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State of Tennessee v. Cindy Gentry

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2002-00415-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; March 13, 2003; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Cindy Gentry was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction, with one year to be served in a county workhouse before being placed on probation. On appeal, Gentry raised two issues: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction and the trial court's decision to mandate one year in the workhouse. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 

The incident occurred on October 2, 2000, when the victim, Danita McCord, was crossing a shopping center parking lot and nearly struck by Gentry's rental car. Prior to this incident, Gentry had threatened McCord, stating, "I’m going to get you, you fucking bitch. You just wait, I’m going to kill you." Witness testimonies described the shopping center layout, indicating that McCord had paused at a median to check for traffic before crossing. As she proceeded, she heard tires squealing and saw Gentry's vehicle approaching. McCord became frightened and attempted to retreat to safety, while Gentry exited the car and yelled threats at her. McCord called for help from store employees, claiming that Gentry had just tried to kill her.

The victim testified that upon entering the Dollar General Store, she requested the manager to call the police after noticing the defendant's vehicle. The defendant then sped away. The victim identified the defendant's usual vehicle as a black Jeep Grand Cherokee. She did not recognize the defendant as the driver of a small white car stopped in front of Kroger, describing it as unremarkable. The victim believed she had ample time to cross safely but felt the defendant accelerated rapidly towards her, stopping mere inches away. She expressed fear during the incident and indicated lasting emotional distress. Officer David Cole noted her visible agitation upon arrival, although the defendant had already left. 

Kathy Davis, a cashier at Dollar General, heard screeching brakes and rushed outside, witnessing the defendant exit her vehicle while the victim was crossing the lane. Davis reported the defendant threatened the victim before driving away, while the victim appeared frightened and urged employees to call 911. 

The defendant testified that she was driving a rented white Dodge Neon at about twenty miles per hour, claiming she stopped four to five feet from the victim after she walked in front of her car. The defendant stated that the victim initially stepped back onto the curb and then continued forward. She denied any intent to scare or harm the victim, asserting that she had not seen the victim until she suddenly appeared in front of her vehicle while turning the corner. During cross-examination, the defendant disputed the victim's claim of having seen her car at Kroger.

The defendant admitted to expressing a desire to "kick [the victim's] ass," but claimed she would not have acted on it at that moment. During her sentencing hearing, probation officer Jeff Walden indicated that the defendant's account suggested the victim fabricated allegations to assist her husband in a custody battle, without specifics that provoked the incident. The defendant denied any physical contact with the victim and stated she had not communicated with her since the incident, although she conceded that anger management counseling "might" be helpful and expressed willingness to comply with probation conditions. On cross-examination, she acknowledged visiting the victim’s workplace but claimed ignorance of her employment there, denied repeated calls, and rejected allegations of attempting to run the victim over with her car. The defendant had not included her husband’s affair with the victim in her divorce counterclaim to avoid confrontation.

The trial court found one minor enhancement factor due to the defendant's prior criminal history, and no mitigating factors were identified. The court noted that previous community release had not deterred her from illegal conduct. Her maintenance of innocence negatively impacted her probation suitability. Consequently, the court denied her full probation request, sentencing her to three years, with one year in a county workhouse before probation. Following the denial of her motion for a new trial, she appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for her conviction and that the court erred in denying full probation. The appellate analysis upheld the State's position, indicating sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, referencing the standard for evaluating sufficiency of evidence as established in Jackson v. Virginia.

In State v. Anderson, the court addresses the standards for evaluating sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases, affirming that a trial court or jury's findings of guilt will be overturned if there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It emphasizes that the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are determined by the trier of fact, typically the jury, which is in a unique position to assess the demeanor and testimony of witnesses. The ruling notes that a jury's guilty verdict shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate.

The case involves a charge of aggravated assault, where the State needed to prove that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to fear imminent bodily injury through the use of a deadly weapon, defined as anything capable of causing death or serious injury, including a motor vehicle. The evidence indicated that the victim had a reasonable fear of imminent harm, which the defendant did not contest. Instead, the defendant claimed the incident was accidental, but the jury could infer intent from her prior threats and her sudden acceleration toward the victim. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence supported the conviction of aggravated assault, as the defendant's actions with the vehicle constituted the use of a deadly weapon.

The evidence supports the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by requiring her to serve one year of her three-year sentence in confinement rather than granting full probation. When reviewing the length and manner of service of a sentence, the court conducts a de novo review with a presumption that the trial court's determinations are correct, provided there is a record showing the court considered all relevant facts and sentencing principles. This presumption does not extend to the trial court's legal conclusions or determinations based on uncontested facts. 

In conducting the review, the court must consider various factors, including evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, sentencing principles, arguments from counsel, the nature of the offense, any mitigating or enhancement factors, statements from the accused, and the potential for rehabilitation. The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the sentence is erroneous. 

As a Range I, standard offender convicted of a Class C felony, the defendant's sentence ranged from three to six years, with the presumptive minimum being three years in the absence of enhancement or mitigating factors. The trial court found one enhancement factor applicable due to the defendant's three prior misdemeanor convictions but assigned it minimal weight and found no mitigating factors. The sentence remained at the minimum of three years since the enhancement factor did not warrant a higher sentence. The defendant argued for full probation based on her history and the circumstances of the crime, including her belief that the victim was having an affair with her husband.

The trial court was obligated to consider probation for the defendant but was not mandated to grant it automatically. The defendant bears the burden of proving her suitability for probation, demonstrating that it serves the interests of justice and both the public and herself. There is no fixed rule for granting probation; each case requires individual analysis based on various factors, including the nature of the offense, the defendant's criminal history, social background, deterrence needs, and overall interests. The defendant's honesty and acceptance of responsibility for her actions are also relevant to her potential for rehabilitation. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying full probation, as the defendant exhibited a lack of remorse and responsibility during her testimony. She maintained that the incident did not occur, failed to acknowledge her need for anger management, and implied that she was the victim. The court concluded that her testimony indicated a lack of candor and acceptance of her actions. Consequently, the trial court's denial of full probation was upheld, affirming the conviction based on sufficient evidence.