Freddie Dean Smith and Anita Ann Smith initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Tony O. Haley regarding a surgical procedure performed on Freddie Dean Smith in 1994. The defendant moved for summary judgment in October 1995, which the plaintiffs did not respond to, opting instead to voluntarily dismiss the case in February 1996. They refiled the complaint in March 1997. Following the defendant's second motion for dismissal or summary judgment, the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to depose the defendant and established a deadline for the plaintiffs to present competent medical evidence. After the deposition on September 3, 1997, the plaintiffs were required to submit their medical evidence by September 25, 1997. The plaintiffs ultimately failed to provide timely evidence to counter the defendant's motion. Subsequently, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, but the trial court later reinstated the case after the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, accompanied by an affidavit from Dr. Joseph Bussey. However, Dr. Bussey later refused to give a deposition, leading the defendant to seek to strike his affidavit and reinstate the dismissal. The trial court granted this request and denied the plaintiffs' motions for relief from judgment under Tennessee rules of civil procedure. The plaintiffs' appeal against this denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's decisions.
On September 24, 1997, Plaintiffs requested an extension to file an affidavit opposing a summary judgment motion, citing difficulties in obtaining a competent medical expert due to logistical challenges. Defendant opposed the extension. On October 1, 1997, the Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendant, noting Plaintiffs had ample time since pre-September 11, 1995, to secure an expert and deemed their efforts insufficient. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider on October 6, 1997, supported by an affidavit from Dr. Joseph Gibson Bussey, Jr. The Trial Court granted this motion on February 25, 1998, reinstating the case without further ruling on Defendant's motions.
On March 10, 1999, Plaintiffs sought a continuance for trial scheduled on March 30, 1999, due to difficulties in scheduling Dr. Bussey's deposition. An Agreed Order for Continuance was entered, rescheduling the trial to July 26, 1999. A day before Dr. Bussey’s deposition, he expressed discomfort with testifying, claiming he thought his involvement would only be through the affidavit. Defendant then moved to strike Dr. Bussey’s affidavit, asserting it was executed in bad faith, and requested reinstatement of the original dismissal. The Trial Court dismissed the case on July 8, 1999, striking Dr. Bussey’s affidavit. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the dismissal on August 6, 1999, arguing Dr. Bussey was qualified and had not indicated reluctance to testify until the day before the deposition. They contended they were unable to secure another expert witness in the nineteen days following Dr. Bussey's withdrawal.
On March 30, 2000, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Final Order denying the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend. The Court characterized the lawsuit's history as "distressfully long and painfully torturous." It interpreted the motion under Rules 59.04 and 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under Rule 59.04 due to their failure to secure expert testimony despite having ample time. The Court further addressed Rule 60.02(1), stating that the absence of expert testimony in a medical malpractice suit did not constitute excusable neglect, especially since the Plaintiffs failed to comply with a prior order requiring an expert affidavit. The Court emphasized that the lack of diligence in obtaining expert testimony was not a valid reason for relief under Rule 60.02(5), which applies only in exceptional circumstances, none of which were found to exist in this case.
In their Notice of Appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge only the March 30, 2000 Order, which denied their motions under Rules 59.04 and 60.02. They did not contest the Trial Court's decision to strike Dr. Bussey's affidavit, which was pivotal for granting summary judgment to the Defendant. The excerpt highlights that in medical malpractice cases, the claimant must demonstrate the standard of care, a breach of that standard, and a direct link between the breach and the injury, as per Tennessee Code Annotated 29-26-115. The document references the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Seffernick v. Saint Thomas Hospital, where a physician’s affidavit was struck for being untrustworthy, reinforcing the necessity for competent evidence in malpractice claims.
The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Dr. Worthington’s affidavit. However, during his deposition, Dr. Worthington acknowledged that Garamycin Ointment had been applied and could not establish a causal link between Dr. Yarborough’s actions and the plaintiff's alleged harm. This led the trial court to strike Dr. Worthington’s affidavit, citing insufficient factual and scientific support for his testimony, its lack of substantial assistance to the trier of fact, irreconcilable discrepancies between his affidavit and deposition, and a fundamental lack of trustworthiness. Subsequently, the trial court reversed its prior decision and granted summary judgment to the defendants.
