Alejandro Rivera was indicted for first degree premeditated murder in connection with the killing of Jonathan Aaron Smith on July 23, 1997. The indictment stemmed from allegations that Smith's ex-wife, Denice, and her twin sister, Deborah Graham, hired Rivera to commit the murder shortly after Denice lost custody of their children to Smith. Following a jury trial in the Cocke County Circuit Court, Rivera was convicted and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole.
Rivera's appeal raised multiple issues, including claims of prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous admission of evidence, denial of a continuance, refusal to grant a judgment of acquittal, improper jury instructions, and challenges related to the voir dire process. Additional grievances included the denial of a venue change, refusal to admit drawings from a key child witness, allowing certain witnesses to remain in the courtroom, and the exclusion of evidence regarding statements made by the jury foreman. Rivera also challenged the admission of a photograph of the deceased and the trial court's failure to review the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) file.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee found no errors in the trial court's judgments and affirmed Rivera's conviction, concluding that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for premeditated first degree murder. The opinion was delivered by Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer, with concurrence from Judges David H. Welles and Jerry L. Smith.
Denice Smith expressed concerns to Jarvis about the possibility of the victim gaining custody of their children, stating on three occasions that she would kill him if he did. Jarvis revealed that Denice mentioned past physical confrontations with the victim and that their son, Joshua, has Down Syndrome. Denice also allegedly involved her daughter Brittany in a break-in to retrieve belongings from the victim’s residence. Sharon Michael Strange, a tanning salon manager, testified that Denice discussed her marital issues and custody battles with her. Strange recounted an instance where Denice asked if she knew someone who could kill her husband, prompting Strange to caution her about the seriousness of such talk. Denice later reported to Strange that the court awarded custody to the victim and threatened to take the children to Florida, stating she would kill him if necessary. Strange corroborated Denice's claims of physical abuse by the victim towards her and the children, including an incident where the victim allegedly harmed Joshua.
Christine Loveday, a coworker of Denice, testified that Denice repeatedly threatened to kill her husband if he obtained custody and expressed her intent to leave the country with the children to prevent that. Loveday noted that five days before the victim's murder, Denice appeared to be preparing to leave, accompanied by her father.
Charles Jackson Snyder, a postal employee, reported a call from Carl Sanders regarding an express package containing drugs addressed to Aaron Smith. Following protocol, Snyder informed his supervisor, which led to an investigation by Postal Inspector Russell F. Fallis. Fallis, posing as a postal carrier, delivered the package to the victim, who opened it in a public area, revealing its contents.
Fallis testified that the victim, after being approached by Task Force officers who identified themselves, claimed he had been “set up.” The victim consented to the officers opening a package he received, which contained two bags of a substance that appeared to be drugs and an envelope addressed to "Aaron Smith" with a note indicating a price increase. Fallis did not arrest the victim since he seemed unaware the package contained drugs. It was later revealed that the package originated from Miami, despite an Atlanta return address, prompting Fallis to request a postal inquiry. Contents of the package were sent to a crime lab, where it was confirmed that the substance was 0.14 grams of cocaine, and Deborah Graham's fingerprints were found on the items. The victim suspected Graham's involvement in sending the package.
Harry T. Smith, the victim’s father, testified about living at Camp Acres, which was gated and accessible only to lot owners, including Denice Smith, the victim's estranged wife. The victim had lived there with Denice and their two children until marital issues led to a divorce filing. On the day of the victim's murder, July 23, 1997, Harry Smith left the house around 4:20 p.m. and returned at 6:00 p.m. to find his son shot and the house ransacked. He noted details such as an open air vent, handcuffs on a chair, and a gun belonging to him under a table. Items including a box of coins and a gun case were missing, while the victim's living space remained relatively undisturbed. Harry last saw Denice the day after their divorce was finalized, when she left with their children.
