Harry G. Parman appeals the trial court's denial of his summary judgment motion and the grant of summary judgment to Hickory Woods Estates Homeowners Association (the Association). The Association, a nonprofit managing the Hickory Woods subdivision in Davidson County, operates under the 'Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Hickory Woods' (Declaration of Covenants), which requires property improvements to receive approval from its Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Parman, who owns a home in the subdivision, began constructing a twelve-by-forty foot detached accessory storage building without ARC approval. After his request for permission was denied on August 12, 1997, Parman was instructed to stop construction and remove the building. Despite this, he continued, leading the Association to file a lawsuit on December 9, 1997, seeking a declaratory judgment against him for violating the Declaration and demanding the removal of the building. Parman's counter-complaint alleges he was unaware of the restrictive covenants when purchasing the property, received notice of the restrictions only after starting construction, and claims he was not informed of any Architectural Guidelines or ARC meetings regarding the building's compliance. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
A declaration is sought stating that the plaintiff's actions against Harry G. Parman were arbitrary, capricious, and an unreasonable restriction of his property rights. On September 24, 1998, the Association filed for summary judgment concerning its claim and Parman's counter-claim, asserting that he had knowledge of and failed to comply with the restrictive covenants. Parman also moved for summary judgment, claiming the enforcement of these covenants was unreasonable. Following a hearing, on November 20, 1998, the trial court granted the Association's motions and denied Parman's, determining that Parman was aware of the Declaration of Covenants as referenced in his property deed and had violated them. The court deemed Parman's affidavit filed on the hearing day as untimely and improperly formatted. Parman appealed, questioning whether the trial court erred in its summary judgment decision. The standard for granting summary judgment is that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the absence of such issues, and the court must view evidence favorably toward the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must provide specific facts to show a genuine dispute for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts allow for a single reasonable conclusion. The review of the trial court’s decision is conducted de novo, with no presumption of correctness. The enforceability of restrictive covenants requiring homeowner association approval for property improvements is generally upheld, provided the administering entity acts reasonably and in good faith.
In Indian Hills Club Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Cooper, the court addressed the enforcement of restrictive covenants that lacked specific criteria for a review committee. It established that the committee's actions would be assessed for reasonableness. The prevailing view allows for broad discretionary powers in approving construction plans, as long as such powers are exercised reasonably and in good faith. The court noted that whether the approval of construction plans is reasonable is a factual question determined by the circumstances.
The case involved Mr. Parman, who was deemed to have constructive notice of the restrictive covenants due to their reference in his deed and his subsequent actions, which indicated he may have had actual notice. The court examined the Association’s denial of Mr. Parman's request to build a storage structure, focusing on whether this denial was reasonable. Mr. Parman claimed the Association acted arbitrarily, while the Association argued it operated within its authority and cited violations of restrictions.
The court highlighted that the Association's motion for summary judgment lacked sufficient evidence to counter Mr. Parman's allegations of unreasonableness. Consequently, it ruled that both parties failed to provide necessary proof to support their claims, resulting in a genuine issue of material fact concerning the Association's reasonableness. The trial court's summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings, with appeal costs split between the parties.
