Defendant Rhonda Patricia Mayes was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and two counts of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court merged the possession with intent to sell into one count and the simple possession into another, resulting in a concurrent sentence of eight years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, effectively an eight-year sentence. Mayes appealed on four grounds: 1) insufficient evidence for the possession with intent to sell conviction; 2) the search warrant lacked probable cause; 3) the indictment was multiplicitous; and 4) the court erred in allowing the use of her prior conviction to demonstrate intent. The court determined that all convictions should merge into a single judgment for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, vacating the sentence for simple possession but leaving the effective sentence unchanged. The original indictment included multiple counts related to cocaine possession, Alprazolam possession, simple possession of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. The motions to suppress evidence and dismiss certain counts of the indictment were denied by the trial court prior to the jury trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict on several counts. The trial court's judgment was partially affirmed and partially reversed, with the case remanded for entry of a single conviction judgment.
The trial court convicted the defendant of simple possession of cocaine, possession of Alprazolam, marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, each classified as a Class A misdemeanor, sentencing her to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each charge. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, but consecutive sentencing was applied for a separate case due to the defendant being on community corrections at the time of the offenses. The appeal does not challenge the convictions for Alprazolam, marijuana, or drug paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied, and subsequently filed a notice of appeal.
In the appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the conviction of possession with intent to sell cocaine, questions the probable cause for the search warrant, claims the indictment was multiplicitous, and asserts the trial court erred by allowing the State to use her prior conviction to prove intent.
Evidence presented included testimony from Detective Jimmy Whitsett, who executed the search warrant at the defendant's residence, where he found various drugs and paraphernalia. Deputy Kevin Clark detailed the discovery of cocaine and marijuana in the defendant's bedroom. Detective Shane Daugherty, the evidence custodian, confirmed the retrieval of multiple drugs and $140 from the defendant, along with hand-held scales. Tim Lane, director of the drug task force, noted the presence of rolling papers and Ziploc bags, while forensic chemist Donna Flowers identified the pills as Alprazolam.
The gold box retrieved from the defendant's dresser contained 0.4 grams of cocaine and 0.5 or 0.6 grams of marijuana. Detective Whitsett discovered approximately 0.8 grams of marijuana, 0.04 grams of powder cocaine, and two Alprazolam pills under a couch cushion. In the defendant's closet, Detective Clark found about 6.6 grams of marijuana, 2.6 grams of crack cocaine, and 11.5 grams of powder cocaine. The total amount of cocaine was approximately 14.54 grams, valued around $1,400. The court examines the sufficiency of evidence when a defendant challenges it, requiring a view of the evidence favoring the prosecution. A jury's guilty verdict, supported by the trial judge, validates the State's witnesses' testimony and resolves any conflicts in favor of the State. While the defendant is initially presumed innocent, this presumption is replaced by a presumption of guilt once a jury verdict is rendered, placing the burden on the defendant to prove evidence insufficiency on appeal.
The evidence, when viewed favorably to the State, included nearly 12 grams of powder cocaine and 2.6 grams of crack cocaine found in a jacket pocket, 0.4 grams of cocaine in the dresser, and hand-held scales indicative of drug dealing. The court concluded that these factors, including the amounts and locations of the drugs, supported a reasonable jury's finding of possession with intent to sell. Additionally, the defendant argued that the affidavit for the search warrant lacked probable cause and contained false statements. The court disagreed with this assertion, affirming the decision.
A search warrant's probable cause in this jurisdiction must be grounded in a written, sworn affidavit, as mandated by Tennessee law. This affidavit must explicitly demonstrate probable cause; the issuing magistrate cannot consider external evidence not included in the affidavit. The affidavit should present facts leading to a reasonable conclusion that contraband exists at the specified location. It must be interpreted with common sense, and the magistrate’s finding of probable cause is granted significant deference.