Harry Smith believed that his wife and her father were departing, but she indicated they were heading to an appointment. Chief Detective Robert Caldwell investigated the murder of the victim on July 23, 1997, discovering the body on the sidewalk near the residence. He requested assistance from the TBI and testified that his affidavit stated he received photos of four suspects, including the Defendant, but initially noted that the victim's daughter, Brittany, did not identify any. Upon review, he found that Brittany did identify one suspect, Harry Hodges, as someone named George seen in a Florida motel.
Dr. Cleland Blake, the Assistant State Chief Medical Examiner, conducted the autopsy and identified three gunshot wounds: one from the front through the right ear, one from behind exiting the forehead, and another from behind entering the back and exiting the right chest, with the head wound being immediately lethal.
Kelly Smith, a TBI agent, led the forensic investigation and arrived after the victim's body was removed. She discovered a spent bullet, reddish-brown stains inside and outside the house, handcuffs, disordered clothing, and a gun on the floor. Stipulations confirmed the stains were human blood, and no readable fingerprints were found at the scene except for the victim's. A firearms examiner concluded that the spent bullet came from a gun belonging to Harry Smith.
Brittany Smith, now fourteen, testified that her parents were the victim and Denice Smith, and she and her brother lived with their mother during their parents' divorce, while their father resided nearby with his parents. At the time of the murder, Brittany was ten and Joshua was eight.
Brittany Smith testified about her family’s actions following her mother’s discovery of her father's custody arrangement. They left town with her grandfather, Don Graham, in two vehicles: her mother’s Mitsubishi Montero and her grandfather’s Chevrolet truck. Before departing, they visited her mother’s workplace to cash her paycheck and went to her attorney's office. They drove straight to Miami, Florida, where they met family members, including her Aunt Debbie and several others, at a bar behind the Golden Nugget.
Brittany identified the Defendant, Alex, who was present at the meeting and described him in detail. While in Miami, Deborah Graham took Brittany and her brother to the beach, while the adults stayed behind to talk. Later that night, Brittany overheard a conversation in their motel room where Deborah Graham and the Defendant discussed having hurt someone, with the Defendant stating, "no, we’ve killed someone," and her mother affirming it was easy. Brittany noted that before their trip, the Defendant had handcuffs visible, but he did not have them upon his return.
Deborah Graham returned wearing items belonging to Brittany's family members, including a ring and a watch. Shortly after hearing about the killing, Brittany left with her family to Michigan, where she learned of her father's death. They stayed for a brief period before returning to Tennessee. During cross-examination, Brittany clarified that the lights were off when she overheard the conversation about the killing and mentioned storing boxes to avoid cluttering the truck. Additionally, records from Alamo Car Rental were stipulated, confirming that her mother leased a white Buick Regal shortly before returning it after accumulating 2,476 miles. Vernon Brown testified about living on a lot in Camp Acres during summer 1997.
On July 23, 1997, witness Brown observed a woman with blonde hair and a man with a slender build and black hair near a car, later seeing the man knocking on victim Harry Smith's door. Brown noted a white car parked nearby, which seemed out of place. Shortly before 5:00 p.m., he heard three gunshots but dismissed them as common due to hunting in the area. After 5:00 p.m., he heard a car speeding away and recognized tire marks indicative of hasty departure. During cross-examination, Brown described the man knocking as a "skinny, white male with long hair, wearing a ball cap."
State trooper Ed Pulley testified that he issued a speeding citation to David Antonio Rivera, who was driving a white 1996 Buick with Florida license tag UVN79B at 80 mph. Although Pulley checked the driver's license for identification, he could not identify the defendant in court. The license was registered to an address in Miami, Florida.
