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Donald Ray Middlebrooks v. State of Tennessee
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2001-01865-CCA-R3-PD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; January 8, 2003; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Donald Ray Middlebrooks, sentenced to death for the felony murder of fourteen-year-old Kerrick Majors, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner raises three main arguments: (1) the court improperly denied his ex parte request for funds to obtain expert services; (2) it wrongfully denied his request for a continuance; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his resentencing hearing. The court affirms the post-conviction court’s judgment. Middlebrooks was initially convicted, but the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded for resentencing due to the unconstitutionality of one aggravating circumstance used in the death penalty determination. At resentencing, the jury again imposed the death penalty, which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. Middlebrooks filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance from his counsel during resentencing, but his petition was denied following a hearing. The background details reveal that on April 26, 1987, Middlebrooks, his wife, and a friend confronted Kerrick Majors and his friends at a flea market, during which a racially charged altercation ensued. Majors was later found murdered, with significant injuries indicating a violent attack. The details of the crime were critical in the context of the court's upholding of the death penalty during resentencing. Majors suffered severe physical injuries, including swollen testicles, multiple stab wounds to the chest, and extensive bleeding, as indicated by the bloody condition of his legs and the presence of urine on his body. An autopsy confirmed death was caused by a stab wound, with the murder weapon penetrating 3.3 inches deep. Notably, an 'X' was carved into his chest prior to the stab wounds, and he remained conscious for a period ranging from five to thirty minutes following the infliction of injuries. Two days post-murder, Brewington contacted police, implicating Donald and Tammy Middlebrooks, and presented a bloodstained knife used in the crime. During a video confession, Middlebrooks admitted to participating in the murder and described Brewington as the instigator. He recounted instances of severe abuse inflicted on Majors, including physical beatings, humiliation, and threats, while reflecting on Majors' pleas for mercy. Middlebrooks also stated he stabbed Majors and that the overall torture was motivated by fear of Brewington and a desire to assert dominance. Majors, a fourteen-year-old, was characterized as a non-violent, good student who did not carry weapons. His murder had profound psychological effects on his family, particularly his mother, who experienced a breakdown and severe anxiety, and his brother, who suffers from guilt and mood swings. Witness testimony revealed Middlebrooks’ racial hatred, including prior violent behavior. The defense presented mitigating evidence regarding Middlebrooks’ troubled childhood, including the early death of his father and his mother’s subsequent relational instability. Middlebrooks' childhood was marked by neglect and abuse, as his mother often left him and his siblings with relatives or took them to bars. Testimony revealed that Middlebrooks' mother not only engaged in sexual activities that the children witnessed but also allowed various men to molest them, including family members. Middlebrooks himself was sexually abused by a male relative and subjected to inappropriate behavior from his mother. The lack of local counseling and social services prevented the family from addressing these issues, which were never openly discussed. Middlebrooks displayed anger and behavioral problems, leading to his placement in a Methodist Home for Children for two years and subsequent imprisonments. He began experiencing seizures, threatened suicide, and was hospitalized in mental institutions. Psychologist Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon diagnosed Middlebrooks with severe borderline personality disorder, noting symptoms such as mood instability, identity disturbance, impulsivity, anger control issues, and self-destructive behavior. Additional evaluations indicated substance abuse, psychotic personality disorder, schizophrenia, and mild organic brain impairment. During cross-examination, Dr. Smalldon acknowledged discrepancies between Middlebrooks' confessions regarding the murder of Kerrick Majors, highlighting Middlebrooks' tendency to lie and lack of remorse. While Dr. Smalldon noted signs of malingering, he asserted these did not negate the presence of mental illness. In rebuttal, state experts argued that Middlebrooks exaggerated symptoms, was competent to stand trial, and did not meet the criteria for an insanity defense. The jury ultimately determined that the murder was especially heinous, leading to a death sentence for Middlebrooks. Additionally, attorney David Stebbins testified about his involvement in Middlebrooks' case during its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Stebbins, along with attorneys Richard McGee and Lionel Barrett, represented the petitioner at resentencing after the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Stebbins was primarily responsible for investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, frequently meeting with the petitioner, reviewing records from the initial trial, and investigating the petitioner’s background. A mitigation specialist was hired for this purpose. The defense team focused on two theories: that the petitioner was a 'lesser player' in the offense compared to co-defendant Roger Brewington, and that the petitioner experienced a 'bizarre childhood with a history of mental illness.' The team reviewed trial transcripts and interviewed