Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
State of Tennessee v. Evangeline Combs and Joseph D. Combs
Citation: Not availableDocket: E2000-02801-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; September 25, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Joseph D. Combs and Evangeline Combs were indicted by a Sullivan County grand jury on multiple serious charges, including especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated perjury, aggravated rape, and rape for Joseph, and similarly severe charges for Evangeline, including aggravated child abuse. Following trial proceedings, the court dismissed certain assault charges against both defendants due to the statute of limitations. The jury found Evangeline guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated child abuse, while Joseph was convicted of several aggravated charges, including rape, resulting in sentences of 65 years for Evangeline and 114 years for Joseph. Both defendants filed separate appeals, which were later consolidated. Key issues on appeal included the trial court's voir dire process, the amendment of charges, the adequacy of the State’s bill of particulars, the admission of prior bad acts, the sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, and the propriety of sentences imposed. Joseph Combs also contested the sufficiency of the allegations regarding tolling the statute of limitations for his rape convictions. The court reviewed the record and reversed the conviction for aggravated perjury against Joseph, ordering a new trial for that charge, while affirming all other judgments of the trial court with modifications. On February 18, 1997, the Bristol Tennessee Fire Department responded to a 911 call from the Emanuel Baptist Church regarding a nineteen-year-old woman, Esther Combs, who was found exhibiting seizure-like activity in a van. Paramedics Timothy Estes, James Gouge, and Jewel Rogers arrived at approximately 11:10 a.m. and noted that Esther was awake but incoherent. Joseph Combs, present at the scene, informed the paramedics that Esther was initially found in a bathroom, where her family had moved her to the van before calling for help. Estes and Gouge inspected the nearby yellow building, which contained a cluttered fellowship hall, but found nothing notable in the bathroom. While treating Esther, the paramedics observed numerous scars on her back, arms, chin, and forehead, which Estes claimed were unprecedented in his career. Esther was transported to Wellmont Bristol Regional Medical Center, arriving around 11:30 a.m. Dr. Gregory Allen Gerlock, the emergency room physician, described Esther as acutely ill and somewhat delirious, with stable vital signs but significant concerns regarding her mental state and the extensive scarring covering her body. When he inquired about the scars, Joseph Combs claimed they resulted from Esther "falling a lot," a statement Dr. Gerlock deemed inconsistent with the nature of the injuries. Joseph also mentioned that Esther was adopted, but he provided little further information regarding this. Terri Matney, an emergency room staff member, testified that Esther arrived in a state of severe distress, appearing disoriented and repeatedly expressing fear and apology. Matney observed numerous scars across Esther’s body, which she had never seen before in such quantity. Nurse Vickie Lee Blaylock corroborated Matney’s observations, noting Esther's thrashing and crying, and her repeated statements of fear when touched. Dr. Gerlock treated Esther until stabilization and recommended her admission to the Cardiac Intensive Care Unit (CICU). Elizabeth Owens Cribb, tasked with photographing Esther’s scars, noted extensive scar tissue while Esther was semi-conscious. Dr. Jennifer Quesenberry Stiefel, the resident physician, described Esther's initial condition as critical, with her unresponsive and moaning. Joseph Combs, Esther’s companion, reported that Esther had gone to bed feeling mildly unwell and was later found unconscious. He denied any history of significant medical issues or substance ingestion. When Esther regained coherence, she stated she remembered going to bed and waking up in the hospital days later, attributing her scars to being clumsy. Dr. Stiefel ordered tests to determine the cause of Esther's mental state, which revealed metabolic acidosis, suggesting highly acidic blood. This finding narrowed down potential diagnoses, including ethylene glycol poisoning, prompting Dr. Stiefel to begin an ethanol drip with bicarbonate as treatment. Esther's condition showed improvement over time, with Dr. Kenneth Emile Ferslew, a pharmacology and toxicology expert, testifying about the toxic effects of ethylene glycol (antifreeze) ingestion. He explained that without removal of the toxin, it depresses the central nervous system and leads to liver metabolism of the compound into oxalic acid, which can form calcium oxalate crystals and cause kidney failure, often resulting in death within days if untreated. Dr. Ferslew agreed with Dr. Stiefel that Esther was suffering from ethylene glycol poisoning and received appropriate treatment, although a specific test for the poisoning was not performed due to the Medical Center's limitations. He noted that a confirmation test would be pointless after the onset of renal toxicity. Dr. Stiefel conducted a thorough examination of Esther, who was responsive but showed signs of severe neglect, including old, overlapping scars on her body, which were not recent and appeared to be from various injuries over time. Evangeline Combs, Esther’s guardian, attributed the scars to her being a clumsy child. However, an examination revealed no clubbing of Esther's feet, contradicting Evangeline's claim about her having been born with clubbed feet. Esther was emaciated, weighing about 90 pounds, had severe dental issues, and was unable to fully extend her left arm due to an unspecified injury. During the pelvic examination, Esther's hymenal ring was intact, suggesting possible past sexual assault. Dr. Stiefel evaluated the scars, stating they did not resemble self-inflicted injuries and that while some scars on her head and scalp could possibly be self-inflicted, it was highly unlikely. Some scars appeared consistent with burn injuries and cuts, which Evangeline attributed to cooking accidents. Overall, Dr. Stiefel concluded that the scars were inconsistent with the personal and medical history provided by Evangeline and Joseph Combs. Dr. Stiefel discovered that Esther was adopted at around five or six months old and had been home-schooled by the Combs family, never attending public school. Evangeline Combs claimed Esther had a 12th-grade education and was preparing for the GED exam. Esther worked in the church nursery and performed cleaning and secretarial tasks for her father. Clinical social worker Susan Francis Early investigated allegations of abuse due to Esther's condition, noting multiple scars on her body during her first visit on February 19, 1997, when Esther was hospitalized. Esther had scars on her face, abdomen, and back, with some raised scars running from her neck to her buttocks. Early questioned Evangeline and Joseph Combs about the scars, and Evangeline attributed them to Esther being 'clumsy.' Esther was discharged on February 25, 1997, after Early informed her of adult protective services. Detective Debbie Richmond-McCauley responded to the abuse allegations, finding Esther unclothed and semi-conscious on February 18, 1997. McCauley documented Esther's extensive scarring and took photographs. During interviews, Esther showed signs of distress and avoided eye contact. Joseph Combs denied knowledge of the scars, attributing them to Esther's clumsiness and rough play, while stating that disciplinary actions were limited to restrictions rather than physical punishment. Evangeline echoed Joseph's statements, also claiming ignorance of the scars and attributing them to cooking accidents. Both parents were unable to provide details about Esther's adoption. After her hospital discharge, Esther attended a follow-up visit with Dr. Stiefel on March 5, 1997. Joseph and Evangeline Combs accompanied Esther to Dr. Stiefel’s office, where she did not provide new information about her hospitalization, only mentioning a burn on her right finger. On March 24, 1997, Detective McCauley, with police and fire personnel, executed a search warrant at the Combs' residence, Emanuel Baptist Church, to inspect for safety and fire code violations. After no response to knocks or phone calls, they forcibly entered the premises, finding the Combs family in sleepwear. Joseph and Evangeline claimed they were unaware of the authorities outside. The officers documented deplorable living conditions, including trash, dead mice, spoiled food, and multiple animals inside. On July 28, 1997, Detective McCauley filed a lawsuit for Esther to appoint a guardian ad litem and conservator to secure her medical care and personal documents. The court appointed attorney David William Tipton as her guardian on September 11, 1997. During the scheduled hearing on October 3, 1997, Esther did not appear, but Joseph Combs claimed she had run away, stating he had no knowledge of her whereabouts despite having seen her at church and spoken to her on the phone. Testimonies from McCauley and Tipton confirmed Joseph's claims under oath. Later that day, the entire Combs family drove Esther to Sonja Caroline Meadows' home, where they awaited her return from work. Joseph requested Meadows to drive Esther to a Waffle House, indicating the trip was related to Esther's court appearance. During the ride, Esther appeared distressed, crying frequently and speaking to Joseph on the phone. Meadows arrived at a Waffle House around midnight and met Douglas Carpenter, a pastor and friend of the Combs family, who offered to temporarily care for Esther Combs to alleviate familial stress due to an ongoing investigation involving her father, Joseph Combs. Initially declining, Joseph later accepted the offer, and Esther stayed with the Carpenter family for four to five weeks. During her stay, Esther maintained daily communication with her parents and appeared to adapt well, participating in family activities and forming a friendship with Carpenter's daughter. Carpenter noted that Esther expressed occasional feelings of missing her parents but never indicated any abuse or fear regarding her home life. He observed scars on her body and noted a limp but did not consider them alarming. As the Carpenter family planned a trip to Israel, Esther suggested staying with her aunt and uncle, which Joseph agreed to. Douglas Carpenter transported Esther to meet Roger Combs, who then took her to Georgia. Upon arrival, Susan Combs described Esther as nervous, withdrawn, and frail, with limited clothing and basic skills. Initially reluctant to go outside alone, Esther gradually became more comfortable, gaining weight and displaying a more positive demeanor over time. After several weeks, she made a phone call to Detective McCauley on February 20, 1998, leading to an interview that revealed the defendants had never legally adopted her. Esther's biological mother, Rachel Garcia, resided in Michigan and confirmed her maternity through a blood test. Dawn Rose Loftis, from the Baptist Children's Home in Valparaiso, Indiana, testified that the home served as both an adoption agency and a group home in 1977, the year of Esther's birth. An adoption agreement dated March 1, 1978, was signed by Joseph and Evangeline Combs, who intended to adopt Esther, referred to as 'baby Garcia.' The Combs received Esther before the adoption was finalized. The home sent multiple letters to the Combs requesting the final adoption decree, with no responses or returns until a letter on March 11, 1994, was marked 'Forwarding Order Expired.' The last communication from the Combs was recorded on November 8, 1979. On March 6, 1998, Detective McCauley took Esther for a reexamination with Dr. Stiefel, who noted significant weight gain and improvement in health, though Esther reported experiencing nightmares and physical pain. She disclosed past abuse, including beatings and a suicide attempt involving antifreeze. Dr. Stiefel confirmed that Esther had previously denied any abuse and had not utilized protective services, although she appeared nervous when discussing them. Esther, now twenty-two years old, changed her birth certificate name to Elsa Rachel Garcia but is referred to as Esther in legal proceedings. She testified about her adoption at four-and-a-half months and her family dynamics, including five siblings. The Combs family relocated from Indiana to Florida in 1986 and later traveled for evangelism. In April 1989, the Combs family relocated to Bristol, Tennessee, where Joseph became the pastor of EBC. Initially living in a trailer, they later moved into a yellow building on church property that also served as the church gymnasium and fellowship hall. During the trial, the State indicated it would pose questions solely relevant to Defendant Evangeline Combs, prompting the trial court to hold a hearing outside the jury's presence. The court instructed the jury to consider the evidence relating to Evangeline's guilt exclusively, and to view evidence of other crimes as part of the "complete story" of especially aggravated kidnapping, not as indicative of either defendant’s propensity for similar offenses. Specifically, the jury was to assess evidence regarding Evangeline's "guilty knowledge" for the other charges. Esther, the victim, testified to severe abuse inflicted by Evangeline during their time in Indiana. She described injuries such as burns from hot oatmeal, inflicted when Evangeline forced her hands into the pot after she dropped a spoon. Esther also recounted physical assaults, including being pushed down stairs, resulting in facial injuries, and having her hands burned on a hot stove. Additional abuse involved using pliers to twist her skin and causing damage to her teeth after being thrown against a wall. Esther endured further punishment, including being made to sleep naked in a cold basement and being tied to a high chair and thrown down stairs. Her testimony continued with accounts of physical harm in Clearwater, Florida, including a scar from having her finger hammered and being whipped with a rope for learning to write her name. Evangeline inflicted severe physical abuse on Esther, including whipping her feet with an electrical cord and denying her food in Florida. Esther was punished for perceived negligence regarding the baby Sarah's diaper rash; Evangeline burned the insides of Esther's thighs with a curling iron to demonstrate the pain of a rash. This resulted in painful wounds that hindered Esther's mobility. Evangeline also used a shower brush to beat Esther's thighs until they formed painful boils, which she further injured by breaking them open. In Tennessee, after an incident involving broken glass, Evangeline cut Esther's arm with a shard to illustrate the danger of leaving glass unattended, leading to heavy bleeding without medical treatment. Additionally, Evangeline burned Esther’s arm for looking at a watch and