Officer Ronald Raccioppi traced the license tag to a rental car registered to LaShawn Taylor and conducted surveillance at her address. Upon stopping Taylor's vehicle, Raccioppi identified the defendant as David Rivera, who denied being named "Alex." Rivera's driver's license matched the name and address linked to the rental car. Raccioppi took Rivera to the police station for questioning about a homicide in Tennessee, where Rivera waived his rights after being read them. Raccioppi observed two visible tattoos on Rivera's arm but noted that Rivera refused to show more. During the interview, Rivera mentioned meeting Deborah Graham in New York five years earlier and having recently reconnected with her through a mutual friend, Alex Rios, although he did not have her cell phone number.
The officer testified that the Defendant claimed Deborah Graham stayed at the Golden Strand and Fountain Head motels in Florida, denying she was at the Driftwood motel while stating that George Penta, her intimate partner, was there. The Defendant mentioned he wasn't allowed at the Driftwood. He also reported traveling to Tennessee with another man before heading to Michigan, using a white rental car from Value Rental in Fort Lauderdale, but hesitated to disclose the renter's name. The Defendant denied knowing any of Deborah Graham's family but identified Alex Rios as a friend. Later, he revealed his name as Al David. When confronted with evidence, including the rental car, the Defendant changed his story, admitting to driving with Graham to Michigan for her job interview but could not recall the city. He mentioned staying with Gilda Hart, describing her home. The officer questioned the mileage on the rental car, and the Defendant insisted it was sufficient for the trip. After the interview, the Defendant offered to have Graham contact the police, and later paged the officer with details of her interview and Hart's address. The officer noted that the post office from where drugs were sent to the victim was close to the Defendant's home, and that the driver's license he produced matched one on a Tennessee citation. Cross-examination revealed witnesses reported seeing a white male at the victim's door before a gunshot. The investigation uncovered that the Defendant's brother is David Rivera, who had a storage unit accessed by Debbie Giovi, containing various items. The State submitted motel records indicating room 321 at Driftwood was rented to Don Jones during specified dates.
Harold David Hutchinson, a criminal investigator, testified regarding the murder investigation of the victim. He could not confirm that Deborah Graham had an interview at Fox Studios in Detroit and was unable to locate Gilda Hart, who lived in Detroit. Hutchinson provided specific mileage for various trips, noting the round trip from Miami to Detroit was 2,788 miles, while from Miami to Cosby, Tennessee, it was 1,882 miles. He cleared Harry David Hodge as a suspect due to lack of evidence placing him in Tennessee at the murder time.
LaShawn Taylor, the long-time girlfriend of the Defendant and mother of his son, described her introduction to Deborah Graham by the Defendant. Taylor recounted that the Defendant and Graham left together, supposedly for a job interview in Michigan, but later claimed they were helping Graham's sister move in Tennessee. They were gone for over three days. Upon their return, Taylor testified that Deborah Graham came to her home in a white car, and the Defendant instructed her to leave. Taylor also mentioned taking Graham to the airport for a trip to New York.
On a police stop, the Defendant used false identification as "David Rivera." After the stop, he picked Taylor up after her work and left her at her mother’s house, stating he would return but never did. Taylor last saw the Defendant on the trial day, having previously warned him about the police search. She noted feelings of jealousy toward Graham and suspected an affair but confirmed the Defendant never mentioned involvement in any murder.
Robert Cecil Latta, Sr., from Cash In Pawn Shop, testified that on July 24, 1997, "David Antonio Rivera" pawned several items, including a Noah’s Ark bracelet. Records indicated that he reclaimed these items on August 7, 1997, and Latta provided a photocopy of Rivera's state-issued ID. Martin Kevin Giovi, a former boyfriend of Deborah Graham, recalled her mentioning her sister Denice Smith’s marital problems related to domestic abuse during their past relationship.
