Rhonda Moffitt v. Paul Moffitt

Citation: Not availableDocket: W1999-02403-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 18, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the divorce case of Rhonda Gale Phillips Moffitt v. Paul Sidney Moffitt, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee upheld the Chancery Court’s final decree regarding the division of marital property, marital debt, and child support arrearages. The couple, married since September 28, 1972, has two children, both of whom were adults at the time of the trial. The trial court, after a hearing on August 27, 1999, awarded Wife a monthly income of approximately $3,583.33 and Husband $2,773.33. The final decree, dated October 1, 1999, included a division of marital property and debt, which Husband contested on four grounds:

1. The trial court’s decision not to deduct child support arrearages from Wife's property award.
2. The reimbursement of $6,167.33 to Wife for mortgage payments she made before the divorce, and the lack of credit to Husband for $25,000.00 in mortgage payments he made.
3. Whether the trial court's division of property and debt was supported by the evidence.
4. The awarding of attorney fees to Wife.

The appellate court conducted a de novo review, affirming the trial court’s findings as they did not preponderate against the evidence. Regarding the child support issue, Husband argued that Wife failed to comply with a court order to pay child support, leading to arrears of $2,863.00. Wife countered that she had given money directly to their children per an agreement with Husband, and asserted that procedural missteps by Husband’s counsel impacted the trial. The court ultimately found no error in the trial court's decisions.

Wife asserts that for the first twelve months following their separation, she provided financial support directly to their children based on an agreement with Husband, rather than paying him child support. The trial court, after hearing testimony from both parties, did not support Husband’s claim of child support arrears. A temporary child support order from February 20, 1997, mandated Wife to pay Husband $409 monthly, with payments structured for the first and fifteenth of each month until their son Brandon turned eighteen or the matter was resolved. Wife testified that she gave money directly to Brandon, including clothing and other support, affirming that this arrangement was agreed upon with Husband. She continued to support Brandon until his high school graduation in May 1998. 

Husband claimed he could not meet mortgage payments due to Wife’s alleged failure to pay child support, leading to debt, but his explanation varied when responding to a petition concerning the mortgage. He attributed his financial difficulties to the nature of his work as a carpenter, which depended on weather conditions. Additionally, when questioned about a consent order permitting Wife to pay child support directly to their son, Husband provided unclear responses. The trial court's silence regarding child support arrears in the final decree suggests it did not find Husband's testimony credible about the consent order. The trial judge, having observed the witnesses, is deemed better positioned to assess credibility, as supported by case law references.

The determination of a witness's credibility rests primarily with the trier of fact, and appellate courts will give significant weight to this credibility. A trial court's findings will not be reversed unless there is clear, concrete, and convincing evidence contradicting those findings beyond mere witness testimony. In this case, Husband failed to contest the issue of child support arrears adequately and did not provide credible evidence of any arrears; thus, the trial court's decision to award no arrearages to him is affirmed.

Husband's second issue regarding the reimbursement of $6,167.33 to Wife for mortgage payments and a $25,000.00 credit for his payments was deemed without merit. The trial court valued the equity of the marital home at $112,825.56, awarding Husband $67,721.04 and Wife $45,104.52. Deductions from Husband's share included $11,308.26 for payments Wife made during his occupancy, $1,382.22 for maintenance costs incurred by Wife, $1,133.21 for fixtures removed by Husband, and $1,858.28 for Wife’s attorney fees due to Husband's failure to pay the mortgage. In total, deductions amounted to $22,049.30, resulting in Husband receiving $34,363.48 and Wife receiving $78,462.08 from the home equity.

According to a court order from September 4, 1997, Husband was mandated to make mortgage payments while occupying the marital residence. He acknowledged this obligation in his response to a contempt petition and requested an equitable division of property, including credit for Wife's payments to keep the mortgage current. Wife had documented her $6,167.33 payment to the mortgage service during Husband's occupancy, and the evidence supported the trial court's decision to credit this amount to her in the property division.

Wife did not receive credit for mortgage payments made during her occupation of the marital home, and the trial court's award regarding these payments is upheld. Husband claims the trial court erred in asset and debt distribution, arguing the marital residence sold for $126,600, leaving net proceeds of $62,511.80 that should be equitably divided, with each party receiving approximately $31,250. He also contests the valuation of several marital assets, asserting the trial court erroneously relied on inflated values presented by Wife. Additionally, Husband argues that a $24,000 award from Wife's father's estate, intended as compensation for her services, was misclassified as her separate property instead of marital property. 

The classification of property as separate or marital is critical, as established by T.C.A. 36-4-121, which guides equitable division by the trial judge. Dividing marital property does not require equal shares of each asset, and trial judges have discretion in these decisions, supported by factors outlined in T.C.A. 36-4-121(c). Valuation of marital assets is a fact-specific process, where parties must present competent evidence, and judges may assign values within supported ranges. The trial court adopted Wife's pretrial valuations, while Husband failed to submit his own but contested her figures, claiming they did not account for depreciation. Wife testified that she considered age and depreciation in her valuations. The appellate court presumes the trial judge's factual findings are correct unless evidence overwhelmingly contradicts them.

The trial court's credibility determinations regarding witness testimony are upheld, as the court is better positioned to evaluate demeanor and manner during testimony. The evidence supports the trial court’s valuation of the property, affirming that the award from Wife’s father’s estate is separate property and not compensation for services. The marital debt, totaling $4,535.91, is divided equitably, with Husband responsible for $2,885.91 and Wife for $1,650.00, based on the benefits derived from the incurred debt. The court's division of marital debt is also affirmed, as it aligns with precedents requiring equitable distribution. Regarding attorney’s fees, the trial court awarded Wife $2,500.00 for trial fees and $1,858.28 for fees from a prior proceeding. The court has discretion in awarding attorney fees as alimony in solido, considering the financial circumstances of both parties. It is noted that such fees are warranted if the requesting spouse lacks sufficient funds for legal expenses. The trial court documented the total costs incurred by Wife for legal services, totaling $4,742.60.

Mr. Byrd's attorney's fees, excluding specific appearances on August 7, 1997, October 2, 1997, and March 11, 1999, total $1,858.28, contributing to an overall sum of $5,244.50. The total attorney fees and costs incurred by the Wife amount to $9,987.10, with the Husband ordered to pay $2,500.00 as alimony in solido. The trial court assessed the costs of the case against the Husband and did not abuse its discretion in awarding a portion of the attorney’s fees to the Wife. Each party is responsible for their attorney fees on appeal, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the appellant, Paul Sidney Moffitt, and his surety.