Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY

Docket: 105

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; October 17, 1966; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion regarding a case involving faculty members of the University of Buffalo, which became part of the State University of New York in 1962. Their employment was contingent on adherence to a New York plan aimed at excluding 'subversive' individuals from state positions. Appellants Hochfield, Maud, Keyishian, and Garver, who were faculty members, refused to sign a required certificate affirming they were not Communists, leading to potential dismissal actions against them. Keyishian's contract was not renewed due to his refusal, while Hochfield and Garver remained employed but faced dismissal proceedings dependent on the plan's constitutionality. Maud resigned voluntarily and lost standing in the case.

Appellant Starbuck, a library employee and part-time lecturer, was dismissed for refusing to answer a question regarding past affiliations with groups advocating government overthrow. The appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the state program violated the Federal Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the program's constitutionality, but the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal and ultimately reversed that decision. The opinion references prior consideration of the New York plan's constitutionality in Adler v. Board of Education, which examined laws regulating employment based on advocacy for government overthrow, including the Feinberg Law and earlier legislative measures defining grounds for dismissal from educational positions.

The Board was mandated to establish rules indicating that membership in certain organizations would serve as prima facie evidence of disqualification for public school positions in the State. The Board of Regents enacted regulations outlining procedures for appointing authorities to identify individuals ineligible under the 1939 law or due to violations of the 1917 law. It was also stated that 'subversive' organizations would be listed following proper notice and hearings, with membership in such organizations post-listing considered prima facie disqualification, while prior membership would be presumed to continue unless proven otherwise. Appointing officials are required to investigate an applicant’s background to confirm eligibility and conduct annual inquiries to ensure current employees remain qualified, filing reports of their findings.

In the case of Adler, the Court determined that there were no constitutional defects in the relevant laws but did not address claims of vagueness regarding specific statutes. Although section 3021 was challenged for vagueness in Adler, the Court did not consider it due to procedural issues. Subsequent constitutional doctrines have undermined the rationale supporting previous conclusions about disqualification based on membership in organizations advocating for government overthrow. 

In 1953, the Feinberg Law was expanded to include higher education personnel, and the Communist Party was designated as a subversive organization. By 1956, applicants were required to sign the 'Feinberg Certificate,' affirming they understood the rules and were not members of the Communist Party. This certificate was refused by appellants Hochfield, Maud, Keyishian, and Garver. In June 1965, the certificate was rescinded, and it was stated that refusal to sign would not result in ineligibility for continued employment. Instead, applicants would be informed that certain laws constituted part of their employment contract.

Candidates must be informed of disqualifications arising from membership in a listed 'subversive' organization. An announcement from 1965 allows candidates to request a personal interview if questions arise during inquiries. A refusal to answer relevant questions can be grounds for denying appointment. New applicants receive a brochure that explains legal effects of the relevant statutes and invites inquiries, stating that those who believe they are not disqualified need not take any action or sign a disclaimer oath. The change in procedure does not resolve the constitutional issues related to the previously required Feinberg Certificate, as the underlying statutory framework remains. 

Section 3021 mandates removal for 'treasonable or seditious' acts or utterances, with a 1958 amendment adding these as grounds for removal under the Civil Service Law. Both statutes use similar language, but Section 3021 does not define 'treasonable' or 'seditious,' whereas the Civil Service Law specifies these terms as they relate to the Penal Law. The lack of definition in Section 3021 raises concerns about the broad interpretation of 'treasonable' and 'seditious' conduct, particularly regarding potential First Amendment implications. 

The definition of 'seditious' is particularly problematic, as it references 'criminal anarchy' defined in the Penal Law. The ambiguity in the definition could lead to a broad application of the law, raising questions about the implications for individuals advocating certain ideologies, such as carrying texts that discuss overthrowing government. The potential for vague interpretation poses risks for those who engage with such materials, as the legal consequences may be unclear.

Teachers face significant uncertainty regarding what constitutes 'seditious' versus non-seditious speech, particularly in the context of advocating or teaching doctrines related to the forceful overthrow of government, as outlined in subdivision 1 (a) and (b) of Section 105. The vagueness of the language may lead to unjust applications, potentially penalizing those who merely discuss the doctrine in abstract terms without inciting action. Specifically, the statute's prohibition on 'advocacy' and 'advising' raises questions about whether it includes simply informing students about historical or theoretical doctrines, such as Marxism or revolutionary texts. 

The broad criteria for disqualification based on the distribution of materials related to such doctrines further complicate compliance, as it may include academic discussions or historical analyses. Additionally, the requirement for ongoing evaluations of teachers regarding their potential 'subversive' activities creates an environment of intimidation, discouraging the free exchange of ideas. The lack of judicial interpretation from New York courts exacerbates this uncertainty, leaving educators cautious and restrained in their teachings to avoid the risk of sanctions, ultimately stifling the spirit of intellectual exploration that should be encouraged in educational settings.