When the affidavit relies on a criminal informant, it must satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring (1) a basis for the informant's knowledge and (2) a basis for the informant’s credibility or reliability. Any false or misleading statements in the affidavit can invalidate the warrant. The Tennessee Supreme Court has identified two scenarios allowing for impeachment of an apparently valid affidavit: false statements made with intent to deceive and essential false statements made recklessly. A false statement is considered essential if it is the sole basis for establishing probable cause.
In the current case, Agent Daugherty's sworn affidavit, relying on a confidential informant's report of seeing crack cocaine in the defendant’s home within the last 72 hours, was the basis for the search warrant. Despite attempts to conduct a controlled buy, no drugs were successfully purchased. The affidavit also referenced the informant’s prior contributions to drug seizures, providing context for their credibility.
The affidavit referenced a confidential informant who claimed to have entered the defendant's residence and requested crack cocaine. The informant reported that the defendant mentioned "things are hot right now," implying police presence. However, Agent Biele testified at a suppression hearing that the informant, not the defendant, made that statement. The defendant argued that the affidavit misrepresented this fact to bolster probable cause, asserting that the informant's unsuccessful drug purchase negated probable cause for the search warrant. The trial court concluded there was no evidence of fraudulent or reckless statements in the affidavit and found sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant, thereby denying the motion to suppress.
The affidavit was deemed valid because the informant had a history of providing reliable information leading to drug seizures and claimed to have seen the defendant with cocaine within the past 72 hours. The trial court determined that the misattributed statement did not undermine probable cause. Even if there were inaccuracies, the informant’s observations of drugs in the defendant's residence were sufficient to establish probable cause.
Regarding the indictment, Count One encompassed the charges from Counts Two through Five, with the jury finding the defendant not guilty of Count One. She was found guilty on Counts Two and Three for possession of cocaine for resale and guilty of the lesser-included offense of simple possession in Counts Four and Five. The defendant contended that the multiple counts constituted double jeopardy, arguing that she faced multiple punishments for a single crime. The court recognized the validity of this claim, noting protections against double jeopardy under both state and federal constitutions.
Multiplicity refers to the improper charging of the same offense in multiple counts, which can lead to unfair jury inferences about a defendant's criminality and violate double jeopardy protections by imposing multiple sentences for a single offense. In the case at hand, Counts One through Five charge possession of various quantities of cocaine, all totaling 14.54 grams, found in different locations within the same residence. It is concluded that these counts represent a single offense, as multiple convictions for cocaine possession found in various parts of the same residence are impermissible.
The jury convicted the defendant on Counts Two and Three for possession with intent to sell, while convicting her of simple possession in Counts Four and Five, indicating a distinction between drugs intended for resale and personal use. The multiple counts did not unduly enhance the prosecution's case, but the concern was whether the defendant faced multiple punishments for a single offense. The trial court merged the convictions under Counts Two and Three, resolving any double jeopardy issues related to those counts. However, the court erred by not merging the simple possession convictions under Counts Four and Five into the judgment for possession with intent to sell. Consequently, the sentence for the misdemeanor possession should be vacated, although this does not alter the defendant's effective eight-year sentence for the primary offense. The convictions for possession of Alprazolam, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia remain unchanged and are not part of this appeal.
The defendant contended that the trial court erred by suggesting that if she testified to having drugs for personal use, the State could question her about prior convictions for cocaine sale. However, the trial court did not make such a ruling; rather, it indicated that no ruling would occur until a jury-out proceeding. The defendant sought an advisory opinion on the potential use of her prior convictions but did not formally request a procedure to assess the admissibility of this evidence, as required by Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The court emphasized that such evidence is inadmissible to prove character but may be allowed for other purposes, contingent upon a prior hearing outside the jury's presence, which the defendant did not request. Consequently, no appealable issue arose regarding the admissibility of the evidence. The court affirmed the conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and ordered that the simple possession convictions merge into this judgment, vacating the sentence for simple possession.
