State of Tennessee v. Joel Christian Parker

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2001-00773-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; December 17, 2002; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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On February 2, 2000, Joel Christian Parker was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to nine years in prison. He appealed, raising eight issues for review: 

1. Sufficiency of evidence supporting the verdict.
2. Fairness and impartiality of the jury.
3. Trial court's failure to instruct the jury on assault or aggravated assault.
4. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.
5. Constitutionality of a pre-trial show-up identification.
6. Adequacy of jury instructions regarding the defendant's mental state.
7. Destruction of evidence essential to the defense.
8. Excessiveness of the sentence.

The court reviewed each claim and found no grounds for reversal, affirming the trial court's judgment. The factual background detailed the robbery on November 12, 1998, where Parker, disguised, threatened employees at a pawn shop, stole firearms, and later confessed to a friend. He was arrested shortly after, and the weapon used was recovered. The appeal primarily contested the evidence's sufficiency concerning consent and Parker's intent during the robbery.

When a defendant contests the sufficiency of evidence, the court evaluates the claim based on established legal principles. A guilty verdict, affirmed by a trial judge, endorses the State's witnesses' testimony and resolves any testimonial conflicts in the State's favor. The presumption of innocence is replaced by a presumption of guilt upon a jury's verdict. Consequently, the defendant bears the burden of proving the evidence is insufficient for conviction. The reviewing court must determine if any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, while giving the State the strongest legitimate interpretation of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it. The court cannot re-weigh the evidence or replace the trier of fact's inferences with its own.

A criminal offense can be established solely through circumstantial evidence, provided that the proof excludes all reasonable theories of innocence. In the case of aggravated robbery, the State must demonstrate that the defendant committed theft, defined as knowingly obtaining or exercising control over property without the owner's effective consent. The "owner" is broadly defined to include individuals with possession or interests in property, regardless of the legality of that possession. The pawn shop employees, who were in lawful possession of the guns taken by the defendant at gunpoint, qualified as owners under the law. The State was not required to prove actual title to the weapons. The defendant also argued that he lacked the intentional or knowing state of mind due to intoxication at the time of the crime, which can influence the assessment of mental capacity to commit an offense.

The jury is responsible for determining if a defendant's intoxication negated the requisite mental element for a crime, as established in State v. Morris. Despite a partially empty whiskey bottle and testimony about the defendant drinking, multiple witnesses, including arresting officers, stated the defendant did not appear intoxicated during the robbery. This evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant acted intentionally and knowingly, rendering the intoxication defense meritless.

Regarding jury bias, the defendant argued that two jurors should have been excused for cause, which forced him to use his peremptory challenges on other jurors. However, this argument was flawed because defense counsel did not formally request the removal of these jurors during trial, waiving the issue under Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Additionally, a defendant must challenge a prospective juror if they wish to raise the issue on appeal, as clarified in State v. Doelman.

Finally, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses like assault and aggravated assault. While the State conceded these are lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery, it argued that the trial court was justified in its decision, as there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find these lesser offenses instead of aggravated robbery. Tennessee law mandates that judges instruct juries on all included offenses, but such an obligation arises only when there is enough evidence to support a conviction for the lesser offense, as noted in State v. Ely.

The evidentiary requirement concerning lesser-included offenses versus greater offenses has presented challenges for trial and appellate courts. In *State v. Allen*, 69 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2002), and *State v. Linnell Richmond*, No. E2000-01545-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Nov. 1, 2002), the court established that if sufficient evidence exists to justify a jury instruction on a greater offense, it also justifies instructions on lesser-included offenses as per part (a) of the Burns test. In the current case, there is adequate evidence to instruct on aggravated robbery, which consequently warrants instructions on lesser offenses, such as assault and aggravated assault. The trial court erred by not providing these instructions.

The court's determination of this error necessitates a harmless error analysis, as established in *State v. Williams*, 977 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1998). The state must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in failing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses was harmless. The analysis of harmless error has proven complex, but it clarifies that if a jury could potentially convict on a lesser-included offense, the trial court is obligated to provide that instruction. When assessing whether the failure to instruct was harmless, the reviewing court must consider if a reasonable jury would have chosen the lesser offense over the greater one, ensuring it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt that the omission did not influence the trial's outcome.