inflicted ongoing daily abuse, including beating her with a water hose for falling asleep in church. Esther presented evidence of numerous scars, including those from an iron, a claw hammer, and repeated whippings with a metal cord, resulting in black eyes that prevented her from attending church. The trial court instructed the jury to consider Evangeline's conduct separately from that of her husband, Joseph Combs, who also abused Esther, notably punishing her for learning to write by using a belt. Joseph physically abused Esther in multiple instances, inflicting severe pain and injuries. He whipped her with a flip-flop sandal until she stopped crying and beat her with a water hose for falling asleep during church, forcing her to undress to ensure he hit all areas of her skin. He later struck her with a belt without her recalling the reason. Esther described a traumatic incident where Joseph banged her head into a wall, creating a hole, and another where he kneed her in the stomach, causing bruising and swelling around her eye, which required no medical attention. Esther detailed specific counts of aggravated assault against both Joseph and Evangeline Combs. Count 2 involved Joseph beating Esther with a rope in the gymnasium as punishment for incomplete chores, during which he threatened her until she stopped screaming, ultimately causing her to pass out. Counts 7 through 10 pertained to Evangeline’s separate acts of aggravated child abuse. In February 1994, she beat Esther with a baseball bat, resulting in a swollen elbow that went untreated. In November 1994, during a cleaning task, Evangeline threw a wooden shoe at Esther, injuring her above the eye and causing significant bleeding, which Evangeline attempted to hide from church members. Evangeline attempted to stitch a wound on Esther without medical assistance, during which Joseph later restricted Esther from attending church until it healed. Esther, who was in pain, covered the resulting scar with bangs after Evangeline removed the stitches. The incident related to count 9 occurred in September 1994, when Evangeline used needle nose pliers to inflict a severe injury on Esther’s hip, referring to the wounds as “marks of the beast.” Esther did not recall any behavior that warranted such punishment. In count 10, which took place between September and November 1995, Esther was beaten with a baseball bat as punishment for lying about cleaning the kitchen. Evangeline, with the help of Jimmy and David Combs, restrained Esther while she was beaten, resulting in a broken tailbone. Joseph provided Esther with over-the-counter pain medication but did not seek medical attention for her injuries. Count 11 alleges that Joseph Combs committed aggravated perjury around October 3, 1997. Esther testified that Joseph misled her regarding a subpoena from Detective Debbie Richmond-McCauley, indicating she needed a legal guardian for court. Joseph planned to report that Esther had run away to avoid the court appearance, which he later bragged about in front of Esther. Count 12 charges Joseph Combs with aggravated rape in April 1989, when Esther was under thirteen. Esther recounted being summoned to Joseph's bedroom, where he forced her to perform oral sex on him. At that time, the family resided in a trailer in Bristol, Tennessee. Esther Combs testified about multiple instances of sexual abuse by Joseph Combs, detailing various incidents of rape predominantly involving oral sex. She described being coerced into performing these acts under threats and manipulation, including claims that it was acceptable because she was his adopted daughter. Specific incidents include: - **Count 13**: On Esther's thirteenth birthday, November 16, 1990, Joseph directed her to perform oral sex after isolating her in the foyer and instructing her on the act, after which she was not allowed to rinse her mouth. - **Count 14**: During the summer of 1995, Joseph called Esther inside from playing outside, insisting on oral sex while justifying his actions with biblical references, allowing her to rinse her mouth afterward. - **Count 15**: On June 16, 1991, Evangeline’s birthday, Joseph made Esther perform oral sex while she was cleaning the kitchen, again not permitting her to rinse her mouth afterward. - **Count 16**: On Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1993, while the family was preoccupied, Joseph forced Esther to perform oral sex. She was allowed to use his boxer shorts to wipe her mouth afterward. - **Count 17**: On her sixteenth birthday, November 16, 1993, Joseph again isolated Esther, made her perform oral sex, and did not permit her to wash afterward. - **Count 18**: On February 14, 1991, while other children were busy, Joseph summoned Esther under the pretense of wanting coffee, leading to further sexual abuse. These accounts illustrate a pattern of manipulation, coercion, and sexual violence against Esther by Joseph Combs. Joseph Combs is accused of multiple instances of sexual assault against Esther, including a specific incident on February 4, 1992, when he forced her to perform oral sex while she was cleaning underneath his desk. During this act, Evangeline Combs entered the room, and Joseph quickly composed himself, while Esther was instructed to continue cleaning without being allowed to clean her mouth afterward. Esther described her life under the Combs family as highly restrictive; she was not permitted to socialize with other children or have visitors due to claims that their home was messy. She often remained isolated in a small room near the men’s bathroom, where she slept and was punished if she attempted to leave, evidenced by powder placed at the door to track her movements. Esther lacked basic identification and struggled with literacy, as she was not allowed to participate in home-schooling until her chores were completed. Her responsibilities included extensive household tasks such as laundry, cooking, and cleaning, with little to no help from her siblings. She was often forced to prepare separate breakfasts for each family member as they woke at different times. Throughout her life with the Combs, she was repeatedly told her purpose was to serve the family, and failure to meet these expectations resulted in punishment, including physical abuse. An example of this occurred on February 17, 1997, when she was beaten for not making coffee correctly. Esther, feeling overwhelmed and suicidal, ingested antifreeze on February 18, 1997, and was later found in a hospital. During her hospital stay, she did not report the abuse she suffered due to fear of retaliation from her guardians, the Combs, following her past attempts to escape. Esther described a lack of understanding about available protective measures and felt isolated without anyone to seek help from outside the Combs’ household. Approximately a year later, living with relatives in Georgia, she reported the abuse to Detective McCauley. Earlier, during two runaway incidents involving police, Esther exhibited fear and distress. The first incident occurred on November 5, 1992, when Officer Vic Jordan responded to a report of a young girl locked in a store bathroom. Upon finding Esther, she expressed a misunderstanding with her parents, leading to her being returned home. The second incident, reported by Joseph Combs on September 29, 1996, involved Esther disappearing from a church nursery. Detective Jerry Smeltzer found evidence of a struggle in the nursery and later located Esther in Carter County. Despite attempts to contact Esther after her return, the responses were unhelpful. Witnesses, including Gayland M. Oaks, II, provided insight into the Combs family dynamics and their treatment of Esther, highlighting a long-standing relationship with Joseph Combs, who was previously a Bible teacher. Gayland's connections with Joseph included working together in church ministry, indicating a network that may have overlooked or enabled the family's treatment of Esther. Malinda Oaks babysat the Combs children weekly from July to October 1987 until she became pregnant, at which point her husband, Gayland Oaks, took over the babysitting duties. Gayland was informed by Joseph Combs that only a select few were allowed to interact with the children, making his role a "great honor." He began babysitting the Combs children every Thursday from November 1987 to May 1988, typically from 8:00 a.m. to between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. Joseph instructed Gayland that his only responsibility was supervision, as Esther, a nine-year-old, would handle food and care for the younger children. Gayland observed that the children rarely ate together or played outside, and Joseph expressed a desire to keep the children's lack of school enrollment hidden from authorities. He noted that Esther was treated differently than the other children and that Joseph believed her purpose was to serve, training her accordingly. When Gayland reported misbehavior by children other than Esther, she would be punished instead. Joseph justified physical punishment as necessary for controlling rebellion in children. Gayland described Esther as frail and sickly-looking, with scars on her lip and hand, long, oversized dresses, and poor dental health. Joseph attributed her injuries to clumsiness, though Gayland never witnessed any falls or clumsiness. He characterized Esther as cooperative and obedient, and noted he never saw her engage in rough play or be separated from her family. After Gayland and Malinda moved to Ohio in May 1988, they lost contact with the Combs family. Malinda had previously taught Esther to write her name, but when Esther showed her parents the work, they reacted with displeasure and sent her to the office. Malinda described Esther as having scars around her mouth and a broken tooth, stating she had never seen Esther clumsy or frequently injured. Kelly Rose Wood, who babysat for the Combs family in fall 1986, noted that Esther had extensive scarring on the back of her legs, with both old and fresh scars, contrasting with the unmarked legs of her sister, Cindy Combs. Wood also observed a fresh gouge wound on Esther’s chest and characterized Esther as quiet, meek, and thin, wearing loose clothing that concealed her appearance. Wood indicated that the Combs treated Esther differently than their other children, though she did not provide details. Andy Steven Arnold, a member of the church, recognized Esther as consistently wearing long dresses and being withdrawn, avoiding interaction with others. He noted she was often under the close supervision of Evangeline Combs. Arnold witnessed Esther with an injured arm in a sling and later with bruises and black eyes. Joseph Combs claimed Esther was clumsy and often fell, a narrative supported by Evangeline. Esther reportedly missed more church services than her siblings, attributed to being "sick." Arnold mentioned delivering food to the Combs but was never permitted inside their home. Betty Atkinson, a church pianist since July 1994, corroborated that Esther wore long sleeves and rarely engaged with others, appearing subdued and obedient, with Evangeline usually nearby. Atkinson noted Evangeline's claim that Esther loved to serve but described her as "rebellious," a characterization Atkinson did not observe. David Lamar Wright, a church member from 1982 to January 1994, recalled Joseph Combs labeling Esther as rebellious. Esther Owens, a church member from 1990 to 1993, also noted Esther's lack of interaction with others and frequent absences from church services, always accompanied by Evangeline. Joseph Combs provided various explanations for his daughter Esther's absences, citing incidents like a bicycle accident. Witnesses noted that Esther appeared very thin and always wore long dresses with long sleeves. Joseph requested that food be delivered to the family, instructing that it be left on the porch for someone to pick up later. Multiple members of the EBS congregation, including Leona Dickens, Mary Johnson, and Donna Sue Hensley, testified about Esther's condition and behavior during church services. They observed visible injuries on Esther and received explanations from Joseph and Evangeline that she was clumsy and fell often; however, none of the witnesses had seen her fall or act clumsily. Esther was described as frightened and quiet, contrasting with her siblings who played freely. She was responsible for caring for her younger sister Sarah Combs and served her family during social gatherings. Hensley recounted delivering food to the Combs home multiple times, always leaving it outside as no one would answer the door. Dr. Mona Gretel Harlan, a forensic pathologist, examined Esther and found scars consistent with burns on her inner thighs, layered scars on her forehead indicating repeated injuries, and a broad scar on her forearm that had not healed properly. While Dr. Harlan acknowledged that some forehead scars could result from accidental trauma in young children, she concluded that the wounds on Esther's back, thighs, and buttocks were indicative of non-accidental and non-self-inflicted trauma, suggesting a pattern of abuse. Dr. Harlan testified that the scars observed on Esther’s body, totaling 410, had healed and were not indicative of recent injuries. She noted that in her 25 years of practice, she had never encountered so many scars on a single individual. Dr. Henry Nichols evaluated Esther’s dental condition and found her front teeth to be severely displaced, attributing this to a traumatic event rather than natural occurrence. He confirmed that the displacement indicated significant trauma and that the shape of Esther's dental arch was distorted, unlike the typical “U” shape. He treated her teeth by placing a permanent bridge. Dr. Glenda Jo Fox Ramsey, a radiologist, reviewed x-rays of Esther’s left elbow and identified an abnormality consistent with a healed fracture from trauma, likely caused by a blunt object rather than normal activity. She also noted an abnormal curvature of Esther’s sacrum and a delay in her bone age, suggesting malnutrition. Following this testimony, the State rested its case. Samuel Johnson, an acquaintance of Defendant Joseph Combs, testified to having known the Combs family since 1983 and described their home as clean and organized. Aaron P. Welch, pastor of Charles Towne Baptist Temple, met Joseph Combs in 1979 as a student at Hyles-Anderson Bible College, graduating in 1982. Welch facilitated Combs preaching at his church in South Carolina starting in 1987, noting that Combs' children were well-mannered, with Esther described as sweet and quiet. Joseph Henry Esposito, a former professor of Combs, lived with the Combs family in Clearwater, Florida, in 1986 and observed their children as normal and happy, reporting no injuries on Esther except for a potential chip in her front tooth. Esposito and his wife testified that they did not see Esther exhibit rebellious or troublesome behavior. Thomas Edward Boyle, another former student, also noted Esther's crooked front teeth but saw no signs of injury or clumsiness during his visits to the Combs home. Trent Pollack, who lived with the Combs family while starting a church in