Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 3, 1968; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion regarding the constitutionality of a New York criminal obscenity statute, § 484-h, which prohibits selling obscene material to minors under 17, regardless of its obscenity status for adults. The appellant, who operates a stationery and luncheonette, was prosecuted for selling "girlie" magazines to a 16-year-old boy. The trial court found him guilty, determining that the magazines contained nudity as defined in the statute, were harmful to minors, and thus constituted a violation of the law.
The conviction was upheld by the Appellate Term without opinion, and the appellant's request for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and ultimately affirmed the lower court's ruling. The Court clarified that while the magazines are not considered obscene for adults, the statute allows the state to restrict their sale to minors. The Court emphasized that obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment, and the definition of obscenity for minors, as established in the three-pronged test of subsection 1(f), differs from that for adults.
The appellant did not contest the classification of the magazines as "harmful to minors," thus leaving no issue regarding their obscenity status. The New York Court of Appeals previously upheld the state's authority to define obscenity variably, affirming that material legal for adult distribution may still be restricted for children.
The definition of obscenity and unprotected material can differ based on the audience or demographic group targeted. States have a compelling interest in preventing minors from accessing objectionable materials, allowing them to regulate distribution to protect community health, safety, welfare, and morals. The appellant does not dispute New York's authority to set a cutoff age of 17 but argues that the constitutional right to freedom of expression should not vary based on age when it concerns sexual material. He claims that denying minors under 17 access to non-obscene material constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.
The court, however, finds no constitutional violation in New York's statute, § 484-h, which restricts minors' rights more than those of adults regarding sexual material. It distinguishes this case from past rulings that invalidated statutes affecting minors’ educational rights or religious freedoms, asserting that New York's regulation is a reasonable adjustment to reflect the sexual interests of minors. The state possesses broader authority to regulate minors' conduct, justified by the interests of child welfare and parental rights. The court acknowledges the primary role of parents in guiding their children's upbringing, asserting that the state's regulation aligns with the constitutional power to protect children from potentially harmful exposure to certain materials.
Parents and educators, who bear primary responsibility for children's well-being, are entitled to legal support to fulfill that role, as recognized in subsection 1 (f) (ii) of § 484-h, which allows parents to judge the suitability of sex-related material for minors based on community standards. The law does not prevent parents from purchasing magazines for their children. The State has a vested interest in protecting youth, which was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, and previously emphasized in People v. Kahan, where it was noted that while parental guidance is ideal, society's interest in safeguarding children justifies reasonable regulations on material sold to them. The court referenced Prince v. Massachusetts, highlighting the State's role in protecting children from harm that could hinder their development.
The legislature concluded that exposure to materials banned by § 484-h could be considered harmful to minors, and the law articulates that such materials impair the ethical and moral development of youth, despite the lack of universally accepted scientific evidence to support this claim. The courts recognize that obscenity is not protected speech and can be restricted without detailed justification. The rational basis for § 484-h's definition of obscenity regarding minors under 17 is upheld, as it aims to protect them from potential harm. The appellant's challenge to subsections (f) and (g) of § 484-h, arguing that the definitions are vague and could confuse honest distributors, is acknowledged but not definitively resolved in this excerpt.
The New York Court of Appeals determined that the definition of obscenity under New York Penal Law § 484-h aligns closely with the Supreme Court's standards, adequately informing individuals of prohibited conduct and satisfying due process requirements. The statute requires knowledge of violations, as mandated by Smith v. California, specifying that sales must be made “knowingly.” The definition of “knowingly” encompasses both “reason to know” and a belief that warrants further inquiry into the material's character and the minor's age. An honest mistake regarding a minor's age may excuse liability if the defendant made a reasonable effort to verify it.
The court highlighted that § 484-h was influenced by the People v. Finkelstein case, which established that only those aware of the material's nature should face penalties, thus preventing self-censorship of protected material. The court rejected a challenge to the statute's scienter requirement, affirming that the statute's language reflects Finkelstein's interpretation of “character.” Additionally, the court dismissed concerns about vagueness regarding the “honest mistake” defense, clarifying that the law specifies the necessity for a reasonable attempt to ascertain a minor's true age. The decision was affirmed, and the court provided definitions pertinent to the statute, including terms like “minor,” “nudity,” “sexual conduct,” and “sexual excitement.”
