is bolstered by referencing Chief Justice Marshall's assertion that as long as the ends of legislation are legitimate and constitutional, the means employed are valid. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is cited to reinforce the constitutionality of protecting civil rights.
The petitioners, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 for civil rights violations, do not require the amount in controversy to exceed $10,000 for federal jurisdiction. The Court concludes that the alleged discrimination breaches a federal statute enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, rendering it unnecessary to evaluate potential violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners aimed to compel the sale of a specific property and to prevent the respondents from selling it during the litigation, alongside seeking a permanent injunction against future discrimination in the sale of homes in the Paddock Woods subdivision.
42 U.S.C. § 1982, while declaratory and lacking explicit enforcement methods, allows federal courts to create equitable remedies. The petitioners claimed actual damages of $50 without supporting facts. They are entitled to injunctive relief, enabling them to purchase a home at the price from 1965, which is acknowledged to be less than its current market value. It is determined that the petitioners would not have suffered uncompensated injury, so the question of an implied right to compensatory damages under § 1982 remains unresolved. Petitioners are not entitled to punitive damages based on the current complaint's facts. The document references hearings prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, indicating that this Act provides more effective remedies. The Attorney General noted that the 1968 Act, if enacted, would enhance housing rights without affecting § 1982. The Act does not change or limit existing laws regarding housing rights. Moreover, the parties acknowledged that the 1968 Act would not apply to this case, as the alleged discrimination occurred before its enactment, and any claims under the Act would be barred by a 180-day limitation period. The passage of the 1968 Act post-oral argument does not provide grounds for dismissing the writ of certiorari.
In Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, the statute under review was directly applicable to the circumstances of the case and aligned with the merits of the petitioner’s claim. In contrast, the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 differs significantly from the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Historical cases such as Harmon v. Tyler invalidated ordinances enabling private racial discrimination, while early opinions suggested that § 1982 may be limited to state actions. Virginia v. Rives clarified that prior statutes did not allow removal of state prosecutions based solely on potential denial of rights, while the Civil Rights Cases invalidated earlier civil rights legislation without addressing the current statute. Additionally, in Hurd v. Hodge, it was incorrectly stated that Corrigan v. Buckley held that the statute focused on governmental action; however, Corrigan did not address the validity of restrictive covenants in that context. Ultimately, Corrigan acknowledged that the covenants did not violate constitutional amendments nor did they prevent private individuals from making contracts regarding their property, and it did not resolve whether § 1982 prohibits refusing to sell property to African Americans.
Appellants in Corrigan did not argue that the statute barred private agreements, suggesting the Corrigan decision should not be seen as a definitive judgment on that issue. The legal framework includes the Act of April 9, 1866, which was later re-enacted and codified, asserting the supremacy of the 1866 statute over conflicting state or local laws. The original text of the statute emphasized this supremacy but had parts removed in subsequent revisions. Additionally, prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress passed a bill to enhance the Freedmen’s Bureau's powers, highlighting that civil rights could be denied not just by state law but also by custom or prejudice. This indicates that discrimination could occur through private actions as well. Congressman Bingham argued that the Civil Rights Act would replicate and expand the scope of the previously vetoed bill, with no opposition to his assertion that it would cover all forms of racial discrimination. Senator Trumbull, the author of both measures, noted the intent to ensure equal civil rights nationwide and abolish all forms of servitude.
Any individual acting under the authority of law who subjects or causes the deprivation of rights protected by this act, or imposes different punishments based on previous status as a slave or involuntary servitude, or due to race or color—except as punishment for a duly convicted crime—shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Penalties for conviction include a fine up to one thousand dollars, imprisonment for up to one year, or both, at the court's discretion. The provision evolved into 18 U.S.C. § 242. Congressman Loan questioned why the second section limited punishable acts to those under color of law, suggesting broader penalties. Chairman Wilson clarified that the Judiciary Committee aimed to avoid creating a general criminal code for states, limiting criminal sanctions to those who discriminate under local laws. It was suggested that Congress believed states would punish violations of rights without official authority. Notably, only violations under state authority were subject to criminal punishment, while private violations were expected to face civil remedies. Senator Trumbull’s comments, indicating the section was directed against all violators, were contextually a response to objections about targeting state officials specifically. Further historical context is provided through references to congressional discussions and documents from the Reconstruction era.