Florida, observed no preferential treatment among the children and noted Esther participated in homeschooling. He mentioned seeing scars on Esther's hands, which Joseph attributed to her accidentally putting her hands in scalding water. Jeffrey Arnold Coester met the Combs children in 1995 during a visit to Bristol, Tennessee, describing them, including Esther, as well-dressed and engaged in sports, with no signs of differential treatment or behavior from her siblings. Coester visited Bristol to evaluate the possibility of joining Joseph Combs' ministry, during which he spent about ten minutes speaking with each of the Combs children, finding Esther to be shy yet comfortable. He noted concerns regarding Esther's facial scars and dental condition but did not relocate or accept a position at EBC, providing no explanation for his decision. Ruby Rhotenberry, a long-time EBC member, testified that she saw the Combs children frequently at church and described them, particularly Esther, as friendly and happy. She had limited private conversations with Esther, who never mentioned mistreatment or abuse. Rhotenberry identified 18 photographs of the Combs family, showing Esther smiling, with visible scarring on one arm and misaligned front teeth. Pauline Melvin, a member from 1981 to 1998, also characterized the Combs children as pleasant and well-behaved, noting that Esther appeared thin and obedient, though she admitted to not being close to her and rarely seeing her skin exposed. Elizabeth and Dickie Lee Huff, who attended EBC from 1996, described the Combs children as friendly and obedient, with Esther appearing "just fine" during a dinner they attended. Dickie Lee stated he had little interaction with the family but confirmed that Esther looked similar to her siblings, did not seem clumsy, and he had not seen any scars on her. Hilda Jane Combs, Joseph's mother, noted that after her son became pastor, she observed the family more frequently, finding all the children, including Esther, to be happy and often smiling. Mrs. Combs reported that her children, including Esther, generally got along well, although she described Esther as a "rough little girl" who enjoyed wrestling with the boys and had a temper. Mrs. Combs expressed confusion about Esther's reluctance to report any issues, as she was unaware of any problems until Esther left town. Esther later revealed that she left due to fears of Debbie Richmond (McCauley) and being placed in an "insane asylum." Mrs. Combs recounted family gatherings on significant days: Father's Day 1991, which coincided with Evangeline's birthday, and Thanksgiving Day 1993, when the family spent the day together until late at night. During cross-examination, Mrs. Combs stated she had no knowledge of any scars on Esther's body and remarked that Esther was too playful to be helpful around the house. She characterized Esther as cheerful, obedient, and active. The testimony included insights from the other Combs children, particularly James, who was the only legally adopted child. At the time of trial, James, aged twenty-two, described the family's daily routine while living in the fellowship hall of EBC, noting that mornings began around 6:00 a.m. on weekdays. He stated that breakfast was usually self-prepared and that Esther did not make his meals. After breakfast, the children undertook their studies, with Evangeline and Joseph instructing them for several hours. James confirmed that Esther was capable of reading, writing, and performing math. Each child was responsible for making their own lunch and completing specific chores. Esther's chores included making her bed, picking up her clothes, helping with dinner, and clearing the table. James asserted that Esther had no more chores than the other children and did not stay up late to finish them. He emphasized that the family did not treat Esther as a servant or have any belief that she was born for such a role. After completing their responsibilities, the children were allowed leisure activities, including watching TV, playing video games, and using computers, in which Esther participated fully. Esther Combs was part of a family that engaged in various activities together, including outdoor play, shopping, dining out, and attending movies, sometimes with adult supervision and other times without. The family shared evening meals, with members taking turns cooking, and Esther was allowed to eat the same food as the others without completing chores beforehand. After meals, family members collectively rinsed dishes and placed them in the dishwasher, while Evangeline Combs handled the laundry, with James assisting her. Esther did not have responsibilities related to laundry. At bedtime, the children, including Esther, slept in the fellowship hall, which was also used for storing musical equipment, and James testified that he never saw Esther inappropriately dressed or near the showers. Disciplinary measures for the Combs children typically involved restrictions on privileges rather than physical punishment, and Esther was not subjected to severe discipline. James noted instances where Esther sustained injuries, such as a black eye from a plastic bat during a baseball game, scrapes from slipping on asphalt, and a twisted arm while carrying groceries against her parents' warnings. A rope burn on her neck was self-inflicted while she was pulling a wagon. James confirmed he never witnessed any abuse or molestation of Esther by her parents and denied knowledge of any incidents leading to legal charges against them. He also reported that Esther wore hand-me-down dresses and participated in church activities, sitting with family or working in the nursery. In February 1997, when Esther fell ill, James was present but not awake, and the family visited her in the hospital, where she appeared happy to see them and expressed joy upon returning home. James received his driver's license shortly after this event, on September 26 or 27, 1997. Prior to obtaining his driver’s license, James claimed he only drove on one occasion when test-driving a car he was considering to purchase. After getting licensed, he frequently drove his siblings, including Esther, to various locations such as the mall before Esther left town on October 3, 1997. Joseph David Combs, Jr. (David), the third oldest sibling, corroborated James' testimony regarding family activities. He stated that Esther slept in the fellowship hall with the other children, did not sleep naked, and participated in daily home-schooling sessions from 7:30 a.m. until after noon. Their mother, Evangeline, prepared lunch with assistance from Esther and Cindy, while the evening meal was a family gathering time, typically prepared by Evangeline. Each child had assigned chores, with David responsible for taking out the trash and vacuuming, while Esther made her bed and helped with cooking. David asserted that Esther had no more chores than the others and refuted the notion that her role was to serve. During leisure time, Esther engaged in activities like video games, basketball, baseball, and biking with her siblings, often participating in rough play. The children sometimes visited the mall unaccompanied by their parents, with James driving them. David described typical punishments as grounding, with occasional spankings or writing assignments, stating that Esther was not punished more harshly than her siblings. He recounted four injuries Esther sustained: a burn from a stove demonstration in 1994, a bicycle accident in 1996, a fall from a ceiling while attempting to retrieve keys, and a black eye from David's accidental elbow during play. David noted he had never seen Esther unclothed and that she never reported being molested. Regarding Esther's clothing choices, he indicated that her preference for long dresses and sleeves appeared to be voluntary, as the children were not dictated what to wear. David testified that the Combs family had three telephones and computers, which Esther used to communicate with friends online. He described having a good relationship with Esther, who appeared fine the day before her hospitalization. The next morning, David found Esther in the bathroom exhibiting self-harm behaviors. After moving her to her bed and waiting for help for about thirty minutes, during which she stopped breathing multiple times, the family decided to transport her to the hospital themselves. Cindy Combs, the fourth oldest child, corroborated David's account of Esther's condition and their family dynamics, asserting that Esther had never been seen without clothes and that she was unaware of any abuse. Cindy detailed incidents of minor injuries to Esther, including an accidental elbow to the eye and being hit with a bat during a game. On the night of February 17, 1997, Cindy and her siblings fell ill and went to bed. After hearing banging from the bathroom, she woke her brother Peter, and they eventually called 911. While waiting for the ambulance, Esther's condition worsened, prompting the family to move her to a van for transport to the hospital. Peter and Sarah, the younger siblings, provided similar testimonies regarding Esther's education and care within the home. Peter testified that he and Esther engaged in various activities, such as reading and writing stories, and that Esther shared a room with other children. He stated that she did not perform household duties like serving food or cleaning up, was not assigned more chores than others, and was not treated as a servant. Peter described the family's disciplinary measures as limited to grounding, asserting he never witnessed physical abuse or neglect towards Esther. He noted that Esther participated in leisure activities similar to other children, including watching TV, playing video games, and going out. He indicated that Esther was allowed to choose her seating during church and was not restricted in her clothing choices. Peter recounted a few incidents of minor injuries Esther sustained, such as burns from hot gravy, a hit to the face from a baseball bat, and scrapes from playing outside. He observed that Esther appeared happy shortly before her hospitalization in February 1997 and expressed frustration over Debbie Richmond's actions towards their family. Peter confirmed he had not witnessed any incidents that led to the charges against the Defendants. Sarah Jane Combs echoed Peter's testimony regarding family dynamics, mealtime routines, and Esther's involvement in family activities. She also noted she never saw Esther unclothed or severely punished. Sarah recounted two injury incidents: a cut from a broken plate and a minor injury from a baseball bat, both being accidents. She affirmed Esther was capable of reading and writing and seemed happy before her hospital stay, also stating that Esther never complained of abuse from the Defendants. Sarah similarly denied witnessing any incidents related to the charges. Mary Ellen Caldwell, a nurse during Esther's treatment, inquired about Esther's scars, to which Esther attributed them to frequent falls during childhood. Caldwell described Esther's family visits as civil and normal, noting a conversation with Joseph Combs where he conveyed his love for Esther. During her hospital stay, Caldwell observed Esther exhibiting restless behavior, clutching stuffed animals, moaning, and having nightmares about her father. Nurse Donna Sue Tiller, who worked during Esther’s hospitalization, noted that while Esther's siblings were friendly, Esther was withdrawn, speaking only when prompted. At one point, Esther expressed homesickness and mentioned cooking at home, indicating she had responsibilities. Tiller inquired about Esther's numerous scars, but Esther refused to discuss them. Joseph Combs testified about the adoption process for Esther, initially known as baby Garcia, explaining he and his wife adopted their son James but later sought to adopt Esther after being informed they could not have biological children. Joseph signed an adoption agreement with the Baptist Children’s Home, which included a provision for a fee yet to be determined, due before finalizing the adoption. After expressing concerns about financial obligations to an attorney, Joseph was advised to take his time. He received two letters from the Home requesting a copy of the adoption decree but did not respond to the first and claimed not to recall the second. He cited financial fears and concerns about losing Esther as reasons for not completing the adoption, despite having full custody. During the time they lived together in Indiana for thirteen years, Esther did not have a Social Security card, birth certificate, or driver's license. In 1986, the Combs family relocated from Indiana to Clearwater, Florida, where Joseph aimed to establish a church. All the Combs children, except for the youngest, Sarah, were born in Indiana. Their Florida home was spacious, featuring 2,200 square feet, four bedrooms, 2.5 bathrooms, and a pool. Joseph characterized the children as outgoing and denied any attempts to hide them or place restrictions on Esther, stating that Evangeline, his wife, was responsible for meals. He emphasized a close-knit family dynamic and efforts to expose the children to diverse experiences. Joseph refuted claims that Esther was not literate, asserting she could read and write prior to their move and participated in home-schooling alongside her siblings. He acknowledged Malinda Oakes' offer to assist with teaching but did not encourage her involvement. Joseph contested allegations made by Rose Kelly Wood regarding Esther's physical condition, asserting they were false. In 1988, the family traveled in a trailer for church engagements before settling in Bristol, Tennessee, where Joseph became the pastor of EBC. They lived in the church's fellowship hall, and Joseph claimed all children, including Esther, had equal chore responsibilities and were treated the same. He denied that Esther was raised to be a servant, stating she had a regular routine, watched television, and was not deprived of food or social interaction. Joseph attributed Esther's two attempts to run away to misunderstandings stemming from family arguments and her confusion during her walk. Esther, feeling anxious after spotting a police car, ducked into a restroom when she left a store. The Combs family quickly noticed her absence, with Joseph expressing concern about her being outside in inclement weather. When police found Esther, Joseph picked her up. A subsequent incident began when Esther, frightened by noises during her church nursery shift, ran outside, believing she was being chased. She later woke up on Highway 421 and was picked up by a pastor and his wife, who eventually turned her over to authorities after she refused to identify herself. The Combs family learned of her location around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. On February 17, 1997, after a day of vigorous play, Esther exhibited signs of distress the following morning, leading to a 911 call when she appeared to seize. Joseph testified that Detective Debbie Richmond-McCauley questioned him about Esther's condition but did not inquire about her scars, nor did he mention her being