"Sado-masochistic abuse" is defined as acts of flagellation or torture involving a person in undergarments, a mask, or bizarre costume, or being physically restrained while in such attire. "Harmful to minors" refers to any depiction of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse that (i) appeals to minors' prurient interests, (ii) is offensive to adult community standards regarding what is suitable for minors, and (iii) lacks redeeming social importance for minors. "Knowingly" indicates having general knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe in the nature of the material and the age of the minor; a genuine mistake regarding a minor's age may be a defense if the defendant made a reasonable effort to verify it.
It is illegal for anyone to knowingly sell or loan to a minor, for monetary gain, any visual representation or written material depicting nudity, sexual conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse that is harmful to minors. Additionally, it is unlawful to sell admission to a minor for any event or venue showcasing such harmful content. Violations of these provisions are classified as misdemeanors.
State obscenity statutes that address distribution to minors are listed from various states, including provisions from California, Colorado, Connecticut, and others, covering a range of years from 1947 to 1968. The appellant does not contest the application of § 484-h, thus the court does not evaluate evidence sufficiency, burden of proof, or expert evidence requirements. The appellant argues that findings regarding sexual content in magazines, not charged in the information, necessitate overturning the conviction. However, the appellant was tried solely for selling magazines with female nudity, not for a different offense. § 484-h was enacted in 1965 to replace an invalid earlier version and was subsequently replaced by a 1967 statute, which introduced a presumption of knowledge regarding the material sold and allowed an affirmative defense for sellers if they believed the minor was of legal age. The court does not express any opinion on the constitutional validity of this presumption.
The 1967 legislation repealed § 484-i, which prohibited sales to minors under 18, and its validity was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals against vagueness challenges. The appellant faced potential penalties of up to one year in prison or a $500 fine but had his sentence suspended by the trial judge under N.Y. Penal Law § 2188 on May 17, 1966. According to § 470-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge could have imposed a sentence within one year but did not do so. The case is not moot, as the State of New York acknowledged that the conviction could lead to collateral consequences, including potential ineligibility for certain licenses necessary for the appellant’s business in Bellmore, New York. The local licensing ordinance allows revocation of licenses for criminal convictions. This situation aligns with the St. Pierre exception regarding cases that are not moot due to additional penalties or disabilities. Previous cases, such as Tannenbaum and Jacobs, were dismissed as moot because there were no demonstrated collateral consequences, unlike the current case, where the conviction may affect the appellant's business license. The excerpt also references various cases and legal standards related to obscenity and the treatment of similar issues in law.
Variable obscenity serves as a framework for addressing adolescents' access to materials intended for sexually mature adults by considering the characteristics of primary and peripheral audiences. Legislators have been urged to create laws that specifically protect children from pornographic content, as recognized by various judicial opinions and legal commentators. It is noted that the state's ability to regulate children's conduct is broader than that over adults, particularly concerning the impact of erotic material on minors, who are not fully part of the adult sphere of free expression. Regulations directed at children do not necessarily need to meet the same First Amendment standards as those for adults.
The constitutionality of such regulations is supported by cases like Prince v. Massachusetts, which uphold parental rights in determining their children's moral upbringing. While many arguments against obscenity laws also pertain to protecting children's morals, laws that empower parents to manage their children's exposure to potentially harmful content are distinguishable. The ongoing debate regarding the antisocial consequences of exposure to pornography is highlighted, with the assertion that concerns about youth being negatively affected by such material are valid. Dr. Gaylin emphasizes that children may not possess the capacity to make informed choices about pornographic content, and the distinction is made between the act of reading pornography, which may not be inherently harmful, and the allowance of such reading, which could have destructive implications. The perception of societal and parental approval plays a significant role in shaping a child's developing identity and moral understanding.
