Lawrence A. Hodge v. Robert C. Edwards

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03A01-9712-CV-00558

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; October 18, 1999; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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An appeal was filed by Lawrence A. Hodge against Robert C. Edwards regarding the dismissal of Hodge's complaint for legal malpractice related to his post-conviction attorney. The trial court dismissed the complaint, citing failure to meet the requirements of a short and plain statement as outlined in Rule 8.01, T.R.C.P., and also indicated that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Hodge, convicted in 1979 for first-degree murder and aggravated rape, had previously filed petitions for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which were dismissed and affirmed on appeal. In 1997, Hodge submitted a new post-conviction petition based on what he claimed was newly discovered evidence regarding his mental health evaluations, but this was also dismissed due to the statute of limitations. Subsequently, he filed a malpractice complaint against Edwards, arguing that the attorney failed to identify and utilize this new evidence. The trial court found the complaint inadequate and ruled that any negligence claims were time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

In September 1997, the Appellant filed objections to a trial court order, asserting that the court was ignorant of the law, and attached mental health records indicating he was borderline mentally retarded and unable to read or write in English. He claimed that despite the statute of limitations potentially barring his action, his mental health status qualified him for relief under T.C.A. 28-1-106, which allows individuals of unsound mind to commence actions after regaining capacity. Following a notice of appeal filed on December 27, 1997, and a subsequent brief, the Appellee, Robert C. Edwards, submitted a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, arguing that the original complaint was never served and thus the court lacked jurisdiction. The Appellant countered that a summons would be futile due to the court's prior dismissal of the action. On July 10, 1998, the trial court denied the Appellant's motion to alter the judgment and found the Appellee’s motion moot. However, on November 20, 1998, the appellate court found that the Appellant's brief had been properly filed and that dismissal for failure to prosecute was unwarranted. The court noted that while the Appellant's complaint had technical inaccuracies, it largely met the requirements of T.R.C.P. Rule 8.01, and emphasized that pro se pleadings should be construed liberally to achieve substantial justice.

Appellant's complaint, titled 'Complaint for Malpractice, Negligence, Breach of Contract,' seeks $250,000 in damages and $100,000 in punitive damages against defendant Robert C. Edwards, alleging attorney malpractice for failing to discover childhood mental health records. The complaint is criticized for being confusing, containing errors, and lacking essential information. The Trial Court noted that the documents were prepared by Joey Perryman, a non-lawyer, attempting to act as counsel. 

Appellant's grounds for relief include the assertion that the recently discovered mental health records, if presented during his post-conviction hearings, would have prevented the dismissal of his petitions. Despite the complaint's deficiencies, it was deemed sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 8.01 T.R.C.P. However, the court upheld the dismissal based on the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice, governed by T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a), which requires such actions to be initiated within one year of the cause of action accruing. 

The court determined that Appellant's cause of action accrued when he experienced an actual injury due to Appellee's alleged negligence, specifically regarding the failure to utilize the mental health records in 1993-1994. Appellant's last post-conviction hearing was on February 24, 1994, and he received his medical records on May 2, 1997, yet filed his complaint on May 12, 1998, exceeding the one-year limitation. The court found no evidence supporting Appellant's claim that the records were newly discovered, and he should have known about the alleged injury by May 2, 1997.

The complaint was filed too late, as it was not submitted within one year of May 2, 1997. The Appellant argued that his mental illness should qualify for the saving statute under T.C.A. 28-1-106, which allows individuals of unsound mind to commence actions after the disability is removed. However, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support this claim. Notably, the Court of Criminal Appeals previously determined that the Appellant was competent to stand trial based on a mental evaluation, thus indicating that an insanity defense was not viable. The Appellant did not provide any affidavits or evidence of incompetency to invoke T.C.A. 28-1-106. Consequently, the complaint was dismissed for being filed after the statute of limitations expired. The Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute was deemed moot since the complaint was already dismissed on other grounds. The Trial Court's dismissal is affirmed, and the case is remanded for any further necessary proceedings, with costs on appeal assessed against the Appellant.