clumsy. He expressed confusion over accusations against him, emphasizing their close relationship. Following a visit from the Bristol Fire Department in March 1997, the Combs children were removed from their custody for about a year. The family relocated in June 1997, and Esther left for South Carolina in October 1997, feeling scared and frustrated by police activity and unfamiliar visitors. Joseph confirmed he assisted her in leaving after a court summons, which was documented in a court order from October 3, 1997, regarding a motion for examinations and the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Joseph Combs, Respondent’s caretaker for over nineteen years, testified regarding Esther Combs's sudden departure prior to the petition's service on August 4, 1997, without informing him of her plans or whereabouts. Although he had maintained contact with her through phone calls and church appearances, he claimed he was unaware of her current location and had not informed her about the legal case, despite later admitting he knew her whereabouts during the hearing. Esther's attorney advised her she was not obligated to appear in court, and as an adult, she chose to leave. Joseph defended against the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping, stating he never confined Esther with deadly weapons and that the household had multiple telephones and doors that could not be locked from the outside, making it impossible to prevent anyone from leaving. He noted that during the time period from April 30, 1990, to October 3, 1997, he and Evangeline frequently left their children home alone without supervision, and Esther had not expressed a desire to leave the home. In response to allegations of choking Esther with a rope between June and September 1996, Joseph claimed the charge was false, citing his recovery from a serious heart surgery that left him incapacitated for over a year. He also denied the rape allegations from June 16, 1991, and November 25, 1993, asserting that he and his family were at his mother’s house on those dates, thus unable to commit the crimes. Regarding physical evidence, Joseph denied any involvement with items found at the EBC fellowship hall that were linked to allegations against him, as well as denying using Esther’s head to create damage in his office wall. Joseph repudiated allegations made by Esther regarding physical abuse and neglect. He denied beating her with a water hose, giving her a black eye, or imposing specific clothing or hairstyle requirements. Joseph claimed he was unaware of any "normal position" Esther assumed during alleged beatings and dismissed the suggestion that powder was placed in front of her door. He attributed the condition of her front teeth to a fall rather than abuse and stated he treated Esther like the other Combs children. Joseph also refuted Esther's claims about his wife Evangeline's behavior and denied recognizing or speaking to Dr. Gerlock about Esther's scars. He asserted that he never stated Esther had never been to a hospital and denied claims by Gayland Oaks regarding his views on child discipline. Joseph rejected statements attributed to him about Esther's purpose and responsibilities, as well as the existence of scars. He contested the credibility of testimonies concerning food deliveries to his family and acknowledged that the lack of formal adoption barred Esther from obtaining a Social Security number. Joseph clarified that he did not take Esther anywhere in October 1997; instead, a man named Ricky Martin did, leading her to Sonja Meadows' home. He claimed inaccuracies in the hearing record and stated he was uncertain about Esther's whereabouts but believed she was with Sonja Meadows. Joseph admitted to arranging transportation for Esther to South Carolina, citing love and a desire to help her. During cross-examination, he was shown photos of Esther's scars but could only explain the origins of three, claiming ignorance regarding the others. Joseph Combs testified that he lacked knowledge of Esther’s injuries as he had never seen her unclothed. Evangeline Combs did not provide testimony. After Joseph's testimony, the defendants rested their cases. In rebuttal, the State called Ricky Dale Martin, who denied transporting Esther from Bristol to Sonja Meadows' residence, with Sonja Meadows corroborating his statement. Jenny Smeltzer, director of the 911 Dispatch Unit, detailed the timing of 911 calls and emergency responses, noting a call at 11:00:18 a.m. and ambulance arrival at 11:09:31 a.m., nine minutes and thirteen seconds after the first call. To counter defense witness Samuel Johnson's assertion that the Combs home was “normal,” Special Agent Franklin C. McCauley, Jr. testified regarding Johnson's comments about the Combs children being quiet and not socializing with others. The trial court heard motions, including one to dismiss counts 3 through 6 based on the statute of limitations, which was granted, leading to the jury instructions on remaining charges. Evangeline Combs was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated child abuse, while Joseph Combs was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated perjury, aggravated rape, and seven counts of rape. Sentences were 65 years for Evangeline and 114 years for Joseph. Both defendants claimed trial court errors during voir dire regarding juror Hunter Jones, who they argued should have been excused for potential bias, and limitations placed on questioning prospective juror Misty Bishop about her suspicions of guilt, asserting these limitations hindered their ability to identify juror biases effectively. Defendants assert that errors in jury selection warrant a reversal of judgments, claiming a violation of their constitutional right to a fair jury. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that the trial court has broad discretion in conducting voir dire to ensure jurors are competent and impartial. The standard for reviewing a trial court's decisions on juror qualifications is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. The rights to an impartial jury are guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and peremptory challenges are a tool for defendants to secure this right. The court notes that an erroneous refusal to excuse a juror for cause is harmless unless it can be shown that the jury was not impartial. Defendants must utilize their peremptory challenges to preserve claims regarding juror challenges for cause. A failure to exclude a juror for cause only justifies reversal if all peremptory challenges are exhausted and an incompetent juror remains. In this case, Defendants claim they had exhausted their peremptory challenges prior to questioning the jurors in question, a point not contested by the State. The Defendants challenge the inclusion of Hunter Jones, arguing he should have been excused for cause due to his close ties with prosecution witnesses and pre-trial exposure to trial information. Jones, a registered nurse with an administrative role at Wellmont Health Systems, had professional relationships with several potential witnesses. Despite this, he stated he would not necessarily find their testimony more credible than others. Jones served as a direct supervisor to Bott for two and a half years but had no social interactions with him. He worked as a social worker with Early, who was assigned to his wife’s case, and he also collaborated with Cribb on various committees. Jones asserted that he had not discussed the case with either Early or Cribb and that they were unaware of his potential juror status. Despite having a close personal relationship with Early, he claimed it would not bias his evaluation of her testimony. During a management meeting, the upcoming Combs trial was briefly mentioned, and staff were instructed to avoid discussing the case and reminded that some might be witnesses. After Jones’ voir dire, the defense attorneys moved to dismiss him for cause, citing his close ties to the State’s witnesses, particularly Early. However, the trial judge denied the motion, noting Jones’ clear assertion that he would not overstep boundaries. The defense referenced Rule 24(b)(2) of Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows challenges for jurors with exposure to potentially prejudicial information. The trial judge found Jones’ pre-trial exposure minimal, as defense inquiries were superficial and did not thoroughly explore the specifics of his knowledge. The judge also concluded that there was no evidence suggesting Jones' personal or professional relationships would impair his ability to deliver an impartial verdict, despite the defense's argument that many State witnesses were affiliated with Wellmont Health Systems. The trial court's determination regarding Jones' impartiality remained unchallenged by any substantial evidence in the record. Jones was only acquainted with witnesses Early and Cribb, whose testimonies were inconclusive at trial. Both witnesses noted the appearance of scars on Esther’s body, corroborated by photographs and other witness accounts. Early indicated that the Defendants were not transparent about the scars' origins but later received information from Evangeline claiming that Esther was accident-prone. The Defendants argued that the trial court limited their voir dire questioning, impacting their ability to ensure a fair trial. This was rejected, as Misty Bishop disclosed during voir dire her exposure to pre-trial publicity through co-workers, who expressed opinions on the Defendants' guilt. Although Bishop acknowledged that the information sounded negative, she stated she had not formed a strong opinion due to a lack of concrete facts. The trial judge confirmed her ability to disregard outside information if selected as a juror. Bishop expressed that she would need evidence to evaluate both sides of the case and admitted that a suspicion of guilt had been raised by co-worker comments. Ultimately, she affirmed that a defendant is not obligated to prove anything in a criminal case. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies solely with the State to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that jurors must uphold the presumption of innocence. Bishop expressed her belief in this standard but initially conveyed uncertainty about her ability to remain unbiased due to her "suspicion of guilt." The court inferred that Bishop's hesitance stemmed from the phrasing of the attorneys' questions. Despite the attorneys' request to excuse Bishop for cause based on her admission, the trial judge concluded that any suspicion felt by a juror does not disqualify them unless it impairs their ability to perform their duties impartially. The judge reassured Bishop of the legal standards and was satisfied that she could be an impartial juror. The trial court’s assessment of juror fitness is granted significant deference due to its direct observation of jurors’ demeanor, and it found no abuse of discretion in retaining Bishop as a juror. The trial judge did not limit the scope of the Defendants' questions during voir dire, as no record evidence supports such a claim. The court found no specific instance where the judge's rulings hindered the Defendants' ability to identify juror bias. The voir dire's purpose of selecting competent, unbiased jurors was deemed fulfilled, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the exclusion for cause of jurors Hunter Jones and Misty Bishop. Jurors may serve even if they have prior opinions about the case, provided they can render a verdict based solely on courtroom evidence. The determination of a juror's impartiality lies within the trial court’s discretion and can only be overturned for manifest error. Regarding the amendment of the presentment, the Defendants argued that a non-consensual amendment to count 1, which charged especially aggravated kidnapping, constituted an alteration of essential offense elements and removed available defenses, thus violating Rule 7(b) of Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure and their constitutional rights. The court disagreed, clarifying that the original presentment incorrectly charged especially aggravated kidnapping, as the offense did not exist on the alleged commencement date of November 16, 1989. Instead, the relevant charge should have been aggravated kidnapping as defined by Tennessee Code Ann. 39-13-301(a), which categorized aggravated kidnapping as a Class A felony. Effective April 30, 1990, the definition of especially aggravated kidnapping was established, characterized as false imprisonment involving one or more of the following: 1) use of a deadly weapon or an item perceived as such; 2) the victim being under thirteen years old; 3) holding the victim for ransom, reward, or as a shield or hostage; or 4) the victim suffering serious bodily injury. This offense is classified as a Class A felony, while aggravated kidnapping is a Class B felony. During a motions hearing on February 3, 2000, the trial court addressed issues regarding the timing of the offense as it pertained to overlapping statutes. The State proposed amendments to align the offense with the new statute by changing the commencement date from November 16, 1989, to April 30, 1990, removing the phrase “to terrorize the victim,” excluding the victim's age as an element, and updating the citation to the current code. The trial court allowed these amendments, citing that the statutory language was concurrent, the amendments did not extend the offense's timeframe, and the original presentment sufficiently described especially aggravated kidnapping. The court concluded that the defendants' substantial rights were not prejudiced by the amendments, referencing Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b), which allows such amendments without defendant consent if they do not charge a different offense and do not prejudice substantial rights. The deletion of the “terrorization” phrase was deemed substantively neutral to the charge. The deletion of the phrase regarding terrorization is deemed inconsequential since serious bodily injury was also alleged in the original charges. The Defendants argue that changing the offense commencement date from November 16, 1989, to April 30, 1990, removed certain defenses under the previous statute; however, their ability to prove they did not terrorize the victim is deemed irrelevant. The Defendants claim that the omission of the victim's age prejudiced their case, asserting that their status as "foster parents" justified their actions as not unlawful. They reference the statutory definition of "unlawful," which requires removal or confinement to be executed via force or without consent from a responsible person. Despite the Defendants’ belief that their actions were lawful due to consent, the statute indicates that confinement can still be unlawful if it involves force, threat, or fraud. The amendment to the presentment reduced the victim’s confinement duration under thirteen from one year to approximately six and a half months but did not eliminate it. The alleged confinement continued for over six years after the victim turned thirteen. Changing the presentment