Ricky Thompson was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson, receiving a death sentence for the murder. Following a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court modified the jury's verdicts to not guilty by reason of insanity. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in reversing the jury's decision. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts, reversed the trial court’s order, and reinstated the jury's findings, remanding the case for consideration of a new trial and sentencing on the aggravated assault and arson charges.
In 1991, Thompson was initially convicted but had his convictions overturned due to the exclusion of expert testimony regarding his mental state. After a retrial in 2000, he was again convicted of the same charges and sentenced to death. Following this, Thompson filed a motion for a new trial or acquittal, which led to the trial judge's controversial order. Key evidence included Thompson’s threatening behavior and statements made the night his wife went missing, indicating his volatile mental state and intent to harm.
Nina, her niece Christy, and her daughter Vanessa confronted the Defendant at his mobile home, leading to a heated argument where the Defendant threatened physical harm to them. Nina signaled for Christy and Vanessa to escape, and they fled with Nina carrying her baby, Ricky. The Defendant followed, armed with an assault rifle, and after ordering Nina out of the car, he shot Christy in the leg and then shot Nina in the back multiple times as she attempted to flee. Witnesses, including neighbors, confirmed the sequence of events, noting the Defendant's erratic behavior and subsequent actions, including firing shots into the air and nearby vehicles. After the shooting, the Defendant took Ricky to a nearby store, where he waited for police. The jury initially convicted the Defendant of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson. However, the trial judge later modified the verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity, citing insufficient proof of the Defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge noted that the State's evidence relied solely on cross-examinations of defense experts and lay testimony, lacking any expert witnesses to establish the Defendant's mental state. Although some witnesses described the Defendant as acting normally, others characterized him as "odd" or "strange." Testimony from family members included threats made by the Defendant prior to the murder, but inconsistencies in these accounts weakened the prosecution's case. Ultimately, the court concluded that the evidence did not meet the legal standard for proving sanity, leading to the acquittal. Additionally, Rule 29(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a motion for judgment of acquittal following a guilty verdict.
The trial court's standard for evaluating a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal mirrors the appellate standard for assessing evidence sufficiency after conviction. A motion should be denied if a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court does not reassess evidence weight, as established in relevant case law. Although the trial judge did not explicitly cite Rule 29, his decision to overturn the jury's verdict and declare the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity implies an intent to grant acquittal under that rule. The State noted that the trial court's order improperly mixed language suitable for a Rule 33(f) analysis—used when the judge disagrees with the jury on evidence weight—with sufficiency review language. The trial judge raised concerns about the prosecution's lack of expert witnesses and confusion regarding jury instructions on the insanity issue, suggesting a decision influenced by Rule 33(f).
However, the ultimate outcome—overturning the jury’s verdict—could only be executed under Rule 29(c). The State contended that the trial court incorrectly determined insufficient evidence regarding the defendant’s sanity. Both the trial court and appellate court must apply the same legal sufficiency standard, ensuring evidence supports the conviction when viewed favorably to the prosecution. Rule 33(f) prohibits a trial court from modifying a jury's verdict without independently weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility. The appellate court must view evidence in the strongest light for the State and cannot re-evaluate the original evidence presented.
Conflicts in trial testimony must be resolved in favor of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. The credibility of witnesses and the value of evidence are determined by the trier of fact, not appellate courts. Prior to 1995, a defendant could claim insanity as a defense if, due to a mental disease or defect, they lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or conform their behavior to legal requirements. The accused is presumed sane, but if evidence raises reasonable doubt regarding sanity, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant understood the wrongfulness of their actions and could conform to the law.
This burden can be met with expert or lay testimony, provided a proper foundation is established. The jury may consider both types of testimony and is not obligated to accept expert opinions over lay evidence or actions inconsistent with insanity. In this case, the Defendant raised reasonable doubt regarding his sanity with the testimony of two expert witnesses. Dr. Michael Tramontana, a clinical psychologist, noted a 'mild to moderate' frontal lobe impairment affecting impulse control and judgment, particularly in stressful situations. He asserted that this impairment could have influenced the Defendant's ability to make reasoned decisions during the alleged crime, indicating that such impairments significantly contributed to compromised judgment and impulsivity.
Dr. Bernet conducted a psychiatric evaluation of the Defendant and identified frontal lobe impairment due to chronic alcohol abuse, impacting self-control, judgment, and impulsivity. He also diagnosed the Defendant with schizo-affective schizophrenia, characterized by mood swings, delusions, hallucinations, and periods of functional stability and disturbance. Dr. Bernet indicated that these mental conditions could exacerbate each other, significantly diminishing the Defendant's ability to discern right from wrong and conform his actions to the law. He affirmed that the Defendant's mental state on the incident date affected his appreciation of morality and his ability to act accordingly.
