State of Tennessee v. Timothy Tyrone Sanders

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2001-02128-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; July 5, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Timothy Tyrone Sanders was convicted in the Bedford County Circuit Court for possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced to seventeen years and six months as a Range II offender. His initial conviction was reversed on appeal due to improper jury instructions regarding the lesser-included offense of simple possession, leading to a retrial. During the retrial, Officer James Wilkerson testified that he and Detective Tony Andrew Collins were patrolling Byrd Street in response to complaints of drug activity. They observed Sanders driving erratically and followed him until he parked. Upon approaching him, they detected a strong odor of alcohol and noted that Sanders appeared nervous, shaking, and sweating. Officer Wilkerson conducted a pat-down for weapons and directed Sanders to sit on the ground. Sanders raised two issues on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court's determination of his sentence length. After reviewing the record, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Detective Collins observed suspicious behavior from passenger Webster while Officer Wilkerson interacted with the appellant. Concerned by Webster’s hand movements, Collins drew his weapon and instructed all passengers to keep their hands visible. After additional officers arrived, Collins ordered Webster and Sutton out of the vehicle for a pat-down search, which led to the discovery of a loaded 12 gauge Winchester shotgun between the driver’s seat and the center console, with extra shotgun shells found in the back seat. 

In the driver’s seat, Collins found a purple Crown Royal bag containing two clear plastic bags, each holding a substance identified as 3.5 grams of crack cocaine by forensic chemist Donna Flowers, with an approximate street value of $350. Officer Wilkerson noted that typical users carry smaller amounts, suggesting the drugs were likely for distribution, especially given the packaging method. Although no crack pipe was found, Wilkerson testified that drug dealers often use Crown Royal bags for concealment.

The appellant, who was driving the vehicle, denied ownership of the drugs during an interview but was in close proximity to the firearm. A jury subsequently convicted him of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell. At sentencing, the trial court, referencing evidence from both the trial and a previous hearing, sentenced the appellant to seventeen years and six months as a Range II offender. The appellant is appealing both his conviction and sentence.

In analyzing the sufficiency of evidence, the court emphasizes that it does not reweigh evidence, as the jury's verdict, supported by the trial court, reflects the credibility of the State's witnesses and favors the prosecution's narrative.

The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate interpretation of evidence and reasonable inferences from it, as established in State v. Tuttle. To successfully challenge a conviction, an appellant must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt, referencing Jackson v. Virginia. The State needed to prove that the appellant knowingly possessed at least .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, per Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-417. The appellant argues that the State failed to prove actual or constructive possession of the cocaine. Constructive possession can be inferred from control over the vehicle containing the drugs, and mere presence or association with someone who possesses drugs is insufficient to establish possession. 

In this case, the cocaine was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle driven by the appellant, who had just exited the vehicle. Although there was no direct proof of ownership, substantial evidence indicated the appellant was driving. Possession may be inferred from ownership or control of a vehicle containing contraband. The evidence, including the appellant's presence in the driver’s seat, proximity to a shotgun, and the vehicle's location in a drug transaction area, supports the conclusion that he had the ability to reduce the cocaine to actual possession. Additionally, the appellant's nervous demeanor was noted by an officer, further indicating involvement beyond mere presence or association. Once possession was established, the State was required to prove intent to sell, which can be inferred from the amount of cocaine and other relevant circumstances surrounding the arrest, as per Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-419.

Flowers, a TBI forensic chemist, confirmed that the substance in question was 3.5 grams of crack cocaine. Officer Wilkerson testified that this amount is significant for personal use, valued at approximately $350, whereas typical users possess only $20 to $50 worth. He noted that drug dealers often conceal their drugs in Crown Royal bags and package them for distribution. The appellant was found with $95 in small bills, while his passenger, Webster, had over $2,000. Additionally, the appellant possessed a loaded shotgun, but no drug paraphernalia was found in the vehicle or on the passengers. This evidence supported the appellant's conviction for possessing over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell.

Regarding sentencing, the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to impose a sentence of seventeen years and six months, arguing it was nearly the maximum. The court generally presumes correctness if the trial court has considered relevant facts and sentencing principles. The appellant claimed the court did not adequately consider these principles, but the review showed that the court made the necessary considerations. Factors evaluated included trial evidence, the presentence report, sentencing principles, characteristics of the crime, enhancement and mitigating factors, the appellant's statements, and potential for rehabilitation. The trial court classified the appellant as a Range II offender due to his two prior felony convictions, which was uncontested. Possessing more than .5 grams of cocaine constitutes a Class B felony, requiring a sentence between twelve and twenty years. The presumptive sentence for such felonies is the minimum unless enhancement or mitigating factors justify adjustments within the range.

The trial court identified three enhancement factors relevant to the appellant's sentencing. First, the appellant has a significant history of criminal behavior, including three felony convictions, exceeding the number required for Range II offender status, and admitted to a history of crack cocaine use. Second, the appellant has shown an unwillingness to comply with community release conditions, evidenced by two prior probation revocations. Third, the court emphasized that the appellant possessed a dangerous weapon during the offense, specifically a fully-loaded 12 gauge shotgun, which he intended to use in connection with drug activities. The trial court found no mitigating factors applicable. Although the appellant argued that his actions did not pose a serious threat of bodily injury and claimed a minor role in the crime, the court rejected these claims. The circumstances—including the loaded shotgun's presence and the appellant's driving of the vehicle containing drugs—indicated that he played a significant role in the offense.

The appellant contends that his guilty plea should be mitigated due to unusual circumstances surrounding his offense, specifically citing his addiction to crack cocaine. However, the court finds insufficient evidence to apply this mitigating factor, noting that the appellant has not sought treatment for his addiction despite available options. His ongoing drug use indicates a sustained intent to violate the law, which is further evidenced by his involvement in drug sales. 

The appellant also claims he acted under duress or domination by another, but the record lacks any supportive evidence for this assertion. Under the "catch-all" provision for mitigating factors, the appellant argues for consideration of his status as an honorably discharged veteran and his work history. Although the State acknowledged his veteran status, it emphasized that he quickly engaged in serious felonies after discharge, diminishing the weight of this factor. The court agrees that while his military service is commendable, his subsequent criminal behavior reduces its relevance.

Regarding his work history, the appellant's claim of having a substantial employment record is undermined by evidence of his incarceration for much of the last decade and the lack of verification for his employment. Therefore, the court concludes that the trial court did not err in imposing a sentence of seventeen years and six months, affirming the judgment.