Sharon Glenn filed a lawsuit against Gordon Construction, Inc. for negligent repairs following tornado damage to her home. The parties reached a settlement on the eve of trial, formalized in an Agreed Order of Compromise, Settlement, and Dismissal, which included provisions for Gordon Construction to hire another company for repairs, payment of $10,000 to Glenn, and the endorsement of two checks totaling $2,461.34. The order also mandated the release of all claims between the parties related to the construction work.
Subsequently, Gordon Construction's new counsel sought to set aside the Agreed Order, arguing that it could not be enforced after one party withdrew consent. Glenn then pursued contempt proceedings for non-compliance, leading to the garnishment of over $11,000 from Gordon's bank account after the company failed to comply with the settlement terms. The trial court denied Gordon's motion to quash the execution, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reinforcing the binding nature of the settlement despite Gordon's claims.
Sharon Glenn will voluntarily dismiss her claims against American National Property Casualty Company without prejudice upon the entry of the Order. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms outlined in the Agreed Order dated October 4, 1999. Following the Order, Gordon Construction changed its stance on the settlement, dismissing its prior counsel and retaining new counsel who subsequently filed a motion to set aside the Order without supporting affidavits or a legal memorandum. Gordon failed to comply with the Agreed Order by stopping payment on a $10,000 check to Glenn and halting home repairs. Glenn filed a motion for contempt against Gordon for this noncompliance. During a hearing on the contempt motion, Gordon's original counsel moved to withdraw, citing an ethical conflict stemming from Gordon's change in direction. The trial court denied both the motion to withdraw and Glenn’s contempt motion, stating that contempt actions must follow specific notice requirements. Although affidavits supporting the motion to set aside were not filed before the hearing, Gordon's new counsel argued against the validity of the Agreed Order. The original counsel expressed concerns regarding the interpretation of repair obligations under the Order, specifically relating to the requirements imposed by Metro Codes Administration. The court clarified that the Agreed Order required Shaub Construction to conduct repairs in compliance with codes but did not grant Metro Codes the authority to dictate the methods of repair. The new counsel contended that the Agreed Order was not final due to the pending motion to set it aside, which was filed shortly after the Agreed Order's filing.
Gordon contended that court rules provided a three-day period to object to an order; however, the trial court clarified that this rule did not apply to agreed orders. Gordon’s new counsel was permitted to argue but was not recognized as counsel of record, thus the court declined to consider the motion to set aside the Agreed Order. The court indicated that the order concerning the show cause motion would be sent to Gordon's original counsel, after which a substitution of counsel could be addressed. Despite various filings by Gordon’s new counsel in the following months, the motion to set aside was neither re-filed nor scheduled for a hearing.
Approximately eight months post-Agreed Order, Glenn secured an order of garnishment against Gordon for $10,667, which included a $10,000 payment plus interest, leading to additional garnishments that totaled $11,455. Following this, Gordon filed a "Motion to Quash Execution Alternatively to Stay Execution." At the hearing, Gordon’s counsel argued the Agreed Order was not final as the defendant had purportedly withdrawn consent before the order was entered. This assertion was based on claims that court personnel indicated on October 7 that the order had not yet been signed or filed. Furthermore, Gordon argued that a local rule prohibited the entry of the Agreed Order for three days following its submission.
The trial court ruled that the local rule did not apply to agreed orders with all parties' counsel signatures and clarified the proper procedure for filing and approving orders. The court found that the procedures adhered to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Ultimately, the court denied Gordon’s motion, affirming that the Agreed Order was properly entered on October 4 at 10:50 a.m., thus nullifying the grounds for quashing execution. The court noted that the order mandated the defendant to repair Glenn’s property and make a $10,000 payment, with the court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms. Consequently, the court treated Gordon's motion as a request to stay execution rather than to quash it, which was also denied.
A final judgment was previously issued in this case, which has been executed and appears satisfied regarding the $10,000 amount. The primary issue at hand is the validity of the Agreed Order. Legal precedent states that a consent judgment cannot be entered if one party withdraws consent and communicates this to the court before the judgment is entered. In this case, Gordon claims to have revoked its consent to the settlement by filing a motion to set aside the Agreed Order on October 7, three days after the Agreed Order was signed and filed on October 4. The court found that Gordon did not withdraw consent prior to the entry of the Agreed Order, rendering its attempt to do so ineffective.
Gordon's argument that a local court rule prevented the Agreed Order from being entered before October 7 is dismissed, as the rule applies only to proposed orders submitted by one attorney, not agreed orders signed by all parties. Therefore, the rule does not affect the Agreed Order's validity. Additionally, Gordon's new counsel alleged that he contacted the clerk’s office on October 7 and was informed that the Agreed Order had not yet been signed or entered. However, the official record indicates that the Agreed Order was effectively entered on October 4, and the attorney's affidavit alone does not suffice to challenge the recorded date of entry.
Gordon did not withdraw its consent to the Agreed Order before its entry. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 62.01, execution on a judgment can occur after thirty days from its entry unless execution is stayed. At the motion to stay execution hearing, Gordon claimed that execution was not available because the Agreed Order was not final. On appeal, Gordon reiterated this position, asserting that it had withdrawn consent prior to the signing of the order. However, Gordon did not present any other grounds for staying execution or for invalidating the Agreed Order. The court found no evidence of a consent withdrawal before the order was entered. The Agreed Order, validly entered on October 4, was not contested by the court at that time. The trial court's denial of the stay of execution is affirmed, and the case is remanded for any necessary further proceedings. Costs of the appeal are charged to Gordon Construction, Inc.