Giovi testified that Deborah Graham repeatedly urged him to kill the victim and later admitted her involvement in the murder after his release from jail in 1997, when they began living together in New York. Upon her arrest, Giovi provided Detective Paul Dotzler with a bag of jewelry given to him by Deborah. Dotzler, involved in her arrest, noted that Deborah left luggage at the airport, which led to her New York address. Cleta Mae Smith, the victim’s mother, identified the jewelry as belonging to her, with specific items missing after the murder. Detective Gilbert Ramirez arrested the Defendant, who initially provided a false name and made threatening comments about others involved. He also had a handcuff key that did not match those found at the murder scene. The Defendant's tattoos were documented by Ramirez. In defense, Eric Rodriguez testified about the check-in and check-out dates of Don Jones at the Driftwood Hotel, but he could not confirm ownership of the hotel at that time. Marion Graham, related to both the victim and Deborah, recounted learning of the murder and receiving a phone number from Deborah for Don Graham, which was later used to make a call to Florida from her home shortly after the murder.
Marion Graham testified about a phone call from Deborah Graham, who was in distress and searching for her father, Don Graham, expressing confusion about his whereabouts. Marion informed Deborah that she had spoken to both Don and Denice Smith, and later, the victim's children, Brittany and Joshua Smith, stayed with her briefly before returning to Cocke County. During this time, Brittany shared her feelings about their father's death but did not disclose any overheard conversations about it. Jennifer Gainer, another family member, corroborated Marion's account, describing her own emotional calls with Deborah regarding the victim's death.
The jury ultimately convicted the Defendant of first-degree murder, sentencing him to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, leading to his appeal. The appeal raised numerous issues, including claims of improper jury statements by the prosecutor, the trial court’s admission of certain evidence, refusal of a continuance, denial of a judgment of acquittal, jury instructions, voir dire issues, denial of a venue change, exclusion of a child-witness's drawings, allowing witnesses to remain during the trial, consideration of jury foreman statements, admission of a New York search warrant, and a photograph of the deceased, as well as the trial court's failure to review the TBI file.
Regarding pre-trial motions, the Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, but did not specify where this motion was recorded. The State contended this issue was waived due to lack of a formal motion, although a review of the record indicated multiple motions for continuance were granted, except for one filed under seal on February 23, 2001, which was denied. The court now addresses the appeal concerning that specific motion.
Issues (10, 11, 12, and 13) raised in the Defendant's statement were not addressed in other parts of the brief, leading to their waiver under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(b) and Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a). The Defendant requested a continuance based on the State's alleged failure to provide information about Harry David Hodge. The Defendant claimed that the State initially gave a list of suspects, including a vague mention of "George," and later identified Hodge after Brittany Smith had previously failed to recognize him. The Defendant argued that this new information warranted further investigation into Hodge's involvement. The investigator noted that his approach to interviewing Hodge would have differed had he known about Smith's identification.
In response, the State provided a letter including statements from George Penta and Hodge, highlighting discrepancies with Brittany Smith's statements and indicating these were potential Brady materials. The investigator acknowledged that Hodge had been treated as a suspect, despite not being officially listed as one. The trial court denied the motion for continuance, stating that the decision lies within its discretion and can only be reversed if shown to be an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the Defendant's case. The burden is on the Defendant to prove that the denial of the continuance led to an unfair trial or that a different outcome was likely had it been granted. The Defendant referenced State v. Reynolds to support his position.
Five factors should be considered by a court when determining whether to grant a continuance to interview or procure a defense witness, as established in Reynolds and referenced from Dickerson v. Alabama. These factors include: (1) the diligence of defense counsel in interviewing the witness; (2) the likelihood of securing the testimony in a reasonable timeframe; (3) the specificity of the expected testimony; (4) the degree to which the testimony is favorable to the defendant; and (5) the uniqueness or cumulative nature of the testimony. The Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance was prejudicial and constituted reversible error, as it hindered his ability to demonstrate that he and Hodge were not present at a crucial meeting described by witness Brittany Smith.