did not constitute a new offense, nor did it prejudice the Defendants' substantial rights. Rule 7(b) allows for amendments without consent prior to jeopardy attaching; since this case did not attach jeopardy at the amendment time, no error occurred. The court also found no violation of the Defendants' constitutional rights due to the State not seeking grand jury review prior to the amendment. Defendants claim their rights under Article I, section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution were violated due to an amendment that they argue resulted in a "material variance" from the original indictment for count 1. The amendment involved changing the offense's commencement date and removing references to the victim's age and language about terrorization. The court found that these changes did not constitute a new or different charge, aligning with precedents such as State v. Kennedy, which noted that immaterial changes do not implicate constitutional concerns. The court emphasized that under both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions, an indictment must clearly inform the accused of the nature of the charges, fulfilling criteria for adequate notice, proper judgment, and protection from double jeopardy. The original presentment sufficiently informed the Defendants of the charges, and the amendment did not mislead them or impede their defenses, thus denying them relief on this matter. Regarding the request for a bill of particulars, the Defendants argued that the State failed to specify the acts causing confinement, the timing of these acts, the nature of injuries classified as "serious bodily injury," and the weapon used. They contended that this information was crucial for preparing their defense and avoiding trial surprises. The State countered that it provided all available information per Tennessee's Criminal Procedure Rules. The court sided with the State, confirming that the Defendants had made requests for specifics on February 22, 1999, concerning all charges against them, and found no error in the State's compliance. On March 24, 1999, the State answered that the offenses occurred at Emmanuel Baptist Church, with specific times unknown but dates detailed in the presentment. In response to Joseph Combs’s request for details on the State's evidence and witnesses, the State asserted that such information exceeded the scope of a bill of particulars. During a hearing on May 10, 1999, the Defendants sought clarification on the nature of injuries and their association with specific charges. Following a court order, the State's July 7, 1999 response detailed the type of injuries, body parts affected, and weapons used for the nineteen counts against the Defendants. Count 1 alleged that Esther Combs suffered extensive abuse from various weapons while in the Defendants' custody from November 16, 1989, until October 3, 1997, when she was allegedly hidden to prevent her court appearance. On January 28, 2000, the trial court mandated the State to provide any available descriptive information to narrow down the time frame of the offenses. The State supplemented its bill of particulars on February 2, 2000, explaining how the offense dates were determined. Rule 7(c) of Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a bill of particulars to help identify charges, aiming to assist the defendant in preparing a defense, prevent surprise at trial, and support claims of double jeopardy. The Advisory Commission Comments clarify that the purpose is to precisely inform the defendant of the charges rather than serve as a broad discovery tool. The trial judge directed the State to provide further details regarding the charges against the Defendants. Defendants received adequate information regarding the crime scene, victim injuries, weapons used, and timing of the offenses, allowing them to prepare their defense against the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping without undue surprise. The trial court emphasized the need for specificity in discovery and mentioned it would consider suppressing evidence for prosecutorial overreach, which did not occur in this case. Defendants did not identify any specific evidence withheld that surprised them at trial or demonstrated prejudice to their defense. Contentions that the State inadequately specified the acts leading to unlawful confinement or serious bodily injury were addressed, affirming that the presentment met the sufficiency standards established in State v. Hill. The court clarified that for kidnapping charges, it is not necessary for defendants to have participated in the initial removal or confinement, as kidnapping is considered a continuing offense. To convict for especially aggravated kidnapping, the State must prove the victim was falsely imprisoned and suffered serious bodily injury, as outlined in Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-13-305. The statute does not require proof that the defendants directly inflicted the injury, only that the injury occurred during the unlawful confinement. The necessity for a bill of particulars was also raised, with Defendants arguing that the presentment failed to clarify whether they were charged as principal actors or as aiders/abettors. The argument presented lacks merit as the case's presentments clearly identified each Defendant as "a party to the offense." Even if the language were deemed vague, neither Defendant expressed confusion or requested clarification necessary for their defense preparation before trial. The presentment, supported by two bills of particulars from the State, provided adequate detail for the Defendants to prepare their defense, avoid prejudicial surprises, and maintain a double jeopardy claim. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to relief on this issue. Furthermore, the Defendants contended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior bad acts and other alleged criminal activities, arguing that such evidence was irrelevant and its probative value was outweighed by potential unfair prejudice. Although the State recognized that much of this evidence fell outside the scope of the indictments, it argued that the prior conduct was relevant to establish the Defendants' "guilty knowledge" and to provide a complete narrative, as permitted by Rule 404(b) of Tennessee’s Rules of Evidence. The admissibility of this evidence followed a thorough two-day hearing, where the trial court considered arguments from both sides and reviewed the evidence carefully. Specific evidentiary objections from the Defendants included photographs of scars on a victim, testimony regarding various injuries inflicted by them, and testimonies from several witnesses. The trial court allowed the photographs of scars on the victim, as they were pertinent to the Defendants' knowledge of her injuries and demonstrated a pattern of conduct. Additionally, the Defendants objected to the relevance of photographs of their former residence in Indiana, taken years after their move, but the court ultimately deemed them admissible. The State argued for the relevance of photographs depicting locations of Esther's injuries and the continuity of the kidnapping offense that began in Indiana, despite the indictment reflecting only the events in Tennessee. The trial court admitted the photographs to provide a complete narrative, as they were linked to both prior and current alleged crimes, ruling that a Rule 404(b) hearing was unnecessary since the images did not indicate criminal acts. During victim Esther Combs' testimony, the Defendants objected to inquiries about her punishment for incomplete chores, prompting a Rule 404(b) hearing where Esther detailed her abuse and injuries across multiple states. The court evaluated these incidents for clear and convincing evidence, admitting some under two theories: to demonstrate absence of mistake or accident and to complete the narrative essential to the kidnapping charge. The court found the probative value of the admissible evidence outweighed its prejudicial effects. Similarly, after evaluating Esther’s testimony regarding events in Florida and Tennessee, the court made parallel assessments on the relevance and probative value of each incident, ruling some testimony inadmissible for various reasons. The Defendants also objected to Gayland Oaks' testimony, claiming irrelevance and inadmissibility under Rule 404(b). After a jury-out hearing, the court admitted some of Oaks' testimony about Esther's treatment, confinement, and statements by Joseph Combs, while excluding other parts due to potential unfair prejudice. The Defendants sought a jury-out hearing for Malinda Oaks' testimony, citing the same objections as before. The trial court ruled that Malinda's testimony would be admissible regarding her babysitting of the Combs children, her observations of Esther’s injuries, and her intent to teach Esther to write, while excluding potentially prejudicial testimony. Malinda testified accordingly, with one hearsay objection from defense counsel. During Kelly Rose Wood’s testimony, the defense objected, leading to a jury recess for the court to assess the prejudicial impact of the testimony under Rule 403. The trial judge ultimately allowed testimony related to babysitting and Esther’s injuries but excluded other parts. When Dr. Gretel Harlan testified regarding her examination of Esther and the scars identified in diagrams, the defense again objected, arguing the scars were irrelevant to the charges against the defendants. The court overruled this objection, citing the State’s theory of continuous confinement as justification for the testimony's relevance. The admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) was discussed, emphasizing that evidence of other crimes or acts is generally inadmissible to prove character but may be admissible for other specified purposes, provided that certain criteria and procedures are followed. These include conducting a hearing outside the jury's presence and establishing a material issue beyond character conformity. Relevant issues for admissibility may include identity, motive, intent, and rebuttal of defenses like accident or mistake, as supported by Tennessee case law. The admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) requires the trial judge to establish relevance and document the ruling and reasoning. The court must assess whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, a stricter standard than that in Rule 403. Additionally, the court must find clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's commission of the specific act in question. The admissibility decisions are generally at the trial court's discretion and can only be overturned for abuse of discretion. However, appellate courts will not defer to a trial court's ruling on Rule 404(b) evidence unless the court has substantially followed the required procedural rules. If these procedures are not adhered to, the reviewing court will independently assess admissibility based on the record. In the current case, the trial court did not conduct Rule 404(b) hearings for all the evidence, and while some analysis was performed for specific testimonies, not all evidence required a formal hearing. Ultimately, Esther's testimony regarding past abuse was deemed admissible under Rule 404(b) as the trial court substantially complied with procedural requirements by conducting hearings outside the jury's presence, despite the defendants' claims regarding the timing and association of the acts with specific charges. The trial court meticulously assessed each incident recounted by the victim to ascertain whether any material issues existed beyond mere character trait conduct and whether the evidence was relevant. It analyzed whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and required clear and convincing evidence for admission. A significant portion of Esther’s testimony was excluded due to findings that the alleged acts were not substantiated by clear evidence and that their probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. The testimony admitted was relevant to the charges: it provided essential context for the aggravated kidnapping charge, illustrating the complete story of confinement, and it also showed absence of mistake for child abuse and assault charges. The court instructed the jury extensively on how to consider the evidence concerning each Defendant and charge. The admissibility of the Rule 404(b) evidence was reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, as the court adhered strictly to evidence rules. Esther’s testimony was deemed valuable for establishing background, necessary for understanding the context of her confinement. Background evidence may be admissible if relevant to an issue other than criminal propensity, provided the probative value is not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Although the threshold for relevance is low, the court recognized that background evidence must still meet certain criteria to avoid confusion and ensure jury comprehension. In this case, the evidence of Esther's abuse was found to be probative of the Defendants’ actions to confine and control her, meeting the established criteria for contextual background evidence. The jury's understanding of Esther's submissiveness and reluctance to escape is crucial, given her history of abuse that began in early childhood. The evidence of her prolonged physical and psychological torture is essential for the jury to determine whether the Defendants committed false imprisonment. Without this context, jurors might struggle with key material issues, leading to confusion. The probative value of this evidence is significant and not outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice against the Defendants. Kidnapping laws penalize ongoing conduct, meaning that the definition of the crime cannot be rigidly confined and must consider the specific circumstances of each case. Here, false imprisonment was characterized by years of abuse rather than a single incident, making evidence of other acts by the Defendants relevant. Evidence of prior crimes can indicate identity, motive, intent, and knowledge, which are pertinent in assessing the Defendants' actions. The ongoing hostility and abusive behavior toward Esther helps establish the Defendants' intent to confine her and supports the claim of their guilty knowledge regarding the inflicted injuries. Despite the Defendants' argument against the relevance of this evidence, it is critical to counter Joseph Combs’ claim of ignorance regarding Esther's scars and to substantiate the charges of aggravated child abuse against Evangeline Combs. Establishing that the injuries were inflicted knowingly reinforces the notion that the abuse was not accidental. Testimonies from Gayland and Malinda Oaks also support the admissibility of evidence regarding confinement and ongoing abuse, aligning with the established legal principles. No abuse of discretion or error was found regarding the trial court's admission of evidence related to other crimes, wrongs, or acts. The Defendants argued that the trial court improperly admitted two sets of photographs, but these did not pertain to prior bad acts or criminal activity by either Defendant. Specifically, the photographs of Esther's scars did not identify the individual responsible for her injuries, thus not violating Rule 404(b) concerning character evidence. The admissibility of this evidence was evaluated under Tennessee's Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 401 and 403. