The defendant, Anthony Humphrey, was convicted on multiple charges including voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, he raised three issues: 1) sufficiency of evidence for his convictions; 2) alleged plain error regarding testimony about his gang affiliations; and 3) the appropriateness of his sentencing. The appeal stemmed from an attempted robbery on August 16, 1996, at the Andrew Jackson Apartments in Memphis, where one victim was killed and another injured. Witness Kevin Helms recounted that Christopher Howard sought to borrow $400, later planning to sell guns to a group of men, ultimately devising a scheme to rob them instead. The plan involved Howard initiating the sale while Humphrey and another accomplice, Fulford, supported from a distance, armed with pistols. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments, with the opinion delivered by Judge Alan E. Glenn and joined by Judges David H. Welles and James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Helms reported that while Howard was conversing with the victims, the defendant and Fulford, feeling impatient, crossed a hole in the fence and approached the victims. The victims, noticing the two masked men, began to flee, leading to chaos. In the ensuing panic, the defendant and Fulford began firing shots. Helms described Fulford's actions as wild, indicating he wasn't aiming to hit anyone but rather shooting into the air to intimidate. The defendant similarly fired indiscriminately.
Julian Becerarra Pereida, a victim of voluntary manslaughter and attempted aggravated robbery, did not flee; instead, he confronted the defendant with hands raised. After a brief standoff, Pereida turned to escape, at which point the defendant shot him twice, with the first bullet striking his chest. Following the incident, the defendant, Fulford, and Helms fled to Howard’s apartment. Helms later asked the defendant why he shot Pereida, to which the defendant responded dismissively.
Christopher Howard testified about being outside with the defendant, Helms, and Fulford on August 16, 1996, stating that they were aware of his plan to sell guns but denied any agreement to rob the victims. He approached the victims alone to negotiate the sale when the chaos erupted. After hearing gunshots, he ran, seeing individuals with bandanas shooting.
The next day, the defendant allegedly threatened Howard, suggesting harm would come to him and his wife if he spoke to the police. Howard, fearing for his family, later claimed ignorance about the incident during his arrest. While in jail, he heard the defendant bragging about the shooting.
Tanilado Gonsales Rodriguez, another victim, recounted the events of that night, noting he and others were drinking outside their apartment when a black man approached, attempting to sell firearms. Due to language barriers, his companion Ciro Rodriguez handled the discussions regarding the purchase.
Tanilado Rodriguez and his friends were approached by a man, later identified as Christopher Howard, who offered to sell them guns for $500. Despite their preference to conduct the transaction upstairs, the seller insisted it take place outside. Witnesses reported that after the seller left and returned with his face covered, shots were fired, prompting a chaotic scene where witnesses ran for cover. One witness was shot in the leg but did not see who fired the shots, nor did he or his friends possess firearms or make threats.
Ciro Rodriguez corroborated that they were drinking outside when approached by Howard. After showing $500, Howard left and returned with other men, causing Ciro to flee upon hearing shots. Erasmo Rodriguez, who also testified, identified the seller as Howard and similarly noted they did not possess weapons or threaten anyone.
Officer Thomas Tilton was the first to arrive at the shooting scene, finding one victim, Julian Pereida, deceased from a gunshot wound to the chest, and another injured with a leg wound. The Medical Examiner confirmed Pereida died from a gunshot wound with no bullets recovered for analysis. Lieutenant Ottis Stewart testified that the defendant voluntarily came to the police station days later, denying any involvement in the shooting and claiming he was home at the time.
The defendant denied owning a gun, but Captain Charles Logan from the Memphis Police Department testified that he obtained a second statement from the defendant after reading him his Miranda rights, which the defendant waived again. In this second statement, the defendant admitted to participating in a robbery at the Andrew Jackson Apartments with accomplices Chris, Rob, and Kevin, who were armed. He claimed to have carried a .22 revolver but did not fire it, expressing shock when others did. The defendant acknowledged knowing about the robbery plan but stated he was seeking money and did not obtain any.