The court found the Defendant's arguments unpersuasive, noting that the Defendant’s investigator had previously interviewed Hodge, who was already considered a suspect. The investigator was aware of Brittany Smith's identification of Hodge and had received a photo of Hodge as potential exculpatory evidence from the State. Although the investigator suggested he would have approached the interview differently if he had known of the identification, he still had the opportunity to interview Hodge. The testimony regarding Hodge’s absence from the meeting lacked specificity and uniqueness and was not highly favorable to the Defendant. The court concluded that the Defendant did not receive an unfair trial and that a different outcome was unlikely had the continuance been granted, thus ruling that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying the motion.
Additionally, the Defendant claimed error in the trial court's refusal to change the venue due to extensive publicity surrounding the case. However, the Defendant did not substantiate this claim with references to the record or legal authority, leading the State to argue that the issue was waived. According to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b), issues not properly briefed are deemed waived.
The Defendant has waived the issue regarding the legality of the jury panel, which included members connected to the grand jury that indicted him, due to failure to specify other jurors in his brief. The focus is on two jurors, Marshall and Vick, whom the Defendant claims should have been excused for cause. Juror Marshall had formed an opinion based on prior exposure to information about the case, while the court's discretion determines juror qualifications. Tennessee law allows challenges for cause if a juror's exposure to potentially prejudicial information or their expressed opinions indicate they cannot be impartial. The trial judge's decisions on juror qualifications are upheld unless there is clear evidence of abuse of discretion. Jurors are not required to be completely uninformed and can serve if they can set aside any preconceived opinions and base their verdict solely on trial evidence.
The United States Supreme Court emphasized the challenges of ensuring juror impartiality in the context of pervasive media coverage, particularly in criminal cases. The Court stated that preconceived notions about a defendant's guilt or innocence do not automatically disqualify a juror unless there is a definitive lack of impartiality. A juror may serve if they can set aside their prior opinions and base their decision solely on courtroom evidence and legal standards. In the current case, Juror Marshall acknowledged having read about the murder and the defendant's involvement but asserted he could remain impartial and judge the case solely on the presented evidence and law. The commentary on Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 clarifies that a juror with prior opinions may still be deemed qualified if they demonstrate unequivocal impartiality. During questioning, Marshall reflected on past knowledge of the case, indicating he initially formed an opinion based on media reports but maintained an open mind regarding the evidence to be presented. He affirmed that the burden of proof lies with the State and expressed confidence in his ability to be fair to both sides.
Juror Marshall expressed open-mindedness regarding the case but acknowledged prior thoughts influenced by newspaper coverage of the murder, indicating some inconsistency. During questioning, he affirmed his ability to base his verdict solely on the evidence presented in court and the applicable law, leading the court to determine there was no abuse of discretion in retaining him as a juror. Juror Vick, when questioned, recalled reading about the murder case but could not remember specific details. He admitted to having formed a general opinion from the newspaper articles but stated that being in the courtroom had altered his perspective. Vick confirmed that he would require evidence to reassess any prior opinions, emphasizing his fairness and understanding of the State's burden of proof. The defense noted that Vick had not provided sufficient argument or citations regarding the trial court's decision to retain him as a juror.
Juror Vick's potential bias was evaluated, and the trial court determined she could remain, as she understood her obligation to base her judgment solely on trial evidence despite having read a related newspaper article. The Defendant challenges several evidentiary rulings made by the trial court: the admission of a handcuff key found during his arrest, photographs of his tattoos, the exclusion of drawings by Brittany Smith depicting the victim negatively, and the admission of co-defendants' testimonies. Under Tennessee law, the admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial judge, who must assess relevance per Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402 and balance probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a consequential fact more probable. The trial court's decisions on evidence may only be overturned if it is shown that the judge acted arbitrarily. The process for determining admissibility includes evaluating the relevance of evidence and its potential prejudicial impact, with the burden of proof on those seeking to exclude relevant evidence.
The Defendant argues that the trial court made an error by allowing the admission of a handcuff key into evidence, which was confiscated during his arrest. The arresting officer testified that the key, found on the Defendant, did not open the handcuffs located at the murder scene. The State contends that the Defendant waived his right to appeal this issue, as he did not object during the trial. However, the record shows that the Defendant had filed a motion in limine to exclude the key, which the trial court denied, making further objection unnecessary.
