Charles Hayes v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2000-02360-CCA-R3PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; August 23, 2001; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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A Marshall County grand jury indicted Charles Hayes on two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft, and one count of evading arrest, stemming from incidents that occurred on July 30, 1997. On October 29, 1997, Hayes entered an open plea of guilt, leaving the sentencing length and manner to the trial court. The court sentenced him to thirty-four years as a Range III persistent offender, running several sentences consecutively. Hayes appealed, arguing his sentence was excessive, but the appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. After an unsuccessful application for Supreme Court review, Hayes filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking the recusal of the trial judge due to alleged personal knowledge of the case. The court appointed new counsel, who amended the petition to include claims against both trial and appellate counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the relief petition. Hayes appealed this dismissal, asserting ineffective assistance claims and the trial judge's error in denying recusal. The appellate court reviewed the record and applicable law, finding the claims meritless and affirming the trial court's dismissal. The factual background details that Hayes, along with an accomplice, committed burglaries, leading to a police chase during which he was ultimately apprehended and confessed to the crimes.

Mr. Mike Randles from the Marshall County Public Defenders Office represented the petitioner during the trial. The State declined to offer a plea deal due to the petitioner’s criminal history and the severity of the charges. Mr. Randles explained to the petitioner that he could either plead not guilty and go to trial or enter an open plea, which would allow the court to determine the sentence. He warned that the petitioner’s extensive criminal record could lead to consecutive sentences, resulting in a longer prison term. The petitioner chose to enter an open plea and was informed by the court about the possibility of consecutive sentencing, to which he affirmed his understanding. He was sentenced to thirty-four years as a Range III persistent offender.

During the plea acceptance, Judge Charles Lee disclosed a prior acquaintance with Mr. Robert Sharp, a burglary victim, through a business transaction, although he stated he could fairly adjudicate the case. The petitioner requested the judge’s recusal, which was denied, as Judge Lee believed that his relationship with Mr. Sharp's cousin did not present an appearance of impropriety. The petitioner appealed the sentence length and the recusal issue, but Mr. Clifford McGown, the appellate attorney, chose to appeal only the sentence, deeming the recusal issue without merit. The appellate court upheld the trial court's sentence, stating it was proportionate to the crimes.

Subsequently, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance from both Mr. Randles and Mr. McGown. At the hearing, the petitioner indicated he thought the maximum sentence for his open plea could be fifteen years at 45, assuming concurrent sentencing due to the crimes occurring within a day. He acknowledged that he might have been mistaken and expressed satisfaction with Mr. Randles' performance. Mr. Randles affirmed that he had informed the petitioner about the potential for consecutive sentences. The petitioner also criticized Mr. McGown’s decision to forgo the recusal appeal, but Mr. McGown defended his action as based on his expertise regarding recusal standards and a desire to focus on viable appeal issues.

The trial court denied the petitioner's request for post-conviction relief, concluding that (1) his claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel were uncorroborated and insufficient for relief, and (2) his appellate counsel acted reasonably by not pursuing a recusal issue related to the trial judge's familiarity with a victim's cousin. The appellate court agreed, finding the allegations of ineffective assistance at both trial and appellate levels to be meritless. 

The court highlighted that the burden rests on the petitioner to prove claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by clear and convincing evidence, as defined by Tennessee law. To establish ineffective assistance, the petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. The appellate court noted that findings of fact from the trial court are upheld unless the evidence strongly contradicts them. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that, but for his counsel's alleged deficiencies, he would have insisted on going to trial instead of accepting a guilty plea. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel, asserting that Mr. Randles failed to inform him that a guilty plea could result in consecutive sentences, leading to a longer total sentence than if the sentences were concurrent. The petitioner believed that if he had known this, he would have opted for a trial instead of pleading guilty. Mr. Randles, however, testified that he did inform the petitioner about the possibility of consecutive sentences and that the maximum sentence would be fifteen years at 45. The trial court resolved the conflicting testimonies against the petitioner, noting that it had specifically advised him of the possibility of consecutive sentences before accepting his guilty plea. Consequently, the court concluded that the petitioner had been adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, rendering this claim without merit.

Additionally, the petitioner accused his appellate counsel, Mr. McGown, of ineffective assistance for not appealing the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal, focusing instead on the length of the sentence. The evaluation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel follows a two-prong standard similar to that used for trial counsel. The decision on which issues to appeal is typically at the discretion of the appellate counsel, provided those decisions are informed. Mr. McGown explained that after researching the recusal issue, he determined it lacked merit and would not benefit the appeal. His choice reflected sound professional judgment, and thus this claim also lacked merit.

The petitioner claims the trial judge improperly denied his recusal motion, asserting that the sentence was invalid due to a lack of neutrality. However, the failure to raise this issue on direct appeal waives the right to seek relief on these grounds, as per Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-206(g) and 40-30-210(f)). A presumption exists that any ground for relief not presented in a competent court is waived. Additionally, the strategic decision by the petitioner’s appellate counsel, Mr. McGown, not to pursue the recusal issue binds the petitioner. The trial judge's discretion in recusal matters can only be overturned if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. The judge must recuse if impartiality is reasonably questioned, assessing both subjective bias and objective appearance of bias. The trial judge conducted this analysis and concluded there was no bias affecting his ability to sentence fairly. His personal knowledge of the case, stemming from a mere acquaintance with the victim’s relation, was not deemed a conflict, especially since the petitioner had pled guilty. The judge primarily considered the petitioner’s extensive criminal history in determining sentencing. Consequently, the court found that the trial judge acted within his discretion in denying the recusal motion, leading to the affirmation of the trial court’s judgment.