Regina Harris, individually and as parent of a minor, Ronnie Dale Netherton, Jr., filed a medical malpractice suit against Baptist Hospital, Inc., following severe brain injuries sustained by the minor at birth. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Baptist Hospital, ruling out negligence related to the post-natal care of the plaintiff. However, the court overruled a motion for summary judgment concerning alleged negligence preceding the plaintiff's birth. The plaintiffs sought to reconsider this ruling, but the trial court denied the motion, stating that the supporting affidavits did not meet the requirements for newly discovered evidence. The plaintiffs contended that they were unaware of certain facts until an obstetrical nurse’s deposition was taken. The appellate court's review focused on whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying the motion to reconsider the partial summary judgment. The standard of review for such motions rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, as established in prior case law.
Christy Willis, an obstetrical nurse, informed the plaintiffs' attorney on December 2, 1997, that she had accessed information regarding temporary cord blood gas results from the laboratory, which had been printed but then removed from the file before the official lab results were reported at 11:03 PM on August 3, 1994. It was revealed that Willis was aware of the infant's severe acidosis but failed to communicate this to the nursery personnel or doctors responsible for the infant's care. The document states that plaintiffs are not required to take the positions of all possible witnesses in opposing a motion for summary judgment, and they are entitled to rely on relevant facts from the hospital records regarding the delivery and physical condition of the infant, Ronnie. The text critiques Baptist for removing pertinent information that should have been retained, questioning the logic of faulting the plaintiffs for not discovering it. It references Schaefer v. Larsen, asserting that the propriety of motions for reconsideration of summary judgment should not be judged by newly discovered evidence rules. The court emphasizes that parties are entitled to one trial and that courts should be cautious in granting new trials based on alleged newly discovered evidence. However, in the context of reconsidering a motion for summary judgment, parties are merely seeking what they are entitled to in a first trial.
A summary judgment can be granted if there are no facts upon which a plaintiff can recover. However, prior to this judgment becoming final, the plaintiff may introduce material and disputed facts through a motion. Motions to alter or amend such judgments should be favorably viewed, as the goal of summary judgment procedures is to eliminate cases without genuine factual issues from the trial docket. Previous cases, including Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., affirm this principle but raise doubts about the ongoing viability of Schaefer. In Braswell v. Carothers, the trial court denied a motion to reconsider a summary judgment, leading the court to endorse the new evidence analysis from Schaefer, which stated that evidence presented by affidavit must have been available to counsel prior to the hearing to be considered newly discovered. The court criticized the holding in Marr, asserting that the reasoning in Schaefer is stronger. Even if Marr’s reasoning were accepted, the trial court erred in not granting the reconsideration motion due to evidence that was not available to plaintiffs at the time of the original summary judgment. This evidence, crucial to questioning Baptist's post-delivery care, was disclosed nearly nine months after the summary judgment was granted.
The Trial Court's handling of the partial summary judgments in favor of Baptist and Dr. Andrew L. Chern is critiqued. It is noted that the order did not explicitly preclude the defendants from renewing their motion for summary judgment after further discovery. The Trial Judge indicated openness to reconsider a second motion from the defendants aimed at overturning the denied portions of their summary judgment motions. Given this context, it is argued that the plaintiffs should similarly have the opportunity to re-raise their issues after discovery. The conclusion reached is that the Trial Court should have granted the motion to reconsider and taken into account the supporting affidavits. Although Baptist argued that the partial summary judgment was appropriate even without considering these affidavits, their counsel conceded during oral arguments that if the affidavits were reviewed, the Trial Court would likely have overruled Baptist's motion. There exists a material factual dispute between the affidavits submitted with the reconsideration motion and those filed by Baptist. As a result, the judgment granting partial summary judgment in favor of Baptist Hospital is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The costs of appeal are directed against Baptist Hospital.