The Defendant claims the handcuff key was irrelevant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401, thus inadmissible under Rule 402, and argues that even if relevant, its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. During the hearing for a new trial, the trial court ruled that the handcuff key was relevant, noting it did not fit the handcuffs found at the crime scene, and emphasized that the evidence was a consideration of the case's specific facts. The court concluded that the admission of the key was appropriate and did not abuse its discretion.
Additionally, witness Brittany Smith testified that the Defendant had handcuffs when she met him, and the presence of handcuffs at the murder scene further linked him to the evidence. The trial court determined that the probative value of the handcuff key was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect, affirming that the evidence presented "cut both ways." Ultimately, the court concluded that the Defendant's claims regarding the handcuff key were without merit.
The trial court admitted photographs of the Defendant's tattoos into evidence, which the Defendant contested as unnecessary since witness Brittany Smith identified him without them. The State argued the tattoos were relevant for establishing Smith’s credibility and accurate identification of the Defendant. The trial court ruled that the photographs were relevant and did not present unfair prejudice, in line with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, which requires that the probative value of evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion.
The admissibility of photographs is at the trial court's discretion, provided they are verified and authenticated by a knowledgeable witness. Previous cases established that requiring a defendant to display physical attributes like tattoos or scars does not violate constitutional rights against self-incrimination. In this case, the tattoos were pertinent to the identification issue, especially as Smith had noted them upon first meeting the Defendant and described them to the jury. Consequently, the trial court's decision to admit the photographs was upheld, with the conclusion that it did not abuse its discretion.
Brittany Smith’s drawings were part of a disputed file from the Department of Children’s Services that the Defendant claimed should have been accessible to him during the trial to challenge Brittany's credibility. The trial court reviewed the file in camera and determined it contained no relevant evidence, a conclusion upheld on appeal, which found the Defendant's argument without merit due to a lack of record citations, waiving the issue under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(b).
Additionally, the Defendant contested the admission of statements made by co-defendants Denice Smith and Deborah Graham regarding intentions to harm the victim. Although initially deemed hearsay, the trial court allowed these statements under the "state of mind" exception in Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(3). However, on appeal, the State acknowledged this was an error but argued the statements were admissible as admissions by a party-opponent per Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(1). The testimonies included claims from witnesses about Denice expressing a desire to kill the victim if custody was awarded to him and Deborah requesting someone to kill the victim. Hearsay is defined as a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and such statements are generally inadmissible unless specified by rules of evidence. The trial court's decision to admit the statements was based on their purported relevance to the individuals' state of mind.
The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(3) was improperly applied, as it is limited to demonstrating the declarant's conduct, not that of a third party. The court determined that the statements were admitted to prove the defendant's actions rather than the declarant's, which constituted an error. The State conceded this error but argued that the statements fell under the co-conspirator exception (Tenn. R. Evid. 803(1.2)(E)). For this exception to apply, the prosecution must prove: (1) the existence of a conspiracy and the connection of the declarants (Denice Smith and Deborah Graham) to the defendant; (2) that the declaration was made during the conspiracy; and (3) that it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. These elements must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. A conspiracy is defined as a collaboration between two or more individuals to commit a criminal act, and evidence of such a conspiracy can be established through an implied understanding rather than formal agreements, relying on circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the involved parties.
The State successfully demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy involving Denice Smith, Deborah Graham, and the Defendant, supported by substantial evidence. This included proof that both Smith and Graham sought to kill the victim, with Graham soliciting someone to do so as early as 1995. Notably, the Defendant was observed with Graham shortly before the murder, and a package containing drugs was mailed to the victim from a location near the Defendant's home, bearing Graham’s fingerprints. After leaving Tennessee, Smith traveled to Florida to meet Graham and the Defendant, after which the Defendant remarked to Smith that they had “killed someone.”