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that which makes a consequential fact more or less probable, while Rule 402 affirms that relevant evidence is generally admissible. Rule 403 mandates excluding relevant evidence if its probative value is significantly outweighed by potential unfair prejudice or confusion. The photographs of Esther’s scars were deemed admissible as they were highly relevant to the charges of physical abuse and serious bodily injury, demonstrating the Defendants' knowledge of Esther's injuries, countering claims of accident or mistake, and indicating intent to control and confine her through physical and psychological means. The extensive nature of her injuries, evidenced by over 400 scars, suggested a pattern of ongoing abuse. The court concluded that the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by any negative considerations under Rule 403. The Defendants' comparison to State v. Copenny, where prior scars were excluded due to potential prejudice, was found inapplicable as the circumstances were different; the Copenny case involved a self-defense claim where the scars were used to argue the victim's propensity for violence. Defendants' reliance on the Copenny case is deemed inappropriate due to a lack of correlation with the current circumstances. The eight photographs of the Combs’ Indiana home, taken around 1999, include one of the house's front and five depicting an interior staircase, with the final two showing a small indoor area and window. The State argued these images were relevant to the location of Esther's injuries and the context of the kidnapping. The trial court ruled that the staircase photographs were pertinent as Esther testified her injury occurred there. However, the other photographs did not demonstrate relevance under Tenn. R. Evid. 401, as they failed to influence any consequential facts. Consequently, while their admission was an error, it was harmless and did not impact the trial outcome. The admissibility of testimonies from Kelly Rose Wood and Dr. Gretel Harlan was also considered. Wood's testimony was partially excluded due to implications of unproven crimes but was allowed concerning her observations of Esther’s injuries and behavior, establishing a pattern of conduct. The court found this relevant under Rule 401 and not outweighed by potential prejudicial effects under Rule 403. Dr. Harlan’s testimony regarding Esther’s injuries was similarly deemed relevant for demonstrating serious bodily harm and outweighed any risk of unfair prejudice. Overall, except for the three photographs, the evidence was found admissible, and the Defendants' claims of insufficient evidence for their convictions were rejected. Evidentiary sufficiency on appeal is reviewed by determining if a rational factfinder could find all essential elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, considering evidence favorably to the State. This standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a mix of both. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence or draw different inferences but must accept the strongest legitimate view of the evidence. A jury's guilty verdict, endorsed by the trial court, credits State witnesses' testimony, resolves conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and shifts the presumption from innocence to guilt. Credibility and evidentiary weight issues are for the trier of fact to resolve, while the defendant must prove the insufficiency of evidence supporting the conviction. For a conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping, the State must establish that the defendant unlawfully removed or confined the victim, substantially interfering with her liberty, and that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. "Serious bodily injury" is defined as injuries posing substantial risks, including death or significant impairment of bodily functions. The term "unlawful confinement" involves actions executed by force, threat, or fraud, or without proper consent in cases involving minors or individuals deemed incompetent. The Defendants challenge the convictions, arguing the State failed to demonstrate unlawful confinement, citing instances where the victim, Esther, voluntarily left and returned home, claiming these events interrupted any alleged continuous confinement and left an essential element of the kidnapping charge unproven. Defendants reference the case of State v. Paul Lee Whited to support their argument regarding confinement. In Whited, the defendant unlawfully confined the victim by locking her in a closet and, although serious bodily injury was evident, it was not proven that these injuries occurred during the confinement. The court ultimately reduced the charge from especially aggravated kidnapping to false imprisonment due to the lack of evidence demonstrating continuous physical or mental restraint over the victim. In contrast, the current case involves Esther, who was confined in a house for years, suffering serious bodily injuries. Unlike the Whited case, where the victim had some freedom of movement and could leave the home, Esther's testimony indicates she was consistently restricted to her room and subjected to severe punishment for disobedience. She was never permitted to visit others or engage in activities independently. The Defendants misrepresented her status, claiming they had adopted her, and Esther lacked basic identification and educational skills, reinforcing the extent of her confinement and control by the Defendants. Esther experienced long-term confinement characterized by psychological and physical abuse, as corroborated by multiple witnesses. The jury could reasonably infer that her confinement resulted from the Defendants' use of force, threat, or fraud. Despite the Defendants' claims that Esther had opportunities to escape, the court maintained that it would not re-evaluate evidence sufficient for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence revealed that Esther was denied basic tools for independent living and that her attempts to escape were driven by desperation, including a suicide attempt. The Defendants argued that any confinement prior to Esther's thirteenth birthday was not unlawful due to parental consent, referencing Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-301(2). They claimed their status as foster parents justified their actions post-thirteenth birthday; however, the court found this argument meritless, noting the Defendants misrepresented their guardianship status and detrimentally affected Esther's welfare. The definition of unlawful confinement indicates that it can occur even with parental consent if achieved through force, threat, or fraud. Esther turned thirteen on November 16, 1990, meaning her unlawful confinement lasted approximately six and a half months before that date and continued for over six years thereafter. Defendants argue that the State did not prove that Esther’s confinement involved a deadly weapon, but this claim is unfounded as the convictions do not rely on that element. Evidence supports the jury’s finding of serious bodily injury, defined under Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-305 (a)(4), which includes conditions such as substantial risk of death and extreme physical pain. Esther's testimony detailed severe abuse, including choking, burns, and permanent damage to her elbow, demonstrating injuries that indicate unconsciousness and substantial impairment. The Defendants' claim that the State needed to specify which injuries caused the serious bodily injury is incorrect, as the offense can be perceived as a single, continuing course of conduct. The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find the essential elements of especially aggravated kidnapping were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding Joseph Combs, he contends that evidence is insufficient for his convictions of aggravated rape and rape, arguing that coercion is necessary for these offenses. While coercion is indeed required for the seven counts of rape, it is not necessary for aggravated rape. The statutory definition of aggravated rape does not necessitate proof of coercion if the victim is under thirteen, as alleged in the relevant count. Conversely, the rape counts explicitly state that force or coercion was used during the acts. Coercion is defined as the threat of kidnapping, extortion, force, or violence, as well as the misuse of authority over a child under 15 years old, according to Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-501(1) (1997). The evidence was deemed sufficient to uphold the convictions for aggravated rape and seven counts of rape, with the victim, Esther, being under 13 years old at the time of the first incident in April 1989. A rational jury could conclude that the Defendant sexually penetrated her on the alleged dates. The earliest rape occurred on November 16, 1990, and the latest was during the summer of 1995. The evidence indicated that the Defendant’s abusive behavior ensured Esther complied with his demands under coercion. Regarding the conviction for aggravated perjury, the Defendant argued that the State did not prove materiality, claiming his false statements during a conservatorship proceeding were immaterial since Esther had already left the jurisdiction. Aggravated perjury, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. 39-16-703(a) (1997), requires a false statement made with intent to deceive, during an official proceeding, and that the statement is material. The court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that the Defendant's statements regarding Esther's whereabouts were indeed material, as the hearing's purpose was to decide her future. The court concluded that a rational jury could find all essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, denying relief to the Defendant on this issue. Lastly, the Defendants claimed the trial court failed to instruct the jury on all appropriate lesser-included offenses, as mandated by State v. Burns and State v. Dominy. The State argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses was either harmless error or did not meet the criteria for such instructions as established in *Burns*. A trial court is mandated by Tennessee statute to instruct juries on all lesser-included offenses when there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for those offenses. The Tennessee Supreme Court specifies that an offense is considered lesser-included if it meets certain statutory criteria, such as encompassing all elements of the charged offense or differing only in mental state or severity of harm. Additionally, mere existence of a lesser offense does not warrant an instruction unless there is evidence that reasonable minds could accept as sufficient for conviction. A failure to provide these instructions constitutes a reversible error unless the State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the trial's outcome. The determination of whether an offense qualifies as a lesser-included offense involves both legal and factual considerations, necessitating a de novo review. In the case at hand, the defendants were convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and argue that the jury should have received instructions on false imprisonment and aggravated assault, with one defendant additionally requesting instructions on facilitation. False imprisonment is defined as unlawfully removing or confining another, thereby significantly interfering with their liberty. A person can be criminally liable for facilitating a felony if they knowingly provide substantial assistance to someone intending to commit that felony, even without the intent required for criminal responsibility. Aggravated assault occurs when one intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts serious bodily injury or uses a deadly weapon during an assault. False imprisonment is recognized as a lesser-included offense within the definition of especially aggravated kidnapping. Under the Burns test, the need to assess whether sufficient evidence exists for the lesser charge is negated by the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Williams, which determined that if a jury finds a defendant guilty of a higher offense, they inherently reject all lesser offenses. This conclusion was reiterated in State v. Bowles. In the present case, the jury was adequately instructed on the elements of especially aggravated kidnapping and its lesser-included offenses. Thus, the jury’s guilty verdict for especially aggravated kidnapping indicates they found it to be the most appropriate charge based on the evidence, and any potential error in not instructing on false imprisonment would not have changed the outcome. