Local Union 760 of the IBEW v. City of Harriman and Harriman Utility Board

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2000-00367-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; December 7, 2000; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the Roane County Chancery Court's summary judgment that a collective bargaining agreement between Local Union 760 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the City of Harriman, along with the Harriman Utility Board, is null and void. The appeal centered on whether the Utility Board exceeded its authority in entering the agreement. The court found no genuine dispute regarding the material facts and applied the law accordingly, concluding that the Utility Board lacked the power to engage in collective bargaining with union representatives, as outlined by a 1997 opinion from the Harriman City Attorney. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, adjudging the costs of the appeal against the appellants.

The City Attorney's opinion rendered any bargaining results with Local Union 760 void, leading the Utility Board to cease negotiations and deny grievance processing. On May 20, 1998, Local Union 760, supported by employees and former employees, sued the Utility Board in Roane County Chancery Court to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. The Utility Board responded with a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming the agreement was unauthorized and against public policy. The City of Harriman also filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. On May 20, 1999, the Chancery Court ruled in favor of both motions, declaring the collective bargaining agreement illegal and void due to the lack of authority for the City and the Utility Board to enter such an agreement. Following this, Local Union 760 filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, citing unaddressed constitutional issues, which was denied on December 1, 1999. Subsequently, Local Union 760 and the Utility Board employees appealed the decision.

Under Tennessee law, municipalities possess only the powers expressly or impliedly granted by the Legislature. The Charter of the City of Harriman does not grant it or the Utility Board the authority to engage in collective bargaining. The appeal referenced the case Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Vick, which established that government entities cannot contractually govern labor relations. The Appellants argue that this precedent has changed, citing three Tennessee statutes. However, the first two statutes, T.C.A. 49-5-601 et seq. and T.C.A. 7-56-101 et seq., are limited to specific employee groups and do not confer general collective bargaining rights. The third statute, T.C.A. 8-44-201, mandates public transparency in labor negotiations but does not grant additional bargaining power.

The Appellants contend that T.C.A. 8-44-201 implies a general right for all public employees to engage in collective bargaining due to its lack of specific classifications. However, the court disagrees, interpreting subsection (c) of T.C.A. 8-44-201 as not granting any recognition rights. The statute applies only where collective bargaining authority is explicitly provided, and the Appellees lack the authority to engage in collective bargaining or to form an agreement with the Appellants, rendering the collective bargaining agreement void and unenforceable.

The Appellants raised constitutional issues under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article XI, Section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, claiming unequal treatment because the Legislature permits collective bargaining for transit workers but not for utility workers. This challenges the validity of T.C.A. 7-56-101 et seq. However, the Appellants failed to notify the Attorney General regarding this statute's validity, which precludes them from pursuing the issue on appeal, as per Rule 24.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additionally, the Appellants argued that applying the court's decision in the Weakley County case to a prior collective bargaining agreement violates the prohibition against contract impairment under Article XI, Section 2. However, this argument was not included in their original complaint and was only introduced in a post-trial motion, which the Chancellor deemed inappropriate. Thus, the court agrees that this issue cannot be reviewed on appeal.

The Appellants also claimed that the Appellee Utility Board is estopped from denying obligations under the agreement. Nonetheless, Tennessee law requires exceptional circumstances to apply estoppel against the State or its subdivisions, which the court finds are not present in this case. Consequently, the judgment of the Chancery Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, with costs of appeal assigned to the Appellants and their surety.