State of Tennessee v. Mark Anthony Griffin

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2001-01233-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; December 10, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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A jury convicted Mark Anthony Griffin of aggravated robbery and attempted robbery, resulting in a nine-year sentence. Griffin appealed, and while the court affirmed the conviction, it remanded the case to assess whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. The trial court concluded that there was no violation, leading Griffin to appeal the dismissal of his motion on those grounds. The appellate court found no error in the trial court's ruling and affirmed the judgment.

The case originated from a February 16, 1993 robbery at a Knoxville video store, where Griffin, armed and masked, demanded money from the clerk and panicked, stealing a customer's wallet when the clerk struggled with the cash drawer. Griffin later admitted to his involvement during a police interview. His defense did not present any evidence at trial. The trial court had previously denied Griffin's motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial delay, which he claimed hindered his ability to secure concurrent sentencing with a prior federal sentence. The court determined any potential prejudice could be addressed during sentencing, ultimately ordering that state sentences align with the remaining time on Griffin's federal sentence.

Prior to June 29, 1993, the defendant and his accomplice were in Anderson County jail on unrelated charges. On June 29, a Knox County detective attempted to interrogate them regarding several video store robberies, but the defendant initially agreed to talk and then declined. On July 1, they were transferred to Knox County jail, though the reason for this transfer is unclear. The defendant claims the transfer was due to being 'arrested' for the robberies. Following a hearing on a motion to dismiss, the state provided certain documents to the defense, including warrants issued but not served on the defendant. Despite this, the defendant provided a taped confession on the same day of the transfer. He received a four-year federal sentence on July 15, 1993, and was later indicted for Knox County charges on July 24, 1995. The defendant alleges that a detainer letter was sent to Knox County in September 1993, but no action was taken until his indictment. After being paroled on October 29, 1996, he was arraigned on November 1, and a trial was set for February 24, 1997, but was continued multiple times, partly due to his federal custody. On June 27, 1997, he violated his federal parole and served the remainder of his sentence. He was released on May 1, 1998, and a new trial date was set for October 5, 1998, but he failed to appear. He was arrested on February 26, 1999, and convicted on August 17, 1999, for aggravated robbery and attempted robbery, receiving concurrent sentences. The court concluded that the timeline and circumstances of the delays in the case were unclear and that no evidence was presented regarding prosecutorial delay between February 1993 and August 1999.

The record includes hearing transcripts on the motion to dismiss, but lacks evidence. Defense motions present an alleged chronology and uncertified documents, which do not qualify as evidence. The Court instructed the trial court on remand to: 1) Determine if the defendant was 'arrested' by Knox County in July 1993 to establish relevant dates for due process and speedy trial analyses, including assessing prejudice and intentional delay; 2) Ascertain if the defendant was on bail for a federal offense during the robberies, as this would impact concurrent sentencing eligibility and prejudice claims; 3) If not on bail, evaluate the probability of concurrent sentencing under Tennessee rules; 4) Issue findings and orders based on the determinations made. If the motion to dismiss is overruled, the convictions will be reinstated; if granted, an appropriate order will be entered, with the possibility for either party to appeal.

Upon remand, the trial court reviewed documentary evidence, including an 'ARREST REPORT' signed by a Knox County detective, confirming the defendant's arrest on July 1, 1993, for aggravated robbery. The court also considered the defendant's federal conviction timeline, noting he was charged with a weapons offense in August 1992, sentenced on July 15, 1993, and thus was on some form of release status during that period. Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant was on release between August 1992 and July 1993, affirming that the robberies occurred in February 1993 under Tennessee law.

The defendant was on felony release status when he committed a subsequent felony, necessitating that his sentence run consecutively to a federal sentence, as mandated by statute. Consequently, the timing of his trial prior to 1999 did not prejudice him, as the sentences could not have been concurrent.

The right to a speedy trial is protected under federal and state constitutions and statutes, guarding against oppressive pretrial incarceration and potential defense impairment. This right attaches at arrest or indictment and continues until trial. To assess a violation of this right, four factors must be evaluated: the delay's length, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and any resulting prejudice. Prejudice is primarily focused on the defendant's ability to prepare a defense. A delay exceeding one year is generally considered presumptively prejudicial.

The standard of review for claims of speedy trial violations involves determining if the trial court properly applied the four-factor test, with an abuse of discretion standard. A reversal requires clear evidence of an incorrect legal standard or illogical decision-making by the trial court.

In this case, the trial court noted that the defendant was arrested on July 1, 1993, with arraignment occurring on November 1, 1996, and the trial commencing on February 4, 1997. This resulted in a delay of nearly four years between arrest and trial, which triggers the speed trial analysis.

A substantial delay in proceedings does not automatically constitute a constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial. Tennessee case law supports this, with the Tennessee Supreme Court previously ruling that delays of over thirteen years and two years do not, by themselves, indicate a violation. Delays can arise from four main reasons: intentional delay for tactical advantage, bureaucratic negligence, necessary delays for fair prosecution, or delays caused by the defense. In this case, the trial court found intentional delay by the State for tactical advantage, although the record was unclear regarding the reasons for the delay from July 1993 to July 1995. While the trial court did not reassess the issue of bad faith on remand, it concluded that, even assuming intentional delay, the outcome would remain unchanged based on the Barker factors.

The defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial on May 26, 1999, claiming he could not do so earlier due to the absence of a formal charge. However, nearly three years lapsed between the service of a capias and the defendant's motion to dismiss, indicating a lack of effort on his part to expedite the trial, which favored the State's position. Prejudice related to the delay was assessed based on three interests: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety, and ensuring the defense is not impaired. The court found no established prejudice due to the defendant’s inability to show significant impairment of his defense or loss of potential concurrent sentencing, since he was deemed ineligible for such sentencing while on bail. Consequently, the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's claim of a speedy trial violation was affirmed, with no abuse of discretion found.