individuals associated with Brewington. Evidence supporting the theory of Brewington's greater involvement came primarily from the petitioner’s statements indicating fear of Brewington, who had threatened him. The defense chose to limit evidence against Brewington to avoid provoking his potential testimony, being aware of his statement to police that implicated the petitioner. Stebbins noted Brewington’s psychological profile, which indicated issues such as poor impulse control and aggressive behavior, and acknowledged he had not thoroughly reviewed Brewington’s presentence report, which suggested he was a leader in the offense. He also lacked access to certain documents regarding Brewington’s social history. Prior to Dr. Jeffery Smalldon’s testimony at resentencing, Stebbins was unaware of evidence suggesting the petitioner urinated on the victim. Although he had multiple discussions with Dr. Smalldon, he was never informed of this detail, which might have influenced the decision to present Dr. Smalldon’s testimony but was not definitive in changing their overall strategy. Stebbins was also unaware of discrepancies between Dr. Smalldon’s handwritten notes and their typed summary before the expert's testimony. Dr. Smalldon’s recounting of the petitioner’s statements aligned with what the petitioner had previously shared with Stebbins, who led the defense's case. The defense started with testimonies from the petitioner’s relatives about his upbringing, which Stebbins noted was well-received. After deliberation, Stebbins and co-counsel McGee decided to present Dr. Smalldon’s testimony, although Stebbins felt it lacked impact and potentially bored the jury. He expressed concern over the introduction of harmful information regarding the petitioner urinating on the victim. Before the resentencing hearing, two assistant district attorneys interviewed Dr. Smalldon in Ohio, a session that was recorded. Although aware of the interview, Stebbins did not attend but received a debrief from Dr. Smalldon afterward. He communicated with co-counsel about potentially obtaining the tape and reviewing Dr. Smalldon’s notes for weaknesses. However, Stebbins did not receive a copy of the tape or know it was transcribed. The transcript revealed Dr. Smalldon reported the petitioner’s claim about urinating on the victim. Prior to resentencing, the state obtained Dr. Smalldon’s notes and summary, but Stebbins did not identify the damaging statement within them. Defense attorney Lionel Barrett testified at the post-conviction hearing, stating the defense's case was strong until Dr. Smalldon testified, after which the prosecutor successfully portrayed him as a 'hired gun.' Barrett acknowledged the harm of Dr. Smalldon’s testimony and admitted deficiencies in investigating his qualifications. Dr. Jay David Woodman, a clinical psychologist who testified for the defense in the initial trial, stated he assessed Roger Brewington and found him likely to be more dominant than the petitioner. He suggested that Brewington might have allowed the petitioner to commit the crime independently. Woodman mentioned he was contacted by the defense team before resentencing to review his data and spoke to Brewington, who was reluctant to cooperate unless the petitioner admitted to stabbing the victim. Dr. Woodman testified that Brewington claimed the petitioner was the primary assailant in the stabbing of the victim. The post-conviction court issued a thirty-page order following the hearing, highlighting deficiencies in trial counsel's performance, specifically regarding the failure to argue that the petitioner acted under the substantial domination of Brewington as a mitigating circumstance under T.C.A. 39-13-204 (j)(6). The court noted that trial counsel did not adequately investigate Brewington's background, despite having access to a psychological report indicating Brewington's aggressive and dominating personality, and failing to consider presenting expert testimony to contrast the personalities of the petitioner and Brewington. The court criticized counsel for not pursuing the theory of Brewington as the dominant actor. Additionally, it found that during an interview, Dr. Smalldon revealed a troubling statement from the petitioner that had not been disclosed to trial counsel, which surprised them during testimony. However, the post-conviction court deemed that counsel had reasonably engaged with Dr. Smalldon and was not at fault for not knowing the petitioner's statement. Despite acknowledging trial counsel's deficiencies in not exploring Brewington's role, the court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have changed had this information been presented. The nature of the crime—described as horrific and involving prolonged torture of the victim—overwhelmed any potential impact from additional mitigating evidence regarding the petitioner's background of abuse and neglect. Lastly, the petitioner sought funds to hire a neurological radiologist for tests related to a past head injury, which was discussed in an ex parte proceeding prior to the post-conviction hearing. Trial counsel was aware of the petitioner's brain injury, but no tests were conducted to confirm organic brain damage, despite Dr. Smalldon's testimony suggesting its presence. A neurological radiologist indicated that an MRI could detect such damage, with a PET scan necessary for confirmation. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner’s motion for expert services on the basis that Dr. Smalldon’s testimony at resentencing established the presence of organic brain damage. The court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the necessity for expert services to substantiate grounds for post-conviction relief, particularly regarding claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petitioner also requested a continuance to further investigate Roger Brewington’s background. The court initially reserved its decision on the motion but ultimately denied the continuance after finding sufficient evidence had already been presented. The petitioner argued this denial was erroneous; however, the court maintained discretion over such motions and found no abuse of that discretion, noting that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from the denial. Finally, the appeal addressed whether trial counsel was deficient at resentencing, with the state contesting the post-conviction court's finding of deficiency related to the investigation of Brewington’s influence. The court concluded that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in these rulings. The petitioner argues that while the lower court correctly identified deficiencies in trial counsel's performance, it wrongly concluded that these deficiencies did not impact the outcome of the resentencing. Additionally, the petitioner disputes the post-conviction court's finding that trial counsel's preparation for Dr. Smalldon's testimony met reasonable standards. To successfully challenge ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below the standard of competency required for criminal attorneys and that this deficiency had a negative effect on the defense. The Supreme Court has established that failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice is sufficient to deny relief. The court emphasizes that hindsight cannot be used to critique trial strategy, particularly in capital cases, where the right to counsel is safeguarded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The post-conviction court found trial counsel deficient for not adequately investigating the theory that the co-defendant, Roger Brewington, was the dominant actor in the murder. While the state contends this finding was erroneous, the petitioner argues it was justified. Counsel's obligation to investigate extends to the sentencing phase, and informed tactical decisions are given deference, whereas uninformed ones are not. Evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing indicated that trial counsel did pursue the theory of Brewington's dominance and had obtained some relevant information about him. Trial counsel was unaware that the state intended to enhance Brewington's sentence due to his role as a leader in the crime. They did not review certain documents indicating Brewington's dominant personality compared to the petitioner. The defense team, led by Attorney Stebbins, opted not to pursue this dominance theory, fearing the state would call Brewington as a witness, who would claim the petitioner was primarily responsible for the victim's torture and murder. The trial court's finding that counsel's decision was informed after adequate investigation is questioned. However, since the petitioner did not demonstrate that evidence of Brewington's dominance would have altered the jury's verdict, the court did not need to assess the adequacy of counsel's performance. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in capital penalty phases, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, without the errors, the jury would have balanced aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently. Factors considered include the nature of unpresented mitigating evidence, whether similar evidence was introduced, and the strength of aggravating evidence. Here, Brewington was sixteen during the crime, while the petitioner was twenty-four and the sole adult involved. The resentencing jury heard the petitioner state he acted out of fear of Brewington, but this claim was undermined by his own admission that he stabbed the victim to impress Brewington. The state's evidence highlighted the petitioner's extended torture of the victim, making it unlikely that pointing to Brewington's youth would have influenced the jury, given the severity of the acts committed. Consequently, the petitioner failed to show prejudice related to the dominance argument. Additionally, although trial counsel was taken aback by expert Dr. Smalldon's testimony regarding the petitioner urinating on the victim, the post-conviction court found that counsel did not breach reasonable standards in presenting this testimony. Stebbins, trial counsel, adequately prepared for Dr. Smalldon’s testimony, having engaged in multiple in-depth discussions with him about the case and the petitioner’s account of events. The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to a lack of preparation concerning Dr. Smalldon’s potential testimony and suggests that obtaining a taped interview or reviewing Smalldon’s notes could have improved the defense. However, evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing indicated that Dr. Smalldon did not disclose a statement from the petitioner about urinating on the victim, nor did Stebbins recall such a statement being made. The court concluded that trial counsel's performance was competent and that the petitioner's defense was not adversely affected by any alleged oversight regarding Dr. Smalldon’s testimony. Testimony revealed that even with knowledge of the statement, the defense would still proceed with Dr. Smalldon’s testimony due to its mitigating content. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that Dr. Smalldon’s testimony, while subject to attack, provided significant mitigating evidence about the petitioner’s background and mental health. The court noted that the prosecution's effective cross-examination of Dr. Smalldon, portraying him as a "hired gun," is a common trial strategy and not a fault of the defense. The overall circumstances of the case, including the petitioner’s violent actions, led to the conclusion that the jury's verdict was not influenced by the purportedly unexpected testimony. Additionally, the petitioner raised various issues in an addendum without proper citation or argument, leading to their waiver. The post-conviction court's decisions regarding requests for expert services and a continuance were upheld, affirming the finding of no ineffective assistance of counsel.