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Afroyim v. Rusk
Citations: 18 L. Ed. 2d 757; 87 S. Ct. 1660; 387 U.S. 253; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2844Docket: 456
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 29, 1967; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Justice Black delivered the Court's opinion regarding a petitioner who immigrated from Poland to the United States in 1912 and became a naturalized citizen in 1926. After voting in an Israeli election in 1951, the petitioner faced the denial of his U.S. passport renewal in 1960, based on Section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which states that U.S. citizenship is lost if a citizen votes in a foreign political election. The petitioner challenged this provision, arguing it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting that citizenship cannot be revoked without voluntary renunciation. The lower courts upheld the government’s position, citing Congress's constitutional authority to regulate foreign affairs, allowing for involuntary loss of citizenship through voting in foreign elections. This aligns with the precedent set in Perez v. Brownell, where the Court had previously ruled in favor of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to strip citizenship without voluntary renunciation. The petitioner sought to have this precedent reconsidered, highlighting ongoing controversy and confusion surrounding the decision. The Court acknowledged that recent cases and commentary have raised doubts about the validity of Perez. The central question remains whether Congress can constitutionally enact laws that strip citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation. The majority opinion in Perez justified this authority based on Congress’s implied power to manage foreign relations, asserting that involuntary expatriation falls within Congress's regulatory powers. The majority opinion concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict Congress's power to withdraw citizenship, explicitly rejecting the idea that this power is contingent upon the citizen's consent. The court asserts that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress lacks any general authority—express or implied—to revoke citizenship without the individual's assent. It emphasizes that the U.S. government derives its power from the people and cannot unilaterally sever this relationship by stripping citizenship. The Constitution does not grant Congress the explicit authority to revoke citizenship, whether through implied powers related to foreign affairs or any other specific powers. Historical legislative attempts to define actions resulting in loss of citizenship have been consistently rejected by Congress, which recognized the right of voluntary expatriation. Early Congresses debated this issue, reflecting on the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance and ultimately concluding that any relinquishment of citizenship required federal consent. The failure of proposed legislation, including a Thirteenth Amendment that would have allowed loss of citizenship for accepting foreign office, supports the view that Congress lacks the constitutional power to define acts resulting in expatriation. The document emphasizes that an individual's strong allegiance to a foreign power and a complete renunciation of American citizenship undermines Congress's authority to legislate on citizenship matters. It critiques a bill that, despite claiming to protect citizens' rights, effectively allows Congress to determine acts that could renounce citizenship. Congressman Pindall contends that allegiance belongs to the people, not Congress, and any changes to citizenship rights must come from the populace. Congressman Lowndes asserts that if Congress were meant to have such power, it would have been explicitly granted in the Constitution. The discussion highlights that defining how a citizen may relinquish citizenship is tantamount to determining how one loses that right, which should be governed by constitutional provisions rather than legislative acts. The bill was ultimately defeated, leading to the later case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, where Chief Justice Marshall ruled that once a person is a citizen, Congress cannot revoke that status. The naturalized citizen enjoys all rights of a native citizen, and Congress lacks the authority to alter these rights. The document notes that Congress's power is limited to establishing a uniform naturalization process. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment clarifies that citizenship, once obtained, is permanent unless voluntarily renounced, establishing a clear and enduring definition of citizenship that cannot be easily rescinded by the government. Fourteenth Amendment citizenship is permanent and cannot be revoked by the Federal Government, states, or any governmental unit. The Amendment was primarily designed to ensure the protection of newly granted citizenship rights for Negroes, addressing concerns raised by the Dred Scott decision, which had previously unsettled the status of Negro citizenship. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 sought to establish citizenship for all born or naturalized in the U.S., the Fourteenth Amendment's sponsors insisted on a clear constitutional definition of citizenship to prevent future Congresses from potentially stripping Negroes of their rights. Senator Howard articulated that the Amendment aimed to settle citizenship questions and secure civil rights beyond legislative control. The framers intended to prevent the government from unilaterally depriving individuals of citizenship without consent. Congressional discussions in 1868 about involuntary expatriation were swiftly rejected, reinforcing the notion that expatriation should be a voluntary act determined solely by the individual's intention. Representative Van Trump emphasized that the right of expatriation rests exclusively with the individual and that the government lacks the power to enforce expatriation without consent. The historical context indicates that any government action to forcibly exile citizens, especially for political reasons, was a violation of constitutional principles. The debates from 1818 highlighted a misunderstanding of the distinction between government authority and individual rights concerning expatriation. Citizenship is an inherent right belonging to individuals, not subject to government control, and the legislation can only recognize this right rather than regulate it. The 1868 Act emphasized that citizenship could only be lost through voluntary renunciation by the citizen, a principle upheld in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, where the Court affirmed that a person born in the U.S. to Chinese aliens was a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled that while Congress has the power to regulate naturalization, it cannot revoke citizenship acquired by birthright. Any attempt by Congress to strip citizenship, such as penalizing voting in a foreign election, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's protections. The holding is grounded in the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, aligning with principles of liberty and justice, and emphasizes that citizenship is not a trivial status to be easily revoked. Loss of citizenship can leave individuals stateless, highlighting the collaborative nature of citizenship within the nation, which cannot be undermined by transient political powers. The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards every U.S. citizen's right to maintain citizenship, irrespective of creed, color, or race, prohibiting Congress from forcibly revoking it. Citizenship can only be relinquished voluntarily. The ruling overrules Perez v. Brownell, reversing the previous judgment. A national loses nationality if they vote in foreign elections, as stated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. All individuals born or naturalized in the U.S. are recognized as citizens. The passage includes references to several significant cases, including Trop v. Dulles and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, highlighting judicial skepticism towards the Perez decision. Historical perspectives on expatriation and congressional authority over citizenship are discussed, emphasizing that citizenship is not a state-derived right and clarifying that the amendment aims to outline the voluntary nature of relinquishing citizenship rather than imply a presumption of loss. A Civil War Congress enacted two Acts aimed at stripping military deserters who sided with the South of their citizenship rights, which the dissenting opinion argues are unreliable indicators of constitutional meaning due to the emotional climate of the time. Representative Jenckes proposed an amendment for expatriation of citizens who naturalized abroad or served foreign governments, claiming it addressed voluntary renunciation of U.S. allegiance. However, Representative Chanler contended that citizenship remains intact unless explicitly renounced. Discussions by Representatives Pruyn and Van Trump highlighted that the right of expatriation belongs to the individual, not the government, with Van Trump arguing for a legislative means to relinquish citizenship without infringing on individual rights. Representative Banks, chairing the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that expatriation is a natural right beyond governmental control, reflecting the constitutional position that Congress lacks authority to legislate on such matters. The passage's implications have been interpreted as either a binding holding or obiter dictum, both considered significant. Chief Justice’s dissent noted that unlawfully obtained naturalization can be revoked, referencing cases such as Knauer v. United States.