Roy D. McGriff, the appellant, appealed a contempt ruling from the Fourth Circuit Court of Davidson County, which found him in contempt for failing to pay child support and alimony to his ex-wife, Ruth Strzelecki. The original divorce decree, issued in October 1995, mandated that McGriff pay both child support and alimony. Following non-compliance, Strzelecki sought enforcement in 1998 and filed for contempt in 1999, resulting in a judgment for $7,200 in unpaid alimony and $13,695 in unpaid child support. After a hearing, the court adjusted these amounts to $6,800 and $13,180.54, respectively, but found McGriff guilty of eighteen counts of contempt, sentencing him to ten consecutive days for each count.
On appeal, McGriff argued that the court incorrectly calculated arrearages from the date of the divorce instead of from the date of a prior judgment made by the Rutherford County Circuit Court. He claimed that the prior judgment was res judicata concerning earlier arrearages. However, the appellate court noted the lack of documentation from the Rutherford County judgment, which made it impossible to ascertain what issues were previously litigated. The court reiterated that the burden of proof lies with the party asserting res judicata, and due to insufficient evidence, this doctrine did not apply. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment regarding arrearages from the divorce decree date.
The appellant argues that the Fourth Circuit Court of Davidson County lacked jurisdiction to determine arrearages after the mother sought enforcement of a child support and alimony decree in Rutherford County. He claims the Davidson County Court lost jurisdiction, but the record lacks evidence of a transfer of the case to Rutherford County as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-3001 to 3008. The law permits enforcement of a support order in another county without transferring jurisdiction for modification, allowing the original court to retain enforcement power.
Additionally, the appellant contends the trial court erred in finding him guilty of eighteen counts of criminal contempt, asserting insufficient evidence of willful violation of the court order under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3). He cites witness testimony indicating he lived with the mother and child for a year post-divorce, was incarcerated for eighteen months, and had custody of the child for three months after release, arguing this precludes a finding of willful contempt. The court found him able-bodied, capable of earning income to pay alimony and child support, and willfully in violation of the order. The only evidence of his claimed inability to pay stemmed from his own statement, while the mother testified he had been employed during different periods. The record was deemed insufficient regarding his employment history, leading to affirmation of the trial court's contempt ruling.
The trial court found the appellant in contempt for failing to make child support payments, establishing eighteen separate counts of contempt. The appellant lived with the mother and child for only two months post-divorce and made no support payments from October 1995 to October 1996 and again from February to May 1998, and from September to December 1998. The court upheld its findings due to insufficient evidence to counter them. The appellant challenged the consecutive sentencing of 180 days, but the court maintained that the appellant had been sentenced appropriately under Tennessee law, allowing ten days imprisonment or a $50 fine per contempt count. The trial court’s discretion in determining punishment for contempt is respected unless there is clear abuse, which was not found in this case. The appellant also argued for credit against support payments for living with the mother and child, but the court ruled that the appellant was entitled to credit for only the two months he cohabited with them, a finding supported by the evidence. Consequently, the trial court's decision was affirmed, the costs were taxed to the appellant, and the case was remanded for any necessary further proceedings.