School authorities are required to act decisively in cases involving the integrity of the education system. New York has a legitimate interest in protecting its educational framework, but this cannot be achieved through broad measures that infringe upon fundamental personal liberties, especially when less restrictive means are available. The Court emphasizes that safeguarding community interests must not come at the expense of constitutional rights such as free speech, free press, and free assembly, which are essential for a responsive government and peaceful political discourse.

Academic freedom is deemed crucial, not only for educators but for society as a whole, and it is protected under the First Amendment. Laws that impose conformity in educational settings are intolerable, as schools serve as vital arenas for the exchange of diverse ideas. The importance of freedom in universities is evident, and constraints on intellectual leaders threaten the nation's future. The need for a vibrant intellectual environment is particularly pronounced in social sciences, where certainty is rare, and inquiry must thrive without fear.

Regulatory measures must be precise to ensure the protection of First Amendment rights. New York's regulations are deemed overly complex and vague, failing to provide clear guidance on what conduct is prohibited. This lack of clarity creates a chilling effect, deterring individuals from exercising their rights due to fear of unintended consequences. The ambiguity and excessive detail in the laws result in confusion, making it difficult for individuals to understand their implications. Consequently, the Court finds that specific provisions of New York's Education Law and Civil Service Law are unconstitutional due to their vagueness and lack of clear standards.

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of specific provisions in subdivision 1 (c) of 105 and subdivision 2 of the Feinberg Law, which classify membership in the Communist Party as prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment. This provision was added in 1958 following the Board of Regents' designation of the Communist Parties as 'subversive' organizations. The constitutionality of subdivision 2 of the Feinberg Law was previously upheld in Adler, but subsequent legal developments have rejected the premise that public employment can require the surrender of constitutional rights not abridged by direct government action. The Court in Adler indicated that while teachers could accept employment under established conditions, their freedom to hold beliefs was not infringed, although their choice between employment and membership was limited.

However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the theory allowing unreasonable conditions on public employment has been consistently rejected. The Court noted that imposing conditions on employment based solely on mere membership, without demonstrating specific intent to further unlawful objectives, is constitutionally inadequate. This principle was reinforced in Elfbrandt v. Russell, which invalidated an oath requiring state employees to renounce membership in the Communist Party under threat of punishment. Additionally, Aptheker v. Secretary of State confirmed that membership without knowledge of unlawful purposes does not justify the deprivation of rights, such as the right to travel. Ultimately, laws imposing disqualifications based solely on membership, absent evidence of intent to support illegal activities, infringe on protected freedoms and rely on the discredited doctrine of 'guilt by association.' Thus, mere membership cannot justify criminal punishment or disbarment based on moral unfitness.

Limitations on Civil Service Law 105, subd. 1 (c) and Education Law 3022, subd. 2 apply to all state employees, irrespective of the sensitivity of their roles. These laws, particularly in the context of the Feinberg Law aimed at teachers with influential roles, must honor freedom of expression and association. Recent studies highlight the negative impact on academic freedom when such freedoms are restricted. The legal standard established in Elfbrandt and Aptheker indicates that legislation penalizing membership without proof of intent to promote illegal activities infringes constitutional rights. Both Civil Service Law and Education Law are deemed overly broad, prohibiting associations that should not be restricted under First Amendment protections. The presumption of disqualification based solely on membership can be contested only through specific denials, making it challenging for individuals to defend against dismissal. Official interpretations stress that these laws target members of the Communist Party and similar organizations, reinforcing the notion of overbreadth. This broad application risks significant infringement on individual rights, compelling individuals to conform to safe behaviors. The court concludes that both laws are invalid when they penalize mere membership without evidence of intent to advance unlawful goals. The District Court's judgment is reversed, and the case is sent back for further proceedings.

Civil Service Law 105 outlines the disqualification criteria for individuals seeking employment or currently employed in state positions, particularly regarding advocacy for the overthrow of government through force or unlawful means. Individuals are ineligible for appointment or retention if they: (a) advocate or teach that the government should be overthrown by violence or illegal means; (b) produce written materials promoting such doctrines; or (c) organize or join groups that advocate for such actions. Membership in the Communist Party is considered prima facie evidence of disqualification.

Dismissed individuals can petition for a hearing within four months to contest their ineligibility, and such a petition will temporarily stay the effects of the dismissal. During this stay, the dismissed individual will be suspended without pay, but if they prevail in the hearing, they will be reinstated with back pay, minus earnings from other employment or unemployment benefits received during the suspension. The burden of proof lies with the dismissing authority to justify the dismissal.

Additionally, individuals in civil service can be removed for treasonable or seditious acts, defined according to penal law. This includes any treasonous or seditious utterances or actions while in office. This provision also applies to superintendents, teachers, and other educational employees who can be removed for similar acts or statements.