Testimony from Nancy Smith, the Defendant’s cousin, supported this assessment, describing the Defendant’s lifelong mental health struggles and instances of suicidal behavior. Smith noted that the Defendant often exhibited strange behavior and was out of touch with reality. Collectively, the testimonies from Dr. Bernet and Smith shifted the burden of proof regarding the Defendant’s sanity to the State. The State, in response, relied on lay testimony and cross-examination of the defense's experts to argue for the Defendant's sanity. Additionally, Dr. Stephen Ross Rogers, the Defendant's treating physician prior to the homicide, had prescribed Valium for anxiety, further contextualizing the Defendant's mental health issues.
On October 25, 1989, the day before the shooting, the Defendant visited Dr. Rogers's office for a prescription refill and was deemed 'stable.' Vickie Lynn Estelle, a coworker of the victim, noted that the Defendant frequently lingered at the convenience store and displayed no unusual behavior. However, she reported that the victim had mentioned ongoing domestic issues with the Defendant. On that day, as the Defendant left the store around 4:30 PM, he threatened both the victim and Ms. Estelle, saying, "You bitches will be sorry. You will pay." Kevin Helms, another coworker, corroborated that the Defendant was a regular presence at the store and described him as 'agitated' when he arrived with his infant son early the next morning. The Defendant, who appeared sober, expressed a readiness to kill someone and showed Mr. Helms an assault rifle, reiterating his intent to harm the victim and law enforcement if they approached him. Mr. Helms also recalled the Defendant's prior demeanor of being 'drugged up' and noted he had consumed alcohol that night. Furthermore, Joe Vann, the victim’s brother, testified that the Defendant threatened him and his family while brandishing a gun, demanding to know the victim's whereabouts and stating he would harm them if they did not comply. The Defendant expressed a belief that he would only face brief consequences for his actions.
Mr. Vann testified on cross-examination regarding the Defendant's jealousy towards his wife, Nina, but refrained from labeling him as 'crazy.' He recounted an incident where the Defendant instructed David Vann on how to feign mental illness. The testimony of Elizabeth Vann, who was unavailable for the second trial, was read into the record, detailing an incident on October 26 where the Defendant visited her home seeking Nina. Upon learning she was not there, he threatened violence against both his wife and their baby, Ricky, declaring he would harm them.
Jack Curtis, an auto parts store owner, had known the Defendant for several years and reported no unusual behavior prior to the murder. After the shooting and subsequent arson of his trailer, the Defendant approached Curtis with Ricky, claiming he hadn’t harmed the baby. Curtis noted the Defendant’s demeanor was not as expected for someone who had just committed such acts, and he later characterized the Defendant as 'different' or 'odd.'
Bill Allen, a neighbor, witnessed the shooting and described the Defendant's behavior post-shooting as strange, particularly when he casually remarked, 'See you later,' to the victim. Allen had previously spent the night at the Defendant's trailer, where he noted no unusual conduct, although the Defendant did express a willingness to protect his children and showed him a rifle. Allen mentioned he had seen the Defendant take pills but did not witness any drug use the night before the shooting.
Police investigator Marvin Farris, who interviewed the Defendant post-incident, stated that the Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of substances and understood his constitutional rights during the interview.
After waiving his rights, the Defendant provided Mr. Farris with a comprehensive account of the shooting incident, detailing an argument with the victim, the victim fleeing with a baby, and the Defendant shooting into several vehicles, including Christy Rominger’s car and Nina multiple times. He stated he later ran to call the police. Mr. Farris noted the Defendant's lack of emotion during the interview. Victim's niece, Dana Christine Rominger Brown, described the Defendant as having a "very different personality" and deemed his actions irrational. The Defendant’s cousin, Nancy Smith, confirmed that he had no history of suicide attempts or mental health treatment from early 1985 until the shooting in October 1989.
The State questioned Dr. Tramontana regarding the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which was found invalid for the Defendant, potentially due to symptom fabrication or exaggeration. The trial court initially permitted Dr. Bernet to testify that the Defendant's mental deficiencies did not warrant an insanity defense but later instructed the jury to disregard this testimony based on a change in the insanity statute.
Prior to 1995, Tennessee's insanity statute defined insanity as a defense if a defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct due to mental disease or defect. In 1995, the statute was amended, establishing insanity as an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence. The new statute states that mental disease or defect alone does not constitute a defense, and expert witnesses are prohibited from opining on a defendant’s sanity; this determination is solely for the trier of fact.
