Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
JoeTrammell and Karen Trammell v. George W. Pope, Jr., Individually and d/b/a Achieva Homes
Citation: Not availableDocket: M1999-00886-COA-R3-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; August 9, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
A default judgment was rendered against George W. Pope, Jr. in a breach of construction contract case initiated by Joe and Karen Trammell. The Trammells filed a complaint on March 3, 1999, alleging Pope failed to complete construction or provided defective work on their home. Pope received service of the complaint on April 6, 1999, and had been informed by the Trammells’ attorney on March 4, 1999, that he was being sued, along with a warning that any warranty work performed would not compromise the ongoing litigation. Despite multiple notices reiterating this point, Pope failed to respond or defend against the lawsuit. Consequently, the Chancery Court granted a default judgment in favor of the Trammells for $918,073.15 after a hearing on damages where Pope did not appear. Pope's application to set aside the default judgment was denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, upholding the judgment against Pope. A damage hearing was scheduled for July 12, 1999, at which the Appellees and their attorney presented evidence, while the Appellant did not appear. Consequently, a judgment of $918,073.15 was entered against the Appellant. On July 26, 1999, the Appellant sought to set aside the default judgment, claiming reliance on opposing counsel's representations and a belief in a possible settlement, asserting he had meritorious defenses. A hearing on this application took place on September 8, 1999, where the trial court found the Appellant failed to demonstrate any valid grounds for relief under Rules 55 and 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, such as mistake or misrepresentation. The court subsequently denied his application. The appellate review standard, based on Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., emphasizes the trial judge's discretion in these matters. Under Rule 60.02, a party may seek relief from a final judgment for specific reasons, but such motions must be made within a reasonable time. The rule establishes that relief is an exception, and the court must consider factors such as whether the default was willful and the prejudice to the non-defaulting party. Ultimately, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the Appellant's request, citing substantial evidence of unjustified failure to defend. The Appellant was informed through at least three letters that any work performed on the home would not resolve the claims against him and received all relevant notices about the case proceedings. The record indicates that the Appellant was aware of the ongoing litigation but failed to act, which cannot be attributed to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” The court found that granting relief under Rule 60.02(1) would unfairly prejudice the Appellees, who complied with all rules in their legal pursuit. The Appellant's assertion that the judgment was rendered unfairly lacks support from the record, and his argument for relief under Rule 60.02(5) is not viable, as this provision is strictly interpreted by the courts. Evidence suggests the Appellant may have deliberately chosen not to respond to the complaint, possibly as a calculated risk involving threats of bankruptcy against the Appellees. Claims that the Appellees’ attorney misled him are unsupported and contradicted by the attorney’s denial. The trial court's credibility determinations will not be overturned, and the Appellant bears a significant burden in seeking relief from judgment. The court upheld the principle of finality in procedural rules, affirming the trial court's denial of the Appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment. Costs of the appeal are assigned to the Appellant, George W. Pope.