The board of regents is mandated to establish and enforce rules for the disqualification or removal of superintendents, teachers, and employees in public schools and state-operated institutions of higher education for violations of specific statutory provisions. This includes individuals ineligible for appointment due to criteria outlined in the civil service law. The board will conduct inquiries, providing notice and hearings as necessary, to compile a list of organizations deemed subversive, defined as those advocating the overthrow of government through unlawful means. Membership in such organizations will be considered prima facie evidence of disqualification for employment in public schools.

Annually, by February 15, the board must report to the legislature on measures taken to enforce compliance with these laws, including surveys assessing the extent of enforcement in school districts. School authorities are required to implement procedures for disqualification or removal of staff based on violations of the relevant laws. Prior to hiring, school officials must investigate candidates' backgrounds to determine any previous violations, particularly concerning membership in the listed subversive organizations. No individual found in violation of these provisions is eligible for employment. Designated officials must submit annual written reports on each employee by specified deadlines.

A report must be prepared regarding teachers or employees suspected of violating statutory provisions, including membership in organizations deemed subversive by the Regents. This report will either confirm no evidence of violations or recommend dismissal if violations are found. School authorities are responsible for preparing these reports on superintendents and other officials, ensuring actions are taken within 90 days of receiving recommendations. If violations are indicated, proceedings for dismissal must commence immediately, adhering to appropriate statutory procedures depending on the employment status (tenured, probationary, or contracted). All parties involved retain rights to a fair trial, legal representation, and the ability to appeal as required by law. The Board of Regents will maintain and periodically update a list of subversive organizations, with membership in such organizations constituting prima facie evidence of disqualification for school positions. School districts must report annually to the Commissioner of Education on enforcement measures taken, including the total number of employees.

The document outlines reporting requirements for school authorities regarding their employees, specifically superintendents and teachers, concerning adherence to statutory provisions related to membership in organizations deemed subversive. It mandates reporting on:

1. The number of employees with no evidence of statutory violations.
2. The number of employees recommended for dismissal due to specific legal violations or subversive organization membership.
3. The status of cases where charges have been or will be filed against employees.
4. Cases where authorities determined that evidence does not justify filing charges.
5. Cases pending resolution as of October 31 of the relevant school year.

Additionally, it specifies that upon determining an employee's disqualification, authorities must report the individual's name and supporting evidence to the Commissioner of Education, including any hearing records.

The document also defines "criminal anarchy" as the advocacy for the violent overthrow of organized government, categorizing such advocacy as a felony punishable by imprisonment or fines. It details various actions constituting this advocacy, such as promoting, teaching, or organizing with the intent to overthrow government authority.

Lastly, it references a resolution by the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York, amending previous resolutions regarding academic appointments and rescinding earlier policies related to this process.

Prior to appointing individuals to positions within the professional service of the University, the authorized officer must provide prospective appointees with a statement from the President outlining disqualifications under Section 105 of the Civil Service Law, Section 3022 of the Education Law, and related Board of Regents rules, including disqualification due to affiliation with certain organizations. The officer is required to conduct thorough inquiries into the candidate's background, professional qualifications, and personal attributes to ascertain any potential disqualifications. Candidates may request a personal interview if questions arise during this inquiry; failure to respond to relevant questions can result in denial of appointment. An appointment signifies the officer's certification that adequate investigation has been conducted and no disqualifications are evident.

This resolution is effective July 1, 1965, but applies immediately to appointments made before this date that take effect thereafter. It also states that individuals currently or previously employed by the University who did not sign the required certificate from 1956 will not be disqualified solely for that reason, provided they are deemed qualified by the Chief Administrative officer based on new policies. Furthermore, current employees are not considered ineligible for continued employment or subject to misconduct charges due to the lack of the certificate, as long as they meet qualifications as determined by the Chief Administrative officer. The document also references relevant statutes and regulations, the District Court's initial decision not to convene a three-judge court, and the appeal that reversed this decision. It mentions the vagueness challenge related to the term "subversive" in the context of the relevant laws, dismissing claims made by the New York Attorney General regarding the applicability of certain laws to the inquiry.

Section 3022 of the Education Law extends certain provisions to faculty members at all higher education institutions in New York. The Court of Appeals convened a three-judge court due to a significant federal constitutional issue, specifically concerning the constitutionality of Section 3021, which Adler did not address. The court affirmed the applicability and constitutionality of these provisions, as appellees defended them throughout previous court proceedings. A key stipulation established that Section 3022 fully incorporates and enforces Section 105 of the Civil Service Law and Section 3021 of the Education Law, mandating the Board of Regents to create regulations for disqualifying individuals from employment in public educational systems based on violations of these sections. 

The legislation aims to disqualify individuals advocating for the violent overthrow of the government, distinguishing it from the Smith Act, which criminalizes incitement to action but not merely teaching the abstract doctrine of such overthrow. The document notes that abstention from federal intervention while awaiting state court interpretation is inappropriate in this case. The discussion includes references to the chilling effect of employment threats on academic freedom, although the court did not address the constitutionality of requiring employees to provide substantial rebuttal evidence against claims of membership in listed organizations.