Dr. Bernet's testimony regarding the Defendant's mental deficiencies was deemed relevant under the old insanity statute, as he did not address the Defendant's sanity according to the new statutory provision in section 501(c) and 39-11-501(a). The trial court correctly ruled that Dr. Bernet should have been permitted to express his opinion about the Defendant's mental state prior to the 1995 amendment; however, the jury was instructed to disregard this evidence. In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the court must evaluate whether any rational jury could find the crime's elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Due to the jury's instruction, the court also cannot consider the State's cross-examination of Dr. Bernet in this review.
To determine if the State met its burden of proving the Defendant's sanity, the court referenced prior case law, noting that expert or lay testimony, or acts consistent with sanity, can suffice. In the case of Edwards v. State, the court found that despite expert testimony suggesting the Defendant was insane when he committed homicide, the State successfully established sanity through the testimony of a state psychological examiner and lay witnesses, highlighting the Defendant’s behavior and statements immediately after the incident. In contrast, in State v. Green, the expert testimony on the defendant's insanity was described as "clear, consistent, and convincing," with no rebuttal expert testimony provided by the State.
The State's rebuttal evidence aimed to prove the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense included testimonies from five police officers and a former county employee. The arresting officer described the defendant as "cooperative, coherent, and intelligent," but acknowledged inquiring about the defendant's mental health. Other officers who encountered the defendant during episodes of vagrancy did not observe any unusual behavior. A county employee who spent forty-five minutes with the defendant on the day of the murder found nothing amiss. Based on this testimony, the State claimed the defendant was not insane, merely "a little bit different." However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that the brief interactions with the defendant did not contradict the conclusion of his insanity. Expert medical testimony confirmed that a paranoid schizophrenic can appear normal while being mentally ill, thus undermining the State's assertion of the defendant's sanity.
The Court highlighted that the State's evidence was significantly weakened by the defendant’s strong insanity defense. It noted that while the defendant’s actions could be interpreted as consistent with sanity, they were equally consistent with insanity, leading to the State's failure to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. In referenced cases, expert witnesses consistently diagnosed defendants as paranoid schizophrenic and stated they could not comprehend the wrongfulness of their actions, with the State's rebuttal evidence being insufficient to counter this. The Court emphasized that lay witnesses lacked the necessary experience and insight to assess the defendant's mental state, ultimately concluding that the State failed to establish the defendant's sanity in these cases.
Two mental health experts confirmed the defendant's mental illness at the time of the homicide, while the State countered with lay witness testimonies indicating the defendant's ability to live independently and respond appropriately in social situations. However, the State's expert acknowledged that these observations did not contradict the defendant's mental illness. The supreme court ruled that the State's evidence, although suggesting sanity, failed to establish it definitively, as it was not inconsistent with insanity.
In a related case, State v. Sparks, the defendant's schizophrenia was demonstrated through expert testimony, showing that his behavior, including calmness and erratic temper, was consistent with his condition. The State's counterarguments, including the defendant's calmness post-crime and ability to recall events, were found insufficient to prove sanity. The court emphasized that lay opinions must be supported by a solid foundation, noting that evidence consistent with sanity does not negate the possibility of insanity.
The current case differs from Jackson and Sparks, as the defense experts did not explicitly declare the defendant insane at the time of the crime, only that his mental condition could have impaired his judgment. The court acknowledged challenges in assessing the consistency of behaviors with insanity but ultimately concluded that, favoring the State's perspective, the evidence was adequate to support the jury's finding of the defendant's sanity, despite his history of mental illness and the absence of treatment prior to the murder.
The jury was entitled to conclude that, at the time of the homicide, the Defendant was in a stable mental state and unaffected by his disorder. Testimony from lay witnesses indicated that, although the Defendant exhibited some differences, he did not behave unusually or bizarrely. Witnesses, including Vickie Lynn Estelle and Jack Curtis, described him as a responsible father. Dr. Stephen Rogers assessed the Defendant as stable the day before the murder. A former police investigator noted the Defendant's coherent recounting of events surrounding the shooting, suggesting he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.
Witnesses also testified to the Defendant's threatening behavior leading up to the homicide, including verbal threats to harm others and show of a firearm, which further indicated a capacity for premeditation. No expert witness supported the idea that the Defendant’s behavior was consistent with insanity. Instead, expert testimonies suggested that individuals with his mental illness would struggle with focus and organization, yet lay accounts showed the Defendant was able to concentrate on his intentions. Dr. Tramontana acknowledged that the Defendant's psychological assessment results were invalid, potentially due to symptom exaggeration.
Overall, the aggregate evidence supported the jury's finding of the Defendant's sanity during the commission of the crimes. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the jury's verdicts of guilty for first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and arson were reinstated. The case was remanded to the trial court for further consideration of unresolved issues and sentencing on the aggravated assault and arson convictions.