A jury could have convicted the defendant of assault or aggravated assault, but it must be determined whether a reasonable jury would have done so. The critical distinction in this case is that the crime involved the theft of property from a pawn shop through intimidation using a gun, which constitutes aggravated robbery. The jury was instructed on lesser charges of simple robbery and theft but chose to convict on aggravated robbery, leading to the conclusion that a reasonable jury would not have found the defendant guilty of assault or aggravated assault. Therefore, any error in the jury instructions is deemed harmless.

Regarding the prosecutor's closing argument, the defendant argued that a comment implied his failure to testify, violating the Fifth Amendment as established in Griffin v. California. However, the court found the remark was a general assertion of the strength of the evidence rather than a direct reference to the defendant’s silence. As such, the defendant’s rights were not violated.

The defendant also challenged the trial court’s decision to allow witness Chris Farris to identify him as the robber shortly after the crime, arguing the identification procedure was suggestive. The court noted that on-the-scene identifications are permissible shortly after an offense, and even if suggestive, the reliability of the identification could still be established through five factors: the witness's opportunity to view the suspect, level of attention, accuracy of prior descriptions, certainty at the confrontation, and time elapsed since the crime.

Farris identified the defendant as the gunman in a robbery occurring two hours prior, asserting confidence in his identification after having seen the defendant closely during both the defendant's earlier visit to the pawn shop and the robbery itself. The court deemed Farris's out-of-court identification admissible. The defendant's defense argued he was too intoxicated to have the required mental state for robbery, supported by the finding of a nearly full bottle of whiskey in his car upon arrest. However, this bottle was either lost or destroyed while in police custody, which the defendant claimed was crucial for his defense. He filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the loss of this evidence compromised his right to a fair trial. The court referenced the State v. Ferguson case, which established a duty for the preservation of evidence that is materially exculpatory, meaning it must have clear exculpatory value and be irreplaceable through other means. The court found no evidence that the whiskey was exculpatory or that authorities were aware of the intoxication defense before trial. Furthermore, the State acknowledged the bottle's contents were partially missing, and the trial judge offered the defendant the chance to replicate the evidence with another bottle. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of the motion to dismiss. Additionally, regarding jury instructions, the defendant requested a specific instruction on the burden of proof for culpable mental state, which was addressed but not positioned exactly as requested. The court clarified that the instruction was not refused but simply not repeated at the defendant's preferred point in the jury charge.

The analysis begins by addressing the denial of a special jury instruction, referencing *State v. Cozart*, which establishes that such a denial is only erroneous if the jury instructions fail to fully and fairly convey the applicable law. The jury was adequately instructed that a unanimous agreement beyond a reasonable doubt was necessary for conviction, and they must acquit if unable to reach that conclusion. Therefore, the issue regarding the special request lacks merit.

Regarding sentencing, the defendant argues that his nine-year sentence is excessive, asserting he should have been classified as an especially mitigated offender or sentenced to the minimum of eight years as a standard Range I offender. Appellate review of sentencing is de novo with a presumption of correctness, contingent on the trial court's consideration of sentencing principles and relevant facts. The review must take into account the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, trial evidence, pre-sentence report, and various sentencing factors. The burden to prove the sentence's impropriety lies with the defendant.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-109 outlines criteria for determining if a defendant is an especially mitigated offender, specifically requiring no prior felony convictions and the absence of enhancement factors. If so classified, the court must reduce the minimum sentence or the release eligibility date. However, the decision to apply this status is at the trial judge's discretion, and the presence of any enhancement factor disqualifies a defendant from being considered as such. In this case, the trial judge identified three enhancement factors and one mitigating factor relevant to the defendant's sentence.

The trial judge determined that the defendant had a history of juvenile delinquency for acts that would be felonies if committed as an adult, leading to the conclusion that prior juvenile punishments had not rehabilitated him. Additionally, the judge noted the involvement of multiple victims in the offense. A mitigating factor acknowledged was the defendant's mental condition, which significantly excused his culpability. However, the judge clarified that he did not find a history of non-compliance with sentencing conditions but instead regarded past rehabilitation efforts as unsuccessful, which led to an enhanced sentence. While this consideration is relevant for determining the appropriateness of an incarcerative sentence, it is not a permissible factor for enhancing sentence length under statutory guidelines. The trial judge ultimately imposed a nine-year sentence, which was above the minimum, based on one valid enhancement factor related to the defendant's prior drug offenses, confirming that he does not qualify for especially mitigated offender status. The application of the enhancement factor and the reasonableness of the nine-year sentence were upheld, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.