The evidence substantiates that the conspiracy was ongoing from at least 1995. Furthermore, the State established that the statements made by co-conspirators were admissible as they occurred during the conspiracy's active period. For a co-conspirator's statement to be admissible, it must be made while the conspiracy is ongoing. The court affirmed that all conspirators are liable for acts and statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if those statements occurred before their participation. This aligns with legal precedents affirming that all actions and declarations by conspirators are admissible against all involved from the conspiracy's inception until its completion or abandonment.
The legal principles established in several cases affirm that statements and actions of co-conspirators are admissible against all members of a conspiracy, even if some of those statements were made before a particular defendant joined. Specifically, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., it was determined that declarations by co-conspirators can be used as evidence against any member once the conspiracy is established. Similar rulings in United States v. Rocha and United States v. Brown clarify that co-conspirator statements made before a defendant's involvement can still be admitted if there is evidence of the defendant’s later knowledge and participation in the conspiracy.
The criteria for a statement to be deemed as made “in furtherance of” a conspiracy include advancing or aiding the conspiracy’s objectives. The court referenced State v. Heflin, noting that statements can take various forms, such as initiating plans or addressing issues that arise. Casual conversations are not considered in furtherance unless they contribute to the conspiracy's goals.
In the case at hand, Denice Smith’s inquiry about finding someone to perform a job and Deborah Graham’s request for a murder to be carried out were determined to be in furtherance of the conspiracy aimed at killing the victim. These statements were made while the conspiracy was ongoing, and the evidence indicated that the sisters successfully engaged the defendant to carry out the murder after attempting to find someone for the task. Thus, the statements made by the sisters were relevant and admissible against the defendant.
Denice Smith's statements to Jarvis and Loveday about the victim potentially killing him were deemed expressions of intent that did not advance the conspiracy, reflecting a casual conversation rather than a conspiratorial effort. Consequently, the trial court's decision to allow testimony regarding these statements was found to be an error, albeit a harmless one since more damning testimony from Strange and Giovi was admissible.
The Defendant also raised concerns about prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that the prosecutor made two improper statements during closing arguments: misdefining "reasonable doubt" and suggesting the Defendant's presence in the car was sufficient for culpability regardless of committing the murder. The Tennessee Supreme Court recognizes the importance of closing arguments but allows for significant leeway, with reversals requiring evidence of abuse of discretion. Closing arguments must be based on trial evidence, relevant to the legal issues, and not improper.
Improper arguments are evaluated based on their potential impact on the verdict, considering the case's circumstances, curative measures, the prosecutor's intent, cumulative errors, and the case's strength. Five recognized areas of prosecutorial misconduct include intentionally misstating evidence, expressing personal beliefs about testimony or guilt, and other unprofessional conduct.
Prosecutors are prohibited from using arguments designed to provoke the jury's emotions or biases, diverting them from focusing solely on the evidence relevant to the case. They must avoid introducing broader issues beyond the defendant’s guilt or innocence, making predictions about the consequences of their verdict, or referencing facts outside the trial record unless they are common public knowledge. The defendant claimed the prosecutor improperly defined "reasonable doubt" during closing arguments but did not object at trial or raise the issue in his motion for a new trial, resulting in a waiver of the claim on appeal. Even if considered, the court found the prosecutor's definition aligned with the jury instructions defining "reasonable doubt." Additionally, the prosecutor's statement that it did not matter whether the defendant pulled the trigger, as long as he was involved, was deemed proper given the context of the evidence presented, including statements made by a witness regarding the defendant's presence and actions. Overall, the court concluded that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute improper argumentation.
The prosecutor asserted that the Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, regardless of whether he directly committed the act or was an accomplice, aligning with the State's theory that the Defendant conspired with Denice Smith and Deborah Graham to kill the victim over child custody issues. The trial court provided comprehensive jury instructions on "criminal responsibility," which supported the prosecutor's statements, leading to the conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing those comments.
The Defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to grant a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence for conviction. The appellate court reviews such claims by determining if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution. This standard applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence, and the court cannot re-evaluate evidence or substitute its inferences for those of the jury. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are determined by the jury.
Given the conviction's presumption of guilt, the Defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was legally insufficient. The evidence, primarily circumstantial, was adequate for a rational jury to convict for first degree murder under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202, which defines first-degree murder as a premeditated and intentional killing or one committed during the commission of certain felonies. Testimonies from Denice Smith and Deborah Graham indicated a desire to kill Denice’s husband, contributing to the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction.
Deborah Graham solicited her boyfriend to kill Denice Smith's husband, while Denice Smith sought someone to commit the murder for her. After Denice's husband gained custody of their children, she fled with them to Florida, where she met with Deborah Graham and the Defendant in their children's presence. Brittany Smith, Denice's daughter, identified the Defendant in court and noted his tattoos. Shortly after this meeting, the Defendant and Deborah Graham left in a rental car. On the day of the murder, the Defendant was cited for speeding in Tennessee while driving this rental car. Upon returning to Florida, Brittany heard the Defendant claim, “we’ve killed someone.” The Defendant pawned jewelry stolen from the victim’s home. When questioned about their trip, he stated they traveled to Detroit, but the rental car's mileage supported a round trip to the victim’s residence. This circumstantial evidence was deemed sufficient for a first-degree murder conviction.
Regarding trial court instructions, the Defendant argued errors in jury instructions related to flight and criminal responsibility. He claimed there was no evidence of flight, as he returned to Miami and later to New York, and did not provide record citations, waiving the issue. The trial court instructed that flight could indicate guilt and defined flight as the voluntary evasion of arrest. The jury was directed to consider flight alongside all evidence in determining guilt or innocence, emphasizing that flight alone does not establish guilt.
An innocent person may flee, and such flight can be explained by evidence and circumstances. Determining the occurrence of flight, its reasons, and its evidentiary weight are jury responsibilities. The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions state that for a jury to consider flight as indicative of guilt, sufficient evidence must exist. Evidence supporting jury instruction on flight includes leaving the scene and subsequent evasion or concealment. In this case, testimony from LaShawn Taylor, the defendant’s girlfriend, indicated that the defendant left after a police encounter, did not return after saying he would, and was aware the police were seeking him. This evidence sufficiently supports the flight instruction.
Regarding the criminal responsibility of another, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury because there was no evidence of his involvement in the crime. However, the defendant failed to cite specific record evidence, waiving the issue. Even if not waived, the argument lacks merit. The court clarified that a defendant can be held criminally responsible as a party for First Degree Murder if the offense was committed through their own actions or those of another. To find the defendant guilty as a party to the offense, the jury must determine that the state proved all essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Criminal responsibility in Tennessee is defined as a theory under which the State can establish a defendant's guilt based on the actions of another, not as a separate crime. To hold a defendant criminally responsible for another's acts, there must be evidence of the defendant's association with the criminal venture, knowledge of the offense, and shared criminal intent with the principal. In this case, circumstantial evidence, including the defendant driving the vehicle and statements made about having killed someone, justified the trial court's instruction to the jury on criminal responsibility.
The defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on procedures for a not-guilty verdict. However, this issue was waived due to lack of record citations. Even if it weren’t waived, the trial court's instructions were sufficient and did not improperly suggest a guilty verdict.
The defendant also claimed error in permitting witnesses Cleta Smith (the victim's mother) and Robert Caldwell (the investigating officer) to remain in the courtroom during trial. This issue was waived as well due to lack of citations. Cleta Smith was properly designated as a party for the victim, and Caldwell’s presence at the prosecutor's table during voir dire did not constitute reversible error. Consequently, the trial court's decisions were affirmed.