Lena Jones, the defendant's second cousin, testified that police threatened to shoot the defendant on sight while searching for him. The defendant's mother, Kathleen Jackson, advised him to surrender due to the police's threats. The defendant recounted that on August 16, 1996, he was playing dice when the accomplices approached him about selling guns. After hearing gunshots, he saw the accomplices fleeing and ran too, discarding his revolver. He claimed he did not understand the waiver of rights form when signing it and requested an attorney, but police allegedly refused. He maintained his first statement about being with his girlfriend was true, asserting that his second statement regarding participation in the robbery was coerced by police promises of release.
The defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions for voluntary manslaughter and attempted robbery, arguing that the primary witnesses were his codefendants and their testimonies were inconsistent. The reviewing court applies a standard that considers whether a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. It is emphasized that the trial court or jury's verdicts should not be overturned if there is sufficient evidence, and the credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are determined by the fact-finder, with the jury's verdict reflecting the State's theory and the credibility of its witnesses.
The trial setting is emphasized as essential for evaluating evidence, as a written record cannot capture the human atmosphere of the courtroom. A conviction shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, who must show that the evidence is insufficient to uphold the verdict. The defendant's codefendants were the sole witnesses linking him to the crime, and under Tennessee law, a conviction cannot solely rely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Corroborative evidence, either direct or circumstantial, must independently suggest the defendant's involvement and identity in the crime, though it need not be conclusive.
In this case, evidence was found sufficient to support convictions for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Two victims identified the defendant as one of the assailants, and a fellow inmate testified to the defendant's admission of involvement. The defendant's inconsistent statements and acknowledgment of being at the crime scene, coupled with threats made to a witness, indicated a consciousness of guilt.
In addressing a claim of plain error, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly allowed testimony suggesting his affiliation with the Gangster Disciples, which was not included in the motion for a new trial, necessitating a contextual analysis of the testimony. Overall, the evidence presented sufficiently supports the defendant's convictions.
Christopher Howard testified that he initially refrained from discussing the defendant's involvement in a shooting due to fear for his family's safety, particularly concerning threats from the defendant and his associates. During direct examination, Howard confirmed he had not spoken to police about the incident out of fear, specifically mentioning concern for his wife. The trial court became aware of a potential threat made by the defendant's mother towards Howard's mother, which prompted a discussion about the defendant's alleged gang affiliation as a factor in Howard's fear.
During cross-examination, the defense questioned Howard about his delayed disclosure of the defendant's involvement, emphasizing his prior silence to the police. Howard admitted he had lied when he initially denied knowledge of the situation, explaining that his fear of repercussions from the Gangster Disciples (GD) prevented him from speaking out. Despite defense objections regarding speculation about potential harm, the court allowed Howard to elaborate on his reasoning for withholding information, reinforcing his claim of being in fear for his family's life due to the gang's presence.
The defense objected to speculation by a witness regarding what might have happened if he had been truthful, not to the use of the initials 'GD.' The defense later employed these initials in questioning to explore why the witness did not disclose his fear for his life and his wife's safety due to the defendant and others being involved with the Gangster Disciples. The witness confirmed his fear of repercussions from the Gangster Disciples, to which no objection was raised. On appeal, the defendant claims plain error occurred when the trial court allowed testimony linking him to the Gangster Disciples. Under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), plain error involves a breach of a clear legal rule adversely affecting substantial rights, which may be addressed for substantial justice. Five factors guide appellate courts in determining plain error, including the record's clarity, breach of law, adverse impact on rights, tactical waiver, and necessity for justice. All five factors must be met for recognition of plain error, which is limited to errors that undermine trial fairness. The court disagreed with the defendant's plain error claim, noting that the witness's fear did not necessarily imply the defendant's gang affiliation, and the defense itself had introduced gang references. Additionally, the defendant's argument shifted from claiming speculation at trial to alleging inadmissibility on appeal, which undermined his position.
The argument on appeal was not previously presented to the trial court. A defendant cannot object to the admissibility of evidence based on one argument and then switch to a different argument for the same evidence. Consequently, this appeal assignment lacks merit. Regarding sentencing, the defendant contends the trial court erred in the length of sentences and the decision to serve three sentences consecutively. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years for voluntary manslaughter (maximum for Range I), four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, six years for attempted aggravated robbery, and twelve years for attempted especially aggravated robbery. The attempted voluntary manslaughter sentence runs concurrently, while the other three sentences are consecutive, resulting in a total effective sentence of twenty-four years.
