State of Tennessee v. Terrance Rogers

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2001-00528-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; January 14, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Terrance Rogers appealed the revocation of his community corrections sentence following a guilty plea to Class D felony vandalism. Initially placed on deferred probation for four years in September 1998, his probation was revoked in November 2000 due to multiple violations, leading to a four-year sentence in the Department of Correction under the Madison County Community Corrections program. A violation report indicated that Rogers failed to report a new arrest for possession of Schedule II drugs on January 19, 2001, violating his behavioral contract, which required him to report all arrests. During the February 20, 2001 revocation hearing, the community corrections supervisor, Shirley Cerrato, testified that Rogers had not informed her of any arrests and that she became aware of his arrest through a jail list. No evidence was presented regarding Rogers' bail status at the time of the hearing. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Rogers had indeed violated the terms of his community corrections agreement.

In January 2001, Madison County Sheriff’s Deputy Fenn conducted a traffic stop and performed a pat-down search on the Defendant, discovering a plastic baggie containing crack cocaine in the Defendant’s left shoe. During direct examination, Fenn testified about his findings without objection from the Defendant. He later acknowledged, during cross-examination, that he did not conduct a field test on the substance. On redirect examination, Fenn described the substance as a small, light yellow rock and referenced his experience with crack cocaine, despite the Defendant's counsel objecting to his expert testimony, which the trial court overruled. 

During closing arguments, the Defendant's counsel argued against considering the drug possession evidence due to a lack of competent proof regarding the substance’s classification as a Schedule II drug. However, the counsel did not move to strike Fenn’s direct examination testimony at any point during the trial. Notably, the Defendant had not been convicted of possession of crack cocaine related to this incident at the time of the revocation hearing, and the trial court indicated there had been no such conviction.

The legal framework for revoking community corrections sentences indicates that a trial judge must find a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The revocation is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs if substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion is absent. The standard for proving a violation is lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring only that the trial judge exercised conscientious judgment. The Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Fenn's testimony without scientific proof of the substance’s identity. However, the Defendant did not object during direct examination, and under Tennessee law, a trial court is not obligated to exclude evidence absent a timely objection. A timely objection is necessary to preserve any error for appellate review.

Defendant did not object to Deputy Fenn's assertion that the substance in his shoe was crack cocaine, which undermined any claim regarding the admissibility of that testimony. Even if the testimony was inadmissible, Defendant's failure to object at the time of evidence admission negates any due process violation claim. Additionally, Deputy Fenn provided prior experience with similar substances that were confirmed as crack cocaine, further solidifying the testimony's reliability. 

In the second issue, Defendant contended that the trial court mistakenly revoked his community corrections sentence for not contacting his supervisor post-arrest, arguing that a phone "block" from the jail prevented him from doing so. The record lacks clarity on why the community corrections office had this block, which likely hinders communication rather than facilitates it. However, the obligation to report an arrest rests with the Defendant, who failed to contact his supervisor from January 2001 to the revocation hearing on February 20, 2001. Despite the supervisor being informed of the arrest through a third party, Defendant could have sent written notice. The court concluded that the phone block policy did not excuse Defendant's failure to comply with reporting requirements. Thus, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.