Senator Trumbull indicated that the Civil Rights Act would not interfere with state laws that do not discriminate against individuals based on race, implying that the Act would have no effect on nondiscriminatory legislation. The Act was intended to be applicable in every state and territory upon enactment, countering any notion that it would selectively apply to states with existing discriminatory laws. Congressman Bingham asserted that the Act would be enforced uniformly across all states at the time of its passage, not just in response to future discriminatory actions.
The congressional debate also acknowledged that private acts of discrimination, referenced in discussions about the Freedmen’s Bureau, would similarly fall under the purview of the Civil Rights Act. Congressman Eldridge noted that arguments against federal intervention based on isolated incidents of mistreatment were flawed, asserting that the South had adjusted to the post-slavery context. Opponents did not deny the potential reach of the Act regarding discriminatory conduct.
Proposals were made to declare void any laws that maintained civil rights inequalities based on race or previous conditions of enslavement, particularly in former Confederate states. Senator Wilson's proposal aimed to eliminate such inequalities outright, while Senator Sumner's proposals sought to ensure equal legal recognition regardless of race or color.
The dissent argues against a previous interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, emphasizing that Senator Trumbull clarified the second clause's intent was to allow federal legislation beyond just slavery, countering Senator Saulsbury’s claim that it did not permit such interference. Trumbull asserted that Congress alone should determine the necessary legislation to enforce the Amendment effectively. He indicated that the Amendment's power was not exhausted once discriminatory laws were nullified, highlighting the ongoing obligation of states to ensure the freedoms of former slaves. The dissent warns against interpreting Trumbull’s comments as suggesting that states' obligations were fulfilled if they merely refrained from discrimination. Trumbull expressed concern over the potential oppression of Negroes through both hostile laws and societal sentiments, arguing for federal intervention unless states adequately provided for the genuine freedom of their former slaves. The discussion includes various senators' remarks reinforcing the notion that state inaction can also infringe upon citizens' rights, indicating a broader understanding of state obligations under the Amendment.
On March 15, the Senate approved various technical amendments made by the House. Senators Cowan and Davis were specifically mentioned in the context of the Act's extensive interpretation, which was widely reported in the press, reflecting public sentiment on the matter. Notably, Congress had not previously overridden a President on significant political issues, and there was a sense of satisfaction that this action was taken for the sake of justice rather than material interests. Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, aiming to protect civil rights and provide means for their vindication. However, subsequent judicial interpretations, such as in Virginia v. Rives and Hurd v. Hodge, implied that the Civil Rights Act primarily addressed governmental action. The Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize coerced labor, but in the Civil Rights Cases, it ruled that private discrimination by business owners did not constitute a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that such discrimination could be considered a badge of servitude that Congress could legislate against. The relevance of this dissent was later diminished by the enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addressed discrimination in public accommodations.
The Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude, ensuring all citizens, regardless of race, have equal rights to make and enforce contracts, sue, provide evidence, and engage in property transactions similar to white citizens. In Hodges v. United States, white men were convicted for conspiring to deny Black individuals the right to contract for employment, a right protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ruling that while the defendants racially deprived Black victims of their labor rights, not all personal assaults or trespasses constitute a reduction to slavery. The majority opinion suggested that only actions that actually enslave a person fall under the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Day, dissented, arguing that the majority's narrow interpretation undermined the freedoms intended by the Thirteenth Amendment and the broader objectives of subsequent constitutional amendments aimed at securing rights for formerly enslaved individuals. The majority's conclusions in Hodges were found to conflict with previous rulings and the Amendment's historical purpose, leading to its overruling.