The Court of Appeals initially reversed the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's summary judgment, emphasizing that under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 703, opinion testimony must be excluded if the underlying facts lack trustworthiness. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's discretion in striking Dr. Worthington's affidavit.
Additionally, Dr. Bussey expressed discomfort in providing deposition testimony and demonstrated unwillingness to support his affidavit claims, leading to the conclusion that his affidavit was also unreliable and properly stricken. Following these actions, the case was left stagnant for years, exacerbated by the late-submitted and unreliable affidavit. The plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in refusing to amend the judgment and grant relief from it, invoking Rules 59.04 and 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate review focused on whether the trial court abused its discretion in these matters, affirming that such determinations are within the trial court's sound discretion.
Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that motions to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 30 days of the judgment's entry and pertains to final judgments, whereas Rule 54.02 addresses interlocutory orders. In *Harris v. Chern*, the Tennessee Supreme Court identified factors for evaluating additional evidence in Rule 54.02 motions to revise partial summary judgments, noting a lack of precedent in Tennessee for standards applicable to these motions. The Court examined Rule 59.04 cases for guidance and rejected two interpretations from the Middle and Western Sections of the Court regarding the use of newly discovered evidence and the introduction of new legal theories or arguments in Rule 59.04 motions. The Court ultimately established a balanced approach, outlining factors to consider when evaluating additional evidence under Rule 54.02, such as the movant's efforts to secure evidence, the evidence's significance, the explanation for its prior absence, potential prejudice to the nonmoving party, and any other pertinent considerations. While the standard for Rule 59.04 motions was not directly addressed, the Court indicated that similar considerations would apply. In applying these factors to the case at hand, the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs’ Rule 59.04 motion was upheld, noting that over five years had elapsed since the alleged malpractice without the Plaintiffs producing competent medical evidence. It was observed that the Plaintiffs only sought a medical expert shortly before the dismissal, which contributed to the Court's conclusion.
Plaintiffs failed to present competent medical evidence to support their case and did not provide sufficient justification to overturn the Trial Court’s judgment. The delay in seeking to amend the judgment has increased the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant. The Plaintiffs merely requested additional time to find a new expert, without presenting any additional evidence. The Court emphasized that it cannot assess the potential importance of evidence that was never submitted. The denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59.04 was affirmed, as they did not substantiate their claims of error under Rules 60.02(1) and 60.02(5), which allow relief from judgments only under specific circumstances such as mistake or neglect. The Court reiterated that dissatisfaction with a judgment is not a valid reason for relief under Rule 60.02. Moreover, the burden lies with the Plaintiffs to demonstrate justifiable reasons for any mistakes or neglect, which they failed to do. Over five years passed since the alleged malpractice, and Plaintiffs did not provide the necessary medical evidence to oppose the Defendant’s summary judgment motion. This situation remains unchanged despite the later withdrawal of support from their expert. Notably, the Plaintiffs did not file competent medical evidence during the nine months leading up to the Trial Court's decision on their Rule 60.02 motion.
Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate justification for not avoiding the claimed surprise, leading to the affirmation of the denial of their motion under Rule 60.02(1). Furthermore, Rule 60.02(5) does not provide a basis for relief, as it is interpreted narrowly and applies demanding standards compared to other grounds for relief. This rule is not intended to relieve parties from deliberate choices made, and parties must take necessary legal steps to protect their interests. Relief under Rule 60.02(5) is reserved for cases of overwhelming importance or extraordinary circumstances, neither of which were present in this case. Plaintiffs did not present competent medical proof to counter the Defendant’s summary judgment motion despite having sufficient time to do so. The Trial Court's judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for cost collection, with costs of the appeal charged to the Appellants, Freddie Dean Smith and Anita Ann Smith, and their surety.