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense was deemed an error, but it was ruled harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This assessment relies on the harmless error analysis outlined in State v. Allen, which evaluates whether the error affected the trial's outcome. A thorough review of the trial record indicated that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury's verdict, particularly given the uncontroverted fact of serious injury to the victim. Consequently, it was concluded that no reasonable jury would have convicted either Defendant of false imprisonment. Regarding Defendant Joseph Combs, the court found that the evidence of his involvement in the alleged offense was so compelling that a jury, if instructed on the lesser offense of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, would still not find him guilty. Therefore, the trial court's omission of this instruction was also deemed harmless. On the issue of whether jury instructions were required for aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping, the court determined that they were not necessary. The Burns test was not satisfied since aggravated assault's statutory elements do not entirely overlap with those of especially aggravated kidnapping. Specifically, aggravated assault requires intent to cause serious bodily injury, while especially aggravated kidnapping involves unlawful confinement leading to serious bodily injury, without a requirement of intent to harm. The analysis concluded that the mental state for aggravated assault does not constitute a lesser culpability than that required for especially aggravated kidnapping, thus failing both parts of the Burns test. Part (c) is not satisfied because the lesser offense does not involve facilitation, attempt, or solicitation relevant to the charged offense or any lesser-included offense as defined in parts (a) or (b). In State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111 (Tenn. 1999), the issue of whether assault is a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping was mentioned but decided on different grounds. The supreme court noted that assault is completed upon the occurrence of bodily injury, unlike aggravated kidnapping, indicating significant differences between the two crimes. Since assault requires proof of intent to cause injury and kidnapping necessitates confinement that may not result in injury by the defendant, the Burns test for lesser-included offense status is not met. Therefore, the trial court correctly refrained from instructing the jury on aggravated assault. Defendant Joseph Combs also argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on "involuntary servitude" as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping. However, involuntary servitude is not a distinct offense but an element of confinement necessary for a kidnapping conviction, rendering this argument meritless. Regarding aggravated assault, the presentment against Combs charged him with intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to Esther Combs with a deadly weapon. The jury received instructions on intentional/knowing aggravated assault and reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense. Combs contended that the trial court erred by not including reckless endangerment and assault as additional lesser-included offenses. The definition of reckless endangerment involves recklessly placing another in imminent danger of serious injury, while aggravated assault involves intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct causing bodily injury or creating fear of injury. The trial court’s omission of reckless endangerment instructions, if an error, was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury’s conviction of intentional or knowing aggravated assault indicated they rejected the notion of reckless conduct. Consequently, it is inferred that the jury would not have returned a verdict for the lesser crime of reckless endangerment or assault. Defendant Joseph Combs argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on rape and aggravated assault as lesser-included offenses of aggravated rape. The court finds this argument unpersuasive. The charge of aggravated rape against Combs, which occurred in April 1989, involved unlawful sexual penetration of a child under thirteen, per Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502. The definition of aggravated rape at that time included several circumstances, such as the use of force, causing personal injury, or the victim being underage. The court notes that the conviction for aggravated rape did not require proof of any additional elements outlined in the rape definition, indicating that the criteria for lesser-included offenses were not met. Even if the jury should have been instructed on rape, such an error would be considered harmless due to the evidence and defense theory presented. Additionally, the court explains that aggravated assault does not satisfy the criteria for a lesser-included offense of aggravated rape, as aggravated assault requires proof of intent to cause serious bodily injury or the use of a deadly weapon, none of which are elements of aggravated rape in this case. Therefore, the trial court was correct in not providing instructions for these lesser offenses. In contrast, the court agrees that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on perjury as a lesser-included offense of aggravated perjury. Aggravated perjury involves making a false statement under oath with intent to deceive during an official proceeding, which is material. A conviction for perjury requires proving a false statement under oath with intent to deceive. The elements of perjury are included in aggravated perjury, satisfying the criteria for a lesser-included offense. To determine if a jury instruction on perjury was warranted, a two-step analysis is applied: first, the trial court assesses whether reasonable evidence exists for the lesser offense, viewing it favorably; second, the court evaluates if this evidence is legally sufficient for a conviction. The defendant admitted to making a false statement under oath during a conservatorship proceeding, meeting the perjury criteria. The contested point revolves around whether the false statement was material, defined as potentially affecting the outcome of the proceeding. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on perjury constitutes error, which is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt unless the error did not impact the trial's outcome. The case law suggests that the omission of a lesser-included offense is akin to omitting an element of the offense, requiring evidence that could lead to a finding contrary to the omitted element. Ultimately, the determination of whether the defendant's false statement was material hinges on whether there is evidence for the jury to conclude otherwise, given the subjective nature of the materiality definition. The court found that it could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would have concluded that the Defendant's false statement did not influence the conservatorship proceedings. Consequently, it could not ascertain that the trial court's failure to instruct on perjury did not impact the jury's verdict, leading to the reversal of the Defendant's conviction for aggravated perjury and a remand for a new trial. Regarding the charge of especially aggravated kidnapping, the Defendants claimed the trial court erred by not providing a complete definition of “unlawful,” specifically omitting the victim’s age, which they argued would allow the jury to consider parental consent as a defense for confining a victim under thirteen. The court reiterated that defendants have the right to accurate jury instructions that address all factual issues raised. It stated that a trial judge is obligated to provide comprehensive legal instructions, and that the definition of “unlawful” includes actions taken without the consent of a responsible adult for minors under thirteen. The trial judge denied the Defendants' request to include this definition, noting that the victim's age had been removed from the charges before trial. The Defendants’ argument was viewed as a reiteration of previous claims, lacking legal support for their assertion that their confinement of the victim was lawful. The Defendants failed to complete the legal requirements necessary to establish themselves as Esther’s legal parent or guardian, rendering their defense based on parental status without merit. The law indicates that confinement through force, threat, or fraud is unlawful, even with consent from a parent or guardian. Evidence supported the conclusion that the Defendants confined Esther unlawfully, particularly noting that she was over thirteen years old during most of this confinement. There is no legal provision supporting the Defendants' proposed defense in the relevant statutes. The trial court's jury instructions were deemed appropriate, and the Defendants' constitutional rights were upheld, thus they are not entitled to relief. Defendant Evangeline Combs contends that her aggravated child abuse convictions should merge with her especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and Defendant Joseph Combs argues similarly regarding his aggravated assault conviction. They claim separate convictions constitute multiplicity, as the offenses overlap in time, share elements, and utilize the same evidence. However, the court disagrees, clarifying that multiplicity refers to improperly dividing a single offense into multiple charges. The principles against double jeopardy protect against multiple punishments for the same offense, and a framework established in State v. Denton guides the determination of whether offenses are distinct based on statutory elements, evidence, victim count, and statutory purposes. Evangeline Combs was convicted of four counts of aggravated child abuse, which is central to this discussion. A person is guilty of aggravated child abuse or aggravated child neglect if they knowingly inflict injury or neglect a child under eighteen, resulting in serious bodily injury or using a deadly weapon, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-15-401. Evangeline Combs was found guilty of two counts of aggravated child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury and two counts involving a deadly weapon. The crime of especially aggravated kidnapping requires proof that the defendant unlawfully removed or confined the victim by force, threat, or fraud, resulting in serious bodily injury. Applying the Denton analysis, the aggravated child abuse and kidnapping offenses have distinct elements; the former necessitates proof of the child's age and non-accidental harm, while the latter requires evidence of unlawful confinement without needing to show intent to harm. The evidence for the child abuse charges, which involved specific serious injuries inflicted with a baseball bat, was different from that for the kidnapping charge, which focused on unlawful confinement over seven years. The offenses were committed through separate acts, supporting their classification as distinct crimes. Additionally, while both statutes address injury, they target different issues: child abuse laws protect children specifically, whereas kidnapping laws safeguard personal liberty. A defendant who unlawfully confined a victim, resulting in serious bodily injury, may face separate convictions and punishments if evidence shows that during the confinement, serious bodily injury was inflicted. In the case of Evangeline Combs, her convictions for aggravated child abuse and especially aggravated kidnapping should not merge, as each offense requires distinct elements. Aggravated assault, defined as intentionally causing bodily injury while using a deadly weapon, was committed by Joseph Combs with a rope, leading to his conviction. The aggravated assault required proof of bodily injury and weapon display, while the kidnapping charge necessitated evidence of serious bodily injury resulting from confinement, which is not an element of aggravated assault. The offenses involved different evidence: the assault occurred between June and September 1996, while the kidnapping involved unlawful confinement from April 1990 to October 1997. The distinct nature of the acts and the differing statutory protections against liberty infringement and bodily injury support separate convictions. The defendants' argument for merger based on overlapping time periods is dismissed, as the law allows for concurrent convictions. Additionally, the defendants claim that separate convictions violate principles established in State v. Anthony, but this assertion lacks merit and is unsupported by legal precedent. A separate kidnapping conviction may violate due process if it is incidental to an accompanying felony and not substantial enough to justify independent prosecution. The initial assessment focuses on whether the movement or confinement exceeded what was necessary for the felony. If it did, further evaluation considers whether the confinement: 1) prevented the victim from seeking help, 2) reduced the risk of detection for the perpetrator, or 3) heightened the victim's risk of harm. In this case, the court determined that Esther's confinement for over seven years was excessive for the felonies of aggravated assault and aggravated child abuse. The psychological and physical torture she endured hindered her ability to seek help, and the presence of the Defendants minimized the likelihood of detection. The duration of her confinement also significantly increased her risk of harm. Consequently, the trial court correctly did not merge the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping with the other offenses, affirming that separate convictions do not breach due process or double jeopardy principles. Regarding sentencing, the Defendants contended that the trial court misapplied enhancement factors, inadequately considered mitigating factors, and improperly ordered consecutive sentences. However, the court disagreed, emphasizing that challenges to sentence length or manner of service are reviewed de novo with a presumption of correctness, provided the trial judge followed sentencing principles. If statutory requirements are not met, this presumption does not apply, and the appealing party bears the burden to prove the sentence's impropriety. The court's review includes examining evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, presentence reports, sentencing principles, the nature of the criminal conduct, enhancement and mitigating factors, and any statements from the defendant regarding sentencing. A trial court's sentencing procedure must adhere to statutory guidelines, which include considering relevant factors and ensuring the findings are supported by the record. If these criteria are met, the sentence will not be modified, even if a different outcome is preferred. For Class B, C, D, and E felonies, if no mitigating or enhancement factors are present, the presumptive sentence is the minimum within the applicable range. For Class A felonies, it is the midpoint of the range. If enhancement factors are applicable, the trial court may increase the presumptive sentence; conversely, if mitigating factors exist, the sentence may be reduced. In the case of Defendant Joseph Combs, the trial court identified several enhancement factors relating to his offenses, including a previous criminal history, leadership in the commission of the offense, the victim's vulnerability, and abuse of trust. These factors were applied to various charges, including especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated perjury, aggravated rape, and multiple counts of rape. The court also noted mitigating factors, such as Combs' lack of a prior criminal record and his community contributions. Combs argues against the application of certain enhancement factors, particularly citing his lack of a criminal record as a basis for contesting factor (1). A criminal record is not mandatory for the application of sentencing enhancement factors; prior unconvicted criminal behavior can be considered if proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court acknowledged the lack of a formal criminal record but utilized substantial evidence of the Defendant's prior criminal conduct, which was not formally charged, to apply this factor. The Defendant contested the application of enhancement factor (2), arguing that it is illogical for both him and his wife to be considered "leaders" in the same offense. However, since the crime of especially aggravated kidnapping is ongoing, evidence suggested both Defendants played significant roles throughout the victim’s seven-year confinement, allowing them to be construed as leaders in the commission of the offense. The Defendant also challenged the application of enhancement factor (4), which addresses the victim's vulnerability due to age. It was argued that mere age does not suffice; rather, the victim's particular vulnerabilities must be established. The State successfully demonstrated that the victim, taken into the Defendants' home at five months old, believed them to be her parents, lacking the ability to recognize proper familial behavior or seek help. This lifelong ignorance significantly contributed to her vulnerability, which was directly linked to the commission of the offense, thereby justifying the application of enhancement factor (4). The court emphasized that the victim's vulnerabilities must relate to her inability to resist the crime or seek assistance, which was satisfied in this case. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to appropriately weigh mitigating factors in his sentencing, specifically citing his lack of prior convictions, good work history, and contributions as a teacher and minister as offsets to the enhancement factors applied. The court maintains that determining the weight of these factors is within its discretion, provided it adheres to the sentencing act's purposes and principles, which it did in this instance. For co-defendant Evangeline Combs, the trial court applied several enhancement factors for her sentence related to especially aggravated kidnapping, including her previous criminal behavior, her role as a leader in the offense, the victim's vulnerability due to age or disability, and her abuse of a position of trust. In considering her aggravated child abuse convictions, the court applied similar enhancement factors, alongside one indicating permanent impairment to the victim. Although the court acknowledged mitigating circumstances such as Combs' lack of a prior criminal record and her intelligence, it assigned them minimal weight. Evangeline Combs contests the applicability of several enhancement factors, similar to arguments made by Joseph Combs. The court finds that previous unconvicted criminal behavior may be considered for sentence enhancement, and that both defendants could be viewed as leaders in the kidnapping. The court also determined the victim's vulnerability and properly applied factor (2) for child abuse, based on evidence of collusion in the crime. The application of factor (15), relating to the abuse of a position of trust, was deemed appropriate given her parental role, regardless of the manner in which that role was acquired. The court addressed the application of enhancement factor (18), which applies when a victim suffers permanent impairment due to aggravated child abuse or neglect. The defendant, identified as one of the adoptive parents of the victim, Esther, argued against the application of this factor, claiming it constituted double enhancement as prohibited in State v. Bingham. However, the court found no support for this argument, indicating that factor (18) is intentionally designed to enhance sentences for such offenses. The court also rejected the defendant's claims regarding the trial court's failure to adequately weigh mitigating factors, affirming that the trial court has discretion in weighing these factors and that its findings were substantiated by the record. Regarding sentencing, the trial court imposed significant sentences on the defendant, Joseph Combs, totaling 114 years for various convictions, including especially aggravated kidnapping and multiple counts of rape. The court justified consecutive sentencing based on findings that the defendant was a dangerous offender and had multiple convictions involving sexual abuse of a minor, factoring in the nature of the offenses and their impact on the victim. Additionally, Evangeline Combs received a sentence of twenty-two years for especially aggravated kidnapping and substantial sentences for aggravated child abuse convictions, reflecting the severity of the offenses committed. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling sixty-five years on the Defendants, designating them as “dangerous offenders” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(4) (1997). The Defendants challenged the propriety of consecutive sentencing, arguing they did not fit the criteria established in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). The court clarified that while evidence of a dangerous offender's behavior indicates a disregard for human life, it must also show that consecutive sentences are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and necessary for public safety. The later case, State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999), emphasized the requirement for "particular facts" to justify consecutive sentencing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). In the case of Joseph Combs, the trial court affirmed that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that he was a dangerous offender and that consecutive sentencing was warranted to protect the public. For Evangeline Combs, the court noted the serious nature and volume of offenses, alongside the victim's inability to escape, as factors justifying her classification as a dangerous offender. The court determined that the Defendants exhibited little regard for human life and that the sentences were appropriate in relation to the offenses committed. Consequently, the court found no abuse of discretion in its sentencing decision, affirming the lawfulness and adherence to sentencing guidelines without the need for modification. Consecutive sentencing for Joseph Combs is deemed appropriate due to multiple convictions for statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor, as outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-114(5). The trial court considered various aggravating circumstances, including the offender's relationship to the victim, the duration of the sexual abuse, the nature of the acts, and the resulting physical and mental harm to the victim, Esther. The evidence presented during the sentencing hearing supports the imposition of consecutive sentences, particularly highlighting the extensive undetected abuse and the significant harm caused to the victim. Combs contends that the trial court erred by not conducting an evaluation required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-705(b), which he claims could influence sentencing options like probation or alternative sentences. However, the 1998 amendment to this statute indicates that such evaluations are only relevant when a defendant is seeking probation or alternatives, and Combs, with multiple felony convictions, is not considered a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing. The trial court's decisions are upheld, as Combs's sentences exceeded eight years for the majority, forbidding probation eligibility. The State argues that for a sex offender destined for incarceration, the trial court’s omission of the evaluation is inconsequential, as evaluations occur once the offender is in custody. The conclusion of the review confirms that the trial court correctly applied the sentencing factors, justifying the length of confinement to protect the public and reflecting the serious nature of the crimes committed. The defendants did not demonstrate that the trial court's sentencing was improper, resulting in no relief granted on this matter. Defendant Joseph Combs argues that his convictions for aggravated rape and six counts of rape should be overturned due to the statute of limitations. He claims that the facts in the presentment do not satisfy the tolling requirements outlined in State v. Davidson and that the State failed to prove the allegations at trial, thus violating his constitutional rights. The State counters that the statute of limitations was tolled because of concealment allegations in the presentment, which were sufficiently proven during the trial, as evidenced by Combs' conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. Additionally, Combs contends that the issue of whether concealment was proven is a factual matter for the jury and that the trial court erred by not providing appropriate jury instructions, constituting plain error under Rule 52(b) of Tennessee's Rules of Criminal Procedure. The charges in question include Count 12, alleging aggravated rape of a child under thirteen, occurring in April 1989, and Counts 13 through 19, which detail rapes committed from November 1990 to February 1992, all involving the victim, Esther A. Combs, after she turned thirteen. The presentment, dated November 4, 1998, falls under a four-year statute of limitations for these offenses. Only Count 14, related to events during the summer of 1995, is not time-barred. The purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect defendants from delayed prosecution and stale evidence, encouraging timely legal action in criminal cases. The applicable statute of limitations for offenses against minors is outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2-101. The statute of limitations for prosecuting offenses under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-15-302 or 39-17-902 begins when the victim reaches the age of majority or within four years after the offense, whichever is later. However, offenses punishable by life imprisonment, such as aggravated rape, can be prosecuted at any time after the offense. Aggravated rape was classified under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-603 as a felony punishable by life or a minimum of 20 years since April 1989, thus allowing prosecution for that charge without limitation. The prosecution for other rape charges, however, faced limitations as more than four years had passed between the offenses and the filing of the presentment, with an exception noted for one count. The defendant had raised the statute of limitations issue prior to trial. The key legal question is whether the statute was effectively tolled, which Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2-103 allows if the accused concealed the crime or was not publicly resident in the state. In State v. Davidson, the court addressed whether the defendant's coercive actions towards the victim constituted concealment under the tolling provision. The indictment alleged that the defendant used threats and parental influence to discourage the victim from reporting the abuse, complicating the ability to determine when the coercion occurred and whether it effectively concealed the crime. The court concluded that the indictment lacked sufficient detail regarding the timeline of the coercion and the victim's reporting of the abuse, failing to demonstrate a sufficient period of concealment to toll the statute of limitations. Determining whether the presentment contained adequate allegations to toll the statute of limitations is essential. The state must not only allege these facts but also prove them at trial for a conviction. Defendant Joseph Combs argues that the allegations regarding the rape offenses are insufficient to toll the statute of limitations, referencing the strict criteria established in Davidson. However, the circumstances in Combs' case differ significantly from those in Davidson, where the state did not specify when coercion occurred. In contrast, Combs' presentment clearly outlined the timeline of the victim's confinement, stating that it lasted from April 30, 1990, to October 3, 1997. Additional counts also indicated that Combs concealed the crime through confinement. Legal precedents support that multiple counts in an indictment can be read together to provide a comprehensive understanding, allowing elements missing from one count to be supplemented by another, as established in cases like Cureton and Youngblood. While Davidson raised concerns about the timing of reports to authorities and the victim's delayed reporting upon reaching adulthood, Combs’ case presents a different scenario. The victim reached adulthood on November 16, 1995, during her confinement, and the presentment was filed just over a year after her confinement ended. This timeline does not raise suspicions about delays in reporting, thereby making additional information regarding when the crimes were reported unnecessary in this context. Statutes of limitations favor the accused and are strictly construed against the state regarding tolling provisions during concealment. In this case, the allegations sufficiently established concealment, allowing the statute to be tolled for the rape offenses, making the presentments timely. The jury's verdict on the especially aggravated kidnapping charge indicated that the State proved Defendant Joseph Combs concealed the rape crimes. The Defendant argues that the question of concealment was a factual issue for the jury and that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on tolling facts constituted plain error under Rule 52(b) of Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the Defendant had the opportunity to request special jury instructions and review the jury charge but did not do so, nor did he include this issue in his motion for a new trial. A trial court must provide complete legal instructions relevant to the case, and failure to request instructions on non-fundamental issues does not constitute error. The Defendant's failure to raise the issue or request instructions means he has waived his right to appeal on this matter. Nonetheless, a reviewing court may recognize "plain errors" that were not raised, provided the error affected the accused's substantial rights and likely prejudiced the judicial process. An appellate court's decision to recognize an error and grant relief without a trial court objection depends on the specific facts of each case. In State v. Smith, the Tennessee Supreme Court established five criteria for determining whether an error qualifies as "plain error" in the absence of prior objection: (a) the trial court record must clearly establish what occurred; (b) a clear law must have been violated; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been harmed; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) addressing the error must be necessary to achieve substantial justice. All five factors must be present for the appellate court to recognize plain error, although if one factor is clearly absent, further consideration of others is unnecessary. Additionally, the plain error must be significant enough to likely have changed the trial's outcome. In this case, the appellate court found that the third and fifth factors were not satisfied, precluding a finding of plain error. The court did not determine whether the Defendant was entitled to jury instructions regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations due to concealment but noted that even if such instructions had been given, they would not have altered the trial's outcome. The jury's guilty verdict on the especially aggravated kidnapping charge implied a finding that the Defendant concealed the rape crimes, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. Consequently, the Defendant's rights to a fair trial and appropriate jury instructions were upheld. The court also identified clerical errors in the judgment forms for the convictions of Evangeline and Joseph Combs, specifically correcting statute numbers related to their offenses. It reversed Joseph Combs' conviction for aggravated perjury and remanded for a new trial on that charge while affirming the trial court's judgments in all other respects.