When reviewing challenges to the length and manner of service of a sentence, the court conducts a de novo review, presuming the trial court's determinations are correct unless the record shows otherwise. This presumption does not apply to legal conclusions or determinations based on uncontroverted facts. The appellate court must give weight to the trial court's findings on controverted facts due to the trial court's insight into witness demeanor. In its review, the court considers various factors, including evidence from trial and sentencing, the presentence report, sentencing principles, arguments from counsel, the nature of the offense, mitigating or enhancement factors, and statements from the defendant regarding rehabilitation potential. The burden is on the party challenging the sentence to prove it is erroneous.
In examining the length of the sentence, the defendant's prior criminal record is significant. The presentence report indicates at least two prior convictions for driving with a suspended license, and a 2000 conviction for driving with a suspended license and drug possession while on bond for the current charges. Additionally, a pretrial services report notes a 1992 juvenile conviction, suggesting it may be a felony related to aggravated assault.
The bond report details the defendant's conviction history, noting that he was placed on probation for unlawful weapon possession on September 7, 1994, and was rearrested on October 15, 1994, for possessing a prohibited weapon and theft over $500, though he was not convicted of theft. During sentencing, the trial court applied eight enhancement factors, including the defendant's prior criminal history, leadership in a multi-actor offense, involvement of multiple victims, non-compliance with release conditions, use of a deadly weapon, and the potential for bodily injury. The defendant contested the application of factors (2), (9), (10), and (16).
Regarding factor (2), evidence supported the claim that the defendant was a leader in the offense, as he influenced the operation and fired fatal shots. For factor (9), the defendant argued that his use of a firearm was inherent to the crimes; however, since voluntary manslaughter does not require a weapon, this factor was deemed applicable. Conversely, it should not apply to attempted aggravated robbery cases where firearm usage is an element. In relation to factor (10), the defendant contended it was an essential element of his convictions, which the court evaluated but did not ultimately accept as a valid argument against its application.
Enhancement factor (10) is applicable in this case, as it considers "risk to human life" without the limitations present in factor (16). The trial court noted the defendant's disregard for human life during a robbery attempt that involved firing at fleeing individuals in a crowded apartment complex, which heightened the risk to innocent bystanders, including children. However, the record does not sufficiently support applying enhancement factors (10) or (3), which pertains to multiple victims, as the evidence does not clarify the extent of risk posed to others by the defendant's actions.
The defendant’s argument against applying enhancement factor (16) is acknowledged, as its application would be redundant given that it is inherently linked to the offenses committed. The trial court reasonably determined that the defendant's mild retardation did not significantly diminish his culpability, especially since he had completed the tenth grade and was employed. Consequently, the court rejected this as a mitigating factor. Additionally, the claim of acting under duress was unsupported by trial testimony, leading the court to dismiss this argument as well.
The defendant sought to apply mitigating factors (4) and (6), asserting he played a minor role in the offenses and lacked substantial judgment due to youth. However, the trial court declined these considerations based on the available evidence.
The trial court did not apply mitigating factor (4) due to evidence indicating the defendant's leadership role in the offenses. Regarding factor (6), the court noted the defendant was not young; he had prior serious juvenile offenses and attempts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful, demonstrating he was mature enough to understand the consequences of his actions. The court found no mitigating factors applicable and identified five enhancement factors for the voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions, and four for the attempted aggravated robbery and attempted especially aggravated robbery convictions. The sentencing court, having enhancement factors and no mitigating factors, is authorized to impose a sentence above the minimum but still within the range, as outlined in Tennessee law. The weight of enhancement factors is at the trial court's discretion, provided it adheres to the 1989 Sentencing Act. The trial court appropriately considered sentencing principles and did not err in determining the defendant’s sentence lengths.
The court ordered three sentences to be served consecutively, which is subject to appeal. Consecutive sentences can be imposed at the trial court's discretion based on statutory criteria, including the defendant being a professional criminal (criterion 1), having an extensive criminal record (criterion 2), or being a dangerous offender (criterion 4). The trial court applied criteria (2) and (4), with the defendant not contesting criterion (2) related to his prior record. Although he challenged criterion (4), the statutory criteria are stated in the alternative, so the presence of just one criterion supports consecutive sentencing. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences was supported by the record, affirming the judgments of the trial court.
